Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

S.B., a 16-year-old girl from Illinois, communicated on the internet with Fredrickson, a 27-year-old man from Iowa. Their conversations turned sexually explicit. S.B., at Fredrickson’s request, sent him images and videos of herself. When Fredrickson sent flowers to S.B.’s high school, her mother became suspicious and discovered the relationship, later contacting police. A search of Fredrickson’s cell phone revealed he had been recording the videos and saving the images. Fredrickson possessed at least 15 sexually explicit videos of S.B. on his phone.Fredrickson was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. 2251(a): Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in … any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct … shall be punished … if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate" commerce.Fredrickson unsuccessfully moved to dismiss, arguing that under Illinois and Iowa state laws, he could have lawfully viewed S.B. making the videos in person and that 2251(a) criminalized protected expressive speech. Convicted, Fredrickson was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Child pornography’s exclusion from the First Amendment’s protection does not hinge on state law. View "United States v. Fredrickson" on Justia Law

Stivers pled guilty to receiving, possessing, and distributing child pornography and was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. Because the parties disputed the restitution amount, the court deferred its restitution decision and allowed the parties to submit additional briefing. Stivers did not object. Months later, once the briefs were submitted, the court entered a written order overruling Stivers’s objections to the government’s proposed restitution calculation and ordering Stivers to pay $3,000 in restitution. Stivers argued that by ordering restitution in his absence the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43's requirement that “the defendant must be present at … sentencing.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 43 does not apply to the restitution order in this case, which was entered under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, 18 U.S.C. 2259. Restitution awards under this Act are subject to the procedures of 18 U.S.C. 3664, which permits a court to delay the “final determination of the victim’s losses” for up to “90 days after sentencing” if the losses are “not ascertainable” ten days before sentencing. Congress can supersede federal rules by statute and section 3664(c) supersedes Rule 43(a)(3) based on the plain language of the statute. View "United States v. Stivers" on Justia Law

Police saw Carswell driving a Porsche over 100 miles per hour through a 45 mph zone of New Haven, Indiana. When police stopped him, he gave his home address. Law enforcement had suspected Carswell of drug dealing but had not determined where he lived. After ATF Officer Anderson learned of Carswell’s arrest, he carried out surveillance for four days, then obtained a warrant to search the residence for evidence of drug trafficking and unlawful possession of a firearm. The supporting affidavit cited: a trash pull from Carswell’s driveway that turned up evidence of drugs, drug packaging materials, and a firearm purchase; Carswell’s prior drug-related activity; and a tip from a recently-arrested drug dealer who identięed Carswell as his supplier. Officers confiscated 64 grams of heroin, five cell phones, $25,000 in cash, firearms, and ammunition, and drug packaging materials, including two digital scales that field-tested positive for cocaine and a machete laced with marijuana residue.Carswell was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and a firearms offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge who issued the search warrant had a reasonable basis for thinking evidence of drug and firearm crimes was likely to be found at Carswell’s home. The prosecution’s closing arguments were not improper, did not make Carswell’s trial unfair, and did not deny him due process. View "United States v. Carswell" on Justia Law

An Illinois jury convicted Evans of the first-degree murder of Williams, who was killed in a Chicago drive-by shooting. Only one eyewitness, Jeffers, connected Evans to the shooting. Jeffers initially only provided a few general identifying details of the shooter and did not specifically identify any shooter. Eleven months later, the police approached him while he was incarcerated; Jeffers then identified Evans as the shooter. At trial, Jeffers recanted that identification: he testified that he did not see the identity of the shooter but had identified Evans because the police told him to. During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that Jeffers’s trial testimony was false and the jury should disbelieve it because Jeffers only changed his story after being paid a visit by a defense investigator working for Evans’s co-defendant, who was a known gang member.The state appellate court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the prosecutor’s closing argument statements, so they were not improper. Evans unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief.The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order granting federal habeas relief. The state appellate court’s determination that the prosecutor’s statements were proper was objectively unreasonable. The facts compel the conclusion that Evans was deprived of his right to a fair trial. View "Evans v. Jones" on Justia Law

In May 2019, Jerry entered a cellphone store carrying a firearm, pointed the gun at the two employees, demanded access to the store’s safe, forced an employee to open it, took all the cell phones inside, then left. Police quickly apprehended Jerry, who pleaded guilty to obstruction of commerce by robbery (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951). His PSR noted that he had prior convictions in Illinois for robbery and attempted murder, both crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Jerry’s Hobbs Act robbery conviction was his third crime of violence, so he received a career offender designation under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, raising his guidelines range from 130-141 months’ imprisonment to 292-365 months’ imprisonment. Jerry made several objections to the Guideline calculations but did not object to the classification of the Hobbs Act robbery as a crime of violence.The district court imposed a total sentence of 264 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence under the “plain error” standard. While Jerry’s case was on appeal, the court had held that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. View "United States v. Jerry" on Justia Law

In 2009, Newton pleaded guilty to bank robberies, and possessing and discharging a firearm during a bank robbery, and was sentenced to 220 months’ imprisonment. In May 2020, Newton sought compassionate release, arguing that his asthma, combined with prison mismanagement of the pandemic, constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and that his prolonged use of a corticosteroid to treat his asthma weakens his immune system, putting him at greater risk. Newton provided a detailed plan for his release and added that a third condition, hypertension. In July 2020, Newton contracted COVID-19. Three weeks later, a prison physician noted that his infection had “resolved” and that he “did not have a severe illness requiring hospitalization.” Newton still reported “recurrent intermittent coughs, headaches, and asthma flare-ups.” The district court denied his request, stating only: The Government contends, however, that Newton has not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant a sentence reduction. I agree. … The CDC … has not been able to determine conclusively that [Newton’s conditions[ pose an increased danger.…. the prison has lately succeeded in drastically reducing active cases.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. When an inmate like Newton presents individualized arguments along with a meaningfully detailed record, the district court’s opinion must establish that it considered those individualized arguments and properly exercised its discretion. View "United States v. Newton" on Justia Law

Thill was convicted of sexual contact with A.M.M., his ex‐girlfriend’s eight‐year‐old daughter. A.M.M. testified that Thill had sexually assaulted her; Thill’s semen was found on her underwear. Thill’s defense was that his jilted ex‐girlfriend framed him by saving his semen for over a year, planting it on her daughter’s underwear, and coaching her to make false accusations. While cross‐examining Thill and in closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced Thill’s failure to tell the police during his initial interview that he believed his ex‐girlfriend had the means or motivation to frame him. In postconviction proceedings, Thill argued that the prosecutor impermissibly used his silence after receiving Miranda warnings to impeach him and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded Thill had not demonstrated prejudice.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that conclusion not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The state court correctly paraphrased Strickland’s prejudice standard and nothing in its analysis suggested it used a standard “‘substantially different’ from or ‘opposite to’” that standard. The state presented significant direct evidence of a specific sexual assault. Thill’s defense had significant holes that extended far beyond his failure to raise this defense to the police; it was “weak and unpersuasive” and largely rested on Thill’s “self‐serving testimony.” View "Thill v. Richardson" on Justia Law

An informant gave South Bend police the number to a phone used by drug dealers. Officers conducted controlled buys in which confidential informants or undercover officers called the number and followed instructions to buy heroin. Officers then submitted an affidavit to a state court judge and obtained a "court order," requiring the phone’s service provider to share 30 days of precise, real-time GPS location data for the phone. The investigation led to two men at the top of the drug-trafficking conspiracy, Gibson and Harris. The district court denied their pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained through the cellphone tracking. Officers and cooperators testified to the large-scale drug-trafficking scheme that the defendants had overseen. Both were convicted of conspiring to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. At sentencing, the court found that the defendants had conspired to distribute a total of 10.5 kilograms of heroin.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of the motion to suppress, the drug-quantity calculations, and the court’s limits on cross-examination of the cooperators about the specific sentences they hoped to avoid by testifying for the government. The court orders for the cellphone data satisfied the requirements for a search warrant: the judge who issued the orders was neutral and found probable cause to believe that the cellphone tracking would lead to the apprehension of drug traffickers and the orders particularly described the object of the search. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the suit of a prisoner filing a petition to proceed in a suit in forma pauperis (IFP) must be dismissed if the prisoner deliberately misrepresented his financial status. Reyes, an Illinois prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in 2017 and another in 2018 and petitioned to proceed IFP in both cases. The district court initially granted those IFP petitions but later dismissed both cases under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(A), after the defendants presented evidence that Reyes deliberately misled the court about his finances on his 2017 IFP application. He did not disclose information about his income for three months in 2017, during which time he had received $1,692 in gifts deposited to his trust account. He had spent $785 at the commissary for non-essential items, such as a television. He claimed to have received no income in 2018 but had received $26.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 2017 case because the district court did not clearly err in finding that Reyes was dishonest about his financial status. The court did not give Reyes a chance to explain any potential issues with his 2018 IFP application and the defendants conceded that he should have been given that opportunity. The court vacated that dismissal. View "Reyes v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

Smith has been in state prison for 19 years for a 2001 murder and robbery that he insists he did not commit. Smith had been charged on the basis of the confession by another (Houghtaling) and was tried three times. The state had no physical evidence linking Smith to the crime. In 2020, the district court held that he is entitled to release unless the state decides to retry him but Smith was seeking more: an unconditional writ based on the insufficiency of the evidence. The state appealed from the issuance of the conditional writ and Smith cross-appealed.The Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the issuance of an unconditional writ and Smith’s immediate release. Even taking the highly deferential view required by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), the evidence failed to support Smith’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; the Illinois Appellate Court was unreasonable, in holding otherwise. The court noted the flaws in Houghtaling’s confession, the exclusion of evidence vital to Smith’s defense, and the trial court’s refusal to allow Smith to impeach prosecution evidence. View "Smith v. Brookhart" on Justia Law