Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Smith has been in state prison for 19 years for a 2001 murder and robbery that he insists he did not commit. Smith had been charged on the basis of the confession by another (Houghtaling) and was tried three times. The state had no physical evidence linking Smith to the crime. In 2020, the district court held that he is entitled to release unless the state decides to retry him but Smith was seeking more: an unconditional writ based on the insufficiency of the evidence. The state appealed from the issuance of the conditional writ and Smith cross-appealed.The Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the issuance of an unconditional writ and Smith’s immediate release. Even taking the highly deferential view required by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), the evidence failed to support Smith’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; the Illinois Appellate Court was unreasonable, in holding otherwise. The court noted the flaws in Houghtaling’s confession, the exclusion of evidence vital to Smith’s defense, and the trial court’s refusal to allow Smith to impeach prosecution evidence. View "Smith v. Brookhart" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Defendant sought release based on medical conditions that he says make him vulnerable to serious illness or death from the spread of COVID-19 in prison. In his plea agreement, defendant voluntarily waived "the right to seek modification of or contest any aspect of the conviction or sentence in any type of proceeding." The court held that this waiver included defendant's right to seek compassionate release under the First Step Act and that his knowing and voluntary waiver of that right in an approved plea agreement is enforceable. View "United States v. Bridgewater" on Justia Law

Hart was charged with robbing two banks by handing tellers notes, then leaving with the cash to board public transportation. One teller inserted a tracking device with the cash. At trial, the government called Chicago Detective Motyka and FBI Agents Lovernick and Yoder to testify about using the tracking device to find Hart and a bank surveillance photo to identify Hart. The government also introduced public-transit records of cards registered to Hart and fingerprints on the demand notes.Hart argued that he found the cash and the tracking device another way and that law enforcement did not identify him when he was on a certain bus (63) because he had not yet acquired the money and the tracking device. Hart cross-examined Motyka, Yoder, and Lovernick. Before the government rested, Hart asked for a continuance and to recall eight government witnesses, none of whom he had subpoenaed, including Lovernick, Motyka, and Yoder. Hart wanted to ask Yoder about boarding the buses, to impeach the timeline established on direct examination.In denying Hart’s request, the judge explained that Hart’s cross-examination had gone “well beyond” the scope of direct; “all” of the evidence Hart sought to elicit came out on direct; other evidence was in the record from which Hart could argue to support his theory; and Hart was trying to delay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Hart’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), upholding denial of Hart’s requests to recall the witnesses. View "United States v. Hart" on Justia Law

Over the course of a three-week crime spree in October 2017, Hammond robbed or attempted to rob, seven stores at gunpoint in Indiana and Michigan. Five of the seven incidents took place in northern Indiana, where Hammond was charged with five counts of Hobbs Act robbery and several attendant weapons charges, including one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and two counts of brandishing a weapon during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Convicted, he was sentenced to 47 years in prison.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court should have suppressed certain cell site location information (CSLI) that law enforcement collected to locate him during his robbery spree and to confirm his location on the days of the robberies, that the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding the felon-in-possession charge under the Supreme Court’s “Rehaif” decision, and that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) or under the Sentencing Guidelines, so his section 924(c) conviction must be overturned, and his sentence vacated. The collection of Hammond’s real-time CSLI was not a search; the resulting traffic stop was valid. View "United States v. Hammond" on Justia Law

Illinois Trooper Chapman received a message about a Volkswagen with California license plates driving on I-72. Chapman spotted the Volkswagen, driven by Cole, and trailed him, intending to find a pretext for a roadside stop. After another car cut off the Volkswagen, Chapman believed that the Volkswagen trailed that car at an unreasonably close distance. Chapman stopped Cole, requested his papers, and ordered him to sit in the police cruiser. This initial stop lasted 10 minutes. Chapman spent about six minutes questioning Cole about his residence, employment, travel history, plans, vehicle history, and registration information. Chapman told Cole that he would get a warning but that they had to go to a gas station to complete the paperwork because he was concerned for their safety. Chapman testified later that he had already decided that he was not going to release Cole until he searched the car. Driving to the gas station, Chapman requested a drug-sniffing dog and learned that Cole had been arrested for drug crimes 15 years earlier. At the gas station, Cole’s answers became contradictory. Finishing the warning, 30 minutes after the stop, Chapman told Cole that he could not leave because he suspected Cole was transporting drugs. The dog arrived 10 minutes later and quickly alerted. Chapman found several kilograms of methamphetamine and heroin in a hidden compartment.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of a motion to suppress. Even assuming that the stop was permissible, the officer prolonged the stop by questioning the driver at length on subjects well beyond the legal justification for the stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress incriminating statements which led to federal charges for distributing heroin. In this case, after defendant overdosed on heroin and fell unconscious, officers brought him to a local hospital where, after receiving care, he agreed to talk to the police, received Miranda warnings, and made several incriminating statements.The Seventh Circuit remanded for the district court to make a determination on the validation of defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights in the first instance. The court explained that whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights at the outset of a police interview is a distinct and separate inquiry from whether, in the circumstances of the interview as a whole, the defendant's statements were voluntary. Given defendant was unconscious and entirely incapacitated from an overdose just two hours before police questioned him, a finding as to whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights matters. View "United States v. Outland" on Justia Law

In a 1999 incident, Hale told Lewis to kill Rogers. Lewis handed his revolver to Mays, who shot Rogers multiple times, fatally. Lewis, Hale, and Mays collected drugs and money and fled. Lewis, represented by Attorney Raff, refused to consider plea offers. Lewis was convicted. At sentencing. the court found no mitigating circumstances—none being asserted by the defense—and sentenced Lewis to the maximum aggregate sentence of 130 years' imprisonment. Lewis’s appeal was unsuccessful.In post‐conviction proceedings, the state conceded that Raff “basically did not do any advocacy" at sentencing but argued that he could not have made a difference. Other witnesses at the post‐conviction hearing spoke about a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, associated substance abuse, physical abuse by Lewis's mother’s boyfriends, mental disorders in other family members, and attempted suicide. The state appellate court concluded that Lewis was not prejudiced by the deficient performance of counsel.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief. The decision of the last responsible state court was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, in holding that “Strickland,” not “Cronic,” furnished the applicable rule, While the Indiana Court of Appeals was not unreasonable in finding that Lewis had not been prejudiced by his attorney’s substandard performance, prejudice need not be shown. Raff gave up on Lewis and left him entirely without the assistance of counsel at the sentencing stage of a felony murder case. View "Lewis v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

At 3:55 a.m. people were loitering outside a lounge when Lopez sideswiped an SUV parked in front of the lounge. Bystanders swarmed Lopez’s car, punching him through an open window. A passenger exited Lopez’s car and fired a warning shot. Lopez exited the car, grabbed the gun, and walked toward the bystanders. Raines, a Cook County correctional officer, out celebrating, arrived at 3:56:11. Lopez walked back toward his car, stopping to fire two shots at an upward angle. Raines approached Lopez with his own gun drawn. Lopez reached to open his car door. Raines started shooting at 3:56:27. Lopez, injured, dropped his gun and staggered away. Raines continued to fire. Raines pursued Lopez, who was leaning against a wall. Lopez’s passenger, Orta, picked up the dropped gun and fired at Raines at 3:56:32 a.m. For about three minutes, Orta and Raines engaged in a standoff. Raines simultaneously restrained Lopez, wounded but conscious, and used him as a human shield. At 4:00:10 a.m., Orta fled. Police and paramedics arrived. Lopez faced criminal charges.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Raines was entitled to qualified immunity because his use of deadly force did not violate clearly established law although the video footage of the events conveys the impression that Raines might have been able to avoid any use of lethal force. View "Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook County" on Justia Law

Jones and Wansley worked at Illinois Post Office branches. Working with Smith and other co-conspirators, they arranged and executed a scheme to ship packages containing marijuana and marijuana derivatives through the mail. Jones and Wansley intercepted the packages and handed them off to others for cash bribes.They were charged with bribery, 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2)(C), conspiracy to commit obstruction of correspondence and theft of mail, 18 U.S.C. 371, and obstruction of correspondence, 18 U.S.C. 1702. The government presented evidence of trash pulls at Smith’s home, surveillance of Jones improperly scanning packages, text messages concerning addresses and payments, observation of hand-offs, and “controlled” deliveries of packages that the government had intercepted and repackaged. Jones and Wansley made statements to postal inspectors following their arrests, admitting to the crimes and describing some of the transactions. At trial, Jones testified that Smith was simply a customer who was having trouble with deliveries, so Jones offered to help intercept Smith’s packages and that the payments from Smith were tips for good service. Wansley testified that she was just following orders from Jones, her supervisor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed their convictions and their sentences, Jones to eight months’ imprisonment and Wansley to 30 days’ imprisonment, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Todd and Shelly Cibulka drove to the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where their daughter Emily was a freshman. They went to a bar and imbibed for several hours. Upon leaving, they were clearly intoxicated. Emily, wanting to get them home, called the police non-emergency number. Conducting a welfare check, Officer Johnson said he could give them a ride but the Cibulkas would not identify the location of their truck. Todd staggered toward Johnson Street. Officer Erwin thought Todd might tumble into the busy street, grabbed Todd, and told Todd to sit down. Todd would not comply. It appeared that Todd might strike the much-smaller officer. The officers took Todd to the ground to reduce the risk of harm, told him to stop resisting, and handcuffed him. Todd declined medical attention. The officers walked Todd to the squad car. Todd resisted and was placed under arrest for disorderly conduct and resisting an officer. He was lifted into a police van and taken to jail. He was released at 2:30 the next morning, returned to his truck, and smashed through the gate instead of paying the exit fare.The Cibulkas filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity. It was reasonable for the officers to believe there was probable cause to arrest Todd for disorderly conduct and for resisting an officer; the officers stopped well short of such unnecessary roughness. View "Cibulka v. City of Madison" on Justia Law