Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Informants reported that Slone was selling methamphetamine out of his basement apartment in Dillon's house. In that basement, agents found two guns, 80 grams of meth, and paperwork in Slone’s name. Dillon stated that Slone had recently moved out, leaving his possessions and that Slone sold meth. Agents later found Slone staying with a friend. A search revealed a small amount of meth and a scale in the apartment, and a revolver in the friend’s van, which she said Slone had borrowed. Slone admitted that he had dealt meth, stayed in Dillon’s basement, and had purchased the guns.Slone was charged with possession with intent to distribute the 80 grams of methamphetamine, and illegally possessing firearms as a felon (non-payment of child support), 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A jury acquitted Slone on the drug charge but convicted him on the firearm charge. The court sentenced him to 41 months’ imprisonment, based on a guidelines range of 41–51 months, adding two offense levels for obstruction of justice, based on perjury, and a four-level enhancement, concluding that Slone possessed the firearms “in connection with” the felony offense of meth trafficking. The court found that the guns potentially facilitated distribution regardless of whether the 80 grams seized were Slone’s and stated that, even if the enhancement did not apply, it would impose the same 41-month sentence based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government did not need to show that Slone ever carried or brandished the gun during a sale; a gun that is available to protect a drug stash has the potential of facilitating drug trafficking. View "United States v. Slone" on Justia Law

In 2012, Berrios was charged with Hobbs Act robbery in connection with an armed robbery of a Chicago AT&T store. The next day, as Berrios and his associate were preparing to rob a currency exchange, the FBI conducted a traffic stop and arrested Berrios without a warrant. During a search incident to that arrest, the agents recovered a Samsung phone and other items including a BB gun that Berrios’ group had used in a series of robberies. The FBI conducted a warrantless search of the phone, downloading the contacts, call logs, text messages, and photographs. Some photos showed Berrios with his co-defendants. The government later admitted that the phone search was illegal but argued that the law at the time of the search did not prohibit it, so the "Davis" good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The other evidence at trial included co-defendant testimony, Berrios’s post-arrest statements, a recorded call that Berrios made from jail, surveillance videos, victim testimony, and the other items recovered from the car.A jury convicted Berrios on all counts; he was sentenced to a total term of 360 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress and the convictions. Stating that it “was a close call,” the court concluded that although there was no binding precedent that would have exempted this search from the exclusionary rule, the independent-source rule allowed the admission of the limited evidence the government used. View "United States v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Illinois law enforcement agents received a tip from a confidential source claiming that Smith had been dealing methamphetamine in Mattoon. The agents conducted controlled buys between Smith and the source and requested that a patrol officer stop Smith’s vehicle. The officer stopped the vehicle for “extremely dark window tinting,” and learned that Smith’s license was suspended. There was a 10-minute wait for batteries for the device to measure the tint. The officer then searched the vehicle and found marijuana, a marijuana grinder, and a firearm.Represented by court-appointed counsel, Smith pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm as a felon. He then sought to retract his guilty plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied Smith’s motion, rejected his request for an evidentiary hearing, and sentenced him to 214 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Smith cannot establish that he would have succeeded on a motion to suppress the firearm evidence and did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s pressure to accept a plea, he would not have pleaded guilty. There is no evidence that appointed counsel made a misrepresentation or that suggests his unfamiliarity with the case. The court correctly applied the career offender enhancement to Smith’s sentence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Perry suffers from serious mental illness defined by two suicide attempts, severe depression, paranoid schizophrenia, and auditory hallucinations. He is serving a 70-year sentence for murdering his former wife during a fit of paranoia in 2013. In 2016, while housed in the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in southern Indiana, Perry’s condition worsened. He refused all medication, stopped eating because he feared someone had poisoned his food, renewed his conspiracy claims against the Wabash medical staff, and threatened to kill himself if left in his cell any longer. A medical review and administrative hearing culminated in a decision to forcibly administer the antipsychotic medication Haldol. Injections continued for about six months.Perry later sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the forcible medication violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied Perry’s request to appoint counsel, finding that Perry understood his case and quite ably prosecuted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The defendants attended carefully to Perry’s health and safety. The Facility’s Review Committee had enough evidence to demonstrate that Perry was a danger to himself or others so as to justify the involuntary administration of Haldol. View "Perry v. Sims" on Justia Law

The Roque drug trafficking organization moved more than 1,500 kilograms of cocaine and 100 kilograms of heroin from Mexico to Chicago for distribution and sale. The district judge stated that she had never seen “the level of drugs that were pumped into Chicago” by this criminal enterprise.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences of seven Roque organization defendants, ranging from 150 to 420 months’ imprisonment. The court rejected arguments that the district court misinterpreted the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6) and failed to adequately consider their arguments on that issue. The court upheld the imposition of enhancements for possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1), for two defendants. The district court committed no error, properly avoided unwarranted sentencing disparities, correctly applied the Sentencing Guidelines, and appropriately imposed supervised release conditions, with one minor exception relating to a condition concerning the consumption of alcohol. View "United States v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

Police responded to a call that a homeless person was sleeping in a car behind a store and found Reedy wearing a bulletproof vest in the front passenger seat of a Kia. They saw an open knife, crowbar, and walkie-talkie on the car’s floorboard. Reedy said that his friend, Jason, was visiting someone nearby. Telling Reedy to stay put with one officer, another officer looked for Jason and found him in a backyard wearing dress clothes yet claiming to be doing lawn work. Searching Jason’s backpack, officers found methamphetamine, credit cards in others’ names, latex gloves, rocks, knives, bolt cutters, shotgun ammo, and a walkie-talkie tuned to the same channel as Reedy’s. A search of the Kia turned up a shotgun. Reedy faced a federal gun possession charge.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Reedy’s motion to suppress. Officers had ample authority to direct Reedy to step out of his car and to subject him to further questioning and investigation consistent with Terry; there was no unreasonable delay in the execution of the Terry stop. This same sequence of events supplied the probable cause necessary to arrest Reedy. Once the police returned Jason to the car, the initial Terry stop of Reedy effectively turned into an arrest supported by probable cause for, at minimum, possession of burglarious tools. View "United States v. Reedy" on Justia Law

Joiner is a 31‐year‐old prisoner serving an eight-year sentence at U.S. Penitentiary Marion for a drug crime. In July 2020, amid the COVID‐19 pandemic, Joiner sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” self‐reported hypertension, a body mass index (BMI) of 28.9 (the “over‐weight” category), and his skin color. He argued that Black Americans have disproportionately suffered from COVID‐19 because “society has put them in worse positions.” He cited a CDC article to argue that Black people in the U.S. face a higher risk of hospitalization and death from COVID‐19, and other articles to contend that, even though skin color should not affect health outcomes from infectious diseases, “our society” delivers subpar health care to “people with black skin,” even when controlling for class, comorbidities, and access to health insurance. The government contended that Joiner’s medical records did not contain evidence of hypertension and that his BMI did not place him at “high risk” for severe COVID‐19 complications.The district court ruled that Joiner did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, without comment on Joiner’s racial disparity argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The cited articles identify multiple societal factors that are not relevant to Joiner’s individual situation in federal prison. Without any factual basis tying those broader societal concerns to Joiner’s individual situation, the district court was not required to address the argument. View "United States v. Joiner" on Justia Law

In August 2018, Ford, Johnson, and Foster committed several Milwaukee armed robberies, in different combinations. On August 22, Johnson provided a handgun; Foster and Ford assaulted a taxi driver, then fled with Johnson, to split the proceeds. On August 23, officers located the getaway car near a Petro Mart where Johnson and Foster had committed an armed robbery that morning. The car contained driver’s licenses of three taxi driver victims; a pair of flip-flops consistent with those worn by Foster during the Petro Mart robbery; and identification cards and a prescription belonging to Johnson.On August 25, surveillance cameras recorded Johnson and Ford entering a B.P. station., Johnson approached the cashier, who stood behind ballistic-proof glass, pointed the handgun, and demanded cash. The cashier refused. Ford had exited the store. The cashier activated the door lock. Ford, unable to re-enter, fled. Johnson eventually escaped by another exit. Johnson was arrested after a high-speed chase. Officers recovered a loaded handgun from her pocket, with distinctive characteristics matching those of the handgun seen in surveillance camera recordings featuring the three. Ford pleaded guilty to two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and one count of brandishing a firearm to further a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) for the attempted armed robbery of the B.P.The court sentenced Ford to 114 months' imprisonment: 30 months (a 35 percent downward departure from the guideline range) for the Hobbs Act counts, and a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of 84 months for brandishing a firearm to further a crime of violence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err by inferring that Ford was accountable for Johnson’s use of the firearm and imposing a six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(B). View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law

Anderson furnished heroin to Sublett every month; Sublett cut the heroin with sleeping-aid medication and used retail-level sellers, including Ray, and paid Anderson after selling the heroin. Occasionally Sublett also stored large quantities of heroin for Anderson. Anderson provided Sublett with “Kansas City” heroin, which Ray sold to his regular customer, Buchanan. Buchanan overdosed. Paramedics revived Buchanan and took him to the hospital. After his release, Buchanan told Ray that he had overdosed on the "Kansas City."Anderson, Sublett, Ray, and others were charged under 21 U.S.C. 846. Count Two charged Anderson with aiding and abetting the distribution of heroin to Buchanan that resulted in his overdose (section 841(a)(1)). Anderson’s codefendants pleaded guilty. Anderson was convicted on both charges. For the serious-bodily-injury enhancement, the jury responded yes to: “With respect to Count One, Count Two, or both … the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt Ian Buchanan suffered serious bodily injury and that the serious bodily injury … resulted from the use of heroin distributed by” Anderson. The court calculated a guidelines range of 360 months to life, considering the serious-bodily-injury finding and a two-level “leadership” enhancement, but ultimately imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 300 months.The Seventh Circuit vacated the distribution conviction, which was based on an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability that was unsupported by the evidence. To establish under an aiding-and-abetting theory, the government had to prove that Anderson “affirmative[ly] act[ed] in furtherance of” Ray’s sale to Buchanan and intended to facilitate the commission of that sale. It is impossible to tell from the jury’s verdict whether the serious-bodily-injury enhancement applied only to the flawed distribution conviction, only to the unchallenged conspiracy conviction, or to both. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Mejia sued correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging his filthy cell conditions and constant hallway lighting that prevented him from sleeping. His primary claim survived dismissal and summary judgment and proceeded to trial. The jury returned a defense verdict. Mejia had asked the district court, six times, to appoint counsel. Each time the court denied the request, reasoning that Mejia had demonstrated through his many filings that he understood his burden of proof and was capable of assembling evidence and marshaling arguments to support his contention that the Pontiac Correctional Center's conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly observed that Mejia had an extensive litigation history, including at least one prior case going to trial, albeit with counsel. Mejia had difficulty with the discovery process, but it was within the judge’s discretion to overlook his slips and help him rather than try to recruit counsel. The court observed, during the pretrial conference, Mejia’s ability to comprehend and address the facts and issues pertinent to his Eighth Amendment claim. There was no abuse of discretion; the fact that some trial witnesses testified by videoconference does not change the analysis. View "Mejia v. Pfister" on Justia Law