Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During a 2009 drug purchase, Rabe and his dealer, Powell, got into a fight. Powell jumped into his truck and sped away, running over Rabe. Ryckman, who had been waiting in Rabe’s car, dialed 911. Powell returned. Ryckman and Powell struggled over the phone; the phone was broken in half. Powell returned to his truck and sped away. When police arrived, they found a knife on the ground. Rabe had several serious injuries and was bleeding from a deep gash on his neck. He survived. At trial, Powell argued that the entire incident was an accident and that Rabe attacked him first. Powell was convicted of first‐degree reckless injury but acquitted of attempted first-degree murder.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Powell’s petition for habeas relief, rejecting an argument that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in approving a supplemental jury instruction about the reckless injury charge. There is no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state appellate court’s conclusion that the instruction was an accurate response to a question from the jury about the definition of “utter disregard for human life.” Powell’s trial counsel had reasonable and strategic reasons for not objecting; by focusing on the injury-producing conduct, he hoped to minimize the chance that the jury would convict Powell based on the severity of Rabe’s injuries. View "Powell v. Fuchs" on Justia Law

In 2013-2016, law enforcement investigated a large methamphetamine distribution conspiracy, installing three cameras on utility poles on public property that viewed Tuggle’s home and a shed owned by Tuggle’s coconspirator, Vaultonburg. The cameras recorded around the clock. Rudimentary lighting technology improved the quality of overnight footage; agents could remotely zoom, pan, and tilt the cameras and review the camera footage in real-time or later. Officers tallied over 100 instances of what they suspected were deliveries of methamphetamine to Tuggle’s residence. After these alleged “drops,” different individuals would arrive, enter the home, and purportedly buy methamphetamine. Several witnesses corroborated these activities. Relying heavily on the video evidence, officers secured and executed search warrants on several locations, including Tuggle’s house.After the denial of his motions to suppress, Tuggle pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) to conspiring to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of methamphetamine and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, and 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1) for maintaining a drug-involved premises. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government used commonplace technology, located where officers were lawfully entitled to be, and captured events observable to any ordinary passerby; it did not invade an expectation of privacy that society would be prepared to accept as reasonable. The prolonged, uninterrupted use of pole cameras did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. View "United States v. Tuggle" on Justia Law

Jackson and Walker sold drugs on six occasions to a confidential source (CS) during a two-month span in 2019. For the final sale, Jackson, through Walker, had agreed to sell 35 grams of crack cocaine to the CS for $1,800. When the CS arrived with Walker to the location for the buy, Jackson handed over only 24.92 grams of crack cocaine. After negotiations, the CS paid Jackson $1,500. Jackson said that he would retrieve and provide the CS the full amount previously agreed. Jackson then traveled to a nearby town to get more crack cocaine before again meeting the CS and Walker at a location one mile from the original meet-up. There, Jackson exchanged 6.28 grams of crack cocaine for the remaining $300.A jury found Jackson guilty of distributing more than 28 grams of crack cocaine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting Jackson’s arguments that the government’s evidence showed that the sale involved two transactions, not one, each amounting to less than 28 grams of crack cocaine and that the district court should have given a lesser-included-offense instruction to allow the jury to find Jackson distributed less than 28 grams of crack cocaine. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Calan-Montiel, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection and was ordered removed. He was returned to Mexico. He came back, again evading inspection, and was caught again in 2019. Convicted under 8 U.S.C. 1326, for reentering without permission, after a removal order, he was sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment. He argued that his first removal was unlawful because his Notice to Appear did not contain the information required by statute.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A removal order that serves as the basis of a section 1326 prosecution is subject to collateral attack only if the alien demonstrates that he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available, the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. Noncompliance with the one document rule is not a jurisdictional defect in a removal proceeding. There is nothing unfair, “fundamentally or otherwise, about using two documents to provide information.” Calan-Montiel does not deny that he had actual knowledge of the removal order. He could have asked to reopen the proceedings, or sought judicial review, even after being removed. His actions make it impossible to satisfy section 1326(d), even if the agency erred in sending notice of the hearing’s date. View "United States v. Calan-Montiel" on Justia Law

Coscia used electronic exchanges for futures trading and implemented high-frequency trading programs. High-frequency trading, called “spoofing,” and defined as bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution, became illegal in 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Act, 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5). Coscia was convicted of commodities fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1348, and spoofing, After an unsuccessful appeal, Coscia sought a new trial, citing new evidence that data discovered after trial establishes that there were errors in the data presented to the jury and that subsequent indictments for similar spoofing activities undercut the government’s characterization of Coscia as a trading “outlier.” He also claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, having an undisclosed conflict of interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that Coscia’s new evidence could not have been discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence, Coscia failed to explain how that evidence or the subsequent indictments seriously called the verdict into question. Coscia has not established that his attorneys learned of relevant and confidential information from its cited unrelated representations. Coscia’s counsel faced “the common situation” where the client stands a better chance of success by admitting the underlying actions and arguing that the actions do not constitute a crime. That the jury did not accept his defense does not render it constitutionally deficient. View "Coscia v. United States" on Justia Law

Chicago officers responded to a 911 call and found Jones bleeding from a gunshot wound. Jones stated, “Damon shot me” and that Damon was wearing a “black hoodie.” About 90 seconds later, officers encountered Damon Goodloe, wearing a black hoodie but unarmed. They took Goodloe to the scene, where Jones stated, “he’s the one that shot me.” Jones died at a hospital.The prosecution introduced Jones’s statements to the officers. Goodloe’s hands tested positive for gunshot residue. Lovett testified that she saw Goodloe (whom she knew) and another man, both in black hoodies, heard several gunshots but ducked before she could see who fired a gun, called 911, and identified Goodloe in a line-up. Loggins testified that he was purchasing cocaine from Jones when he observed two men in black hoodies. When the shots were fired, he fled. A jury convicted Goodloe of first-degree murder without finding that he personally discharged a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Goodloe’s habeas petition, first upholding the admission of Jones’s identification of Goodloe. Statements are nontestimonial when made during police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to meet an ongoing emergency. The state appellate court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in concluding that the emergency was ongoing when Goodloe was taken to the ambulance in handcuffs. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate witnesses who could have provided an innocent explanation for Goodloe's presence near the shooting; their testimony was unlikely to create a reasonable probability of a different result. View "Goodloe v. Brannon" on Justia Law

Gonzalez, a member of the Latin Kings street gang, sold a gun to a fellow Latin Kings member, who was a confidential government source. The source assisted law enforcement in recording conversations between himself and Gonzalez, including a call in which Gonzalez stated that he could sell him two more firearms the following day. Gonzalez, who had an earlier felony conviction for aggravated robbery, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). During Probation Office interviews, Gonzalez made “several inconsistent statements” about his identity and lied about his gang membership.The district court awarded Gonzalez a three‐point reduction in his offense level for accepting responsibility but concluded that Gonzalez’s material misrepresentations merited a two‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice, resulting in a sentencing range of 33-41 months. The court found this to be inadequate, in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and imposed a sentence of 72 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While a court must always consult the guidelines and take them into account, the ultimate length of a sentence (within statutory maxima and minima) is committed to the discretion of the judge, who is constrained by the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Gonzalez’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Schenck and Davis have a young child, ABC. Schenck took sexually explicit photos of ABC and sent them to Schneibel, who told Davis, who told Schenck’s mother, who told Detective Bauman. Detective Enget interviewed Schneibel, who described the images she received from Schenck. Bauman obtained, from a Wisconsin state judge, a warrant to search Schenck’s apartment for child pornography. Police executed the warrant, seized Schenck’s computer and iPhone, and found four pornographic images of ABC when she was under two years old.Schenck was charged with three counts of production of child pornography and one count of distribution. Schenck moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the search, arguing the affidavit lacked probable cause because it failed to demonstrate ABC was a child, and it failed to demonstrate the images were sexually explicit. . The district judge denied the motion and sentenced Schenk to 240 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of suppression. Considering the totality of the circumstances, and applying common sense, it is clear that there were good reasons for the state judge to think ABC was a child at the relevant times. The complete content and context of the affidavit also gave the issuing judge ample grounds to find probable cause that a search would produce evidence of a crime. View "United States v. Schenck" on Justia Law

Wessel, who has a history of mental issues, allegedly raised a gun toward a police officer. He was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. Defense counsel moved multiple times to find Wessel not competent to stand trial. The judge ordered three 45-day evaluations by mental-health experts. Defense counsel also sent multiple mental-health experts to evaluate Wessel. The judge held three competency hearings. She determined he was competent. At trial, Wessel refused to wear civilian clothing provided by his attorney and exploded into a tirade of profanities and accusations in front of the venire. The judge sent him to a remote room where he stayed for most of the trial. The jury convicted him. The judge sentenced him to 100 months' imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge applied an appropriate standard; she was in the courtroom, heard the expert testimony, and could also evaluate Wessel’s demeanor over time. Even with mental illness, a defendant can be competent to stand trial; the judge committed no clear error in relying on the government’s experts or in determining Wessel was competent for trial even though she denied his attempted jury waiver because she could not conclude that waiver was knowing and voluntary. Defense counsel vigorously and continuously challenged competency but the judge considered and carefully weighed his position. View "United States v. Wessel" on Justia Law

Parzych, a 58-year-old Polish citizen, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1967. He was convicted of burglary in Illinois in 2011 and again in 2015 for knowingly and without authority remaining in buildings (storage lockers) with intent to commit theft. He was charged as removable for committing aggravated felonies of burglary and crimes involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii), and for committing aggravated felonies of attempted theft, sections 1101(a)(43)(G), (U), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii).The “categorical approach” to determine whether a state-law conviction qualifies as a removable offense compares the elements listed in the statute of conviction with the generic elements of the crime. When a statute of conviction proscribes some types of conduct that would constitute removable offenses and some that would not and is divisible, the “modified categorical approach” applies; a court may consult a limited class of documents to determine which alternative formed the basis of the conviction and compare it to the generic offense.An IJ applied the categorical approach and found that the location and intent elements of the Illinois statute were broader than the removable offenses of burglary and attempted theft. The Board reversed, finding the statute divisible. On remand, the IJ found Parzych removable. The Board affirmed that Parzych was removable for committing aggravated felonies of attempted theft and crimes of moral turpitude under the modified categorical approach. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The Illinois burglary statute is not divisible and the modified categorical approach does not apply. View "Parzych v. Garland" on Justia Law