Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Inmate Ebmeyer alleged that when the Illinois Department of Corrections Special Operations Response Team, “Orange Crush” performed a facility-wide shakedown, they subjected him to a humiliating, unconstitutional strip search and excessive force, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and 42 U.S.C. 1983. He asserted that an unidentified “John Doe” placed him in extremely tight handcuffs that caused him injuries; Sergeant Oelberg struck him with a baton, squeezed his testicles, and forced him to stand handcuffed and facing a wall in a stress position for more than three hours; and prison officials Yurkovich and Akpore promulgated policies that encouraged the challenged unconstitutional conduct.The court granted summary judgment in favor of Yurkovich, Akpore, and Oelberg for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. After Ebmeyer identified the unnamed defendant as Adam Brock, the court became aware that Ebmeyer had known from the beginning that John Doe’s first name was “Adam,” and issued an Order to Show Cause why it should not dismiss the case with prejudice for Ebmeyer’s failure to disclose that information sooner. The court rejected Ebmeyer’s ensuing explanation and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to Brock but otherwise affirmed. Ebmeyer did not establish that the grievance process was unavailable. The court failed to make the necessary findings to support the dismissal sanction. View "Ebmeyer v. Brock" on Justia Law

Correctional Officer Decker confiscated items from Stands Alone’s cell. Other officers later entered and removed additional items. Stands Alone was pacing, throwing clothes, and shouting. Decker ordered him to move toward the front of the unit. Instead, he returned to his cell. Decker followed him and warned that she would use pepper spray if he continued to resist. Stands Alone grabbed a fire extinguisher and lifted it to his chest; Decker deployed her pepper spray. Stands Alone discharged the fire extinguisher. Fire suppressant and pepper spray chemicals blew towards Decker, who experienced visual impairment and chemical burns. Stands Alone was charged under 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b), which penalizes whoever “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with” federal correctional officers. Subsection (b) enhances the penalty for those who “inflict[] bodily injury” on the victim.Stands Alone challenged the indictment as “defective,” arguing that assault is an essential element of section 111; the indictment did not allege “assault” and instead “merely provide[d] that he resisted, intimidated and interfered with” Decker. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of that argument. The government could secure a section 111(b) conviction by demonstrating that Stands Alone forcibly committed at least one of the six acts in section 111(a)(1) against a federal officer. Stands Alone’s interpretation “runs contrary to the textual language, rendering five of the six verbs in subsection (a)(1) superfluous.” View "United States v. Stands Alone" on Justia Law

Four men robbed a liquor store. Hours later, three of them also robbed a gas station. Surveillance video captured these robberies. Five days later, three of the perpetrators (Cooper, Holliman, and Williams) committed another robbery. Holliman and Williams died from a car crash during a high-speed pursuit. Cooper spoke to officers from his hospital bed and signed a statement identifying Flint as the fourth man from the liquor store robbery.At Flint’s trial, the prosecutor’s opening statement described the testimony that Cooper would provide. Flint’s counsel described Flint's interview, stating: “My client, thinking that he’s being cooperative, talks to them, says, yes, I know Kenneth Cooper; he and I have been childhood friends. The prosecutor moved for a mistrial, citing inadmissible hearsay. Flint’s counsel contended that a mistrial was inappropriate because multiple witnesses would testify about the friendship between the men. The judge granted a mistrial. During preparations for Flint’s second trial, a different judge raised the issue of double jeopardy but, after looking at a transcript, found that the statement "sufficient to cause a mistrial. A jury found Flint guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the manifest necessity standard to find no prejudice from counsel’s failure to move for dismissal based on double jeopardy.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Expressing some reservations about whether a mistrial should have been declared, the court cited deference to the discretion of a trial judge. View "Flint v. Carr" on Justia Law

In 2016, Wisconsin charged Carter with drug and firearm offenses. Mid-trial, Carter pleaded guilty to heroin and firearm charges; the state agreed to recommend a six-year sentence. The prosecutor backtracked at sentencing. The court sentenced Carter to nine years’ imprisonment in July 2017. Carter sought to appeal his sentence, contending that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at sentencing and that the court imposed the sentence based on inaccurate information. In Wisconsin, a defendant must file, within 20 days of sentencing, a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief. Carter filed such a notice five days after sentencing. The public defender’s office assigned him counsel but the clerk and court reporter took 10 months to locate and share the trial transcripts, a step that should have been completed within 60 days. Carter’s counsel successfully filed a new extension request on each day the prior request was due to expire. Over four years Carter had three different public defenders and 14 extension requests by counsel and the court without a ruling on the merits.Carter filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the petition. The “extreme and tragic” delay experienced by Carter excuses him from otherwise applicable statutory exhaustion requirements and shows that Wisconsin’s appellate process, at least with respect to Carter, is ineffective to protect rights secured by the U.S. Constitution. View "Carter v. Buesgen" on Justia Law

Chicago requires its police officers to seize, inventory, and store property belonging to an arrested person if that property is not permitted in the Cook County Jail. After 30 days, any property unclaimed by the owner or her authorized representative is deemed abandoned and is sold or destroyed. The plaintiffs brought a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Chicago’s right to seize and inventory the property upon arrest is not at issue and the plaintiffs do not contend that municipalities are not permitted to manage the seized property. The plaintiffs alleged that the notice Chicago furnished was not adequate to alert them to the fact that the police would destroy their personal property if they did not claim it within 30 days.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Chicago did not seize the plaintiffs’ property with an intent to keep it permanently; its motive for the seizures related to safety at the jail, not punishment, The 30-day limit reflected the practical constraints on storage capacity. The detainee knows exactly what has been taken from him and when that confiscation occurred and is told both how to get his property back and how quickly he must do so. The plaintiffs did not show that they were unable to find out the details of the property-recovery process that were disclosed on the police webpage. View "Conyers v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) as it applies to offenders who have relocated to Indiana from other states. A 2006 SORA amendment applied its requirements to any “person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” Indiana does not require any person to register if the offense occurred prior to SORA, provided that person remains a resident of Indiana. Under the amendment, persons with pre-SORA convictions who relocate to Indiana from another state where registration was required must register in Indiana, even if Indiana would not have required them to register had they committed their offenses in Indiana and never left.The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed but on rehearing, en banc, reversed. SORA does not violate the right to travel because it does not expressly discriminate based on residency, as consistently required by the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs’ ex post facto claim is likewise precluded by precedent. SORA is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to surmount Indiana’s nonpunitive intent for the law. Because the district court did not address whether SORA passes rational basis scrutiny under an equal protection analysis, the court remanded for consideration of the equal protection claim. View "Hope v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Correction" on Justia Law

For years, Beltran was a high-level lieutenant in the Sinaloa Cartel drug-trafficking organization. He pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. Beltran had never previously been arrested. Although his plea declaration referenced a single transaction involving 46 kilograms of cocaine, his lawyer agreed that Beltran was involved with the movement of hundreds of kilograms of controlled substances in multiple transactions with the sons of El Chapo.The government proposed that Beltran was responsible for more than 450 kilograms of cocaine and 10 kilograms of heroin. The probation office and the court concurred. The court applied sentencing enhancements for use of a firearm, bribery, criminal livelihood, and leader or organizer of criminal activity but rejected enhancements for the use of violence; maintaining a stash house, and obstruction of justice. From an adjusted offense level of 48, the court subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines “range” was life imprisonment. Beltran’s argued that the Mexican authorities who effected his arrest tortured him before turning him over, overriding the section 3553(a) concerns. The judge referenced an article that had not been disclosed to the parties, indicating that Mexican law enforcement suffered hundreds of deaths at the hands of drug cartels, and expressing his “personal hurt” as a person of Mexican descent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 28-year sentence, expressing “complete confidence that none of the discussed factors affected the selection of Beltran’s sentence.” View "United States v. Beltran-Leon" on Justia Law

GMC, a 15-year-old girl, ran away from her foster home and was arrested for shoplifting. She did not provide her real name or age to the police Her friend picked her up from jail, accompanied by Vines, who began prostituting GMC. He posted ads online, including on the website Backpage, and arranged for FMC to meet with customers to engage in sex acts. She gave the money paid for those acts to him. Vines was aware that GMC was a minor. GMC was taken into custody by law enforcement and was evaluated at an emergency room, where an examination determined that she had injuries “too numerous to count.” GMC told officers what had happened.Vines was found guilty of sex trafficking of a child, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), (c); sex trafficking of a child, conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor, sections 1594(c), 1591, transportation of a minor, section 2423(a); and interstate travel in aid of racketeering, section 1952(a)(3). He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment, with supervised release for life, and ordered to pay $13,500 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of an expert witness that related to the credibility of GMC; denying his motion to suppress GMC’s identification of Vines through a Facebook photo; and denying motions to suppress evidence obtained from searches of Vines’s iPhone and of his Facebook and iCloud accounts. View "United States v. Vines" on Justia Law

Wyatt victimized six women, each of whom acted as prostitutes under Wyatt’s abusive supervision in 2011-2014. He pleaded guilty to interstate sex trafficking 18 U.S.C. 1594(c). Under 18 U.S.C. 1593, Wyatt was subject to mandatory restitution to the victims for the full amount of their losses. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. Following negotiations between the parties, oral argument, and supplemental briefing, the district court entered an order requiring Wyatt to pay $12,750 to Adult Victim 1, $45,200 to Adult Victim 3, and $37,125 to Adult Victim 5, totaling $95,075.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Wyatt’s arguments that the district court improperly delayed the restitution determination, did not rely on a statutorily required “complete accounting” of the victims’ losses (and relied on improper evidence), deprived him of counsel during the restitution process, and improperly ordered restitution outside of his presence. The amount of restitution was not ascertainable on the record at the time of sentencing; the court based its determination of the amounts on materials sufficient to make a reasoned restitution award. View "United States v. Wyatt" on Justia Law

McGill was convicted of possessing child pornography. He completed his prison sentence and began serving supervised release. McGill has a history of violating the terms of his supervised release. McGill failed two polygraph tests, administered as part of his sex offender treatment program, when he was asked whether he had sexual contact with a minor.Probation Officer Williams conducted a home visit, entered McGill’s bedroom, and observed a black cell phone that he recognized as McGill’s monitored phone and an unknown white cell phone. McGill attempted to block the officer’s view of the second cell phone, stating that it was an old phone that no longer worked. At Williams’s request, McGill handed over the white phone. Williams claims that he was able to power on the phone, saw that the background photo was of a young boy’s face, and then powered it off. Williams delivered the phone to the FBI, which obtained a search warrant. The subsequent search of the phone revealed thousands of images of child pornography. McGill was again charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B).The district court denied McGill’s motion to suppress, accepted a conditional plea, and sentenced McGill to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Williams was lawfully present in McGill’s house, the unmonitored phone was in plain view, and, under the circumstances, the phone’s incriminating nature was immediately apparent. Williams had reasonable suspicion to believe that the cell phone was evidence a criminal act. View "United States v. McGill" on Justia Law