Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dean, incarcerated since 2012, developed kidney cancer. Seven months after he first presented symptoms, Dean had kidney-removal surgery. The cancer had already spread to his liver, Dean remains terminally ill. Dean sued his doctors and their employer, Wexford, a private corporation that contracts to provide healthcare to Illinois inmates, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Dean cited delays in his diagnosis and treatment, caused by his doctors’ failure to arrange timely off-site care, and on a policy that requires Wexford’s corporate office to pre-approve off-site care.A jury awarded $1 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages, which was reduced to $7 million. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Dean has endured great suffering, but he did not produce enough evidence to hold any of the defendants liable for violating the Eighth Amendment. Dean’s claim against Wexford hinged on two expert reports from another case that critique the medical care, and process for medical care, that Illinois provides, through Wexford, to its prisoners. Those reports are hearsay, but the district court allowed Dean to use them for a non-hearsay purpose: to prove that Wexford had prior notice of the negative assessments of its review policy. One report postdated all events relevant to Dean and could not have given Wexford prior notice. The other report alone was insufficient to hold Wexford liable under the exacting “Monell” requirements in this single-incident case. View "Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Kurzynowski pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography. He admitted to officers that he spent years in internet chatrooms discussing sexual behavior involving minors and that his sexual interest focused on 10-13-year-old boys. His more recent online conversations explored fantasies of cooking and eating children. In 2015, the district court sentenced Kurzynowski to 96 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Kurzynowski moved for compassionate release under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing his hypertension, diabetes, and obesity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. The fact that Kurzynowski is vaccinated precludes a finding that the COVID-19 pandemic presents extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. The district court properly recognized that the need to protect the public, “especially the most vulnerable members, children,” was particularly significant with Kurzynowski because his crimes “were motivated by his depraved sexual appetite toward young children, a pathology for which he has not received medical, psychological, or spiritual treatment.” The district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not err or abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Kurzynowski" on Justia Law

Believing that Sammons had stolen his girlfriend’s jewelry, Price called the house in Indianapolis where Sammons was staying and announced that he was coming to get the jewelry back—by force, if necessary. In trying to gain entrance, Price fired a revolver several times through the door, hitting Smith in the leg, then dropped the revolver and fled. When police caught him, they found a Taurus pistol. Price pleaded guilty to possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The factual basis proffered in support of the plea identifies possessing the Taurus pistol as the crime of conviction. The PSR recommended that the judge add four offense levels under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which applies when the defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense” (shooting into an occupied house). The court sentenced Price to 110 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit remanded based on the district court’s failure to make an essential finding connecting the Taurus pistol to the shooting. The judge did not declare that the sentence is independent of section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), so the error cannot be found to be harmless. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Wilber was convicted of a 2004 murder and was sentenced to life in prison. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction in Wisconsin state court, Wilber sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2554, arguing that he was deprived of his right to due process when he was visibly shackled before the jury during closing arguments. The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision sustaining the shackling order amounted to an unreasonable application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision, “Deck v. Missouri.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Neither the trial judge nor the state appellate court ever articulated a reason why Wilber had to be visibly restrained in the jury’s presence, so the shackling decision ran afoul of Deck. Wilber was visibly restrained at a key phase of the trial, when the prosecution highlighted evidence that, in the moments leading up to the murder, Wilber’s behavior was “wild,” “crazy,” “possessed,” and “out of control,” so Wilber was prejudiced by the shackling error. The restraints would have suggested to the jury that the court itself perceived Wilber to be incapable of self-control and to pose such a danger that he must be manacled in order to protect others in the courtroom, including the jurors. View "Wilber v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Palladinetti and others purchased 30 Chicago-area apartment buildings and resold individual apartments as condominiums. Using a process that Palladinetti helped create, his co-defendants bought the buildings, falsely representing to lenders that they had made down payments. Palladinetti served as his co-defendants’ attorney for the purchases and sales and as the registered agent for LLCs formed to facilitate the scheme. The group recruited buyers for the condominiums and prepared their mortgage applications, misrepresenting facts to ensure they qualified for the loans.Palladinetti and his co-defendants were charged with seven counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) and (2), and nine counts of making false statements on loan applications, 18 U.S.C. 1014 and 2. Count one involved a $345,000 mortgage that Palladinetti’s wife obtained for the purchase of a residence. That mortgage application was prepared using the group’s fraudulent scheme in July 2005. The government agreed to dismiss all other counts if Palladinetti were convicted on count one. Because Palladinetti stipulated to almost all elements of section 1344(1), the trial was limited to whether the bank he defrauded was insured by the FDIC when the mortgage application was submitted.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The testimony and exhibits demonstrated that one entity was continuously insured, 1997-2008, that on the date the mortgage was executed that entity was “Washington Mutual Bank” and also did business as “Washington Mutual Bank, FA,” and that entity was the lender for the mortgage at issue. View "United States v. Palladinetti" on Justia Law

Wood served time in Indiana state prison for methamphetamine‐related offenses. He was released on parole, subject to conditions, including that he was subject to "reasonable" searches, Wood violated his parole by failing to report to his supervising officer. The Parole Board issued an arrest warrant. Agents arrested Wood at his home. Agent Gentry secured Wood with wrist restraints, conducted a frisk search, and noticed Wood repeatedly turning toward his cellphone, which was lying nearby. Gentry picked up the cellphone and handed it to Agent Rains. Wood demanded that his cellphone be turned off and began to physically resist Gentry. Rains felt something “lumpy” on the back of Wood’s cellphone, removed the back cover, and found a packet of a substance which Rains believed to be methamphetamine. Wood admitted the substance was methamphetamine. A later search of the home revealed syringes and other drug paraphernalia.Seven days after Wood’s arrest, an Indiana Department of Correction investigator performed a warrantless search of Wood’s cellphone, which revealed child pornography. The investigator forwarded the information to the FBI, which obtained a search‐and‐seizure warrant for Wood’s cellphone and its contents. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B), Wood unsuccessfully moved to suppress the data extracted from his cellphone. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given Wood’s diminished expectation of privacy and Indiana’s strong governmental interests, the search of Wood’s cellphone was reasonable. View "United States v. Wood" on Justia Law

Lovies, wielding a gun, stole Butler’s car as she was filling it with gasoline. Along with three other individuals, including a minor, Lovies kidnapped Butler and took her from Indianapolis to Cincinnati while threatening to kill her. The others accepted plea agreements. Lovies was convicted of kidnapping, carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), 2119, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c( and was sentenced to an imprisonment term of 388 months within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In rejecting Lovies’s Batson challenge, the district court found the prosecutors credible and their explanation for exercising the challenged peremptory strike to be plausible--that the prospective juror kept falling asleep. The court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The district court’s factual findings were also adequate to support the application of the sentencing enhancements for use of a minor to commit the offense, and for his role in the offense. Any error with respect to the calculation of Lovies’s Guidelines range would be harmless. View "United States v. Lovies" on Justia Law

Plunkett sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant and was charged with distributing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). Convictions for offenses under section 841(b)(1)(C) carry a default statutory maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. After Plunkett pleaded not guilty, the government notified the court under 21 U.S.C. 851 that Plunkett had a 2008 Illinois felony conviction for unlawful delivery of cocaine and asserted that the prior conviction qualified as a predicate “felony drug offense” under 841(b)(1)(C) that subjected Plunkett to an increased statutory maximum prison term of 30 years for his federal drug offense.Plunkett’s subsequent plea agreement stated that he qualified as a career offender and that his U.S.S.G. advisory range was 188-235 months’ imprisonment. Plunkett waived his rights to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction or sentence, with limited exceptions. Among these, Plunkett preserved his right to seek collateral review based on any subsequent change in the interpretation of the law declared retroactive that renders him actually innocent of the charges. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Plunkett’s appeal of the denial of his section 2241 collateral attack on his 212-month sentence as barred by the appellate waiver. The court rejected Plunkett's argument that the exception to his appellate waiver refers to the applicable sentence enhancement View "Plunkett v. Sproul" on Justia Law

McClain pleaded guilty to drug charges and violating the conditions of his supervised release. He was also sentenced in state court to 20 years for failure to report an accident involving death. He was sentenced to 120 months in the distribution case; 24 months to be served concurrent to the state sentence and the remaining 96 months consecutive to it. In his delivery case, the court imposed a sentence of 24 months consecutive to both the distribution and state sentences. In 2013, the Seventh Circuit vacated: the district court resentenced McClain. The written judgments, however, were inconsistent with the oral pronouncements. In 2016, following U.S.S.G. Amendment 782, McClain's distribution sentence was reduced, under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), to 70 months, to run concurrent to the delivery sentence; 24 months would run concurrent to the state sentence. In 2021, the court corrected the 2016 errors.McClain was scheduled to be released in June 2021. In April, he moved in with his family and secured employment. Meanwhile, the government moved under FRCP 36, to correct clerical errors in the judgment. The district court entered an amended judgment in the distribution case. McClain was sent back to prison to serve 18 additional months. The Seventh Circuit ordered McClain’s release and vacated. The changes to his sentences were not merely clerical, so the district court erred by “correcting” the sentences under Rule 36. View "United States v. McClain" on Justia Law

Wilks, indicted for possessing a firearm as a prohibited person, was released on bond with conditions, including home confinement with limited exceptions. A superseding indictment in an earlier-filed drug-trafficking case added Wilks as a defendant. The new indictment included the original firearm charge; his bond and release conditions were carried over. Wilks obtained the court’s permission to leave his home near Indianapolis to stay overnight in Centralia, Illinois for medical appointments, a family wedding, and religious services. He went to a bar in Mount Vernon, where a fatal shooting occurred. The government moved to revoke Wilks’s release for violating his release conditions prohibiting any contact with codefendants and requiring him to promptly report any contact with law enforcement. The district judge viewed a video of Wilks in the bar and revoked Wilks’s release, finding that Wilks had violated his home-confinement condition as amended by the order allowing his visit to Centralia.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. A finding that the defendant violated a release condition does not alone permit revocation; the judge must make findings under 18 U.S.C. 3148(b)(1) and (b)(2) before he may revoke release. Though it was not improper for the judge to reframe the inquiry, Wilks’s counsel did not have an opportunity to address the specific issue that the judge was concerned about. The judge did not explain why detention was necessary under section 3148(b)(2). View "United States v. Wilks" on Justia Law