Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Thomas moved to a cell at Pontiac Correctional Center. Thomas claimed there were feces, urine, and mold smeared on the walls, sink, and cell door; the mattress was soiled with feces and reeked of urine; there were dead flies on the bunk bed; and the sink emitted only cold, black, oily water. After Thomas complained about his mattress, prison officials got him a new one within two weeks. Thomas used his sheets and blanket to avoid contact with the soiled mattress. Thomas received gloves to remove the dead flies; he had a towel for cleaning and received a disinfectant solution several times during his eight-week stay in the cell. Thomas refused to clean the walls. While awaiting a plumbing repair, officials allowed Thomas three hot showers per week. Pontiac’s water supply underwent regular testing and met all environmental requirements. Thomas sought treatment for dry skin and a rash on his back. A health worker noted “a small clogged pore,” recommended warm moist compresses, and told Thomas to return as needed. Thomas obtained hot water for the compresses from another inmate. Thomas sought no further medical care at Pontiac.Thomas later invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting Eighth Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his suit. Had the officials done nothing in response to Thomas’s complaints, they would have violated the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment but the prison responded to Thomas’s concerns and medical needs. View "Thomas v. Blackard" on Justia Law

In September 2013, Chicago Police Officers stopped a car in which Smith was a passenger. According to Smith, the officers fabricated a story that, during this stop, he made a “furtive movement” and that the officers found a bullet in the car. Smith was arrested and detained for seven months in the Cook County Jail. Smith was released on bond “on or about” March 29, 2014. While on bond, Smith was required to appear in court once per month and to request permission before leaving Illinois. Smith contends his bond conditions diminished his employment prospects and that he experienced financial stress and emotional anxiety. He was acquitted on July 21, 2016. On July 18, 2018, Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit as untimely under a two-year limitations period, rejecting Smith’s argument that his claim accrued when he was acquitted at trial. A Fourth Amendment claim such as Smith’s accrues when he is released from detention. The court also rejected Smith’s contention that his bond conditions constituted an ongoing Fourth Amendment seizure, so he was not released from custody until he was acquitted. Requirements to appear in court for a hearing and to request permission before leaving the state, taken together or separately, do not amount to Fourth Amendment seizures. View "Smith v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

“Teddy” lived in Los Angeles and supplied local distributors with drugs delivered through the U.S. Postal Service. The FBI used a confidential informant to conduct multiple controlled drug purchases from Teddy; obtained court authorization to intercept the phone calls and text messages; and determined that “Porky,” was supplying drugs to Teddy from Mexico. Alvarez-Carvajal, Porky’s father, served as a drug and cash courier in this operation,Alvarez-Carvajal and others were charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Alvarez-Carvajal testified that Teddy gave him money to help Porky during his time in jail and again when Porky was kidnapped in Mexico; while he knew Porky and Teddy were drug dealers, he had no intentional involvement in the drug-distribution conspiracy. Alvarez-Carvajal’s testimony conflicted with that of cooperating witnesses.The jury found Alvarez-Carvajal guilty but did not find that Alvarez-Carvajal had testified falsely; no perjury charges were brought. Applying a two-offense-level increase because Alvarez-Carvajal “stored and allowed [methamphetamine] to be stored at his residence” and another two-level increase for obstruction of justice because Alvarez-Carvajal “testified falsely,” the PSR recommended a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Without the enhancements, his range was 235-293 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 240-month sentence. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court made clear that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of its Guidelines calculation. View "United States v. Alvarez-Carvajal" on Justia Law

Olvera’s conviction stems from the 2000, death of Stropes during a gang-related drive-by shooting in East Moline. Olvera’s codefendant, Delgado, fired the shot. Olvera was the driver of the vehicle and did not fire any shots that evening. Delgado pleaded guilty to murder. At Olvera’s trial, his girlfriend and others testified that the shooting arose out of an incident at a party. Olvera unsuccessfully sought state court post-conviction review, claiming that his trial counsel had failed to “contact or call” several witnesses “whose testimony would have been of significant benefit to him.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Olvera’s petition for federal habeas relief. The state court’s articulation of the Strickland standard was not contrary to the Supreme Court’s clearly established law. The state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland when it concluded that affidavits submitted by the potential witnesses identified by Olvera failed to demonstrate prejudice or failed to demonstrate deficient performance. The court noted the overwhelming evidence supporting the state’s accountability theory and precluding Olvera’s claim of self-defense that was “left untouched.” View "Olvera v. Gomez" on Justia Law

In 1984, Kidd stabbed four people to death in a Chicago apartment. The building was then set on fire. Officers arrested Kidd and Kidd’s half-brother, Orange. Kidd made statements that implicated himself and identified Orange as the primary perpetrator and led the police to a knife stained with a victim’s blood. At Orange’s trial, Kidd voluntarily testified that he alone committed the murders. Months later, Kidd pled guilty to the murders. He testified at his sentencing hearing that he stabbed all four victims.On remand in 1992, Kidd moved to suppress his statements from the night of the murders as an unlawfully coerced confession, claiming various acts of torture by the police, that he was under the influence of drugs when he made the statement .and that the police refused to let him contact a lawyer. At a hearing, Kidd did not testify, but the officers denied Kidd’s allegations. The court denied his motion. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Kidd filed an unsuccessful state postconviction petition alleging that he was abused by the police, including former Chicago Officer Burge, who was found in other cases to have abused many people around the time of Kidd’s arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Kidd’s federal habeas petition. Even if the allegedly coerced confession was improperly admitted at Kidd’s trial, the admission did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. View "Kidd v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers responded to a call of shots fired near a residence, canvassed the area, and, minutes after the shots were fired, came upon Lowe running in an alley. In the alley Lowe had just traversed, other officers noticed a partially opened dumpster; they found a pistol on top of the garbage. Ballistics revealed that the handgun had fired the shots near the residence. No physical or biological evidence conclusively linked Lowe to the gun, cartridge casings, or fired bullets found at the scene. Security video footage from the alley showed someone running from the residence and throwing a gun-shaped object into the dumpster, with the same clothes, backpack, and tattoo as Lowe.Lowe was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). During a jury poll, the court asked each juror whether the verdict “constitute[s] your individual verdict in all respects.” Juror Eleven answered, “Yes. Barely.” The court responded, “You said yes?” The juror replied, “Yes, ma’am.” The court stated: “Juror [Eleven], who was a lawyer, did not indicate disagreement with the verdict; he simply indicated that he found the government’s evidence to be minimally sufficient to carry its burden.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed Lowe’s conviction and 90-month sentence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony that referred to the prior shooting. The juror’s answer was not equivocal. View "United States v. Lowe" on Justia Law

In 2008, Canfield was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release for knowingly possessing child pornography. Canfield’s first years of supervision went without incident. The district court later modified conditions of and extended Canfield’s supervised release based Canfield’s use of unauthorized smartphones to view adult pornography and his purchase of DVDs containing adult pornography. The district court revoked Canfield’s supervised release in 2017 for failure to participate in sex offender treatment and unauthorized contact with a person under the age of 18.A 2020 revocation petition alleged that two minor females had lived at Canfield’s apartment for several days. Canfield was also charged with violations of Illinois sex-offender registration laws. The probation office memo indicated that the applicable sentencing options were “[n]ot less than 5 years to life.” Canfield’s attorney noted that she had reviewed the petitions and violation memorandum with Canfield; the court recited the applicable penalties. Canfield confirmed he had reviewed the report. In response to his guilty plea, the district court revoked Canfield’s supervised release and sentenced him to 20 months’ imprisonment and an additional five years’ supervised release. Both government and defense counsel referred to the five-year supervised release term as “mandatory.” Canfield waived a reading of the conditions of supervision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Canfield had ample advance notice of the terms of his supervised release and was given a meaningful opportunity to object, His actions amount to waiver. View "United States v. Canfield" on Justia Law

Roush, pled guilty to transportation and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1), and 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment on Count I and 120 months’ imprisonment on Count II, followed by 10 years of supervised release.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in failing to properly identify the Guidelines range and in failing to consider his primary arguments in mitigation before imposing the sentence. The court recognized the proper Guidelines range, which is confirmed in its post-sentencing statement of reasons, and awarded the two-level deduction for acceptance of responsibility, which was the only deduction available to Roush. The court held that Roush’s base offense level was 22, and applied a two-level increase because the offense involved images of minor children as young as five years old; a five-level increase because Roush distributed child pornography in exchange for valuable consideration but not for pecuniary gain; a four-level increase because Roush possessed images that portrayed sadistic conduct or other depictions of violence; and a five-level increase because Roush was responsible for possessing at least 21 video files which represent 1,575 images of child pornography. The court considered and denied Roush’s objections to specific enhancements. View "United States v. Roush" on Justia Law

Leal used an online dating application to contact a user who was an undercover FBI agent, posing as a teenage boy. Despite learning that the user was underage, Leal engaged in sexually explicit conversations and solicited oral sex. The agent provided Leal an address. Under surveillance, Leal arrived at the house. When a surveillance officer drove an unmarked vehicle up the alley, Leal sped off. Leal was quickly pulled over. Three officers were present, wearing clothes that identified them as officers. Leal was told that he was not under arrest and agreed to speak with other agents in the house. Leal consented to a pat-down and surrendered his cell phone and his car keys. The recorded interview proceeded with the door closed. The agents neither handcuffed nor restrained Leal. Leal quickly confessed and confirmed he had sent the messages. After the 18-minute interview, the FBI arrested Leal for knowingly attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of Leal’s motion to suppress his statements. The agents did not conduct a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Fifth Amendment rights. The custody inquiry is not whether the defendant was under a subjective belief that his movements were restricted, but whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that he was free to leave. That Leal believed he was in a precarious position says nothing about the officers' behavior or whether a reasonable person would have felt bound to stay. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law

Frazier, age 45, reported to the jail to begin a sentence for felony theft. Frazier informed the intake officer that she was epileptic, had blackouts and high blood pressure, and had used heroin the night before; that year she had experienced a stroke. Frazier got a “medical designation,” which meant that an officer would check on Frazier at least every 15 minutes. At health evaluations, hours later, she did not report pain or withdrawal symptoms. At 2:30 a.m., Frazier began groaning. Correctional officers responded several times, but Frazier did not describe her problem. Around 9:00 a.m., a nurse spoke with Frazier, who did not voice any complaints nor display signs of distress. Around 11:00 a.m., Frazier was evaluated as having “mild withdrawal.” A doctor prescribed heroin withdrawal medications. At 3:23 p.m., security footage shows Frazier removing (Advil or Aleve) pills from her toiletry bag and placing them in her mouth. Minutes later, Frazier had a seizure. An officer found Frazier unresponsive at 5:11 p.m. and called emergency personnel. Frazier was pronounced dead. A coroner determined that Frazier died of “diphenhydramine toxicity.” Frazier had smuggled the medication into the jail.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. There is no evidence that corrections officers were aware of the risk of substantial harm that Frazier ultimately suffered— death from diphenhydramine toxicity. No reasonable jury could conclude that they were deliberately indifferent to Frazier’s heroin withdrawal. View "Jones v. Mathews" on Justia Law