Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In this case, the defendant, Patrick Thompson, was convicted of making false statements about his loans to financial institutions. Thompson took out three loans from a bank totaling $219,000. After the bank failed, its receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and a loan servicer, Planet Home, attempted to recoup the money owed by Thompson. However, Thompson disputed the loan balance, insisting that he had only borrowed $110,000. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of making false statements to influence the FDIC and a mortgage lending business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.On appeal, Thompson argued that his statements were not “false” under § 1014 because they were literally true, and that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him. He also claimed that the government constructively amended the indictment and that the district court lacked the authority to order him to pay restitution to the FDIC.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Thompson's arguments and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that under its precedent, § 1014 criminalizes misleading representations, and Thompson's statements were misleading. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Thompson's conviction and that the indictment was not constructively amended. Finally, the court held that the district court properly awarded restitution to the FDIC, as the FDIC had suffered a financial loss as a direct and proximate result of Thompson's false statements. View "USA v. Thompson" on Justia Law

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This case concerns Johnnie Wesley, who was brought in for questioning by Wisconsin police in connection with a murder investigation. Wesley invoked his right to remain silent during the initial interrogation, and the interrogation ceased. However, he was interrogated two more times, during which he made incriminating statements implicating himself in the murder. Wesley was subsequently charged with felony murder. He moved to suppress the incriminating statements on two grounds: (1) the officers did not honor his initial invocation of his right to remain silent, and (2) he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The motion was denied and Wesley was convicted. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was dismissed.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent to Wesley’s case. The court determined that Wesley's right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored" after he invoked it during the first interrogation, and that he did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The court reasoned that Wesley's statements during the third interrogation could reasonably be interpreted as exculpatory, rather than as an invocation of silence. View "Wesley v. Hepp" on Justia Law

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In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court looked at the appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The defendant, Johneak Johnson, was indicted for possessing a firearm as a person previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government appealed a pretrial ruling by the District Court, which excluded evidence of a laser sight attached to the firearm. The District Court had ruled that the evidence would cause unfair prejudice to the defendant, outweighing its probative value. The government's proposal to limit the laser sight evidence to reduce any risk of unfair prejudice was also denied by the District Court.The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, ruling that the District Court had incorrectly assessed the balance between the probative value of the laser sight evidence and the risk of unfair prejudice. The Court of Appeals held that the laser sight evidence was central to proving a key disputed element of the offense – possession of the firearm. It also found that the laser sight evidence tended to corroborate the testimony of the government's eyewitnesses, which was critical given the defense's intended strategy of attacking their credibility.The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the District Court's assessment of the risk of unfair prejudice, holding that the government's proposed limits on the laser sight evidence should minimize any risk that it will cause the jury to view the defendant as unduly dangerous. Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding the laser sight evidence under Rule 403 and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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This case involves the appeal of a judgment convicting Byron Pierson of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Pierson contested the decision, arguing that the district court erred by not holding a hearing to determine if he had knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights when he entered into a proffer agreement with the government. Furthermore, he argued that the court erred by allowing a witness to testify about the investigation that led to his arrest. The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions.The case began when an Indianapolis Police Officer responded to a 911 call from a woman who reported that Pierson threatened to "come back and shoot the house up." After learning about Pierson's criminal record and obtaining a description of his car, the officer decided to return to the woman's home later that evening. Upon returning, the officer saw the car described by the woman and initiated a traffic stop. Pierson was in the back seat of the car. When asked to step out of the car, Pierson hesitated and then fled on foot when an attempt was made to handcuff him. During the ensuing chase, officers saw a firearm under Pierson's body, which was later retrieved and used as evidence against him.Prior to his trial, Pierson had entered into plea negotiations with the government, signing a Proffer Letter that waived certain rights. After admitting possession of the firearm in two proffer sessions, Pierson withdrew his plea and decided to go to trial. Pierson moved to exclude statements he made during these plea negotiations, arguing that he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.The Court of Appeals found that Pierson failed to provide an evidentiary basis for his assertion that he had not knowingly and voluntarily entered into the proffer agreement. Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, the court did not find it necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing, and the proffer waiver was deemed valid. The court also noted that the government never sought to introduce any of Pierson's proffer statements at trial, meaning any potential error in refusing to hold a hearing was harmless.Additionally, Pierson contended that the district court erred in allowing the government to present evidence about the investigation that led to his arrest. The court found that Pierson had opened the door to this testimony in his opening statement by referencing a complaint made by his ex-girlfriend. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony, and immediately gave a limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of this evidence.Given the strong evidence of Pierson's guilt, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decisions. View "USA v. Pierson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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This case involves Daryl McGhee, who was charged with several federal offenses related to possession of a firearm and cocaine. The charges arose after the police received a 911 call from McGhee's wife reporting domestic violence and alleging that McGhee had left their house carrying a gun and a leather bag. The police followed footprints in the snow to find McGhee and later found the bag, which contained the gun and cocaine, under a nearby dumpster. During the trial, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois issued an order prohibiting McGhee from testifying about the domestic violence incident, even to deny the allegation, threatening to jail him and his defense counsel if they violated the order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that while the district court's decision to limit McGhee's testimony was valid as it avoided turning the trial into a domestic dispute, the order was overly broad as it completely silenced McGhee, leaving the jury to potentially conclude that he did hit his wife. Despite this, the appellate court concluded that the exclusionary order did not have a substantial influence over the jury and did not result in a verdict inconsistent with substantial justice. The court expressed concerns about the district court's treatment of McGhee's defense counsel but ultimately affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. McGhee" on Justia Law

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The defendant-appellant, Rickey Claybron, was convicted on counts of Hobbs Act robbery and firearm-related offenses. He appealed his sentence, arguing that Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and that a retroactive amendment in the Sentencing Guidelines should have been applied to lower his criminal history category and consequently, his sentencing range. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Claybron's firearm-related convictions, ruling that Hobbs Act robbery does qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c). However, the court agreed with Claybron's argument about the retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. It ruled that because the amendment would reduce his Guidelines range and it was retroactive, Claybron's sentence for the robbery counts should be reconsidered. The court found that remand for resentencing was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, given the lower Guidelines range Claybron would have had if the amendment had been in effect at sentencing. Consequently, while Claybron's convictions and sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were affirmed, the sentence imposed on his convictions for the Hobbs Act robbery counts was vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of the Sentencing Guidelines amendments. View "USA v. Claybron" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the sentencing of Senque Bingham, who had pleaded guilty to drug offenses. Bingham had requested "safety-valve" relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) at sentencing, meaning he sought a sentence below the statutory minimum because he met certain criteria, including not having possessed a firearm in connection with his offense. However, the district court found Bingham ineligible for safety-valve relief, because he fulfilled the criteria for a firearms enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which applies if a dangerous weapon was possessed in connection with the offense.The appellate court found that the district court had erroneously conflated the scope of the safety-valve no-firearms condition with the broader scope of the Sentencing Guidelines firearms enhancement. The court clarified that the safety-valve no-firearms condition is narrower than the firearms enhancement, as the latter may apply even if a co-conspirator's possession of a firearm was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, but not induced by them. The court held that eligibility for a firearms enhancement does not automatically disqualify a defendant from safety-valve relief.Because the district court's error in conflating these two provisions could have affected its sentencing decision, the Court of Appeals could not determine whether the error was harmless. Thus, the court vacated Bingham's sentence and remanded the case back to the district court for resentencing. View "USA v. Bingham" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case, the defendant, Michael Angelo Tovar, was found guilty of various drug and firearm charges and was sentenced to 101 months in prison. He appealed his sentence, raising three issues: one surrounding his attempts to withdraw his guilty plea for the firearm charges and two concerning the calculation of his sentence.Tovar had sold cocaine to a confidential source twice and was arrested with cocaine and a large amount of cash on his person. A subsequent search of his home found further cash, a firearm, ammunition, and more drugs. Tovar pleaded guilty to all charges but later attempted to withdraw his guilty plea for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, arguing that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied these motions but removed his counsel from the case.Tovar also contested the district court's calculation of his sentence. The court had applied a "controlled substance offense" enhancement based on Tovar's prior Illinois cannabis conviction and had converted the cash found on Tovar's person and in his home to its equivalent marijuana weight as suspected drug proceeds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. It found no error in the district court's denial of Tovar's motions to withdraw his guilty plea and the calculation of his sentence, including the application of the "controlled substance offense" enhancement and the conversion of the cash to its equivalent marijuana weight. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying Tovar's request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. View "USA v. Tovar" on Justia Law

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In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, the defendant, Henry Underwood, had chosen to represent himself in a trial where he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. During the trial, Underwood refused to answer a question during cross-examination and was subsequently held in criminal contempt. He was convicted of the charged offense and appealed against the conviction, arguing that his pretrial waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary and that the criminal contempt finding was improper.The court rejected both arguments. First, it found that the defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. It took into consideration the extent of the court's formal inquiry into the defendant's waiver, evidence in the record showing the defendant understood the dangers of self-representation, the defendant's background and experience, and the context of the choice to proceed pro se.Secondly, the court found that the criminal contempt finding was appropriate because the defendant had improperly refused to testify on cross-examination in the judge’s presence, which met the literal requirements of Rule 42(b) that permits summary disposition of criminal contempt. Furthermore, the court held that by choosing to testify, the defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and could not refuse to answer questions relevant to his testimony.The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Underwood" on Justia Law

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In this case, the defendant, Miguel Navarrete, a felon, was charged with possessing a firearm, which he could not lawfully do. Navarrete was arraigned, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced by video under the CARES Act, which permitted such proceedings during the COVID-19 pandemic. He consented to the video proceedings during the arraignment and guilty plea, and all necessary findings were made. He was sentenced to 58 months’ imprisonment, a term below the range calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines. Navarrete appealed the sentence, arguing that he should be resentenced because he did not appear personally in court and did not formally consent on the record to the video sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's argument did not meet the requirements for "plain error" reversal. The court reasoned that Navarrete had, in fact, enjoyed the substantial part of the entitlement secured by Rule 43(a), and the absence of a formal consent on the record to a video appearance that was evidently voluntary on the defendant’s part did not call the justice system into disrepute. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that failure to obtain on-the-record consent for video sentencing was a structural error that required automatic reversal. The court held such an error to be a "discrete defect," not affecting the entire conduct of the proceedings or necessarily rendering the outcome unreliable. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's sentencing decision. View "USA v. Navarrete" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law