Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his counsel was ineffective by not challenging whether his prior drug convictions were predicates, as Indiana law defined cocaine isomers more broadly than federal law.The Seventh Circuit concluded that, although petitioner forfeited his theory of ineffectiveness in the district court, it is subject to plain error review. The court also concluded that, because it was objectively reasonable for petitioner's counsel not to advise risking a mandatory life sentence to pursue the isomer argument, the district court did not plainly err in ruling that counsel's performance was constitutionally adequate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. View "Harris v. United States" on Justia Law

During a funeral, Stevenson drew a revolver, fired one shot into the grave, waved the gun toward the crowd, and fled. Police officers quickly arrested Stevenson and recovered the gun. He pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(e). The PSR applied the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on prior Illinois state convictions: a. 1989 conviction for attempted murder; a 1989 conviction for manufacture and delivery of cocaine; and a 2010 conviction for robbery. The guidelines range was 135-168 months but because Stevenson qualified as an armed career criminal—warranting a minimum 15-year sentence—the PSR recommended 180 months’ imprisonment. Stevenson claimed he received an Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) letter restoring his civil rights discharging him from his 1989 convictions. A former IDOC computer programmer testified “the restoration-of-rights discharge letters were generated when an offender ‘completed the term of parole.’”From Stevenson’s “convoluted” history of incarceration, parole, and re-arrest, the court concluded that Stevenson was not discharged from parole on either the drug trafficking charge or the attempted murder charge and sentenced Stevenson to 15 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Stevenson did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the letter in question pertained to those predicate convictions View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

Grainger, the victim of cyberattacks against its computer systems, isolated the source of the intrusions to a single internet protocol (IP) address, coming from a high-rise apartment building where disgruntled former employee Soybel lived. Grainger reported the attacks to the FBI, which obtained a court order under the Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. 3121, authorizing the installation of pen registers and “trap and trace” devices to monitor internet traffic in and out of the building generally and Soybel’s unit specifically. The pen registers were instrumental in confirming that Soybel unlawfully accessed Grainger’s system. The district court denied Soybel’s motion to suppress the pen-register evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Soybel’s convictions under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The use of a pen register to identify IP addresses visited by a criminal suspect is not a Fourth Amendment “search” that requires a warrant. IP pen registers are analogous in all material respects to the telephone pen registers that the Supreme Court upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge in 1979. The connection between Soybel’s IP address and external IP addresses was routed through a third party, an internet service provider. Soybel has no expectation of privacy in the captured routing information. The court distinguished historical cell-site location information, which implicates unique privacy interests that are absent here. The IP pen register had no ability to track Soybel’s past movements. View "United States v. Soybel" on Justia Law

Kenosha officers McDonough and Kinzer responded to a 911 call from an apartment building’s manager who reported that there was a woman inside Ferguson’s apartment who was “causing problems” and did not live there. McDonough spoke with Rupp-Kent who was alone inside Ferguson’s apartment and who reported that Ferguson had been violent with her. McDonough observed bruises on Rupp-Kent’s leg and neck and saw the knife Ferguson purportedly pointed at her. McDonough learned that Ferguson was on probation for robbery, had his driving privileges revoked, and drove a Chrysler. He reviewed Ferguson’s booking photo. McDonough, in his squad completing the paperwork, saw Ferguson drive past and followed. The parties dispute the events that occurred as McDonough attempted to arrest Ferguson. McDonough ultimately deployed his taser for five seconds.Ferguson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. McDonough moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained for a jury to decide. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. McDonough and Ferguson offered competing accounts and the dashcam video of the incident did not conclusively support either party’s account. Under one version of the events, Ferguson was not resisting and a reasonable officer would have known that an officer’s substantial escalation of force in response to an individual’s passive resistance violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against excessive force. View "Ferguson v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Ballard has a long and violent criminal history: the court listed 50 convictions between the age of 17 and his current age, over 50. In 2018, Ballard pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The judge determined Ballard was an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 232 months. Ballard appealed, arguing that two prior Illinois attempted residential burglary convictions were not violent felonies after the Supreme Court held the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause unconstitutional. At his 2019 resentencing, Ballard's guideline range was 33-41 months. The judge imposed a sentence of 108 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded.At the third sentencing, in 2020, Ballard's guidelines range was 33-41 months. The government and Ballard both recommended a sentence of 63 months. The judge sentenced Ballard to 92 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the judge failed to justify the 125% variance and failed to consider disparity and mitigation. The judge complied with the remand instructions, addressing the Sixth Circuit’s concerns specifically, in detail. The serious nature of the offense, Ballard’s age, the long and dramatic and dangerous criminal history, the continual recidivism, and the continued need for deterrence and incapacitation for the protection of the public, “overwhelm the relatively minor potential mitigating factors.” View "United States v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Chavez and her aunt owned a clothing store on the south side of Chicago where they sold socks and t-shirts out of the front and kilogram quantities of heroin and cocaine out of the back. In 2015, one of their customers started cooperating with federal law enforcement; eventually, Chavez was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin and distribution of heroin under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1). Chavez proceeded to trial where the cooperator’s testimony and videos he had recorded in the store were key pieces of evidence in the government’s case. The jury convicted Chavez; she was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecutor, during the rebuttal portion of closing argument, made a litany of improper statements vouching for the informant’s truthfulness, maligning her defense counsel, and inflaming the jury’s fears, and that she must be resentenced because the district court relied on inaccurate information in determining her sentence. The district court clarified its reasoning in its written statement of reasons, clarifying that the aggravating factor upon which it relied at sentencing was Chavez’s lack of economic need to commit the crime. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

On August 9, 2005, a group of men fired bullets into a crowd of rival gang members gathered outside a Wisconsin garage. There were no fatalities; three of the victims suffered gunshot wounds. The shooters wanted to prevent retaliation against members of their own gang, including Adeyanju’s brother, who had robbed members of the rival gang. Adeyanju was convicted of three counts each of attempted first‐degree intentional homicide and of endangering safety by use of a firearm. His primary defense was that he was not involved, as no physical evidence connected him to the crime, and that the state’s witnesses could not be trusted. Adeyanju’s counsel contended that the shooters—whoever they were—intended to scare but not to kill their rivals, so they were guilty of endangering safety but not attempted homicide.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Adeyanju’s habeas petition, rejecting an argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on a lesser‐included offense to attempted homicide—first‐degree recklessly endangering safety--so that the jury could have found that he was among the shooters but did not intend to kill anyone. The jury already had that option with the endangering safety by use of a firearm charge, which it chose not to take. Adeyanju failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s purported error. View "Adeyanju v. Wiersma" on Justia Law

Schutt, her children, and her boyfriend were driving into her Fort Wayne apartment complex when the car was hit with bullets; one grazed her boyfriend's scalp. Schutt saw her ex-boyfriend, Parker, shooting, wearing a red hooded sweatshirt. Other witnesses agreed about the hoodie and seeing a long gun. The police found ammunition and a spent shell casing. A Ford Fusion in the parking lot had a red hoodie lying inside. Parker appeared with the keys to the Ford, which contained Parker’s debit card and paperwork and a rifle in the trunk with ammunition in the chamber.Parker was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The owner of the Ford testified that on the day of the shooting she loaned the car to Parker, among others; the keys in Parker's possession were the only keys to the vehicle. She had never before seen the gun. Parker’s counsel asked the crime scene investigator if he collected DNA samples from the gun. The district court prohibited the question under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, noting that Parker was not challenging the reliability of any specific investigative steps but was impermissibly arguing generally that the investigation was shoddy because it did not attempt DNA testing. The police department’s latent fingerprint examiner testified that he found no prints of value on the gun or magazine.After his conviction, the court sentenced Parker to 114 months in prison. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected a Confrontation Clause argument. It is beyond reasonable doubt that any exclusion of cross-examination about the DNA evidence did not contribute to the verdict obtained. The evidence of Parker’s guilt was overwhelming. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

A store employee overheard his coworker talking with Matthews about a pipe bomb that they had detonated the previous day; they discussed where to place another bomb that Matthews apparently had with him. Long called the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office and told Sergeant Becherer that Matthews was a frequent customer and that he knew Matthews owned a “highly modified” AR-15 with a silencer, lived in a trailer behind “the old Fin & Feather Restaurant,” worked on cars in the shed, and had “free reign of the property.” Someone living near the restaurant had called the Sheriff's Office about an explosion. Matthews’s social media posts showed that he possessed explosives. Nothing in the warrant complaint or affidavit explained why Becherer or the State’s Attorney believed Matthews had access to all structures and buildings. The judge heard their testimony and signed the warrant covering all buildings and structures on the former restaurant property. An hour later, a team searched the property and found multiple firearms, silencers, a pipe bomb, and more explosive materials.Matthews, present during the search, was charged with possessing a machine gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), an unregistered silencer, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and an unregistered short-barreled rifle. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of a motion to suppress. An objectively reasonable officer, having consulted with the State’s Attorney in preparing the complaint and affidavit, could have relied in good faith on the search warrant, which, although incomplete, was not utterly lacking in indicia of probable cause. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Hopper was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 50 or more grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 846, and 841(b)(1)(B). The court sentenced Hopper to 235 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court had committed plain error in the calculation of the drug quantity for which Hopper was responsible. The district court ordered a revised presentence report, which reduced to 1.17 kilograms the amount of “ice” methamphetamine for which Hopper was responsible and assessed an additional criminal history point for a state burglary conviction, the plea for which was entered after the original federal sentencing but before the remand. Hopper submitted a pro se objection, arguing that a jury, not the court, should make the determination that the drugs at issue qualified as “ice” under the Sentencing Guidelines. He did not object to the additional criminal history point. The court rejected his challenge, reasoning that the issue of drug type, as opposed to drug quantity, already had been decided in the first appeal. The court reimposed a sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Hopper’s arguments that the district court committed plain error in both the determination of the drug type and in the assessment of the additional criminal history point for the state burglary conviction. The earlier remand order did not permit reconsideration of Hopper’s argument about the drug type. View "United States v. Hopper" on Justia Law