Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Skaggs was charged with 12 counts related to his production and possession of child pornography, based on evidence found in thumb drives seized from him during a warrantless border search at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. The district court denied a motion to suppress, convicted Skaggs of all counts. Believing a life sentence was mandatory because of his prior state conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor, the court sentenced him to life in prison.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No court has ever required more than reasonable suspicion for a border search An investigation revealed that Skaggs had a prior sexual misconduct conviction; traveled abroad multiple times and was involved with overseas orphanages; posted suggestive pictures on Facebook of himself with young girls; was the director of Ukrainian Angels, whose name appeared to be borrowed from a well-known child pornography website; and was suspected of child sex tourism and traveling to Ukraine to meet minors. Skaggs lied during his customs interview, stating that he had no thumb drives with him. These facts, taken together, give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court said it would have imposed a life sentence in any event and discussed the section 3553(a) factors that supported the sentence, any error was harmless. View "United States v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

Wisconsin inmate Zimmerman filed a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Though “far from clear and very abbreviated,” the complaint seemed to contend that Corrections Officer Bornick had it out for him because of grievances Zimmerman had filed concerning Bornick. Zimmerman also seemed to allege that he had received an undeserved warning from Bornick, who also confiscated about $100 worth of Zimmerman’s property and issued a conduct report that led to 16 days of disciplinary confinement.The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) and determined that Zimmerman failed to state a claim; the complaint did not establish a causal relationship between Bornick’s actions and any protected speech. Deciding that any amendment to the complaint would be futile because Zimmerman’s allegations were thorough, the district court dismissed it with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court was wrong not to dismiss the complaint but absent a clear indication of futility or some extraordinary circumstance, litigants, including prisoners, should have the opportunity to try again by filing an amended complaint. The district court may have held Zimmerman to a pleading standard beyond that required by the Federal Rules and, regardless, should have given him a second try. View "Zimmerman v. Bornick" on Justia Law

Howell was convicted on two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to concurrent 96‐month terms. In 2020, the Seventh Circuit vacated one conviction and remanded. The 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) permits federal courts to conduct by video teleconference some criminal proceedings that otherwise require the defendant’s physical presence in court, including felony resentencing. The court must make certain findings; the defendant must consent after consulting with counsel.At a video conference status hearing attended by Howell, the court stated that it needed Howell’s consent to issue a CARES Act order for sentencing by video teleconference. The court delayed the resentencing to allow Howell’s counsel to confer with him. The court issued a CARES Act order saying that “Howell moved to proceed with a video‐conference resentencing,” and made the necessary findings. There is no record of that motion. During the hearing, Howell’s counsel acknowledged that she had had the opportunity to speak with Howell about the hearing. Neither Howell nor his counsel objected to the video teleconference hearing. The judge reimposed a 96‐month prison term. Howell had already served 96 months' imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record sufficiently indicated that Howell was informed his consent was required; that he conferred with his counsel; and that the judge, lawyers, and Howell proceeded with the understanding that Howell had consented to the video teleconference. View "United States v. Howell" on Justia Law

Sanders, a severely mentally ill inmate, has been in the custody of the Illinois Department of Correction since 2004. For eight years, he was in solitary confinement, where his mental health deteriorated. Sanders has attempted suicide and engaged in self-harm multiple times. He claims that self-mutilation was a pre-condition for solitary confinement inmates to speak with a mental health person. Sanders filed suit and applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows indigent prisoners to bring suits without prepaying the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner who has three strikes—actions or appeals dismissed for being “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim”—can only proceed without prepayment if he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Sanders cited the “imminent danger exception.”The district court initially granted his IFP application but later revoked its grant, finding that none of Sanders’s allegations demonstrated that he was in imminent danger. The Seventh Circuit reinstated his IFP status. Sanders adequately alleged his belief that certain practices at the Pontiac Correctional Center would lead him to self-harm. The district court erroneously determined that the allegations were fraudulent and did so without explicitly considering whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate. View "Sanders v. Melvin" on Justia Law

In 2004, Johnson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on his prior convictions, the district court found that he qualified for a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him to 275 months in prison. The 2015 Supreme Court “Johnson “ decision held that the so‐called “residual clause” of the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, Johnson moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence on the grounds that it was based on the ACCA’s now‐defunct residual clause.The district court denied his motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Despite the Supreme Court’s holding, Johnson’s sentence is proper if he has at least three prior convictions that qualify for enhancement under the provisions of the ACCA which that decision left undisturbed: the “violent felony” and “serious drug offense” provisions. Johnson does have at least three such convictions. He did not challenge that his prior drug and burglary convictions qualified as ACCA predicates; Indiana’s criminal deviate conduct offense is divisible and that the forcible compulsion variety of that offense requires sufficient force and intent to qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The court did not address an escape conviction. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

Gooch alleged that correctional officers Young and Wilson falsely informed another inmate that Gooch had stolen from him and directed the inmate to “take action”; the inmate then attacked Gooch with a weapon. When Gooch defended himself, Wilson intervened and instructed Gooch to lie on the floor, where the inmate attacked him again. Gooch asked his correctional counselor for the form on which to file a grievance against the officers. Gooch asserts that his counselor refused to give him the form, stating “you better watch out snitching on staff.” Over the next two days, “multiple guards” walked by his cell, calling him a “rat” and making threats.Three days later, Gooch filed a “Bivens action,” which was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. Exhaustion is not required when the responsible prison officials refuse to give a prisoner the necessary grievance form or thwart a prisoner from filing a grievance through threats or intimidation. Gooch attested that he feared for his life if he continued with the administrative-remedy process. The government did not contest his assertion and failed to meet its burden of showing that remedies were “available” to Gooch. View "Gooch v. Young" on Justia Law

A felony defendant normally must be present in the courtroom at sentencing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a)(3). The 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 134 Stat. 281, permits district courts to conduct felony plea and sentencing proceedings by videoconference if the defendant consents and the judge finds “for specific reasons” that the sentencing “cannot be further delayed without serious harm to the interests of justice,” In March 2020, just before the CARES Act was adopted, Coffin pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. Sentencing was postponed several times.Coffin eventually consented to a sentencing hearing by videoconference under the Act. The district judge confirmed Coffin’s consent on the record and found that further delay would seriously harm the interests of justice, noting several reasons why that was so. The judge asked if there were any objections to his findings. Coffin’s attorney said, “No, thank you.” The judge imposed 60-month concurrent sentences. The Seventh Circuit rejected Coffin’s challenges to the judge’s CARES Act findings as “far too late.” He expressly consented to the videoconference sentencing and confirmed that he had no objection to the judge’s findings under the Act. “That’s a waiver.” View "United States v. Coffin" on Justia Law

Detectives Roseman and Hunt stopped Goodwill for a window tint violation. After asking Goodwill to sit in the squad car, Roseman began the paperwork while both detectives asked Goodwill questions. A canine unit arrived minutes later, before Roseman finished the warning form. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. A search revealed two kilograms of cocaine. Goodwill, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officers unlawfully prolonged the search by asking unrelated questions and conducted the dog sniff without his consent.The district court found that the questioning did not extend the stop and denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Roseman needed to check the driver’s license and vehicle information—which involved typing in the motorist’s name and date of birth or driver’s license number plus the vehicle’s registration information—then complete, by hand, the warning—which included the date, time, vehicle information, driver’s information, and the location. Roseman’s testimony at the suppression hearing and the traffic-stop video indicated that he worked expeditiously. Roseman worked on the ticket continuously without any breaks. An officer does not need a driver’s consent to conduct a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop, if it does not prolong the stop. View "United States v. Goodwill" on Justia Law

Merrill pressured 12-13-year-old girls to take and send him sexually explicit photographs of themselves. Merrill was indicted for producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); receiving child pornography, section 2252A(a)(2)(A); and possessing child pornography, section 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty to one count each of producing and possessing with respect to one girl. At his plea hearing, Merrill confirmed that he remembered: “soliciting photographs and possessing the types of photographs that are set forth in the plea agreement.” Before the scheduled sentencing hearing, new counsel appeared for Merrill and moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that his former attorneys “never explained what the elements of the production charge were or what the government was required to prove to establish his guilt.”At an evidentiary hearing. Merrill’s former lawyers testified to having explained to Merrill the differences among the three charges and how the evidence established each element of the production charge; each told Merrill that he could be convicted of production based on proof that he had asked the minors to take and send the sexually explicit photographs and that the minors did so at his request.The district judge denied Merrill’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Merrill’s attorneys’ advice was sound, and in any event, he has not shown prejudice from the supposedly erroneous advice. View "United States v. Merrill" on Justia Law

After his co-conspirator gave officers details about a plan to defraud a university and about previous fraudulent schemes, Mboule was charged and signed a plea agreement. The agreement provided that Mboule was entitled to a reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility and contained an appellate waiver. Mboule participated in a pre-plea proffer session with an FBI agent. Mboule broke his promise to provide complete and truthful information. After a plea colloquy, the district judge accepted Mboule’s plea. At the initial sentencing hearing, the government objected to the PSR’s acceptance-of-responsibility recommendation and presented information about the proffer session. The court also heard testimony from a victim of a different wire fraud that Mboule committed. The district court concluded that Mboule violated his plea agreement.Mboule moved to withdraw his guilty plea, stating that Mboule’s previous trial counsel failed to inform Mboule that he could “enter[] an open plea of guilty.” The court denied the motion, noting that Mboule did not express dissatisfaction with his attorney or a desire to cancel the plea agreement until he saw the consequences of his lies. Mboule was sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment, within the guidelines range of 37-46 months. The court advised Mboule of his right to appeal but stated that “[appellate] waivers are generally enforceable.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. Mboule has not shown that the plea agreement should be voided in its entirety; the appellate waiver is applicable. View "United States v. Mboule" on Justia Law