Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Chabad branch of Hasidic Judaism emphasizes mysticism over legalism. There are Chabad emissaries on many college campuses where they manage Chabad houses. Tannenbaum Chabad House, near Northwestern University’s Evanston campus, has been run by Rabbi Klein since 1985. Northwestern paid Sodexo to provide food for its students and Sodexo paid Klein for rabbinic supervision of its provision of kosher food. Northwestern reimbursed Sodexo . In 2001 the university learned that underage students had vomited after excessive consumption of alcohol at Tannenbaum; one was hospitalized. In 2005, at a university dining hall, alcohol was served to underage students, although Klein had assured officials that no alcohol would be served. Although the chaplain warned Klein, hard liquor continued to be served to students on Jewish holidays and Friday evenings. Klein made no effort to limit consumption and drank with the students. After another rabbi complained, the university informed Klein that unless he was replaced, the university would terminate Chabad House's recognition. Klein remained and, in 2012, the university terminated recognition, access to various Northwestern facilities and services, and the Sodexo contract. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. 2000d, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Lubavitch-Chabad of IL v. Northwestern Univ." on Justia Law

Meade wrote a letter to the League for Innovation in the Community College about her employer, Moraine Valley Community College. Meade, an adjunct faculty member, alleged that poor treatment of adjuncts harmed students. She signed the letter as president of the adjunct faculty union. Two days later, Moraine Valley fired Meade, sending her written notice explicitly citing Meade’s letter. A few weeks later, the college warned Meade that it would regard her further presence on campus as criminal trespass. Believing that Moraine Valley retaliated against her for exercising her right to freedom of speech and violated her due process rights, Meade sued the college under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Meade’s letter did not address matters of public interest and could not serve as the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. It rejected Meade’s due process claim for lack of a cognizable property interest in her employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Meade may not pursue a due process claim based on the deprivation of a liberty interest, but pleaded enough to go forward on the theory that the college deprived her of a protected property interest. She also stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation.View "Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

In 2005 Greene and his wife had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and obtained a discharge from all their debts except federal student loan debt of $207,000. As part of the bankruptcy case they sought an order that the Department of Education cancel their debt on the ground that having to repay it would inflict undue hardship. The Greenes claimed that the statute of limitations prohibited collection of their loans, penalties and interest on the loans were caused by the DOE’s negligence, and the loans should be discharged as reparations for slavery and discrimination.” The Seventh Circuit rejected the undue hardship defense on the ground that “the Greenes initiated this case and the DOE has not counterclaimed or sought any judgment … there is no actual controversy.” In 2010 the Department began to garnish Greene’s wages and he sought an injunction. The DOE counterclaimed. The district court ordered Greene to pay the debt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that DOE’s counterclaim was not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or failure to make a compulsory counterclaim in the bankruptcy proceeding.View "Greene v. U.S. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

“Jane Doe” was born in Russia and came to the U.S. at age two when she was adopted by American parents. During her sixth and seventh grade years, male classmates bullied her, sometimes hurling gendered or ethnic insults. The bullying turned violent. Three boys were charged with criminal battery and were expelled or withdrew from school. Doe sued Elmbrook School District and administrators under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, claiming that the bullying was motivated by her sex and ethnicity, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “Although Doe’s classmates’ actions were inexcusable,” the defendants are not legally responsible for those actions. Knowing how thoughtless and cruel children can be to one another, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VI and Title IX to impose a demanding standard for holding schools and school officials legally responsible for one student’s mistreatment of another. School officials must have had “actual knowledge” of harassment “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Even assuming Doe’s harassers were motivated by her sex or ethnicity, once the defendants gained actual notice of behavior that could qualify as severe and pervasive, they took action against the wrongdoers. View "Doe v. Galster" on Justia Law

The Educational Rate Program, a subsidy program authorized by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is implemented by the FCC, which established USAC, a private non-profit corporation, to administer the Program. USAC provides subsidies to eligible school districts for the cost of telecommunication services. FCC regulations require that providers offer schools the “lowest corresponding price” (LCP) for their services: the “lowest price that a service provider charges to non-residential customers who are similarly situated to a particular school, library, or library consortium for similar services.” Heath operates a business that audits telecommunications bills and was retained by Wisconsin school districts. Heath found that certain schools paid much higher rates than others for the same services. As a result, many districts did not receive the benefit of LCP and the government paid subsidies greater than they should have been. Heath informed Wisconsin Bell of the discrepancy, but it refused to provide the more favorable pricing. Heath also learned of an even lower price charged to the Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA). Heath filed a qui tam lawsuit. The government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the public disclosure bar applied and that Heath was not saved by the original source exception, because the DOA pricing was on its website. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the claim was not based on the DOA website information and that Heath was not an opportunist plaintiff who did not contribute significant information. View "Heath v. WI Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010 Price was a full-time tenured Chicago Public Schools teacher who was working in a program to improve the class-room teaching skills of other teachers. In all of her evaluations, she was rated excellent or superior. In 2010, the Board of Education authorized the discharge of 1,289 teachers, some of whom were tenured. At the same time as the layoffs, Price alleges CPS was continuing to hire teachers to fill vacant positions, including new hires with no prior experience. Price alleges that she was not considered for any vacant positions, nor was she given any notice of existing vacant positions before her layoff and that the Board did not implement procedures to allow laid-off tenured teachers to show they were qualified to fill vacant positions. Price filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit one year later on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated teachers. The district court dismissed because Price did not identify any protected property interest that could give rise to a due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that tenure did not create the claimed property rights. View "Price v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Carmody worked for the University of Illinois for 25 years until he was fired for reasons involving a security breach of the university’s email system. The breach was connected to a state court lawsuit Carmody was pursuing against a university professor, alleging that the professor had assaulted him. Carmody says that he discovered several printed emails, contradicting affidavits filed in the case, in the newspaper box outside his home. Carmody gave the emails to his lawyer. After unsuccessfully appealing his discharge, Carmody filed, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and an Illinois statute designed to protect whistle-blowers. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that Carmody has plausibly alleged that his pre-termination opportunity to be heard was meaningless because he could not answer the university’s crucial questions or respond to its accusations without violating a state court order that required him not to discuss the subject. The university fired Carmody on the same day the state court modified its order to allow him to respond to the charges. Carmody also alleged that he was actually fired based in part on a charge for which he had no prior notice and opportunity to be heard. View "Carmody v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

A.H.’s Greensburg, Indiana school has a policy: Hair Styles which create problems of health and sanitation, obstruct vision, or call undue attention to the athlete are not acceptable….. Each varsity head coach will be responsible for determining acceptable length of hair for a particular sport. The head varsity basketball coach has established an unwritten hair-length policy, providing that each player’s hair must be cut above the ears, eyebrows, and collar, to promote “team unity” and project a “clean cut” image. The boys’ baseball teams have a similar policy; the track and football teams do not. No girls’ team is subject to a hair-length policy. When A.H. refused to comply, he was removed from the team. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and rejected substantive due process claim, acknowledging that one’s choice of hairstyle is an element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but noting that public schools have authority to enact and enforce dress and grooming policies and may condition participation in interscholastic sports upon a greater degree of regulation than imposed on students generally. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, reasoning that the policy treats boys and girls differently; there was no evidence of comparable grooming standards applied to girls playing basketball. The evidence supported the sex discrimination claims.View "Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Charlie has Type 1 diabetes, managed with an insulin pump, a personal diabetes manager, and a continuous glucose monitor. Before Charlie entered kindergarten, his parents worked with the school district to develop a “504 plan” to enable him to attend public school. Charlie’s plan incorporated doctor’s orders for how insulin doses and snacks would be administered at school; required his school to train three “Diabetes Personnel;” and that all staff members who would interact with Charlie be given general training about diabetes. The school hired a licensed nurse, to perform Charlie’s care and held one general training session and one session specific to Charlie’s equipment, attended by almost all staff who would interact with Charlie. In Charlie’s second year, the parents complained to the Department of Education that the school was violating the 504 plan by failing to have three Trained Diabetes Personnel and refusing to allow the nurse to adjust insulin doses on a case-by-case basis. A mediated agreement required the school to conduct training for three nurses and generally required the school to follow the 504 plan. The parents continued to be dissatisfied and moved Charlie to a private school with no medically trained staff and no formal plan for his diabetes care. The district court rejected their suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding neither intentional discrimination nor failure to reasonably accommodate Charlie’s diabetes.View "CTL v. Ashland Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Aurora School District fired Green from his position as a teacher. His union refused his requests to pursue a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement and to represent him in a suit under the Illinois Teacher Tenure Act. Green sued, won, and was reinstated, then sued, claiming that his union abandoned him because of his race, violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c). Green, who is black, claims that the union has represented comparable white employees in grievance proceedings and litigation under the Tenure Act and that the union retaliated against him because he had opposed earlier discrimination. The district judge called Green’s evidence “conclusory;” concluded that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to employees of state or local government, so the union did not have a duty of fair representation; and stated that Illinois law does not require teachers’ unions to represent teachers by filing grievances under a collective bargaining agreement or suits under the Tenure Act. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that neither 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c) nor 2000e–3(a) makes anything turn on the existence of a statutory or contractual duty violated by the act said to be discriminatory. View "Green v. AFT/IFT Local 604" on Justia Law