Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Davis operated a "Ponzi" scheme. His victims lost $5 million. Davis was charged with mail and wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful activity. Because of the pandemic, non-emergent proceedings, including Davis’ trial, were continued. Parties could request plea hearings held by video or telephone conference under the 2020 CARES Act. The parties negotiated a plea agreement. During a status hearing, Davis’ attorney agreed to conduct a plea hearing by telephone. Davis, telephonically present, did not object. The plea hearing was reset several times; each order indicated that the hearing would proceed telephonically. Davis never objected.At the January 2021 telephonic plea hearing, Davis was present in his lawyer’s office and spoke. The court confirmed that Davis agreed to hold the hearing telephonically. Davis pleaded guilty to mail fraud and signed a plea agreement that included an appellate waiver. The court expressed willingness to hold the sentencing hearing in person. At the sentencing hearing, which proceeded by videoconference, Davis stated that he had agreed to videoconference sentencing. The court sentenced Davis to 160 months imprisonment and to pay $7,171,085 in restitution.The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal that argued that the district court erred by holding the plea hearing by telephone. Davis waived his right to appeal all errors, including any errors in the application of the CARES Act, in his plea agreement and in the district court. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Nieto and Vallodolid led Indiana chapters of the Latin Kings gang and were convicted under RICO (18 U.S.C. 1962(d)) and for drug conspiracy (21 U.S.C. 846); the jury made four special findings—that Vallodolid participated in a 2009 murder, that Nieto played a role in a 2013 murder, and that each defendant was responsible for distributing more than five kilograms of cocaine and 100 kilograms of marijuana. The district court sentenced both men to life, the maximum penalty available.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecution committed a “Batson” violation by striking two prospective Hispanic jurors from the venire, that the evidence was insufficient to support the special findings and the drug convictions, and that the district court lacked the legal authority under RICO, to impose a life sentence without first complying with certain state law procedural requirements. Although the government struck a greater proportion of Hispanic than non-Hispanic prospective jurors, the statistical disparity alone is not enough in these circumstances to show purposeful discrimination. The court reasonably accepted the government’s ethnicity-neutral justifications, that one prospective juror’s disagreement with U.S. immigration policy reflected anti-government bias and that another believed the system was biased against people of lesser means. View "United States v. Vallodolid" on Justia Law

Bayon attempted to rob an Indianapolis gas station, then fled the scene in a vehicle. Numerous police officers gave chase. A high-speed pursuit through residential areas ensued. Officer Brink executed a maneuver that resulted in the Traverse spinning and crashing into a tree. Using a loudspeaker, Officer Myers ordered Bayon to exit the vehicle multiple times. Bayon took several minutes to exit the vehicle, saw 10-15 police officers, and heard commands to put his hands up and to show identification. He claims he reached for his wallet. The officers shot him. Three bullets hit Bayon; he fell face-first to the ground. Bayon claims that after he was rolled over, an officer said, “Oh, my God, he doesn’t have a weapon.” The officers claim that Bayon took several aggressive steps toward Myers and reached for something near his waistband. Two officers saw a black, hard object, and thought it was a gun. Another officer pulled “a car jack handle,” out of his pant leg.In Bayon’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that the facts were in dispute. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The parties’ claims are inseparable from disputed facts. View "Bayon v. Berkebile" on Justia Law

Robinson, whose criminal career began in 1991, pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court granted Robinson an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to his offense level but, after Robinson argued that he should not be classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e), revoked that reduction. It then found that Robinson was an armed career criminal, subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated his 188-month sentence. On remand, the district court sentenced Robinson to the 180-month statutory minimum.While Robinson’s second appeal was pending, the Supreme Court (Borden, 2021) addressed the meaning of “use … of physical force against the person of another” in ACCA section 924(e)(2)(B). Robinson argued that his 1992 Illinois conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm no longer qualified as an ACCA predicate offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Robinson’s ACCA status was settled at his initial sentencing proceeding and remains settled after Borden. The mens rea for Illinois’s aggravated-discharge offense is knowledge, not recklessness; Borden is irrelevant to Robinson’s status because his predicate violent offense was not a reckless crime. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

An anonymous woman called 911 to report a man carrying a gun, "a 45,” wearing blue jeans, white gym shoes, a black skullcap, and a black coat with fur around the collar. She stated that the man had his hand in his right coat pocket "with a gun in it” and exclaimed that he “just walked into the liquor store.” The call was recorded; the caller’s cell phone number was captured by the system. The dispatcher stated “no number on the callback" and identified the man as black although the caller had not said so. Minutes later, Chicago Police Department officers entered the liquor store. They saw Swinney near the register, wearing a black coat with a fur-trimmed hood, a black skullcap, blue jeans, and white sneakers. The officers patted him down and found a loaded .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol in Swinney’s right coat pocket. In Illinois, it is a crime to carry a firearm on a public street and in any place that is licensed to sell alcohol.Swinney was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an illegal search. The police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop; the anonymous tip reliably reported criminal activity. View "United States v. Swinney" on Justia Law

Lange, who is deaf and communicates primarily in American Sign Language (ASL), sued the cities under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (AD”), 42 U.S.C. 12131, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, because their police officers did not provide a qualified ASL interpreter for her during four interactions but relied on written communications and on Lange’s children, ages 14 and 17, to act as interpreters. Lange apparently never requested an ASL interpreter. A jury returned a verdict for the cities. The district court then awarded $1,000 in costs to the cities.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lange was not prejudiced by the jury instructions. The court acknowledged that the ADA generally prohibits the use of minor children as interpreters but instructed the jury that the police could rely on “the decision of a private citizen to use his or her own child to facilitate her communication.” The court upheld the district court’s decisions in allowing testimony about Lange’s encounters with police other than the four interactions at issue and in awarding a reduced amount of costs to the cities despite Lange’s apparent indigency. View "Lange v. City of Oconto" on Justia Law

Kik Messenger flagged suspected child pornography, involving a girl, about eight years old, engaging in explicit sexual acts with an adult male. Agents traced the files to Boyle’s Decatur home. Boyle admitted that he was the man in the images and had live-streamed his sexual abuse of the girl. A search of Boyle’s cell phone revealed 100 images and videos of other children being sexually abused and exploited. The eight-year-old stated that the sexual abuse started when she was five. Boyle pled guilty in state court to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment.In federal court, Boyle pled guilty based on his production and distribution of visual depictions of that abuse. His Guidelines range was life imprisonment, subject to the cumulative statutory maximum of 230 years. The district court sentenced Boyle to 50 years’ imprisonment, consecutive to his state sentence because the sexual assault “was a separate course of conduct” from the production and possession. The court acknowledged the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing objectives and the horrors of Boyle’s own background but stated that Boyle sentenced the child “to a lifetime of nightmares” and immortalized her trauma by live-streaming it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court was aware of the length and gravity of the 90-year cumulative sentences. What mattered most, however, was the atrocity of Boyle’s offense conduct. View "United States v. Boyle" on Justia Law

Officers received a tip from Dropbox, a well-known cloud-storage host, that someone had uploaded child pornography. They tracked the IP address to Hyatt’s home, where he admitted that he had uploaded the files. Hyatt was charged with transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(4)(B). Hyatt entered a guilty plea, unaccompanied by any agreement, to the receiving offense. The PSR determined that he had a total offense level of 34, applying five enhancements. Hyatt had 22 criminal history points, leading to a guidelines range of 262-327 months’ imprisonment. Hyatt did not object to the calculations but argued that the court should disregard the enhancements for sadistic behavior, prepubescent children, using a computer, and 600 or more images, arguing that they apply to almost everyone charged with child-pornography offenses. He did not mention the two-level “knowing distribution” enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), based on the fact that Hyatt “uploaded 65 files of child pornography on Dropbox.”The Seventh Circuit vacated Hyatt’s 293-month sentence. Hyatt did not waive the right to challenge the enhancement on appeal and the error was prejudicial to him. The court noted the lack of evidence or findings that Hyatt took any steps to make the uploaded files available to others. View "United States v. Hyatt" on Justia Law

Garcia was convicted of attempted homicide, recklessly endangering safety, and aggravated battery based on a drive-by shooting that left one victim seriously injured. Garcia’s post-conviction counsel unsuccessfully sought a new trial claiming that trial counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses amounted to ineffective assistance. Garcia filed a consolidated appeal and post-conviction order. In the meantime, the state acknowledged that the reckless endangerment counts were lesser-included offenses; the judge modified the judgment, which was affirmed as modified.Garcia filed another post-conviction motion, raising new claims of ineffective assistance. Wisconsin rules require a defendant to raise all available claims for relief in his first post-conviction motion or on direct appeal unless the defendant can demonstrate a “sufficient reason.” Garcia needed to allege specific facts that would establish his post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, including allegations showing that the defaulted claims were “clearly stronger” than the issues post-conviction counsel chose to present.After Wisconsin courts rejected his petition, Garcia sought federal habeas relief. The district judge rejected the state’s procedural objection but agreed that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, the mistakes were not prejudicial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The state appellate court rejected Garcia’s second post-conviction motion based on failure to satisfy the pleading standard for overcoming procedural default. That independent and adequate state procedural basis barred federal review unless Garcia can establish cause for and prejudice from his default. He has not done so. View "Garcia v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas, fraudulently promised victims that they could save their homes from foreclosure or lower their mortgage payments. They targeted monolingual Spanish‐speakers. They charged a $5,000-$10,000 "membership fee" and spent the fees on personal expenses. Their fraudulent entity never prevented a foreclosure. More than 60 homeowners joined, losing almost $260,000.Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas were charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Although Bell consistently refused legal representation, the district court assigned an experienced stand-by attorney. On the eve of trial, Bell moved to retain Joyce, who was newly admitted to the Illinois bar, had never tried a case, and had met Bell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center days earlier, at the behest of Eliades, co‐defendant Rayas’s counsel. Later, Eliades and Joyce denied that Eliades asked Joyce to visit Bell. Conflict attorneys from the Federal Public Defender’s Office discussed the situation with Bell and Rayas separately and held a conflict hearing for Hernandez. Rayas and Hernandez chose new attorneys. Bell insisted on Joyce, signing a waiver in which he acknowledged his right to conflict‐free counsel and the potential conflicts associated with Joyce.Convicted, Bell was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $259,211 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bell’s waiver was knowing and voluntary; he has not demonstrated actual or serious potential for conflict that would have obliged the court to disregard his waiver. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law