Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pulliam was arrested after fleeing from two Chicago police officers. During the chase, both officers saw a gun in Pulliam’s hand. Pulliam had previously been convicted of multiple felonies, making it a federal crime for him to possess a gun. Pulliam was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After Pulliam was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif (2019), which clarified the elements of section 922(g) convictions; in addition to proving that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, the government must also prove the defendant knew he belonged to “the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” This knowledge-of-status element was not mentioned in the jury instructions at Pulliam’s trial.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The jury instructions, missing an essential element, constituted plain error, but the error did not seriously affect “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The court noted that Pulliam stipulated to his prior felony conviction, has had many convictions, has served prison sentences of more than a year, and ran from police, indicating knowledge of his status. The only potential evidentiary error would be harmless. View "United States v. Pulliam" on Justia Law

Sparkman belonged to a gang that was responsible for murders, kidnappings, and robberies. Sparkman was directly involved in at least two kidnappings in which firearms were used to threaten the victims. He was convicted of federal offenses, including racketeering, drug crimes, and two counts of using a firearm to commit a kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). In 2012, Sparkman was sentenced to the mandatory minimum--42 years' imprisonment.Before the First Step Act of 2018, the second violation of section 924(c) triggered a much higher 25‐year mandatory minimum, even if the two counts were asserted in a single indictment. The First Step Act amended section 924(c) so that only a second violation committed after a prior conviction for the same offense will trigger the 25‐year minimum. These amendments apply to an offense committed before enactment “if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.” 18 U.S.C. 924 note). Sparkman’s sentence was pending on appeal on the date of enactment. The Seventh Circuit rejected his First Step Act petition; “a sentence is ‘imposed’ in the district court, regardless of later appeals.” View "United States v. Sparkman" on Justia Law

Officers Cates and Hannah responded to a call by Lemons. While Lemons was alone with Cates in her home, he sexually assaulted her. Lemons was arrested, then taken to a hospital. A nurse documented swelling on Lemons’ neck and her bloodshot eyes, as evidence that she had been choked. She did not show signs of vaginal trauma or injury. Cates initially denied having sex with Lemons but later admitted to having oral and vaginal sex with Lemons, claiming it was consensual. Cates was charged under 18 U.S.C. 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law) and 18 U.S.C. 942(c) (use of a weapon during a crime of violence). The jury found Cates guilty on the first count and not guilty on the firearm count. By special verdict, the jury found Cates committed aggravated sexual abuse but found Lemons did not suffer bodily injury. Cates was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that the district court had instructed the jury incorrectly on the elements of aggravated sexual abuse by defining “force” to include not just force, but also psychological coercion.Cates was then charged with violation of civil rights under color of law, which again alleged his actions constituted aggravated sexual abuse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a “double jeopardy” motion to dismiss. Cates failed to show the jury decided he did not use force to cause Lemons to engage in sexual acts. A rational jury could conclude that Cates forcibly grabbed Lemons’ neck and continued to squeeze it during the assault without causing her bodily injury, consistent with the jury’s findings. View "United States v. Cates" on Justia Law

The Hobos street gang operated in Chicago, 2004-2013. Ten gang members were charged and convicted for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, among other crimes. The underlying crimes included drug trafficking, murder, attempted murder, and robbery. Three gang members pleaded guilty.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, remanding only the sentence imposed on the gang’s leader, Chester. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to evidentiary rulings concerning recorded conversations and tool mark analysis of firearms, to in-court identifications, and to sentencing contentions; View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Carnell pled guilty to a conspiracy to distribute a mixture containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846.. The Sentencing Guidelines distinguish between mixtures involving run-of-the-mill methamphetamine and methamphetamine that is at least 80% pure. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1, note C (ice). Ice sentences are substantially higher than those for non-ice methamphetamine. Carnell claims that the government failed to meet its burden of proving that the substance in which he dealt was ice methamphetamine.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Ice, unlike other drugs, is subject to lab tests and precise definitions, which eliminates the value of any evidence in the nomenclature category, such as “everyone referred to the drugs as ice.” In this case, the two methamphetamine samples that were tested by DEA laboratories and found to be 100% pure had no connection to the Carnell conspiracy. Courts cannot rely on the expertise of a drug user, dealer, or law enforcement officer alone to determine that methamphetamine is more than 80% pure as opposed to 79% pure. The court declined to address the question of whether all of the methamphetamine attributable to a defendant must be tested, and if not, what would constitute a reliably representative sample. In this case, none of the ice attributable to the conspiracy was tested. View "United States v. Carnell" on Justia Law

Officers Duszak and Weber initiated a traffic stop because the light over Harrington’s license plate was out. Dispatch notified the officers that there was no record of Harrington’s license plate. The officers attempted to identify the vehicle through the VIN number and asked Harrington to exit the vehicle. Harrington fled. The officers chased him down; one tased him and the other hit him with a baton. Harrington’s gun fell to the ground. Officers handcuffed Harrington and took him to the hospital for his injuries. Harrington sued, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene. The jury ruled in favor of the officers. Harrington’s motions for post‐trial discovery and a new trial were denied.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the gun evidence was admissible and not unduly prejudicial. Harrington failed to present any evidence at trial from which a reasonable jury could infer that the officers’ actions were racially motivated. Without support for race‐based allegations during the case or presented at trial, introducing this argument at closing arguments would have been highly inflammatory and prejudicial.Harrington unsuccessfully sought sanctions post‐trial based on an unverified third‐party website detailing undisclosed complaints against Duszak. A records request with the city disclosed that four complaints not included in discovery were filed after the discovery request. Four were not complaints, but information reports. Harrington failed to show how the absence of these records prejudiced him. View "Harrington v. Duszak" on Justia Law

To keep his car dealership afloat, Friedman secured loans for fake buyers of a phony inventory of luxury cars. The dealership exported cars overseas, but kept many of the title certificates and used the names of friends, customers, and former employees to secure loans, usually without the person’s knowledge; the loan applications included false income information and forged signatures. The scheme resulted in a bank fraud conviction (18 U.S.C. 1344) and a 108‐month prison sentence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rejecting a claim based on a conflict of interest concerning an attorney who had briefly represented both Friedman and a cooperating co-defendant, Bilis, the court stated that Friedman has not shown that any privileged communications were ever shared, let alone that any breach of privilege affected his trial. The court upheld “aiding and abetting” and “acting through another” jury instructions that tracked Seventh Circuit pattern instructions; rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; rejected challenges to comments that, essentially, called on the jury to use common sense; and rejected challenges to sentencing enhancements. The court upheld the denial of a motion for a new trial that was based on “new evidence” concerning Bilis’s finances and upheld the loss calculation of $4,722,347 and an order of restitution in that amount. View "United States v. Friedman" on Justia Law

Spring Hill owned a 240-apartment complex in a Chicago suburb. In 2007, the owner converted the apartments into condominiums and attempted to sell them. Ginsberg recruited several people to buy units in bulk, telling them they would not need to put their own money down and that he would pay them after the closings. The scheme was a fraud that consisted of multiple components and false statements to trick financial institutions into loaning nearly $5,000,000 for these transactions. The seller made payments through Ginsberg that the buyers should have made, which meant that the stated sales prices were shams, the loans were under-collateralized, and the “buyers” had nothing at stake. The seller paid Ginsberg about $1,200,000; Ginsberg used nearly $600,000 to make payments the buyers should have made, paid over $200,000 to the buyers and their relatives, and kept nearly $400,000 for himself. The loans ultimately went into default, causing the financial institutions significant losses.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ginsberg’s bank fraud conviction, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude Ginsberg knew that the loan applications, real estate contracts, and settlement statements contained materially false information about the transactions, including the sales prices, the down payments, and Ginsberg's fees. The court rejected a challenge to the admission of testimony by a title company employee. View "United States v. Ginsberg" on Justia Law

Waagner was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and of possessing a stolen vehicle that had crossed a state line. The court adopted the PSR finding that Waagner was an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on his prior convictions for “violent felonies,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B): two 1978 convictions for Ohio aggravated burglary and one 1992 conviction for Ohio attempted robbery. Waagner had a sentencing guidelines range of 262-327 months’ imprisonment; the statutory minimum was 15 years. While awaiting sentencing, Waagner escaped from custody and, while a fugitive, committed offenses in multiple districts. After his apprehension, he pleaded guilty to escape. The court imposed a 364-month sentence.Waagner filed a second collateral attack on his sentence, challenging his ACCA classification. The district court denied his motion, finding that, although his Ohio aggravated burglary convictions no longer constitute ACCA predicate offenses under the Supreme Court's 2015 "Johnson" decision, invalidating the residual clause, they still qualify as predicate offenses under ACCA's enumerated offenses clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The advent of Johnson permitted Waagner to bring a second motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255; before Johnson, any such challenge would have been futile. Nonetheless, Ohio aggravated burglary and Ohio attempted robbery are violent felonies as that term is defined in the ACCA. View "Waagner v. United States" on Justia Law

Police conducted a traffic stop, approached Cook’s car and noticed a strong odor of marijuana. Cook was driving on a suspended license and without a license plate. The officers ordered him to step out of the vehicle and removed Cook's loaded pistol from his holster. In purchasing the firearm, Cook completed an ATF form, answering “no” to the question, “Are you an unlawful user of, or addicted to, marijuana or any depressant, stimulant, narcotic drug, or any other controlled substance?” Cook acknowledged that he used marijuana almost daily and had smoked two “blunts” that day. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Cook's conviction for being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3).The Supreme Court subsequently held in “Rehaif,” that the knowledge element of section 924(a)(2) requires the government to show that the defendant knew not only that he possessed a firearm, but that he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. The indictment in Cook’s case did not allege, nor the jury instructions advise the jury that it must find, that Cook knew he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. On remand, the Seventh Circuit again rejected Cook’s vagueness and Second Amendment challenges and his objection to the jury instruction on who constitutes an unlawful user of a controlled substance but held that, in light of Rehaif, Cook is entitled to a new trial. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law