Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Peoples led a gang that robbed four Indiana banks in 1997-1998, brandishing an assault rifle. At least once, he pointed the gun at tellers and threatened to kill them. Peoples stole getaway cars; twice he burned them. A jury convicted Peoples on multiple counts of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(d)), using a firearm during a felony (section 924(c)) and to commit a felony (844(h)), and maliciously destroying a vehicle by fire (844(i)). The four 924(c) convictions required the imposition of consecutive minimum sentences totaling 65 mandatory years. The two 844(h) convictions required a sentence of at least 30 consecutive years. Peoples was sentenced to almost 111 years.In prison, Peoples has successfully completed many classes and received no disciplinary infractions. Peoples, at substantial risk to his own safety, took steps to save another person’s life in prison. Nine correctional officers supported his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which cited his rehabilitation and the reality that, under the First Step Act’s amendments to 924(c), he would face a much shorter sentence today for the same armed bank robberies.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. In a compassionate release motion, the prisoner must identify an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction, but that reason cannot include, alone or in combination with other factors, consideration of the First Step Act. Peoples otherwise failed to identify an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting early release. View "United States v. Peoples" on Justia Law

Ten-year-old Amani, walking home, was grabbed by a man and pushed into a vehicle. The man hit her eye and lip, threatened to kill her, parked in an alley, pulled down her leggings, and touched her inside of her underwear. Amani escaped, ran away, and flagged down a passing car. The driver called 911. A week later, police arrested Protho, who was charged with kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and (g)(1)). During a nine-day jury trial, 29 witnesses, including Amani and Protho, testified. The trial focused on the kidnapper’s identity.The jury found Protho guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 38 years’ imprisonment plus restitution, including $87,770 for Amani’s psychotherapy needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of testimony by three expert witnesses: an FBI photographic technologist who analyzed surveillance videos that were admitted at trial, an expert on fiber evidence, and a manager of Ford's Design Analysis Engineering Department, who identified the vehicle on the videos. The district court did not clearly err in handling either of Protho’s Batson challenges or in allowing Amani to testify via closed-circuit television, 18 U.S.C. 3509. The court rejected challenges based on the “interstate commerce” element of the statute and to the district court’s handling of an evidentiary question at trial. The court noted the “overwhelming evidence” of guilt. View "United States v. Protho" on Justia Law

Wilson rekindled a romantic relationship with Yegger, whose five children include FT, who was seven years old and had special needs. The Bureau of Child Welfare had received reports of physical abuse and unexplained injuries on Yegger’s children, who were eventually placed with foster families. Each child received a medical checkup. A pediatric nurse practitioner observed five genital lesions on FT. A pediatrician later observed genital and anal lesions; an antibody test later allowed her to diagnose them as herpes. In a recorded interview with a forensic interviewer, FT recounted eight times that she had been sexually assaulted by Wilson. Wilson was charged with Engaging in Repeated Acts of Sexual Assault of the Same Child, which requires at least three qualifying acts “within a specified period of time.” The judge instructed the jury that it could find Wilson guilty of the lesser-included offense of First-Degree Sexual Assault of a Child, which requires only a single qualifying act. The jury found Wilson guilty of the greater offense. The judge referred to “overwhelming testimony that you committed these outrageous assaults” and sentenced Wilson to 37 years’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Wilson’s petition for habeas relief. Wisconsin courts reasonably rejected his arguments that the evidence could not support his conviction and that his counsel’s representation was constitutionally deficient. View "Wilson v. Boughton" on Justia Law

Olson arrived in Madison, Wisconsin during the second night of violent civil unrest following the death of George Floyd and armed himself with a gun. Three Madison Police officers observed Olson take the gun from the trunk of his car, then apprehended Olson, who was a felon, retrieved the gun, and placed him under arrest, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Olson attempted unsuccessfully to suppress the gun.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. Olson’s initial seizure was a Terry stop, not a de facto arrest. Given the unique circumstances of the night, the officers’ use of force when approaching Olson “was eminently justifiable.” They saw Olson conceal a gun in the waistband of his pants; saw Olson drinking from a “tallboy” style, suggesting Olson could be intoxicated; and saw Olson carefully scrutinize his surroundings, which suggested avoiding detection. The officers reasonably suspected Olson was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity while the city was experiencing an almost complete collapse of civil order. Any omissions or inaccuracies in the officers’ contemporaneous reports are plausibly explained by their sleep deprivation and stress. View "United States v. Olson" on Justia Law

Officers executed a search warrant at Goliday’s Indianapolis home, recovering drugs and a loaded handgun. Goliday arrived during the search, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted that the drugs and gun were his. Goliday stated that he had bought two ounces of heroin every week for the last year from the same supplier, then resold smaller amounts. He pled guilty to three counts of possession with intent to distribute drugs—one count each for fentanyl, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and, based on his statement, to conspiring to distribute more than 1,000 grams of heroin. Without the conspiracy charge, he would have faced a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years; the conspiracy charge, enhanced by Goliday’s prior conviction, carried a statutory minimum of 15 years.At sentencing, when the court asked Goliday if the facts relating to the conspiracy charge were accurate, Goliday indicated that his statement about how much he purchased was only intended to implicate his supplier. However, he subsequently agreed to the judge's recitation of the charge.The Seventh Circuit vacated his 15-year sentence. Goliday’s statements suggested he did not understand how a conspiracy offense differed from just buying and selling drugs. The district court did not resolve the confusion and should have ensured that Goliday understood the nature of the charged conspiracy offense and that there was a factual basis for the plea. View "United States v. Goliday" on Justia Law

Childs pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24 months of supervised release. While serving supervised release, Childs, who is addicted to alcohol and controlled substances, had numerous violations: resisting a peace officer, two charges of reckless driving, DUI, other traffic offenses, possession of marijuana, retail theft, and use of alcohol. The court revoked his supervised release and sentenced Childs to 14 months of imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised release. During his second term of supervised release, Childs again committed multiple violations and overdosed on controlled substances.The government argued that Childs was a danger to himself and others. Childs’ lawyer noted that Childs had accepted responsibility and argued that a short sentence would allow Childs to “get on with” the steps needed to overcome his addictions. The court remarked on Childs’ significant criminal history, dangerous conduct, and the many opportunities he had been given for treatment, then focused on deterrence and the need to protect the public, sentencing Childs to 24 months’ imprisonment with no further supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court considered the facts of Childs’ violations, his criminal history, the relevant section 3553(a) factors, and the policy statements, and said enough about the reasons for the sentence to provide an adequate basis for review. The sentence was not plainly unreasonable. View "United States v. Childs" on Justia Law

Thurston was convicted of felony rape after his DNA was matched to cigarette butts found in the park that was the scene of the crime. Thurston claimed that his attorney did not object to the admission of a report summarizing the DNA analysis of the cigarettes because the defense attorney did not notice that the report also identified Thurston’s DNA as matching a “sperm fraction” collected in “case IP06051889”—another rape for which Thurston was charged. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, reasoning that the reference to the sperm fraction was “too vague” to “support the forbidden [propensity] inference.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, finding that the Indiana decision was not an “unreasonable application of” the Supreme Court’s Strickland decision. The Indiana Court of Appeals was entitled to presume that the jury would not disobey its instructions and speculate about the reference to case ‐889. View "Thurston v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

In a jury trial before District Judge Bruce, Shannon was convicted of 19 counts of sexually exploiting a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e), and one count of distributing child pornography, sections 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1). The charges arose from Shannon’s relationship with J.W., a minor; the two originally met when J.W. was around eight years old. Shannon was in his forties at the time. Judge Bruce sentenced Shannon to 720 months in prison.Shannon challenged those convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he did not receive a fair trial before an unbiased judge. The motion was assigned to District Judge Shadid, who denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given the extensive and powerful evidence against Shannon, even if his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, he has failed to show that he was prejudiced by any deficiency. On the judicial-bias claim, the court found that ex-parte communications between Judge Bruce and staff of the U.S. Attorney’s office do not warrant a new trial on guilt or innocence. Based on those ex parte communications and comments by Judge Bruce at Shannon’s sentencing that implicitly discouraged an appeal, the court concluded that Shannon must be resentenced before a different judge. View "Shannon v. United States" on Justia Law

Green Bay Police Department officers arrested Tubby and transported him to jail for booking. In the jail’s secure entryway, Tubby became non-compliant, refusing to exit the squad car and concealing one hand under his shirt while threatening to “do it” if officers came any closer. The officers called for backup. Tubby was eventually forced out of the car with pepper spray. He kept one hand under his shirt in a manner that, to officers, indicated he had a weapon. Exiting the squad car, Tubby refused to surrender but instead rushed toward the exit in an apparent escape attempt. An officer heard a “pop” that he believed to be a gunshot coming from the weapon he presumed Tubby was hiding and discharged his firearm eight times, hitting Tubby with five shots. Tubby died. His estate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The officer’s conduct did not violate Tubby’s constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures; qualified immunity shields the officer from liability. The officer’s conduct was reasonable, given that Tubby intentionally led the officers to believe he was armed and ready to “do it.” View "Doxtator v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Miller and Krasilnikova are married. Miller pled guilty to wire fraud. His sentence included an order to pay approximately $1.1 million in restitution. Days after Miller received his sentence, Krasilnikova agreed to sell their family home to a third party for $855,000. The United States then gave notice of a lien on the property, 18 U.S.C. 3613(c), asserting that Miller had a one-half interest in the proceeds and that his share should be used to pay restitution. Krasilnikova argued that she was the sole owner; the title to the property was only in Krasilnikova’s name.The Seventh Circuit upheld an order dividing the sale proceeds equally so that Miller’s share will be applied to the restitution order. The district court properly considered additional evidence. Under Illinois law, courts evaluating ownership can look past title and instead ask who actually exercised control over the property at issue. A series of property transfers and mortgages casts significant doubt on the legitimacy of Krasilnikova’s paper title. Ample evidence suggests that Miller and Krasilnikova manipulated property and financial records and even forged signatures to conceal the true ownership of the property. View "Krasilnikova v. United States" on Justia Law