Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In September 2020, Michael Karmo informed a friend that he was traveling to Kenosha, Wisconsin, with firearms during a period of civil unrest. The friend reported this to local police, who then notified the FBI. The FBI, believing Karmo intended to shoot people and loot, requested real-time cell site location information (CSLI) from AT&T under exigent circumstances. Law enforcement located Karmo in a hotel parking lot, where he consented to searches of his vehicle and hotel room, revealing multiple firearms. Later, it was clarified that Karmo did not explicitly state he intended to shoot people and loot.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin reviewed the case. Karmo moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the CSLI collection, arguing that the exigent circumstances form contained false information. He also requested a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of the form. The district court denied his motion, and Karmo subsequently pleaded guilty while reserving his right to appeal the suppression issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed, without deciding, that the CSLI collection constituted a Fourth Amendment search. It held that law enforcement reasonably believed probable cause and exigent circumstances existed, justifying the warrantless search. The court found that even without the misrepresentation in the exigency form, the totality of circumstances supported a reasonable belief of a public safety threat. The court also determined that a Franks hearing was inapplicable because no judge had made a probable cause determination based on the form. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Karmo" on Justia Law

Darkel Martin, after serving a custodial sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon, began a three-year term of supervised release. The government petitioned to revoke his supervised release, alleging multiple violations, including committing another crime, possessing a controlled substance, and failing to participate in treatment programs. Martin admitted to several violations, and the district court revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to twenty months of imprisonment and one year of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois handled the initial proceedings. The court found Martin had committed several violations of his supervised release conditions. The U.S. Probation Office recommended an advisory Guidelines range of eighteen to twenty-four months of imprisonment. The district court sentenced Martin within this range, imposing twenty months of imprisonment and one year of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Martin argued that the district court erred by not calculating his Guidelines range and improperly relying on certain facts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The appellate court found that the district court had considered the Guidelines range and the relevant statutory factors. The court noted that the district court referenced the Guidelines and the Probation Office’s recommendations during the hearing. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the district court primarily relied on permissible factors under § 3583(e) when sentencing Martin, rather than the factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A). Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Martin" on Justia Law

Shannon Cotton violated the terms of his supervised release by using cocaine and losing contact with his probation officer. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to two years in prison, disagreeing with the government's assertion that the maximum revocation sentence should be five years. The dispute centered on the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) regarding the maximum period of imprisonment for such violations.Cotton was originally convicted in 2007 for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, which carried a mandatory minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life imprisonment due to prior felony convictions. In 2018, under the First Step Act, his sentence was reduced from 262 months to 188 months. After completing his reduced sentence, Cotton began supervised release in 2020 but subsequently violated its terms, leading to the revocation and the current legal dispute over the maximum revocation sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court erred in its interpretation. The appellate court concluded that the maximum revocation sentence Cotton faced was five years, based on the original classification of his offense as a class A felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The court emphasized that the classification of the offense should be based on the original conviction and not on current law or subsequent legal changes. Consequently, the appellate court vacated Cotton's two-year revocation sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, allowing the district court to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and any intervening legal changes. View "United States v. Cotton" on Justia Law

Aurelio Cervantes pleaded guilty in 2016 to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine. The district court sentenced him to 168 months, the bottom of his calculated guidelines range. This calculation included a base offense level of 34, a four-level increase for his role as a leader in a criminal activity involving five or more participants, and a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility. Cervantes had no criminal history points, resulting in a guidelines range of 168-210 months. He did not appeal the judgment.In 2023, Cervantes sought to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), citing a recent amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines (Amendment 821) that allows a two-level reduction for certain offenders with no criminal history. The district court denied the motion, determining that Cervantes did not qualify for the reduction because he had received an aggravating-role adjustment under § 3B1.1. The court relied on the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Draheim, which interpreted similar language to require that each negative phrase in a conjunctive list be a separate requirement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of § 4C1.1 de novo. The court agreed with the district court, holding that Cervantes’s role adjustment under § 3B1.1 disqualified him from eligibility for the two-level reduction under § 4C1.1. The court found that the conjunctive "and" in § 4C1.1(a)(10) should be interpreted similarly to the language in Draheim, meaning that each condition listed is a separate requirement. The court also noted that a pending amendment to § 4C1.1 would clarify this interpretation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that any error in the alternative ground for denial was harmless. View "USA v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

On March 17, 2022, Anycco Rivers and Ladonta Tucker carjacked a BMW in Bourbonnais, Illinois. Rivers pointed two guns at the car’s owner, while Tucker searched the owner and then drove the car away. During a high-speed chase, Rivers fired a gun into the air. The chase ended when the BMW crashed into a guardrail. Tucker and Rivers fled on foot but were eventually captured. Police found firearms and spent cartridges at the scene.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois indicted both Rivers and Tucker on charges of carjacking and firearms violations. At trial, both were found guilty. Tucker was sentenced to 100 months for carjacking and an additional 60 months for the firearms charge, plus 24 months for violating supervised release, totaling 184 months. Rivers received 87 months for carjacking and 120 months for the firearms charge. Rivers objected to a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight, which the district court applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Tucker challenged his conviction, arguing insufficient evidence that his firearm facilitated the carjacking. The court upheld his conviction, stating that the jury could reasonably conclude that carrying a firearm during a carjacking had the potential to facilitate the crime. Rivers challenged his sentence enhancement and requested resentencing due to recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court affirmed the enhancement but vacated and remanded Rivers’s carjacking sentence for reconsideration in light of the new Guidelines amendments. View "USA v. Tucker" on Justia Law

A former immigration attorney was convicted of conspiring with clients, interpreters, and employees to defraud the U.S. by submitting fabricated asylum applications. The attorney would create false stories for clients, often including fabricated details of persecution, and submit these to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Interpreters assisted by coaching clients to memorize false information and providing fraudulent translations during asylum interviews. Nine former clients testified against the attorney, and the jury found him guilty of conspiracy to defraud the U.S.The attorney's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He then moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming undisclosed benefits were provided to witnesses. The district court authorized broad discovery, held a weeklong hearing, and denied the motion. The court found that undisclosed pre-trial benefits were immaterial and that post-trial benefits did not violate the attorney's rights as they were not promised to witnesses and would not have affected the trial's outcome.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the undisclosed pre-trial benefits were immaterial and that the post-trial assistance provided to witnesses did not constitute a Brady violation. The court found no evidence of pre-trial promises regarding immigration status and concluded that the undisclosed availability of an "insider" for post-trial assistance was not material to the trial's outcome. The attorney's § 2255 motion was denied. View "Dekelaita v. USA" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old, Donnell Wilson, was convicted of two murders, armed robbery, and criminal gang activity in Gary, Indiana. Wilson and his accomplice, Jonte Crawford, harassed and robbed a teenager before encountering and fatally shooting two brothers affiliated with a rival gang. Wilson was sentenced to 183 years in prison, which was later reduced to 181 years on appeal due to a vacated gang activity conviction.Wilson sought post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles. The Indiana Supreme Court found his trial counsel effective but agreed his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The court then reduced Wilson’s sentence to 100 years, considering his youth as a mitigating factor.Wilson filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing his 100-year sentence was a de facto life sentence violating the Eighth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana found the petition timely but denied relief, stating no clearly established law extended Miller to de facto life sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing the petition was timely but holding that the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Miller’s protections did not extend to Wilson’s 100-year sentence, thus affirming the denial of his habeas petition. View "Wilson v. Neal" on Justia Law

Scott Carlberg was convicted by a jury of four counts of wire fraud for fraudulently obtaining disability benefits from the United States Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). Carlberg, who had suffered a traumatic brain injury while working at Soo Line Railroad, applied for occupational disability benefits in 2013 and later for enhanced benefits in 2015. The RRB requires applicants to disclose any non-railroad work and earnings, which Carlberg failed to do accurately. Despite purchasing and operating a tanning salon, Carlberg misrepresented his work activities to the RRB, leading to his prosecution.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Carlberg’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, which argued that the evidence did not show he intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud or made material misrepresentations. The court found sufficient evidence that Carlberg had concealed his ownership and involvement in the salon, and that his misrepresentations were material to the RRB’s decision to grant him benefits. Carlberg was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $279,655.22 in restitution, representing the full value of the benefits he received.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Carlberg’s appeal, which challenged both the denial of his motion for acquittal and the restitution award. The court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, as it showed Carlberg engaged in significant physical and mental duties at the salon, which would have disqualified him from receiving benefits. The court also upheld the restitution award, agreeing that the government had proven the full amount of benefits Carlberg received was ill-gotten. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. View "United States v. Carlberg" on Justia Law

Dijon Foston pleaded guilty to four charges: conspiracy to engage in racketeering, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug offense. The prosecutor dismissed two other charges. Foston was sentenced to a total of 203 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. The sentence was favorable compared to the Sentencing Guidelines range of 262 months.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois accepted Foston's guilty plea. Foston did not move to withdraw his plea in the district court, so his appeal depended on showing that accepting the plea was plain error. He argued that the district judge did not properly inform him of the nature of the racketeering charge during the plea colloquy, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Foston was aware of the elements of the racketeering charge before pleading guilty, as the prosecutor described them in open court and Foston submitted a written declaration of his activities. The court noted an internal disagreement within the Seventh Circuit regarding whether a RICO conspiracy requires an agreement to assist enterprise leaders, but concluded that any error by the district judge was not "plain" due to this conflict. Additionally, the court found no prejudice to Foston, as his sentence would not change even if he were acquitted of the RICO charge. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Foston" on Justia Law

Jonathan Smith pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine in federal court. At sentencing, the district court applied two recidivist enhancements based on his 2008 Illinois conviction for aggravated robbery, classifying it as a "crime of violence" and a "serious violent felony." Smith argued that his prior conviction should not qualify as a predicate offense for these enhancements because Illinois law did not require the intentional use of force for an aggravated robbery conviction.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois disagreed with Smith, relying on the Seventh Circuit's previous decision in United States v. Chagoya-Morales, which held that an Illinois aggravated robbery conviction involves the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." The district court followed this precedent and sentenced Smith to 120 months in prison. Smith appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined whether the Illinois aggravated robbery statute, under which Smith was convicted, required the use of force directed at another person. The court found that Illinois law necessitated the use of force or the threat of force to deprive someone of property, aligning with the federal definitions of "serious violent felony" and "crime of violence." The court also considered Smith's arguments regarding the applicability of recklessness and the lack of a specific intent requirement but found them unpersuasive. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit held that Smith's 2008 conviction qualified as a predicate offense for the sentence enhancements and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Smith" on Justia Law