Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) asked the Southern District of Indiana to oversee a multidistrict litigation docket to coordinate discovery and other pretrial proceedings in thousands of medical product-liability suits, alleging that Cook’s inferior vena cava (IVC) filters were defective. The court and the parties agreed to a procedure by which new plaintiffs could join the MDL by filing directly in the Southern District of Indiana rather than filing in their home districts and waiting for the judiciary’s administrative machinery to transfer their cases to the MDL in Indiana. The plaintiffs filed their lawsuits directly in the Indiana MDL rather than filing in the states where they lived and had their IVC filters implanted.Cook moved to dismiss both cases based on Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The plaintiffs’ home states (South Carolina and Mississippi) have three-year statutes. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suits. The unique facts of this case indicate that Cook implicitly consented to using choice-of-law rules for these plaintiffs as if they had filed in their home states. It was not fair to allow Cook to change positions retroactively to dismiss these plaintiffs’ cases that had been timely filed under the “law of the case.” View "Looper v. Cook Inc." on Justia Law

DEA obtained a search warrant for Perryman’s Indianapolis home. Agents arrived at the property, read Perryman his Miranda rights, then searched the home. In the master suite, they found fentanyl, baggies, a digital scale, and a loaded AR-15 rifle, three to four steps away from the fentanyl, along with men’s shoes and clothes. Perryman’s girlfriend, Moore, lived elsewhere but had signed the lease for the home. Moore said that the drugs, money, and gun were not hers. The agents read Perryman his Miranda rights for a second time. He agreed to talk. He admitted that the drugs were his, then provided the agents with the name of his drug supplier but said the rifle “belonged to a girlfriend.”Perryman was indicted for possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), and possessing a firearm while a convicted felon, 922(g)(1). The court excluded questioning concerning the disciplinary record of Sergeant Jones, who participated in the search of Perryman’s home. Jones’ 15-year-old disciplinary offense resulted in a reprimand and stemmed from an unrelated investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Perryman’s convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and, under the Confrontation Clause, to the exclusion of evidence relating to Jones’ disciplinary record. View "United States v. Perryman" on Justia Law

Von Kahl is serving a life sentence, plus consecutive terms of 10 and five years’ imprisonment, for murdering two deputy U.S. Marshals and related crimes. The Bureau of Prisons originally calculated his release date as February 2013. In 1994, the Bureau recalculated his release date as February 2023. Von Kahl contested the calculation of his release date 28 U.S.C. 2241. Von Kahl, whose crime predates the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act, is subject to the 1976 Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. 4201–28, and was eligible for parole as soon as he was sentenced. The Parole Commission denied him release. He contends that he is now entitled to mandatory release under section 4206(d), which caps how long anyone must serve unless the inmate has seriously or frequently violated institutional rules or that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any crime.The Seventh Circuit upheld the 2023 release date. The statute says that a life term is treated the same as a 45-year term, so anyone sentenced to life is presumptively released after 30 years but, unless paroled earlier, a prisoner must serve two-thirds or 30 years of “each consecutive term or terms.” Von Kahl is serving three consecutive terms: life, ten years, and five years. Thirty years for the life term, plus two-thirds of each term of years, adds to 40 years, running through February 2023. View "Von Kahl v. Segal" on Justia Law

Police were called when a highly-inebriated Gupta became belligerent while trying to enter a hotel at which he was not a guest. Surveillance video shows Gupta stumbling around and knocking over a brochure rack. A police officer, attempting to move Gupta outside, tugged on his handcuffed arm causing him to fall on his head and chest and fracture a vertebra in his neck. The officer then picked Gupta up by the arms and dragged him to the sidewalk. The officer asserts that he used a reasonable amount of force because Gupta was resisting arrest. Gupta asserts that he was not resisting the arrest, and was intoxicated, unsteady on his feet, and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. The video does not show Gupta stiffening or jerking himself away from the officer.The Seventh Circuit reversed an order granting the defendant summary judgment on Gupta’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claim. There are material disputes of fact that make resolution of this case on summary judgment inappropriate. View "Gupta v. Melloh" on Justia Law

Chambers appealed the denial of two petitions for habeas corpus, asserting that he was denied due process in prison disciplinary hearings. Chambers lost good-time credit for one incident of refusing a prison guard’s instructions to provide a urine sample, disobeying a staff member’s order, and acting with insolence towards the staff member and another incident of interfering with a security device (he had activated a cell alarm by forcibly kicking his cell door). The hearing officers discounted Chambers’s claim that the guard never asked for a sample, noting video evidence that the guard was carrying a sample bottle and found Chambers guilty based on his undisputed statement to the guard that he was not in distress or having a medical emergency when he kicked his cell door.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The disciplinary determinations were supported by sufficient evidence. Chambers had no due-process right to call witnesses whose testimony would be repetitive and irrelevant. The record lacked any evidence of bias and the initial reviews of Chambers’s cases by a one-member Unit Disciplinary Committee complied with BOP rules. Federal courts must affirm prison disciplinary decisions if they are supported by “some evidence,” and the incident reports cleared that low bar. “Chambers, a frequent litigant, is warned that he risks monetary sanctions if he continues to repeat in future cases these arguments that we have found to be frivolous.” View "Chambers v. Ciolli" on Justia Law

Anderson rode with Cooper and Jackson to a Chicago sandwich shop. The trio entered the shop. Inside were customers Hazziez and Hart and several cooks, behind a glass wall. While waiting for food, Jackson sold two dime bags of crack cocaine to an unknown person outside the shop. Hart confronted Anderson’s group, stating it wasn’t their turf and they shouldn’t be selling drugs there. The argument moved outside. Anderson shot Hart three times. Hazziez, having witnessed the shooting, jumped in his car and took off. As Hazziez drove away, he heard three more shots.Anderson was convicted of first-degree murder of Hart, attempted first-degree murder of Hazziez, and aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by Hazziez. His first-degree murder conviction was affirmed. Because of an erroneous jury instruction, the attempted murder conviction was reversed. The court entered judgment on the aggravated discharge of a firearm count. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Anderson then sought federal habeas relief, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his aggravated-discharge conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Illinois Appellate Court reasonably applied U.S. Supreme Court precedent in upholding Anderson’s conviction by pointing to trial testimony supporting an inference that Anderson was shooting at Hazziez. View "Anderson v. Brookhart" on Justia Law

Owens was charged with the distribution and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2)l after a government investigator used a confidential software program, Torrential Downpour Receptor (TDR), to download a video file containing child pornography from a folder shared via the BitTorrent network at an IP address later associated with Owens. A forensic search of Owens’s computer when he was arrested failed to locate the file on his computer. Owens unsuccessfully moved, under FRCP 16, to compel the production of information relating to the government’s download of the file.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Owens suffered no prejudice from the denial. The government presented evidence that undermined Owens’s proffered “false positive” theory, which the district court was entitled to credit. The court did not clearly err when it accepted testimony that the torrent relating to the target file had been opened in Owens’s BitComet application while the investigation was occurring, and evidence that a file with the same filename as the illicit video was present in Owens’s “most recently used” folder. This testimony was based on forensic analysis of Owens’s computer, which the government produced to the defense. Owens cannot demonstrate that access to TDR would “substantially alter the quantum of proof in his favor. View "United States v. Owens" on Justia Law

Yang pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Before his sentencing hearing, Yang objected to the inclusion of one ounce of methamphetamine in the drug-quantity calculation listed in the PSR. The prosecutor cited an audio file of a recorded phone call between Yang and a co-conspirator that supported the PSR’s inclusion of the one ounce of methamphetamine in the drug-quantity calculation. Yang and his counsel acknowledged that they had listened to the recording before sentencing. The court overruled Yang’s objection and sentenced Yang to 30 months’ imprisonment, 21 months below the bottom of the applicable guidelines range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Yang’s argument that the district court committed reversible error because it considered an audio file at sentencing that was not publicly available on the court’s electronic docket. District courts routinely review evidence at sentencing that is not publicly available on the court’s docket. The federal judiciary’s case management-electronic case filing system does not support the submission of audio files; like other exhibits not available electronically on the system, audio files are maintained by the district court, which transmits those files to the court of appeals if requested. That happened here. View "United States v. Yang" on Justia Law

Following an investigation of an Indianapolis‐based drug trafficking organization, the government secured a warrant to search Zamudio’s residence, where they found large amounts of methamphetamine, a digital scale, and a loaded firearm. Zamudio pled guilty to two drug‐related offenses and was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. Zamudio challenged the calculation of his base offense level based on the amount of drugs attributed to him, the court’s application of a 2‐level firearm enhancement. and the court’s application of a 2‐level enhancement for maintaining drug premises.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on the government’s factual basis for the plea, the PSR, and an agent’s testimony, the district court found that Zamudio coordinated the sale of drugs to co‐conspirators, agreed (in text messages) to assist his brother in all aspects of the conspiracy, allowed large amounts of drugs and drug proceeds to be stored in his home; served as an interpreter in drug transactions, and picked up drug proceeds and wired the proceeds to the source in Mexico. Zamudio played a large role in the conspiracy; the drug amounts were reasonably foreseeable to him. Because the gun was found in close proximity to illegal drugs, it is presumed to have been used in connection with the drug trafficking offense. View "United States v. Zamudio" on Justia Law

Moreland, convicted of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance, unsuccessfully appealed. On August 11, 2013, his direct review ended when the opportunity to file a certiorari petition in the U.S. Supreme Court expired. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, he had one year from that date to file a federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Moreland sought collateral postconviction relief in state court on July 30, 2014. On March 7, 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Moreland’s petition for review. All 586 days of the state postconviction process were tolled.Moreland filed a federal habeas petition on March 28, 2016, nine days after the one-year statute of limitations elapsed; 374 untolled days had elapsed since the end of Moreland’s direct review. Moreland’s petition raised claims related to due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to a fair and impartial jury. Moreland alleged that the time for filing his petition should be equitably tolled because he suffered from schizophrenia, and on several occasions, was unable to research his case due to lack of access to the prison library.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Moreland has not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence to warrant equitable tolling. The court rejected claims that the district court should have tolled the time connected with motions for postconviction discovery and for reconsideration. View "Moreland v. Eplett" on Justia Law