Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Indiana Department of Correction places offenders in restrictive housing when their continued presence in the general population would pose a serious threat to life, property, and others, or the security and orderly operation of a correctional facility. Crouch has been an Indiana inmate for about a decade. In February 2016, Crouch was assigned to disciplinary restrictive status housing due to disciplinary code violations. Crouch spent almost four years in solitary confinement. Throughout this period, Crouch received dozens of classification and status reports. Crouch did not appeal any of these reports; before entering solitary confinement he was aware of the process to appeal and had done so. Crouch also received regular 30-day reviews. Crouch did not appeal those reviews. Inmates also may raise concerns through an offender grievance or a disciplinary appeal; both processes are explained to inmates during orientation and copies of the policies are available at the facilities’ law libraries.Crouch sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his Due Process rights because of his “prolonged placement in solitary confinement” which “did not receive meaningful review.” The district court dismissed because Crouch failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a federal claim about prison conditions. View "Crouch v. Brown" on Justia Law

Price had been convicted of felony aggravated battery. A gunshop employee ran a background check after Price placed an order, then contacted ATF Agent Clancy, and gave Price an inoperable magazine shell. Price purchased ammunition. Price later complained the magazine did not fit “his firearm.” Clancy impersonated a store employee for Price’s return and contacted the Indiana Department of Correction. Parole officers arrived at the store and searched Price's vehicle, as authorized by his parole agreement. They found a (stolen) loaded pistol. Clancy and the parole officers drove Price to his residence. The officers searched, discovered ammunition, and notified Clancy. Clancy obtained and executed a search warrant for the home, a van parked in the driveway, and an outbuilding. Officers found a firearm and ammunition. A rifle was found in the van.Indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Price unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrantless parole searches violated the Fourth Amendment because the parole officers acted as a “stalking horse” for the ATF, allowing Clancy to circumvent typical warrant and probable cause requirements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The parole officers complied with the parole agreement; they had reasonable cause to believe Price had violated his parole conditions. The court also rejected arguments that there was insufficient evidence that Price had constructively possessed the guns and challenges to sentencing enhancements for multiple firearms, a stolen firearm, and obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Burkhart, the CEO of ASC, a private company that operates Indiana nursing homes and long-term care facilities, orchestrated an extensive conspiracy exploiting the company’s operations and business relationships for personal gain. Most of the funds involved in the scheme came from Medicare and Medicaid. After other defendants pled guilty and Burkhart’s brother agreed to testify against him, Burkhart pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and healthcare fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349); conspiracy to violate the AntiKickback Statute (18 U.S.C. 371); and money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). With a Guidelines range of 121-151 months, Burkhart was sentenced to 114 months’ imprisonment.Burkhart later filed a habeas action, contending that his defense counsel, Barnes & Thornburg provided constitutionally deficient representation because the firm also represented Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, a victim of the fraudulent scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the firm labored under an actual conflict of interest, that conflict did not adversely affect Burkhart’s representation. Nothing in the record shows that the firm improperly shaded its advice to induce Burkhart to plead guilty; the advice reflected a reasonable response to the “dire circumstances” facing Burkhart. The evidence of Burkhart’s guilt was overwhelming. View "Burkhart v. United States" on Justia Law

Captain Van Lanen saw apparent contraband in Jackson’s cell and ordered a search, which uncovered prohibited items: bottles of unknown liquids, a hair pick, and documents containing the names and health information of other inmates. Van Lanen ordered the confiscation of the records, some of which belonged to inmate Jones. Jackson had the records because he was helping Jones prepare a civil rights lawsuit against Van Lanen and others. Jones sought to retrieve the paperwork, claiming the documents were privileged, confidential legal materials. Prison officials denied each request. Jones claims Van Lanen said: “you won’t get to use it to sue me with!” Jackson declined to support Jones’s claim. Captain Wickman found that much of the confiscated paperwork consisted not of legal materials but rather other inmates’ medical records, constituting contraband under prison policy, and ordered most of them destroyed. Jones invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated the First Amendment by confiscating and destroying the documents in an effort to retaliate against Jones for filing administrative grievances and taking steps to sue Van Lanen and that the document destruction deprived him of his right to access the courts.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the access to courts claim, agreeing that Jones had not identified any harm. Jones identified enough facts to get part of his remaining retaliation claim to trial. View "Jones v. Van Lanen" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin jury found Antonio and his brother guilty of first-degree homicide and a related firearms charge. The charges arose from the 2006 shooting death of a rival gang member. Antonio was sentenced to life in prison plus five years, without the possibility of release. Wisconsin courts affirmed Antonio’s conviction and denied his post-conviction petitions. Antonio sought federal habeas relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate his claim of self-defense, in advising him not to testify in support of that defense, and in neglecting to prepare him to testify, and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue the ineffective assistance claim on appeal.The district court denied Antonio’s petition, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision rejecting these claims was not an unreasonable application of “Strickland.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Antonio made the decision not to testify; his attorney warned Antonio that testifying could undermine his self-defense argument by allowing exploration of his actions that indicated guilt, including setting fire to his vehicle and fleeing the state, and would place in his hand the gun that was responsible for the fatal shooting. The court noted that Antonio’s testimony was not essential to his claim of self-defense. View "Shannon v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Asbury came to a controlled buy with 82.2 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine. He was charged with distributing at least 50 grams of the drug, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). The indictment alleged that Asbury had a prior conviction for a serious drug offense. The PSR, “reflecting reports from others,” proposed holding Asbury responsible for 15,819.3 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, plus 82.2 grams of the pure drug. When the judge asked whether the prosecution had any additional evidence, he was told that it did not. Rather than nail down the factual basis for the additional drug-quantity allegations, the court addressed whether the distribution of drugs other than those directly involved in the offense could be considered as relevant conduct, then adopted the PSR, raising Asbury’s offense level from 30 to 36, then added two levels for perjury, resulting in a guidelines range of 360 months to life. Had the offense level been 32, his range would have been 210-262 months. Because of Asbury’s prior conviction, his statutory minimum sentence was 180 months. The court addressed 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s factors, stating that any error in Asbury’s offense level, “would not affect my sentence," and imposed a 360-month sentence.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The district court erred in calculating Asbury’s relevant conduct. The judge’s brief statement did not establish that the guideline error was immaterial. View "United States v. Asbury" on Justia Law

In 2014, Shorter pleaded guilty to possessing a stolen firearm, which he used to threaten a person who, unbeknownst to Shorter, was a U.S. Marshal. The district court sentenced him to 117 months’ imprisonment. In December 2020, with approximately one-and-a-half years remaining on his prison term, Shorter sought compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that his hypertension and sickle cell disease made him more susceptible to a severe COVID-19 infection. The government noted that Shorter did not suffer from sickle cell disease, but only carries the sickle cell trait.The district court denied the motion, finding Shorter’s medical conditions did not qualify as extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant compassionate release and noting his serious criminal record. On appeal, Shorter argued that the fact that his hypertension was well-treated did not sufficiently address whether his condition increases his COVID-19 risk, that the district court ignored evidence that people with sickle cell trait are more susceptible to COVID-19, and that the court failed to consider his postconviction conduct. After the parties completed briefing, the Bureau of Prisons transferred Shorter to home confinement, scheduled to end in May 2022. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. View "United States v. Shorter" on Justia Law

Dixon pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment, raising his base‐offense level by six levels under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because he had a previous conviction for a “crime of violence,” an Iowa conviction for intimidation with a dangerous weapon. According to the charging document in the Iowa court, Dixon had shot at a vehicle with multiple occupants and continued firing at them as they fled.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A conviction under the Iowa statute requires that the defendant placed someone in “reasonable apprehension of serious injury.” The court applied the categorical approach and stated that the only way a defendant uses a dangerous weapon to put someone in fear of serious injury is by threatening physical force. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Rucker is serving a 240-month sentence. While awaiting a jail transfer in 2012, Rucker attacked another prisoner who had testified against him, slamming the man’s head against a concrete wall. In 2020, Rucker sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that he had an extraordinary and compelling reason for release—his medical conditions (obesity, hypertension, pre-diabetes, poor eyesight, possible sickle cell trait, and his then-current COVID-19 infection) and the spread of COVID-19 throughout the prison. He argued that early release was supported by 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, specifically his traumatic childhood during which his mother died and his father abused drugs, and his successful completion of anger management and drug abuse courses while in prison. Rucker’s criminal history included prior convictions for damage to property, battery, home invasion, and drug trafficking.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The district court’s assessment of Rucker’s COVID-19 risk was cursory but any error was harmless because the court acted within its broad discretion in finding that the 3553(a) factors did not favor release. The court highlighted the need to protect the public from further crimes and the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense and provide just punishment for the offense. "Recent events underscore the need for ... individualized arguments and evidence." View "United States v. Rucker" on Justia Law

Thomas pleaded guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), while he was serving an extended term of supervised release based on an earlier conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. Thomas did not contest the revocation of his supervision term. The probation officer determined that Thomas qualified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines because he had committed a controlled substance offense and had “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense” In addition to his prior federal heroin conviction Thomas had a Wisconsin conviction for Child Abuse—Intentionally Cause Harm. Employing the career offender guidelines yielded a sentencing range of 262-327 months; without that designation, the range would have been 120-125 months.The underlying Wisconsin statute refers to: “Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a child.” Thomas argued that because the statute did not require the use of physical force as an element, it did not fit the definition of a “crime of violence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentences of 100 months in the distribution case with a consecutive sentence of 30 months in the revocation case. Seventh Circuit controlling precedent holds that the crime of intentionally causing bodily harm is a crime of violence. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law