Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In each of the consolidated appeals, the defendant, having been imprisoned for drug crimes, violated the conditions of his original term of supervision. Each appeared in front of the same judge at a revocation hearing. Acting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), (h), the district court ordered each to be returned to prison and to serve an additional period of supervised release afterward; the court imposed the term of supervised release mandated by statute as part of the original sentence.The Seventh Circuit vacated. A federal criminal sentence may, and sometimes must, be a period of supervised release to follow the offender's time in prison, 18 U.S.C. 3583(a); statutes often confer discretion on the district court, but there are instances in which they specify the required duration or range. Those rules, however, pertain to the initial sentence. The picture is different for a person who has completed his term of incarceration, has begun serving supervised release, and violates the conditions of his supervised release. If his probation officer moves for revocation of supervised release, a term of supervised release that was mandatory for initial sentencing does not remain a mandatory part of any new sentence after revocation. Revocation operates under different rules. View "United States v. Teague" on Justia Law

In 2011, Evans approached his girlfriend’s house after a fight with While. White appeared with a loaded gun, raised the gun, and tried to strike Evans. Evans blocked the blow, but the gun fired. The bullet struck Evans in the abdomen and grazed the leg of Evans’s girlfriend. White was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). White’s criminal history included 12 previous Illinois convictions, including delivery of crack cocaine (2003), attempted armed robbery (2004), aggravated fleeing (2007), and delivery of crack cocaine near a church (2008). The district court designated White as an armed career criminal, subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act, based on his three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense”: the 2008 drug delivery, the attempted armed robbery, and the aggravated fleeing.The Seventh Circuit rejected his 28 U.S.C. 2255 challenge to his 30-year sentence. The sentencing court relied on a previous conviction that no longer supports the enhancement. For that inapplicable conviction, the district court substituted the 2003 cocaine delivery. Reasonable jurists may debate whether a court may substitute one predicate conviction for another for a sentencing enhancement and whether an Illinois cocaine conviction may serve as a predicate offense. White’s petition fails, nonetheless. He had fair notice that the substitute conviction could be used as a predicate offense; waiver and procedural default also foreclose his challenge. View "White v. United States" on Justia Law

Robl, an unlicensed and uninsured asbestos abatement contractor, undertook asbestos removal and disposal in Minnesota and Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud for falsely holding himself out as a licensed and insured asbestos abatement contractor and to knowingly releasing asbestos into the ambient air by burning asbestos-containing material in burn piles and in burn barrels at his home. The district court sentenced Robl to 144 months in prison and entered judgment, noting that it had not yet determined a restitution amount. At Robl’s request, the court canceled the initial restitution hearing until after the disposition of his pending direct appeal. Robl dismissed his initial appeal with prejudice.The district court then set a new restitution hearing. After a telephonic status hearing, at which Robl was not present but was represented by counsel, the hearing was again canceled. The district court subsequently ordered restitution of $94,031.41. Robl challenged the court’s jurisdiction to order restitution and the award amount and argued that the court denied him his rights to be present and to speak as guaranteed by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 43(a) and 32(i)(4). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court had jurisdiction under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A to enter the order and committed no error in adjudicating the amount of restitution. View "United States v. Robl" on Justia Law

DHS Agent Goehring obtained a warrant for Calligan's girlfriend's Fort Wayne house. His supporting affidavit reported that, 10 days earlier, customs agents had intercepted a package containing one kilogram of a synthetic cannabinoid controlled substance (5F‐ADB), addressed to that house, with Calligan as the addressee. Calligan had received more than 50 international shipments there. Calligan had Indiana convictions for attempted murder, criminal recklessness, and unlawfully resisting police, and a pending gun possession charge. Although police delivered the package, agents had replaced the controlled substance with sugar. After Calligan accepted the package, the officers executed the warrant and found money, a gun, and a notebook that contained the package’s tracking number and a recipe for making 5F‐ADB into a consumable product. In the warrant return, Goehring inaccurately reported that police had also recovered 5F‐ADB, the package’s original contents.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Calligan’s convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon, importing a controlled substance, and attempting to distribute a controlled substance. The court rejected arguments that because the warrant application said police would deliver actual drugs, the agent’s replacement of the drugs with sugar took the search outside the warrant’s scope and that Goehring’s warrant application relied on materially false representations that police would deliver drugs to the home before the search. The warrant was supported by probable cause and had no triggering condition and, in any event, police relied on it in good faith. View "United States v. Calligan" on Justia Law

Love sold crack to a confidential informant. Officers searched his apartment and found crack in the kitchen and found two guns and ammunition in an adjoining room, about 15 feet from the drugs. Love pleaded guilty to three drug counts and one felon-in-possession count (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)). A violation of section 922(g)(1) causes a default sentencing range of up to 10 years but the Armed Career Criminal Act increases the penalty to a 15-year mandatory minimum if the defendant had three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Love’s prior convictions included Illinois armed robbery (1994), federal distribution of crack cocaine (2009), and Indiana Class D battery resulting in bodily injury (2015). Love argued that he received a “restoration of rights” letter without an express reference to guns after he was released on the 1994 Illinois armed robbery conviction and that his Indiana Class D battery-resulting-in-bodily-injury conviction was not a crime of violence. The judge held the armed robbery conviction was an ACCA predicate but that the battery-resulting-in-bodily-injury conviction was not, as a categorical matter, a “violent felony,” so Love was not an armed career criminal. The judge sentenced Love to 96 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Love committed three ACCA-predicate offenses. View "United States v. Love" on Justia Law

Herrera, an Illinois state prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against three correctional officers of the Cook County Jail for failing to protect him from assault and denying him prompt medical care. In his timely filed original complaint, Herrera named each of the defendants “John Doe” as a nominal placeholder until he could ascertain the proper identities of the officers. Herrera then twice amended his complaint to include their actual names—but did so outside of the two-year limitations period set by Illinois law.The district court denied a motion to dismiss, reasoning that suing “John Doe” defendants constituted a “mistake” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), so that Herrera’s amended complaint “related back” to his original complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Knowingly suing a John Doe defendant is not a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c). Whether Herrer satisfies the factual test for equitable tolling is beyond the scope of an interlocutory appeal and should be considered on remand. View "Herrera v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

In 2009, Brown, then 13 years old, was tried as an adult, convicted of murder, and sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment. Brown unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in Indiana state courts, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.On remand the federal district court granted Brown a conditional writ of habeas corpus, noting that the court had admitted an out-of-court statement (a jailhouse confession to another detainee) by the co-defendant. The statement was hearsay as to Brown but implicated him in the shooting. Brown could not cross-examine his co-defendant. Brown’s lawyer failed even to ask for a limiting instruction. The conditional writ ordered Indiana to vacate Brown’s conviction and release him from custody unless it elected to retry Brown within 120 days. The state appealed. Brown filed a cross-appeal, challenging the denial of his motions to authorize discovery and expand the record in light of statements made by the elected county prosecutor in a 2018 campaign debate that Brown asserts contradicted the prosecution’s theory at trial. Within 120 days, the state moved to vacate Brown’s murder conviction, to initiate retrial proceedings in a new criminal case, and to transfer Brown to pretrial custody. In March 2021, the state court vacated Brown’s conviction. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the state’s appeal. The state court’s vacatur of the conviction ended its jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. 2254 and Article III of the U.S. Constitution. View "Brown v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

ATF agents and Chicago police officers went to the “Back of the Yards” neighborhood to replace court‐approved global positioning system trackers on cars belonging to members of the Latin Saints gang. Shortly after the officers arrived, they came under gunfire. A federal agent was shot and seriously injured. Godinez, a member of the gang, was charged with the shooting. In the government’s view, Godinez, tasked with guarding the neighborhood, mistook federal agents for rival gang members and shot the agent.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Godinez’s convictions for forcibly assaulting a federal officer while using a deadly weapon, 18 U.S.C. 111(a) and (b), and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The district court properly admitted ballistics evidence concerning the shots fired. Although the gun was not recovered, that does not render inadmissible the physical evidence (casings) that was recovered. The chain of custody need not be perfect. Testimony about a gunshot detection system— ShotSpotter—should have been handled differently. The court did not adequately explore ShotSpotter’s methodology before admitting the evidence. A rational jury, even without the improperly admitted evidence, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Godinez shot the agent. View "United States v. Godinez" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Resnick’s conviction and life sentence for sexually abusing two young boys, brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Resnick had entered a plea of guilty to charges brought in Florida with respect to one boy. Plea negotiations broke down with respect to charges brought in Indiana with respect to the other boy.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Resnick’s motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence, rejecting an argument that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance during the plea process, throughout the pretrial and trial proceedings, and at sentencing. Resnick’s rejection of the amended offer means that he, not trial counsel, is responsible for the sentence he ultimately received. The court rejected challenges to counsel’s handling of evidence. Dueling experts on the correlation between child pornography possession and contact offenses was highly unlikely to sway the verdict, given that there was substantial evidence that directly showed Resnick sexually abused the boys. Any expert testimony on Resnick’s behalf would have been considerably undermined by his plea agreement from the Florida proceedings, in which he admitted he deleted child pornography from the computer. The law surrounding the admission of his refusal to take a polygraph was far from clearly established at the time of his trial. View "Resnick v. United States" on Justia Law

Dingwall was charged with three counts of robbery and three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. She admits the robberies but claims she committed them under duress, in fear of brutal violence by her abusive boyfriend, Stanley. Dingwall sought a ruling on evidence to support her duress defense, including expert evidence on battering and its effects. The duress defense has two elements: reasonable fear of imminent death or serious injury, and the absence of reasonable, legal alternatives to committing the crime. The district court denied Dingwall’s motion. Dingwall then pleaded guilty, reserving her right to appeal the decision on the motion in limine. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the cases are close and difficult, often dividing appellate panels. “Dingwall surely faces challenges” Stanley was not physically present for any of the robberies, Dingwall actually held a gun, and there is a dispute about whether Stanley threatened harm if she did not commit these specific offenses. Those facts present questions for a jury; the immediate physical presence of the threat is not always essential to a duress defense. Expert evidence of battering and its effects may inform the jury how an objectively reasonable person under the defendant’s circumstances might behave. View "United States v. Dingwall" on Justia Law