Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendants played active roles in a cross-country drug organization: Castro-Aguirre served as the head of operations; Ramirez-Prado handled logistics, including providing cars and hotels for distributors and couriers; Rojas-Reyes coordinated sales in Indianapolis; and Carrillo-Tremillo conducted sales in the northeast. A jury found each of 12 defendants guilty of conspiracy to distribute the controlled substances (methamphetamine and cocaine), 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846, and conspiracy to launder money., 18 U.S.C. 1956(h)) Castro-Aguirre and Rojas-Reyes were also convicted on several additional charges.The Seventh Circuit affirmed their convictions and sentences, including one life sentence, with the exception of vacating Carrillo-Tremillo’s conviction for conspiracy to launder money. The court upheld the denial of a motion to suppress cell-site location information; the government, following the procedures set forth in the Stored Communications Act, gathered it in good faith. The court also upheld the denial of a motion in limine to suppress evidence of their gang membership and evidence that the Sinaloa Cartel was behind the kidnapping and murder of the defendants’ supplier. Although the evidence of the kidnapping and murder was highly prejudicial and its connection to the charged conduct was tenuous, any error was harmless in light of the other evidence. View "United States v. Rojas-Reyes" on Justia Law

Meza, deep in debt, fell for fraudulent international trading programs promising incredible profits. He then tricked people he knew into investing in these programs. The scam involved ridiculous promises. The district judge called the dupes “the most improbable victims” she had ever seen. Meza was acquitted on one count of wire fraud and acquitted on another The judge sentenced him to 19 months in prison and ordered him to pay $881,500 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trial court adequately explained its reasons for aggregating losses and excluded all losses around the time of the wire supporting the acquitted count: $295,000. The sentencing hearing covered the misrepresentations and losses in detail. Meza’s restitution did not include unconvicted and acquitted conduct. View "United States v. Meza" on Justia Law

In 2014-2016, Onamuti, a Nigerian citizen, led an identity-theft ring responsible for filing almost 1,500 tax returns and netting $5 million in illicit refunds. Charged with 11 counts of presenting false claims, 18 U.S.C. 287, nine counts of identity theft, section 1028(a)(7), two counts of aggravated identity theft, section 1028A, and conspiracy to defraud the government, section 371, Onamuti pleaded guilty to one count each of false claims, identity theft, and aggravated identity theft. Onamuti expressly acknowledged that, while his plea “may have consequences” for his immigration status, he wanted to accept responsibility. He certified that he had read the agreement, discussed it with his attorney, and understood its terms. Onamuti also “expressly waive[d]” the right to appeal “on any ground” except a claim alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. During his plea colloquy, Onamuti confirmed under oath that, by pleading guilty, he “may very well be deported” and that he was waiving his appellate rights. The district court sentenced him to 204 months’ imprisonment.Onamuti sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that his lawyer failed to advise him that his convictions would subject him to mandatory deportation. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal without addressing the merits. Onamuti is bound by the waiver of appeal. The court noted that “almost invariably, defendants are better served by pursuing such claims on collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2254 or 2255.” View "United States v. Onamuti" on Justia Law

Banks was charged with conspiracy and aiding and abetting a robbery of the Gary, Indiana Post Office, where she worked, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2114(a). After a five-day trial and four hours of deliberation, at about 8:45 p.m., the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. At the request of Banks’s counsel, the judge polled the jurors. The first four affirmed the verdict. The fifth did not. When asked whether the guilty verdict was in fact his verdict, Juror 32 responded, “Forced into.” The judge repeated the question. Juror 32 responded that he needed more time. The remaining jurors affirmed the verdict, singling out Juror 32 as the lone dissenter. The judge instructed the jurors to continue deliberating and sent them back to the jury room at 9:06 p.m. Twenty-nine minutes later, the jury again returned a guilty verdict. This time the poll confirmed a unanimous decision.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. The totality of the circumstances, most notably, Juror 32’s troubling responses to the poll questions, the judge’s decision to complete the poll notwithstanding the juror’s dissent, the lateness of the hour, and the extreme brevity of the jury’s renewed deliberations, were unacceptably coercive. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

In 2009. Zamora, a high-ranking Latin Kings Chicago gang member, pleaded guilty to an extortion and racketeering conspiracy. After successfully challenging his sentence, Zamora was transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) to await resentencing. At MCC, Zamora took orders from fellow inmates for contraband and directed his sister to obtain the items. She would pass synthetic marijuana, cigarettes, and cell phones to an MCC guard, Lizak, who smuggled the items to Zamora. Over six months, the group smuggled four loads of contraband into the MCC before Lizak withdrew from the scheme. Zamora was charged with conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371, and giving and offering bribes to a federal official, 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(1)(C). He pleaded guilty to bribery; the government dismissed the conspiracy charge.The district court calculated Zamora’s guideline sentencing range using USSG 2C1.1 and added a four-level enhancement because the offense “involved … [a] public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” The district court overruled Zamora’s objection, explaining that although Lizak “may not have had high-level decision-making authority,” a prison guard qualifies as a “sensitive position.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Guideline’s commentary, which generally binds courts on issues of interpretation, explains that officials in sensitive positions include those who are situated similarly to a law enforcement officer. View "United States v. Zamora" on Justia Law

Two armed men robbed three cash-and-check stores. Jett and McKissick were convicted of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and attempted bank robbery “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” section 2113(a). The government alleged four “overt acts” for Count 1: three completed robberies and an attempted fourth robbery The defendants had unsuccessfully moved for a special verdict form requiring the jury to find unanimously that the defendants had committed one specific overt act. The district court sentenced each to 293 months’ imprisonment, based on a Guidelines range of 235-293 months, repeatedly commenting on the strength of the evidence.The Seventh Circuit reversed the attempted-robbery convictions because there was no evidence of force, violence, or intimidation, but otherwise affirmed, stating “Hobbs Act conspiracy does not have an overt-act requirement.” On remand, a probation officer calculated the defendants’ advisory Guidelines ranges as 188-235 months. Although Count 2 was gone, the defendants’ total offense levels were still 33, using a grouping analysis and multiple-count adjustment based on the three robberies and the attempted robbery. The defendants’ criminal history categories were lower because of intervening precedent.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 230-month sentences imposed on remand. The district court erred by using the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, and not the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, to decide whether the defendants conspired to commit the “object offenses” of the conspiracy but the error was harmless. The court adequately explained increasing their sentences on the conspiracy count. View "United States v. Jett" on Justia Law

Norwood met a 15‐year‐old girl, a runaway from a state facility, at an Indianapolis gas station. Using drugs, violence, threats, and manipulative affection, he enticed her to have sexual intercourse with him and then prostituted her to countless men. A jury convicted him of attempted transportation of a minor across state lines with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and (e). The district court sentenced him to 330 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Norwood’s efforts to prostitute the victim before attempting to transport her to Wisconsin was sufficient evidence of his intent to continue prostituting her once they crossed state lines. The court upheld the admission of the victim’s medical records; the victim’s statements about what had happened and when were for the primary purpose of medical treatment. They are non-testimonial. The court also upheld the admission of a recorded jail call in which Norwood talked about “pimping” a young “white girl” to whom he had given cocaine. By arguing that the victim had sex with five men per day because that was what Norwood intended, the government simply asked the jury to draw a reasonable inference from the evidence. The court rejected a challenge involving a juror and affirmed the substantive reasonableness of the sentence and the application of the five‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G 4B1.5(b). View "United States v. Norwood" on Justia Law

Wyatt pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic a minor, 18 U.S.C. 1594(c). The government promised to recommend a below-Guidelines sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and to notify the court about his post-plea cooperation. Wyatt’s recommended sentencing range was 262-327 months. At sentencing, Wyatt described how he had “turned his life around” and requested a three-year sentence but reiterated that he wanted to stand by his plea agreement. The government recommended a 10-year sentence but it was defense counsel, not the prosecution, that told the court about Wyatt’s cooperation.Wyatt did not object and received the recommended sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the government’s silence breached the plea agreement, Wyatt did not show a reasonable probability that the breach had any effect on his sentence. View "United States v. Wyatt" on Justia Law

During a 2005 traffic stop, officers searched Hogsett’s vehicle and discovered crack cocaine and a firearm. A jury convicted Hogsett of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), possessing with intent to distribute 0.5 grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). The court found that Hogsett’s relevant conduct was approximately 21.5 grams of crack cocaine (0.5 grams from the vehicle search and 21 grams from prior, noncharged instances of trafficking) and sentenced him to 355 months’ imprisonment: 295 months on Count 1, 240 months concurrently on Count 2, and 60 months consecutively on Count 3. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 subsequently reduced the crack-to-powder penalty disparity from 100:1 to 18:1; Congress made this reduction retroactive in the First Step Act of 2018, permitting district courts to reduce the sentences of defendants convicted of a “covered offense” before August 3, 2010.In 2019, Hogsett sought resentencing. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) is a covered offense. View "United States v. Hogsett" on Justia Law

Donald has glaucoma and keratoconus, a thinning of the cornea that causes distorted vision. To treat his keratoconus, Donald had left-eye corneal transplant surgery in 2011. A few years later, Donald was convicted of drug crimes. He began his prison sentence at Illinois River Correctional Facility in 2014. His eye problems started flaring up, causing redness and poor vision. He was subsequently seen by Illinois River’s optometrists and at Illinois Eye Center several times. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with a rupture of the globe, an irreversible loss of vision in his left eye. After surgery, pathological tests revealed that the infection that led to the ruptured globe was caused by bacteria that can act very quickly and cause perforation in as few as 72 hours. Donald filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The undisputed evidence shows that the defendants did not act with deliberate indifference toward an objectively serious medical condition and the district court appropriately exercised supplemental jurisdiction to dispose of the malpractice claim. View "Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law