Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Elmer owned and operated multiple healthcare-related companies including Pharmakon, a compounding pharmacy that mixes and distributes drugs—including potent opioids like morphine and fentanyl—to hospitals across the U.S.. Pharmakon conducted its own internal potency testing and contracted with a third party to perform additional testing to evaluate whether its compounded drugs had too little of the active ingredient (under-potent) or too much (over-potent). In 2014-2016, testing showed 134 instances of under- or over-potent drugs being distributed to customers. Elmer knew the drugs were dangerous. Rather than halting manufacturing or recalling past shipments, sales continued and led to the near-death of an infant. Elmer and Pharmakon lied to the FDA.Elmer was charged with conspiracy to defraud the FDA (18 U.S.C. 371); introducing adulterated drugs into interstate commerce (21 U.S.C. 331(a), 333(a)(1) & 351); and adulterating drugs being held for sale in interstate commerce (21 U.S.C. 331(k), 331(a)(1) & 351). Pharmakon employees, FDA inspectors, and Community Health Network medical staff testified that Elmer was aware of and directed the efforts to conceal out-of-specification test results from the FDA. The district court sentenced Elmer to 33 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to rulings related to the evidence admitted at trial and Elmer’s sentence. The evidence before the jury overwhelmingly proved Elmer’s guilt. The sentence was more than reasonable given the gravity of Elmer’s crimes. View "United States v. Elmer" on Justia Law

Shuhaiber, who is confined to a wheelchair, sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. He alleged that the Stateville Center failed to accommodate his disability by confining him to a cell unsuited to the use of a wheelchair and that he was transported to physical therapy in vans that were not ADA-compliant, leaving him to depend on an officer to lift him. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that Shuhaiber failed to allege that he was deprived of access to facilities or services or that the vans caused him to miss medical appointments.Shuhaiber appealed and sought permission to proceed without prepaying the requisite filing fee. Meanwhile, Shuhaiber, a native of the United Arab Emirates, had been transferred to DHS custody for removal from the United States. Shuhaiber, as a frequent filer of federal lawsuits, had accumulated more than three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for filing frivolous lawsuits and would have had to prepay the filing fee to appeal the dismissal of his claims. Doubting that Shuhaiber was still a “prisoner,” the district court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the appellate filing-fee bar does not apply where the appellant is being held by immigration authorities and no longer is a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA. The district court was, nonetheless, right to dismiss his claims. View "Shuhaiber v. Illinois Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Dawson pled guilty to conspiring to transport stolen property in interstate commerce and was sentenced to 18 months of prison followed by three years of supervised release, plus restitution. Less than a year after Dawson was released, Dawson’s probation officer asked the court to revoke his supervised release because Dawson had violated several conditions, including by possession of a firearm. Dawson was charged in state court with weapons violations. He was released to home confinement on electronic monitoring.At the federal revocation hearing, the parties disagreed about proving the firearms violation. The judge opined that state courts “do literally nothing” on firearm violations and continued the hearing. Later, officers testified and the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Dawson had possessed the firearm. Dawson did not contest the other violations.The advisory Guidelines range was six-12 months in prison. The statutory maximum was 24 months. The court revoked Dawson’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment with no supervised release to follow. The court focused first on Dawson’s electronic-monitoring violation, then on Dawson’s failure to make restitution payments. As for Dawson’s missed drug tests, the court considered them a “technical violation.” The court called the firearm violation, “an affront to the Court,” and “a danger to the community.” The court made its sentence consecutive to any forthcoming sentence in the pending state-court case.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court chose its sentence to punish Dawson for possessing the firearm but should have focused on his breach of the court’s trust and left any punishment to the state court and that the court disregarded his mitigation arguments and the relevant sentencing factors. View "United States v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Daoud came to the FBI’s attention because of online activity that evinced a desire to engage in violent jihad. While communicating and meeting with undercover agents, Daoud sometimes wavered about killing people. Daoud planned a Chicago car bomb attack. Undercover agent, “Mudafar” described the bomb that he would supply and the mass carnage it would cause. Mudafar and Daoud met to implement the attack. Daoud, age 18, was arrested upon pressing the button and was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempting to destroy a building used in interstate commerce with an explosive. While Daoud was in pretrial custody, he solicited the murder of the FBI agent (Mudafar). Daoud’s cellmate was paid to record conversations and instructed Daoud to make a phone call authorizing the killing, which Daoud did. Daoud was charged with soliciting a crime of violence, murder-for-hire, and obstruction of justice. Two years later, Daoud physically attacked another for drawing a picture of the Prophet Muhammad. Daoud was, again, charged. Daoud spent over 400 days in segregated housing during his pretrial incarceration, and Daoud witnessed his cellmate commit suicide.The cases were consolidated. Daoud was diagnosed with psychiatric disorders. With medication, Daoud’s condition improved; he was found competent to stand trial. Daoud pled guilty while maintaining his innocence. The advisory Guidelines range was life imprisonment; he was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable. The court downplayed the extreme seriousness of Daoud’s offenses in conflict with the undisputed facts; failed to account for the need to protect the public from Daoud’s high risk of reoffending; improperly distinguished the sentences of similar offenders by relying on Daoud’s pretrial confinement; and premised its sentence on mitigating factors that could not bear the weight assigned to them. View "United States v. Daoud" on Justia Law

Johnson, a “sovereign citizen,” participated in a bogus mortgage-elimination scheme. Charged with mail fraud, Johnson represented himself at a month-long jury trial, presenting nonsensical defenses. Johnson was capable of basic trial tasks. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction, stating that Johnson was a “fool,” but not incompetent.While serving his 300-month sentence, Johnson filed false bankruptcy petitions. Charged with bankruptcy fraud, Johnson did not have counsel at his initial appearance and repeatedly insisted that he was not the defendant. The magistrate asked Johnson several questions to confirm his decision to proceed pro se. Johnson stated that his competency to represent himself had “already been established and affirmed on appeal.” The magistrate “strongly urge[d]” him to accept counsel but ultimately found that Johnson had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Johnson was again questioned and declined counsel during the final pretrial conference, Before and at trial, Johnson performed the necessary functions. Johnson’s arguments were gibberish, characterized by statements like, “the United States is a figment of our imagination.” Johnson accepted counsel for sentencing. The court applied a downward variance and sentenced Johnson, age 55, to 216 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his current sentence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s colloquy with Johnson was lacking, but Johnson’s waiver of counsel was valid. Johnson’s history and his separate, more thorough colloquy with the magistrate indicate that Johnson’s decision to forgo counsel was not uninformed. The court also rejected Johnson’s challenge to the sentencing explanation. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Mzembe and two others kidnapped another man, shot him, beat him, and held him for ransom, then abandoned him in an alley. Separate federal juries found the three men guilty of multiple federal crimes. Mzembe was sentenced to 44 years' imprisonment. Intervening changes in law required the Seventh Circuit to vacate the convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for discharging a firearm in a crime of violence. Between Mzembe’s federal sentencing hearings, Mzembe was convicted in Indiana state court for crimes committed before the kidnapping and was sentenced to 62 years, consecutive to the federal sentence. The state sentence became final.Mzembe's Guidelines range for the remaining federal crimes was life in prison; he was sentenced to 36 years, to run consecutively. The court addressed mitigation evidence and said that a below-guideline sentence would be appropriate but said: I don’t know if I have the authority to run the sentences concurrent … if I do ... I don’t think it would be an appropriate exercise of my authority” because the state judge decided that the reasonable punishment for the state crime included consecutive sentencing. The written opinion stated: It is one thing for a federal court to modify a federal sentence in light of changes in federal law, but it would be a different thing for a federal court to restructure the state sentence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the judge gave an inadequate explanation for his decision, erred in deferring to the state court’s intervening judgment to make the sentences consecutive, and imposed an unreasonably severe sentence. View "United States v. Mzembe" on Justia Law

Hogenkamp pleaded guilty to a federal crime and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment plus 25 years’ supervised release. Fourteen months before the anticipated end of his custodial time (April 2021), he asked the district court to modify the terms of his supervised release. The judge denied his motion as premature, suggesting that Hogenkamp wait until after his release to seek a change in those terms.The Seventh Circuit remanded. A prisoner is entitled to know, before he leaves prison, what terms and conditions govern his supervised release. Those terms govern where a person may live, with whom he may associate, and what jobs he may hold from the day he walks out of prison. Federal judges may alter the terms and conditions of supervised release at any time, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2). A district judge has the discretion to determine the apt time for decision—provided that a motion made a reasonable time in advance of release is resolved before supervised release begins--and to decide whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Hogenkam’s date is approaching; further delay in making a decision is appropriate only if the court has reason to think that better information will be available in the next few months. View "United States v. Hogenkamp" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin jury found Gage guilty of repeatedly sexually assaulting his daughter, H.R.G., when she was a child. Gage asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and present testimony from his son and mother, Josh and Nancy. Gage was living with Nancy at the time of the assaults and most of the assaults occurred on Nancy's property. The state appellate court concluded that Gage was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to call those witnesses because their testimony in post-conviction proceedings concerned only matters such as the layout of Nancy's house.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, despite its incorrect recitation of the "Strickland" prejudice standard. The state court’s analysis focused on the consistency between Josh’s and Nancy’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing and H.R.G.’s testimony at trial, which can reasonably be interpreted as “whether the proffered testimony could have affected the outcome,” or its likely impact on the verdict. The state court noted that Josh’s and Nancy’s testimony did not undermine H.R.G.’s testimony in any significant way. View "Gage v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In 2008, an Illinois jury convicted Brown of three counts of first-degree murder for shooting three people outside of the Champaign American Legion building. Brown subsequently filed two post-conviction motions, a direct appeal, and a federal habeas corpus petition. Brown’s only remaining claim is that the Illinois Court unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s Batson holding. Ware was one of two African-Americans in the 60-person venire gathered for Brown’s trial. The court asked whether anyone was familiar with the American Legion where the crime took place. Ware said yes: “Been on the outside. Not inside.” He denied that his familiarity with the site would affect his jury service. Ware was excused at the prosecutor's request. The court overruled a Batson objection, finding that Brown failed to make “a prima facie case that a discriminatory practice was being conducted” and did not ask the prosecution to provide “a race-neutral explanation” for its strike. The Illinois Appellate Court explained that there was no evidence of a pattern of striking African-Americans or of a disproportionate number of strikes used against African-Americans and that Ware meaningfully distinguished himself from other potential jurors by stating that he was familiar with the crime scene.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Illinois court correctly noted the prosecution’s apparent reason for striking Ware—that he had been to the crime scene—and found no circumstances giving rise to an inference that the prosecution engaged in racial discrimination. View "Brown v. Jones" on Justia Law

For about three years, Nulf, an Illinois licensed loan originator, and two co-defendants participated in a mortgage-fraud scheme, causing approximately $2.2 million in losses. Nulf was charged with bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and making a false statement to a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1014. Each crime carries a 30-year maximum prison term. The government filed a superseding information charging Nulf with a single count of making a false statement to HUD, a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison. 18 U.S.C. 1012. Nulf pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor; the government agreed to dismiss the felony charges. The one-year statutory maximum was the recommended sentence. The plea agreement included an appeal waiver. Sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, Nulf claims that the judge interfered with her allocution, wrongly denied credit for acceptance of responsibility, and committed other sentencing mistakes, amounting to a miscarriage of justice, making the appeal waiver unenforceable.The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating that it has not announced a general “miscarriage of justice” exception to the enforcement of appeal waivers. A narrow set of extraordinary circumstances can justify displacing an otherwise valid appeal waiver. Nulf’s case is far from extraordinary, so the appeal waiver is enforceable unless the underlying guilty plea was invalid. Nulf does not claim that her plea was unknowing or involuntary. View "United States v. Nulf" on Justia Law