Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After four months of pretrial detention at the Madison County jail in 2007, Pittman attempted suicide by hanging himself with a blanket. The attempt left Pittman in a vegetative state. In his suicide note, he stated that the guards were “f***ing” with him and would not give him access to “crisis [counseling].” Banovz, an inmate housed near Pittman’s cell, substantiated the claim that Pittman had made in his suicide note. In a recorded interview with a county detective, Banovz stated that in the days leading up to Pittman’s suicide attempt, Pittman had asked officers Werner and Eaton to refer him to crisis counseling; neither of them followed through with their promises. On remand, in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court’s exclusion of the Banovz video interview was a reversible error. After a second trial, the jury again returned a verdict for the defendants.The Seventh Circuit again remanded. One of the jury instructions erroneously directed the jury to evaluate Pittman’s Fourteenth Amendment claim according to a subjective rather than objective standard. The jury was told to consider whether the defendants “consciously failed to take reasonable measures to prevent [Pittman] from harming himself.” View "Pittman v. Madison County" on Justia Law

Greene pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1), 2252A(b)(1), and received a within‐guidelines 15-year prison sentence and a life term of supervised release. Greene argued that the sentence violated the parsimony provision of the sentencing statute, which requires that a sentence be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.” He challenged the district court’s statement that, for him, at age 59, terms of 10 years and life would be “effectively the same” because his life after prison would be “short.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court considered the guidelines and explained, with reference to section 3553(a)'s factors, why it believed that a life term of supervised release was necessary. Agents found approximately 2,850 images of child pornography on his laptop and a thumb drive; he had a prior conviction for child pornography and was subject to a statutory minimum term of 15 years in prison. While Greene admitted that he had a problem and that his actions had caused a lot of pain and injury, the court saw a need for deterrence and to protect the public. View "United States v. Greene" on Justia Law

Thomas agreed to sell methamphetamine to a government cooperator and drove to the prearranged delivery time and place, where the police arrested him and searched his car. When police opened the glove compartment, out fell two firearms and a bag of methamphetamine. Thomas claimed that he used the guns for lawful purposes unrelated to drug dealing and did not possess them “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). He had a concealed-carry permit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, applying the plain error standard. At trial, Thomas had not challenged the admission of so-called “dual-role” (both expert and lay) testimony from a federal agent nor the jury instructions. Even setting aside the agent’s testimony, the government had ample evidence to show that Thomas was using the firearms found in his car to facilitate his drug dealing. Imperfect as they were, the jury instructions were not so confusing or misleading as to warrant reversal. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Machicote, a Wisconsin inmate underwent surgery to remove damaged bone, tissue, and cartilage in his ankle after he suffered an injury while playing basketball in the prison yard. After the procedure, the surgeon supplied Machicote with oxycodone and warned that he would be in “extreme pain” when the medication wore off. He was discharged with instructions recommending narcotic-strength painkillers every six hours. At the prison, Dr. Herweijer ordered Tylenol #3, as needed every six hours for three days. Because of Nurse Stecker’s scheduling of the doses, Machicote woke at 3:30 a.m. in “excruciating pain.” Machicote continued to have trouble accessing the medication that had been ordered; the prison’s medication distribution schedule did not match Machicote’s prescription. Concerned about pain during the night, Machicote was told: “That’s how it will go.” Machicote’s medication order ran out completely and he began experiencing agonizing pain around the clock. Nurse Stecker refused to contact a doctor. Five days later, Dr. Hoffman prescribed him another painkiller, Tramadol. Machicote did not receive the medication for two more days, and his medical records show that the pain required management for several more weeks.In Machicote’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the other defendants but vacated in part; a factual issue remains as to the deliberate indifference of Nurse Stecker. View "Machicote v. Roethlisberger" on Justia Law

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service identified suspicious packages sent from Puerto Rico to Duenas. Milwaukee officers intercepted and followed a package and arrested Duenas once he accepted the delivery. Duenas mentioned the shooting incident and stated that Medina had repeatedly shipped him cocaine from Puerto Rico. The powdery substance in the intercepted package contained cocaine; 40 small bags amounted to more than one kilogram. Three fingerprints inside the package matched Medina’s fingerprints. Medina was indicted for conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. The defense suggested that a fourth mail receipt—labeled as being sent from Milwaukee on August 19, 2014, at 3:25 pm—could not have been in Medina’s car. The judge said the receipt raised a “mystery” but dismissed the idea that it created a reasonable doubt as to the Puerto Rico officers’ testimony or the receipts bearing Duenas’ name.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Medina’s conviction. The judge recognized the factual discrepancies that Medina identified and only relied on the credible portions of the testimony. Medina’s arguments do not render the testimony physically impossible or otherwise unbelievable. Given the testimony and the corroborating physical evidence, a rational trier of fact could have easily found Medina guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Medina" on Justia Law

In July 2010, Fieldman climbed into a truck in a Walmart parking lot and told a hitman that he wanted his ex-wife and her boyfriend killed. The hitman was actually an undercover police officer who videotaped their conversation. Fieldman was convicted in Illinois state court for solicitation of murder for hire. Fieldman contested his intent, a necessary element of the offense, and sought to testify about his interactions with the informant during the weeks before his conversation with the hitman. Fieldman believed this testimony would provide critical contextual information about his state of mind and demonstrate that his meeting with the hitman was a charade. The trial court did not allow the jury to hear this testimony because the court concluded it was irrelevant. Fieldman unsuccessfully appealed his convictions.In his federal habeas petition, Fieldman successfully argued that the court’s exclusion of his testimony deprived him of his federal constitutional right to present a complete defense. The Seventh Circuit held that exclusion of the testimony was contrary to clearly established federal law confirming a defendant’s right to testify, on his own behalf, about circumstances bearing directly on his guilt or innocence or the jury’s ascertainment of guilt. The exclusion of material portions of his testimony had a detrimental effect on his interests because it undercut his entire defense and effectively prevented him from challenging the state’s strongest evidence. View "Fieldman v. Brannon" on Justia Law

A certified class claimed that during 2011 female inmates at an Illinois prison were strip-searched as part of a training exercise for cadet guards; the inmates were required to stand naked, nearly shoulder to shoulder, in a room where they could be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male officers. Menstruating inmates had to remove their sanitary protection in front of others, were not given replacements, and many got blood on their bodies, clothing, and the floor. The naked inmates had to stand barefoot on a floor dirty with menstrual blood and raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough.The district court awarded summary judgment to defendants on the 42 U.S.C. 1983 Fourth Amendment theory; a jury returned a defense verdict on the Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but, on rehearing, reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment protects a right to bodily privacy for convicted prisoners, albeit in a significantly limited way, including during visual inspections. The court remanded for the district court to assess whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that an issue of fact exists as to the reasonableness of the strip and body cavity searches. View "Henry v. Hulett" on Justia Law

Gamble robbed a Chicago branch of Chase Bank, where she had worked until three months earlier. Two Chase employees were working at the time of the robbery, Gamble entered the bank wearing a disguise and waited for customers to leave, then pulled out a gun and ordered the employees to open the vault, pressing the gun against the back of one employee's head, The employee later testified that the gun felt cold and made a clicking noise. Gamble took over $126,000 from the vault and left the bank. Both employees had recognized her. FBI agents arrested Gamble hours later when she arrived for work at another Chase branch. Gamble waived her Miranda rights and admitted that she had robbed the bank. She said that the gun was a “play gun” that she had bought at a Walmart store. A later investigation determined that Walmart did not sell fake guns in Illinois. Gamble also said that she disposed of the gun on Irving Park Road and stashed the money in a trash can. FBI agents canvassed Irving Park Road and looked for the money, but found nothing.Convicted of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113, Gamble was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ample evidence supported a finding that Gamble used a real firearm. Gamble’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated. The district judge was entitled to consider her false statements in deciding on her sentence. View "United States v. Gamble" on Justia Law

A confidential source, “Bonz” told Champaign Police that he knew a crack cocaine dealer named Moe. Over a few months, the department conducted five controlled buys from Moe, consistent with information from Bonz. After reviewing the video of the transactions, officers identified Moe as Orr, who was on parole after being convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Bonz identified a picture of Orr. Officers tied the involved vehicle and apartment to Orr. Pursuant to a warrant, officers searched Orr’s apartment. They found a semi-automatic pistol with ammunition, approximately 22 grams of crack cocaine, approximately 15 grams of powdered cocaine, and drug paraphernalia. Orr voluntarily admitted that the gun and cocaine were his. Indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Orr unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, asserting Bonz was an unreliable source.Orr testified that he had no reason to possess a firearm. The prosecutor presented evidence of Orr’s drug involvement. The jury found Orr guilty. Before sentencing, the Judicial Council of the Seventh Circuit determined that Judge Bruce had breached the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges by engaging in improper ex parte communications in other cases with members of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Although the Council found no evidence that those communications affected the outcome of any case, it suspended Bruce from all criminal matters involving the U.S. Attorney’s Office for one year. Orr’s case was transferred to another judge. The Seventh Circuit vacated Orr’s conviction. Judge Bruce’s conduct “cast a pall over certain decisions" that "required the exercise of substantial discretion.” This was not harmless error. View "United States v. Orr" on Justia Law

In 2000, Indiana University student Jill Behrman went for a bike ride but never returned. The police later found her bicycle less than a mile from the home of Myers, on the north side of Bloomington. Two years later a woman (Owings) confessed to the murder. The case was reopened when a hunter came upon Behrman’s remains far from the location Owings described. Recognizing her story no longer added up, Owings recanted her confession and admitted to lying about the murder in hopes of leniency on other charges. A renewed investigation led the authorities to Myers, who was eventually charged with the murder. Multiple Indiana courts affirmed his conviction.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of his application for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Myers’s trial counsel was plainly deficient by promising to prove that Behrman was killed by someone else although he had to know he could not follow through on that promise and by failing to object to testimony about a bloodhound tracking Behrman’s scent. However, given the strength of the state’s case against him, including many self‐incriminating statements that Myers made to many different people, combined with other evidence, his counsel’s deficient performance did not prejudice him. View "Myers v. Neal" on Justia Law