Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Swank, a registered sex offender, logged onto a dating application under the username “lkng4younger.” After eight days of sexually explicit online chatting, the other user (an undercover FBI agent) stated he was 15. Swank drove from Iowa to meet with the user in Illinois. FBI agents arrested Swank, who admitted to exchanging sexually explicit images and messages with the user and crossing state lines with the intent of taking a 15-year-old male to Iowa for sex. The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 210-262 months’ imprisonment and found that a 210-month sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary because of Swank’s risk to recidivate and the danger he presented. The judge stated: I do think that general deterrence is a factor … it is a little arbitrary, but it is the way that our system works is it’s tethered to the reality of the sentences and the ranges and everything like that. … a variance … could minimize the general deterrent impact.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Swank’s argument that the district court procedurally erred when it suggested the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(B) factor of adequate deterrence was “tethered” to the Guidelines. When read as a whole, the transcript indicates that the district court followed the proper procedure and did not err in determining the appropriate sentence. View "United States v. Swank" on Justia Law

Hernandez pled guilty to a RICO conspiracy charge, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) stemming from his more than three decades of involvement with a violent gang, the Almighty Latin Kings Nation. Like many defendants during the COVID-19 pandemic, Hernandez underwent sentencing by video. He received 175 months’ imprisonment, slightly more than the 138-165 months recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not commit a nonwaivable error when it conducted Hernandez's sentencing by video without first making a statutorily-required finding that Hernandez’s sentencing could not be delayed without serious harm to the interests of justice under the CARES Act, Pub. L. 116-136, 15002(b)(2) (2020). The court noted that, given the judge's apparent sympathy for Hernandez, it is unlikely that he could have obtained a more favorable result by making the same sentencing arguments in person rather than remotely. The evidence supported the court's finding that Hernandez should be held accountable for conspiracy to commit murder. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Eaden defrauded his employer, SIT, of more than $200,000 by falsely inflating the profits at his store (to obtain unearned performance‐based bonuses) by billing SIT’s largest customer (Gibson) for products it did not purchase and by submitting false claims to a rewards program sponsored by a tire manufacturer. After receiving a tip, police investigated, and SIT hired a forensic accounting firm, which concluded that Eaden received more than $47,000 in unearned bonuses. At sentencing, the district court imposed 46 months’ imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and ordered restitution of $244,673.00, and the forfeiture of Eaden’s bonuses from 2014-2016, $88,106.78.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting arguments that the court deprived him of a fair trial by informing prospective jurors that a grand jury had issued Eaden’s indictment based on probable cause, meaning “it’s probably true that [Eaden] had some connection with criminal activity” and wrongly admitted a lay witness’s opinion testimony regarding a subset of his fraud charges. The witness used the word "fraudulent" in discussing Eaden's submissions to the rewards program. Based on miscalculation, the court reduced Eaden’s restitution and forfeiture obligations by $189,709 and $40,817.81, respectively. View "United States v. Eaden" on Justia Law

After multiple sales of methamphetamine and of a weapon to a confidential informant, Garcia was charged with three counts of distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); two counts of distributing five grams or more of methamphetamine; and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Garcia argued entrapment. He was convicted on all counts. The PSR set Garcia’s offense level at 35, with a resulting Guidelines range of 292-365 months, and noted that Garcia was subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on the firearm count based on three previous convictions for violent felonies.The Seventh Circuit vacated Garcia's 210-month sentence but affirmed his convictions. There was ample evidence that Garcia was not induced but was otherwise predisposed to engage in the illegal transactions. The court rejected an argument that the district court committed plain error in subjecting him to a mandatory minimum sentence because the PSR did not identify the statute attendant to Garcia’s conviction for aggravated battery with a firearm. The PSR, supported by documentation, identifies Garcia’s crime of conviction as aggravated battery with a firearm under Illinois law, which is a crime of violence.The district court committed plain error in using his 1993 aggravated battery with a firearm conviction when calculating his offense level; the district court should not have increased the offense level based on prior convictions for which no criminal history points were awarded. View "United States v Garcia" on Justia Law

Nitzkin was executive director of an Illinois charity that raised about $1.1 million a year. He took home more than $300,000 annually—about half as salary and the rest embezzled. Nitzkin pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and was sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment, a fine, restitution, and supervised release. He challenged the addition of two sentencing levels under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(9)(A), for offenses involving “a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious, or political organization.” Nitzkin’s argued that he did not “misrepresent” his status as a person “acting on behalf of” the charity and that 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) does not deal with the diversion of funds raised by a legitimate officer of a charity. The enhancement increased his sentence by 8-10 months.The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. Application Note 8(E)(i) states: “If the conduct that forms the basis for an enhancement under subsection (b)(9)(A) is the only conduct that forms the basis for an adjustment under 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill–an enhancement also applied to Nitzkin), do not apply that adjustment under 3B1.3.” The court found no misconstruction of 2B1.1(b)(9)(A), but remanded for a determination of whether the two enhancements reflect different conduct. Even if only one applies, the judge may conclude that a 42-month sentence retains the support of the criteria in 18 U.S.C. 3553. View "United States v. Nitzkin" on Justia Law

Police arrested demonstrators in Rockford, Illinois, seven on Friday and one on Saturday. Winnebago County does not hold bail hearings over the weekend. All eight waited until Monday at 1:30 p.m. to receive a bail hearing, seven were then released either on their own recognizance or on bond. The charges against three have been dismissed; the court sentenced three to probation or conditional discharge. The Friday detainees were held for about 68 hours. The Saturday detainee was held for slightly over 48 hours. Three missed work; one lost her job; one could not seek medical attention for an open wound and bruised ribs while in jail; one endured three days of solitary confinement and was not allowed to take her prescription medication; and one was denied medical attention for a concussion and a bleeding head wound.The detainees filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 198,3 against the Chief Judge and the Sheriff, in their official capacities, and Winnebago County, arguing that the County violated the Fourth Amendment by denying them a bail hearing within 48 hours after detention even though a probable-cause determination had been made within that period. The district court denied a class-certification motion and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Precedent dictates that only a probable-cause determination must be held within 48 hours; as a matter of first impression, the court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require a bail hearing within 48 hours after arrest. View "Mitchell v. Doherty" on Justia Law

Each of the plaintiffs has been convicted of multiple sex offenses involving children. Wisconsin law requires some sex offenders to wear GPS tracking devices for life, even after they have completed post-confinement supervision, WIS. STAT. 301.48. The tracking device is attached to an ankle bracelet. The tracking data is not monitored in real-time; officials review it about every 24 hours to determine if an offender has been near a school, a playground, or another place that might raise a concern. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute violates their rights under the Fourth Amendment and sought a preliminary injunction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction, noting that it addressed section 301.48 in 2016 and upheld a provision that imposes lifetime monitoring on sex offenders who have been released from post-prison civil commitment. Applying the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, the government’s interest in deterring recidivism by dangerous offenders outweighs the offenders’ diminished expectation of privacy. Any differences between the 2016 plaintiff and these plaintiffs are too immaterial to make the earlier holding inapplicable. View "Braam v. Carr" on Justia Law

Sarno headed a criminal enterprise for several years. When a rival organization tried to encroach on Sarno’s territory, he sent a pipe bomb that exploded outside its headquarters. In 2010, Sarno was convicted of conspiring to participate in racketeering activity and conducting an illegal gambling business. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison and ordered to pay $1.8 million in restitution.In 2020, Sarno sought compassionate release. Then 62 years old, he has severe osteoarthritis in his shoulder and knee, preventing him from walking, bathing, dressing, or using the toilet on his own. He frequently falls when trying to transition into and out of his wheelchair. This immobility compounded the disabling effects of his respiratory disease, obesity, hypertension, and kidney dysfunction. On multiple occasions, Sarno had to be transported to outside medical facilities for treatment of acute health problems.The district court assumed Sarno’s poor health constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant compassionate release but determined early release would be inconsistent with the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, considering the seriousness of his offenses, his extensive criminal history, and danger to the public. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Sarno’s arguments that the court erred in weighing the factors and failed to discuss his evidence, and that inability to communicate with his attorney at a critical point prevented him from disputing certain inaccurate government assertions. View "United States v. Sarno" on Justia Law

Haas believes that Jews are responsible for crimes against humanity, that Israel is “the biggest racist organization on the planet,” and that anyone who supports Israel or Jews is a traitor who deserves to die. After posting death threats against former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley on her Instagram page, Haas was visited by diplomatic security officers. He reiterated his violent message during that conversation and then posted vile, anti-Semitic statements on a Russian social media website. An FBI agent questioned him about the new threats, but Haas made threats against the agent via texts and voicemails. He was convicted for transmitting threats in interstate commerce and for the threats against the FBI agent and was sentenced to 51 months in prison.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Only a multiplicity challenge to the indictment was properly preserved. The allowable unit of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 115 is the individual threat, not some broader scheme or plot to threaten. After a “fact-intensive inquiry,” the court concluded that the individual threats were properly charged separately. Contentions that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, that the indictment was constructively amended, and that some counts were improperly grouped for sentencing, were all forfeited and do not undermine the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Haas" on Justia Law

After passengers in a car shot two people, the police approached a car matching the description given by witnesses. The car sped away but crashed into another car. Three men, including Burnett, got out and ran. At least one passenger carried a gun. Police pursued two of the men and caught Burnett; they found two different brands of ammunition in his pockets, matching that found in two loaded guns tossed during the foot chase. Police later determined that the gun in the alley where police arrested Burnett and the gun from the backseat of the car were fired during the shooting. Burnett pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), reasoning that, even if Burnett did not personally possess the three guns, all three were attributable to him as relevant conduct because they were used as part of joint criminal activity and Burnett had aided and abetted the others in possessing them.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Burnett’s 110-month sentence. The district court could permissibly infer that, even if not fired, the gun was still involved in the broader events around the shooting. The district court could reasonably infer that Burnett intended to aid his associates based on his continued participation in the crime during and after the shooting. View "United States v. Burnett" on Justia Law