Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ballard has a long and violent criminal history: the court listed 50 convictions between the age of 17 and his current age, over 50. In 2018, Ballard pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The judge determined Ballard was an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 232 months. Ballard appealed, arguing that two prior Illinois attempted residential burglary convictions were not violent felonies after the Supreme Court held the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause unconstitutional. At his 2019 resentencing, Ballard's guideline range was 33-41 months. The judge imposed a sentence of 108 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded.At the third sentencing, in 2020, Ballard's guidelines range was 33-41 months. The government and Ballard both recommended a sentence of 63 months. The judge sentenced Ballard to 92 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the judge failed to justify the 125% variance and failed to consider disparity and mitigation. The judge complied with the remand instructions, addressing the Sixth Circuit’s concerns specifically, in detail. The serious nature of the offense, Ballard’s age, the long and dramatic and dangerous criminal history, the continual recidivism, and the continued need for deterrence and incapacitation for the protection of the public, “overwhelm the relatively minor potential mitigating factors.” View "United States v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Chavez and her aunt owned a clothing store on the south side of Chicago where they sold socks and t-shirts out of the front and kilogram quantities of heroin and cocaine out of the back. In 2015, one of their customers started cooperating with federal law enforcement; eventually, Chavez was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin and distribution of heroin under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1). Chavez proceeded to trial where the cooperator’s testimony and videos he had recorded in the store were key pieces of evidence in the government’s case. The jury convicted Chavez; she was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecutor, during the rebuttal portion of closing argument, made a litany of improper statements vouching for the informant’s truthfulness, maligning her defense counsel, and inflaming the jury’s fears, and that she must be resentenced because the district court relied on inaccurate information in determining her sentence. The district court clarified its reasoning in its written statement of reasons, clarifying that the aggravating factor upon which it relied at sentencing was Chavez’s lack of economic need to commit the crime. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

On August 9, 2005, a group of men fired bullets into a crowd of rival gang members gathered outside a Wisconsin garage. There were no fatalities; three of the victims suffered gunshot wounds. The shooters wanted to prevent retaliation against members of their own gang, including Adeyanju’s brother, who had robbed members of the rival gang. Adeyanju was convicted of three counts each of attempted first‐degree intentional homicide and of endangering safety by use of a firearm. His primary defense was that he was not involved, as no physical evidence connected him to the crime, and that the state’s witnesses could not be trusted. Adeyanju’s counsel contended that the shooters—whoever they were—intended to scare but not to kill their rivals, so they were guilty of endangering safety but not attempted homicide.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Adeyanju’s habeas petition, rejecting an argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on a lesser‐included offense to attempted homicide—first‐degree recklessly endangering safety--so that the jury could have found that he was among the shooters but did not intend to kill anyone. The jury already had that option with the endangering safety by use of a firearm charge, which it chose not to take. Adeyanju failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s purported error. View "Adeyanju v. Wiersma" on Justia Law

Schutt, her children, and her boyfriend were driving into her Fort Wayne apartment complex when the car was hit with bullets; one grazed her boyfriend's scalp. Schutt saw her ex-boyfriend, Parker, shooting, wearing a red hooded sweatshirt. Other witnesses agreed about the hoodie and seeing a long gun. The police found ammunition and a spent shell casing. A Ford Fusion in the parking lot had a red hoodie lying inside. Parker appeared with the keys to the Ford, which contained Parker’s debit card and paperwork and a rifle in the trunk with ammunition in the chamber.Parker was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The owner of the Ford testified that on the day of the shooting she loaned the car to Parker, among others; the keys in Parker's possession were the only keys to the vehicle. She had never before seen the gun. Parker’s counsel asked the crime scene investigator if he collected DNA samples from the gun. The district court prohibited the question under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, noting that Parker was not challenging the reliability of any specific investigative steps but was impermissibly arguing generally that the investigation was shoddy because it did not attempt DNA testing. The police department’s latent fingerprint examiner testified that he found no prints of value on the gun or magazine.After his conviction, the court sentenced Parker to 114 months in prison. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected a Confrontation Clause argument. It is beyond reasonable doubt that any exclusion of cross-examination about the DNA evidence did not contribute to the verdict obtained. The evidence of Parker’s guilt was overwhelming. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

A store employee overheard his coworker talking with Matthews about a pipe bomb that they had detonated the previous day; they discussed where to place another bomb that Matthews apparently had with him. Long called the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office and told Sergeant Becherer that Matthews was a frequent customer and that he knew Matthews owned a “highly modified” AR-15 with a silencer, lived in a trailer behind “the old Fin & Feather Restaurant,” worked on cars in the shed, and had “free reign of the property.” Someone living near the restaurant had called the Sheriff's Office about an explosion. Matthews’s social media posts showed that he possessed explosives. Nothing in the warrant complaint or affidavit explained why Becherer or the State’s Attorney believed Matthews had access to all structures and buildings. The judge heard their testimony and signed the warrant covering all buildings and structures on the former restaurant property. An hour later, a team searched the property and found multiple firearms, silencers, a pipe bomb, and more explosive materials.Matthews, present during the search, was charged with possessing a machine gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), an unregistered silencer, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and an unregistered short-barreled rifle. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of a motion to suppress. An objectively reasonable officer, having consulted with the State’s Attorney in preparing the complaint and affidavit, could have relied in good faith on the search warrant, which, although incomplete, was not utterly lacking in indicia of probable cause. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Hopper was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 50 or more grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 846, and 841(b)(1)(B). The court sentenced Hopper to 235 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court had committed plain error in the calculation of the drug quantity for which Hopper was responsible. The district court ordered a revised presentence report, which reduced to 1.17 kilograms the amount of “ice” methamphetamine for which Hopper was responsible and assessed an additional criminal history point for a state burglary conviction, the plea for which was entered after the original federal sentencing but before the remand. Hopper submitted a pro se objection, arguing that a jury, not the court, should make the determination that the drugs at issue qualified as “ice” under the Sentencing Guidelines. He did not object to the additional criminal history point. The court rejected his challenge, reasoning that the issue of drug type, as opposed to drug quantity, already had been decided in the first appeal. The court reimposed a sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Hopper’s arguments that the district court committed plain error in both the determination of the drug type and in the assessment of the additional criminal history point for the state burglary conviction. The earlier remand order did not permit reconsideration of Hopper’s argument about the drug type. View "United States v. Hopper" on Justia Law

Inmate Ebmeyer alleged that when the Illinois Department of Corrections Special Operations Response Team, “Orange Crush” performed a facility-wide shakedown, they subjected him to a humiliating, unconstitutional strip search and excessive force, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and 42 U.S.C. 1983. He asserted that an unidentified “John Doe” placed him in extremely tight handcuffs that caused him injuries; Sergeant Oelberg struck him with a baton, squeezed his testicles, and forced him to stand handcuffed and facing a wall in a stress position for more than three hours; and prison officials Yurkovich and Akpore promulgated policies that encouraged the challenged unconstitutional conduct.The court granted summary judgment in favor of Yurkovich, Akpore, and Oelberg for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. After Ebmeyer identified the unnamed defendant as Adam Brock, the court became aware that Ebmeyer had known from the beginning that John Doe’s first name was “Adam,” and issued an Order to Show Cause why it should not dismiss the case with prejudice for Ebmeyer’s failure to disclose that information sooner. The court rejected Ebmeyer’s ensuing explanation and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to Brock but otherwise affirmed. Ebmeyer did not establish that the grievance process was unavailable. The court failed to make the necessary findings to support the dismissal sanction. View "Ebmeyer v. Brock" on Justia Law

Correctional Officer Decker confiscated items from Stands Alone’s cell. Other officers later entered and removed additional items. Stands Alone was pacing, throwing clothes, and shouting. Decker ordered him to move toward the front of the unit. Instead, he returned to his cell. Decker followed him and warned that she would use pepper spray if he continued to resist. Stands Alone grabbed a fire extinguisher and lifted it to his chest; Decker deployed her pepper spray. Stands Alone discharged the fire extinguisher. Fire suppressant and pepper spray chemicals blew towards Decker, who experienced visual impairment and chemical burns. Stands Alone was charged under 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b), which penalizes whoever “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with” federal correctional officers. Subsection (b) enhances the penalty for those who “inflict[] bodily injury” on the victim.Stands Alone challenged the indictment as “defective,” arguing that assault is an essential element of section 111; the indictment did not allege “assault” and instead “merely provide[d] that he resisted, intimidated and interfered with” Decker. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of that argument. The government could secure a section 111(b) conviction by demonstrating that Stands Alone forcibly committed at least one of the six acts in section 111(a)(1) against a federal officer. Stands Alone’s interpretation “runs contrary to the textual language, rendering five of the six verbs in subsection (a)(1) superfluous.” View "United States v. Stands Alone" on Justia Law

Four men robbed a liquor store. Hours later, three of them also robbed a gas station. Surveillance video captured these robberies. Five days later, three of the perpetrators (Cooper, Holliman, and Williams) committed another robbery. Holliman and Williams died from a car crash during a high-speed pursuit. Cooper spoke to officers from his hospital bed and signed a statement identifying Flint as the fourth man from the liquor store robbery.At Flint’s trial, the prosecutor’s opening statement described the testimony that Cooper would provide. Flint’s counsel described Flint's interview, stating: “My client, thinking that he’s being cooperative, talks to them, says, yes, I know Kenneth Cooper; he and I have been childhood friends. The prosecutor moved for a mistrial, citing inadmissible hearsay. Flint’s counsel contended that a mistrial was inappropriate because multiple witnesses would testify about the friendship between the men. The judge granted a mistrial. During preparations for Flint’s second trial, a different judge raised the issue of double jeopardy but, after looking at a transcript, found that the statement "sufficient to cause a mistrial. A jury found Flint guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the manifest necessity standard to find no prejudice from counsel’s failure to move for dismissal based on double jeopardy.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Expressing some reservations about whether a mistrial should have been declared, the court cited deference to the discretion of a trial judge. View "Flint v. Carr" on Justia Law

In 2016, Wisconsin charged Carter with drug and firearm offenses. Mid-trial, Carter pleaded guilty to heroin and firearm charges; the state agreed to recommend a six-year sentence. The prosecutor backtracked at sentencing. The court sentenced Carter to nine years’ imprisonment in July 2017. Carter sought to appeal his sentence, contending that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at sentencing and that the court imposed the sentence based on inaccurate information. In Wisconsin, a defendant must file, within 20 days of sentencing, a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief. Carter filed such a notice five days after sentencing. The public defender’s office assigned him counsel but the clerk and court reporter took 10 months to locate and share the trial transcripts, a step that should have been completed within 60 days. Carter’s counsel successfully filed a new extension request on each day the prior request was due to expire. Over four years Carter had three different public defenders and 14 extension requests by counsel and the court without a ruling on the merits.Carter filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the petition. The “extreme and tragic” delay experienced by Carter excuses him from otherwise applicable statutory exhaustion requirements and shows that Wisconsin’s appellate process, at least with respect to Carter, is ineffective to protect rights secured by the U.S. Constitution. View "Carter v. Buesgen" on Justia Law