Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Manuel's disabled cellmate requested a change of rooms and became hostile toward Manuel. Manuel reported this but no action was taken. The cellmate beat Manuel into unconsciousness. Officer Nalley investigated. Manuel submitted a grievance to Counselor Miller. Manuel later filed additional grievances and requested status updates. Miller failed to respond. Manuel filed a civil complaint. Later, an inmate informed prison personnel that Manuel asked him and another inmate to file fraudulent paperwork regarding the attack. The prison filed an incident report and shakedown slip.Two weeks later, Manuel again sought a status update The conversation ended when Miller asked Manuel if he was going to file a grievance against her; he responded “maybe.” Minutes later, Nalley searched Manuel’s cell following the shakedown slip and confiscated a note describing trading and trafficking, forged letters describing the cellmate incident, letters addressed to the court, and a contraband cassette tape. The prison committee found Manuel guilty of forging documents and possessing contraband.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, his 42 U.S.C. 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Miller and Nalley. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Manuel needed to furnish evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that his protected speech was at least a motivating factor for Nalley’s response. The suspicious timing of the shakedown shortly after the conversation with Miller is not enough to prove that Nalley was motivated by the protected activity and the shakedown was retaliation. View "Manuel v. Nalley" on Justia Law

Police investigating Vermilion County drug trafficking sent an informant to buy cocaine at Glenn’s home. The transaction was recorded on audio and video. About a month later a state judge put agent Alblinger under oath, took his testimony, and issued a warrant to search Glenn’s home. A search turned up cocaine and guns. Glenn unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The warrant rested on the “controlled buy” plus Alblinger’s testimony that the informant had for more than a decade provided reliable information. Although Alblinger did not reveal whether agents had searched the informant before the transaction, that the informant had a long criminal record and was cooperating to earn lenience, and that the informant’s record of providing accurate information was with the local police rather than with Alblinger personally, the omissions do not negate probable cause. Given the audio and video evidence of the controlled buy, the informant’s reliability and motivations are not material to the existence of probable cause. The passage of time did not render the information stale. In an interview shortly before Alblinger applied for the warrant, Glenn conceded that he sold cocaine from his house, negating any possibility that Alblinger knew that information obtained after the controlled buy implied that Glenn’s house no longer contained cocaine. The delay was intended to prevent Glenn from inferring the informant’s identity. View "United States v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Officers executed a search warrant at Ruth’s residence and recovered 2.9 grams of crack cocaine, 5.6 grams of powder cocaine, a counterfeit $100 bill, $2,250 in U.S. currency, and drug paraphernalia. Ruth was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The government notified Ruth (21 U.S.C. 851) of intent to rely on his 2006 Illinois conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute as a predicate felony drug offense to enhance his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment. Ruth eventually pleaded guilty.The probation officer determined that Ruth was a career offender based on prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1: the 2006 Illinois cocaine conviction and a 2010 Illinois conviction for possession with intent to deliver cannabis. Ruth’s resulting Guidelines range was 188-235 months. Ruth argued that his 2006 conviction was not a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines because the Illinois statute is categorically broader than federal law; it prohibits possession of positional isomers of cocaine whereas the federal Controlled Substances Act does not and its definition of cocaine “analog” was categorically broader than the federal definition of a controlled substance analog. Ruth did not object to the section 851 sentencing enhancement.The Seventh Circuit vacated Ruth’s 108-month sentence. Using the categorical approach, the overbreadth of the Illinois statute disqualifies his prior conviction as a predicate felony drug offense. View "United States v. Ruth" on Justia Law

In 1997, Durham received a 35-year sentence for a federal drug offense that was reduced to 20 years after amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. Durham was released in 2015. In 2018, he violated the terms of his supervised release by domestic battery, unauthorized travel, making false statements to a probation officer, and theft of over $500. Dunham denied having assaulted his ex-girlfriend, despite the testimony of a third party witness.He was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, about twice the high end of the guidelines range. The district court emphasized the gravity of Durham’s abuse of his ex-girlfriend and stated: “The guideline allows for an upward variance if he received a reduction. He has received two reductions.” Durham’s attorney responded: “That’s a point well-taken, Judge.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Dunham’s argument that he was being punished for the Guidelines amendments. Read as a whole, the sentencing transcript indicates that the district court selected the 30-month revocation sentence by applying the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and, most especially, considering the “nature and circumstances” of Durham’s supervised release violations, foremost the violent assault of his former girlfriend. The district court could reasonably conclude that Durham “squandered” his early release. View "United States v. Durham" on Justia Law

While in a hospital, Mintner entered a coma and seemed on the brink of death. Her blood and urine contained vastly more thallium than the natural concentration. Her fiancé, Fayemi had been providing some of her food, including in the hospital. Seven of Minter’s friends who occasionally ate with her also suffered from thallium poisoning. Her dog died of thallium poisoning after it ate table scraps. Fayemi had purchased enough thallium sulfate to kill about 50 people. Fayemi told the supplier that he needed the substance for research but later asserted that he and Minter wanted it to kill mice, a forbidden use, and that Minter had been careless with the poison. Fayemi often ate at Minter’s house without showing any traces of thallium poisoning. Thallium was found in a salt shaker in Fayemi’s kitchen. Fayemi had threatened to kill Minter if she left him. The jury convicted Fayemi of attempting to murder Minter plus seven counts of aggravated battery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal; a state court rejected a collateral attack.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Fayemi claimed that his lawyer was ineffective by telling the jurors, in his opening statement, that Fayemi would testify that Minter asked Fayemi to get the thallium for her. After the judge decided that some of his prior convictions, plus evidence that he had annotated a book about poisoning people, could come in on cross-examination, counsel persuaded Fayemi not to testify. Fayemi waived that right in open court. The state’s appellate judges reasonably concluded that there was no possibility of prejudice. View "Fayemi v. Roberson" on Justia Law

In 2006-2009,, Ghuman and Khan “flipped” 44 gas stations. Ghuman would recruit a buyer before they purchased the station. The buyers lacked the financial wherewithal to qualify loans. Ghuman and Khan's co-defendant, AEB loan officer Brahmbhatt, arranged loans based on fraudulent documentation. They also created false financial statements for the gas stations. Co-defendant Mehta, an accountant, prepared fictitious tax returns. The loans, which were guaranteed by the Small Business Administration, went into arrears. In 2008-2009 the SBA began auditing the AEB loans; the FBI began looking into suspected bank fraud. AEB ultimately incurred a loss in excess of $14 million.Khan cooperated and pled guilty to one count of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, in connection with a $331,000 loan. Ghuman pleaded guilty to another count of bank fraud in connection with a $744,000 loan and to one count of filing a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. 7206. The district court denied Ghuman credit for acceptance of responsibility and imposed a below-Guidelines prison term of 66 months. The court ordered Khan to serve a 36-month prison term and ordered Ghuman to pay $11.8 million and Khan to pay $10.8 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences with an adjustment to Ghuman’s term of supervised release. View "United States v. Khan" on Justia Law

Police arrested Pulera on suspicion of bail jumping and took him to the Kenosha Pre-Trial Facility. About 48 hours later, Pulera attempted to hang himself in his cell. Correctional officers swiftly cut him down and called for an ambulance that saved his life. While at the facility, Pulera never told any official that he was contemplating suicide. Pulera did submit three requests for his prescription medications--clonazepam, apparently prescribed for anxiety, and tramadol, an opioid pain-reliever for his chronic pain from a back injury. He reported physical symptoms relating to not having those drugs and was seen by a nurse, who recorded that he had normal vital signs. Pulera was not given the pills because several of his pills were missing and the doctor inferred that Pulera could have already taken them. Pulera alleges that he had previously been on suicide watch at the facility and that his brother and his mother had recently committed suicide.The district court rejected Pulera’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given Pulera’s express statement that he was not considering suicide and the absence of more significant indirect signs, no rational jury could find that Pulera was unreasonably placed in the general population. A jury could not infer that depriving Pulera of his medications might be deadly from the mere fact that a physician had prescribed them. View "Pulera v. Sarzant" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Felders’s conviction as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and his 96-month sentence, rejecting an argument that his statements should have been suppressed because the police did not give him the required “Miranda” warnings. Felders testified that the police had not given him warnings of any kind. Officer Price testified that he had taken from his credential case a card, issued by the state police, with warnings and read Felders the advice on that card. On appeal, Felders no longer denied that Price read him warnings from a card but claimed that the record does not show that the statements read from the card satisfy Miranda. The Seventh Circuit held that Felders had the burden of persuasion and, on a silent record, he cannot show that any error occurred. The district judge could have asked Price to read the card aloud, but the absence of this information cuts against Felders given the plain-error burden. The court stated that it had no “reason to believe that Indiana, or any other state, distributes warning cards that fail to satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirements.” View "United States v. Felders" on Justia Law

Officer Francisko, checking hunters’ licenses, approached a van parked on the side of a road. Armed hunters had just emerged from the woods. The driver, Cataline, was acting strangely but handed Francisko his driver’s license. While Francisko was doing a license check, Cataline called 911 and said: “I am in a lot of trouble … I think I am going to be disappearing.” He then hung up. Francisko told Cataline that he was free to go. The 911 operator reached Officer Kuehl’s supervisor, who told him to stop Cataline to check whether he was fit to drive. The officers followed Cataline’s van, pulled it over, and asked Cataline to turn off the engine. He did not comply but stared straight ahead. After ignoring three requests, Cataline put the van into reverse, turned, and pointed the van west in the eastbound lanes of the Interstate. Cataline then made another turn and plowed the van into the side of Kuehl’s car. Kuehl and Francisko say that Kuehl was pinned behind the door. Francisko shot Cataline, who died at the scene. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Cataline’s behavior and the odd 911 call would have led an officer to be concerned that he posed a danger to himself and others. Francisko and Kuehl testified that they saw the van cross the white line on the highway several times. The stop was reasonable and compatible with the Fourth Amendment. View "Gysan v. Francisko" on Justia Law

Brown, a detainee at Wisconsin’s Polk County Jail, underwent a physical search of her body cavities. The institution had a written policy authorizing such a search to be conducted by medical personnel when there was reasonable suspicion to believe an inmate was internally hiding contraband. Fellow inmates had reported that Brown was concealing methamphetamine inside her body, which prompted jail staff to invoke the policy. Officers took Brown to a hospital, where a doctor and nurse first conducted an ultrasound, then inspected both her vagina and rectum in a private room without officers present. The search revealed no drugs. Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants had reasonable suspicion that Brown was concealing contraband, their suspicion justified the cavity search, and the ensuing search was reasonable. View "Brown v. Polk County" on Justia Law