Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jan Kowalski, an attorney, was accused of using her position to hide her brother's assets during his bankruptcy proceedings. She allegedly concealed around $357,000 in her attorney trust account and made false statements under oath to cover up the concealment. Kowalski was charged with four counts of bankruptcy fraud and one count of concealing assets from the bankruptcy trustee. She pleaded guilty to the charge of concealing assets.Prior to her trial, Kowalski had been involved in her brother's bankruptcy proceedings, where she used her attorney trust account to hide her brother's assets from his creditors and the bankruptcy trustee. She also made false statements under oath and fabricated documents to cover up her actions. The bankruptcy trustee confronted Kowalski with inconsistencies between her personal bank records and her earlier testimony, but she continued to lie under oath.Kowalski was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The court applied two sentencing enhancements: the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) sophisticated-means enhancement, and the § 3B1.3 abuse of position of trust enhancement. Kowalski appealed her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying these enhancements and that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Kowalski had indeed used sophisticated means to commit the offense and had abused her position of trust. The court also found her sentence to be substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

The case involves Patrick Hancock, who pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. His federal sentence was enhanced on the grounds that he also violated Indiana Code § 35-44.1-2-6, which makes it a felony for a civilian to impersonate a law enforcement officer. Hancock appealed his sentence, challenging the Sentencing Guidelines enhancement. The evidence supported the district court’s findings that Hancock represented himself as a police officer by wearing various law enforcement paraphernalia.The district court applied a four-level sentencing enhancement, finding that Hancock's attire was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applied. The court sentenced Hancock to 48 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. The district court varied upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range because it found that Hancock’s crime involved “extreme conduct” and that greater punishment was needed to deter future criminal conduct.In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, the court affirmed the district court’s decision. The court rejected Hancock’s argument that he did not intend to deceive anyone at Costco into thinking he was a law enforcement officer. The court also rejected Hancock’s argument that Indiana’s false impersonation statute violates the First Amendment. The court held that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling public interest in preserving public safety and protecting the reputation of law enforcement. View "USA v. Hancock" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a traffic stop in Urbana, Illinois, where a police officer pulled over a car driven by Prentiss Jackson due to unlit head and taillights. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled unburnt marijuana. Jackson was asked to exit the car and was informed that he and the vehicle would be searched. However, Jackson fled the scene, and during his escape, a gun fell from his waistband. Jackson, a felon, was subsequently indicted for possessing a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence of the gun, arguing that it was the product of an unlawful search.The district court denied Jackson's motion to suppress the evidence. Jackson had conditionally pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He was convicted and sentenced to 72 months' imprisonment. In another case, his supervised release was revoked for unlawfully possessing a firearm, among other things.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Jackson argued that the officer did not have probable cause to search him or the car, contending that the smell of unburnt marijuana does not provide probable cause under Illinois law. The court disagreed, affirming the district court's decision. It held that the officer had probable cause to search Jackson and the vehicle, based on the totality of the circumstances, including the smell of unburnt marijuana. The court also noted that while possession of marijuana is legal in Illinois under certain circumstances, the state retains laws restricting the packaging and use of marijuana. The smell of unburnt marijuana, therefore, provided probable cause for a violation of state law. View "USA v. Jackson" on Justia Law

David Lewicki was part of a group that attempted to rob Humberto Pelayo, resulting in Pelayo suffering permanent injuries. Lewicki claimed he did not inflict the injuries and had tried to protect Pelayo. However, the jury found him guilty of attempted robbery causing serious bodily injury, and he was sentenced to 65 years in prison as a habitual offender. Lewicki's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the state courts.Lewicki then sought federal relief, arguing that his appellate lawyer had been ineffective for not arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court agreed, issuing a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The court found that Lewicki's lawyer's failure to raise the speedy trial argument amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court did not find that Indiana had violated the Speedy Trial Clause. Instead, it ordered Indiana to release Lewicki unless it provided him with a new appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court had erred in granting relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel without finding that Lewicki had been prejudiced by his lawyer's failure to raise the speedy trial argument. The court explained that ineffective assistance of counsel requires both deficient performance and prejudice. The court also found that Lewicki did not have a strong speedy-trial claim. Despite a nearly three-year delay between his charge and trial, the court found that Lewicki had not shown prejudice from the delay. The court noted that Lewicki's own lawyer had proposed multiple continuances, and Lewicki had not shown that evidence was lost or memories faded due to the delay. The court also noted that little of Lewicki's time in custody could be attributed to the delayed trial of the attempted-robbery charge. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and upheld Lewicki's conviction and sentence. View "Lewicki v. Emerson" on Justia Law

Emanuel Dameron was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon after police officers spotted him on a live video feed from a pole camera, observed an "L-shaped object" resembling a gun in his waistband, and subsequently found a gun on him during a frisk search on a public bus in Chicago. Dameron moved to suppress the firearm and other evidence gathered during the stop, arguing that the police's search violated the Fourth Amendment and the standards set in Terry v. Ohio. The district court denied Dameron's motion, and he was found guilty at trial.The district court held an evidentiary hearing, during which the officer operating the pole camera testified about his familiarity with the neighborhood, its history of gang and narcotic activity, and his observation of the "L-shaped object" in Dameron's waistband. The court concluded that the visible bulge in Dameron's waistband and his presence in a high-crime area generated reasonable suspicion to justify the Terry stop. Dameron was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to 110 months' imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Dameron renewed his contention that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. He argued that Illinois permits the concealed carrying of firearms and that the police had no way of knowing whether he was an authorized license holder. The court declined to address this argument as it was not presented to the district court. Instead, the court focused on the fact that Dameron was on a public bus when the search occurred, noting that the Illinois Concealed Carry Act prohibits carrying a firearm on public transportation. The court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Dameron had violated the law and that their pat-down search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "United States v. Dameron" on Justia Law

The defendant, Otho Harris, visited a Boost Mobile store for assistance with his broken cellphone. When told it could not be repaired, he became enraged and later set fire to the store, causing extensive damage. Harris was charged with arson and, after difficult relationships with three different appointed attorneys, he chose to represent himself and eventually pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to eight years in prison and ordered to pay $195,701 in restitution.The case moved slowly due to Harris's disagreements with his appointed counsel. After the third appointed lawyer moved to withdraw, Harris decided to represent himself. He filed numerous pretrial motions and requests with the court. A few weeks before the scheduled trial date, he agreed to plead guilty and signed a written plea agreement with the government. The judge accepted his guilty plea and set the case for sentencing.On appeal, Harris challenged only the restitution order, arguing that it was not supported by a proper investigation and determination of the loss amount. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that Harris had waived his right to challenge the restitution order by expressly affirming the accuracy of the factual material in the presentence report at the sentencing hearing. The court noted that Harris had ample notice of the restitution amount, the factual basis for it, and an opportunity to object. He did not object; on the contrary, he affirmed that he was satisfied with the accuracy of the factual material in the presentence report. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Gustavo Colon, serving a life sentence for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a), appealed the denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The district court denied his motion on the grounds that Colon’s CCE conviction was not a “covered offense” under the Act.Previously, Colon was found guilty of conspiring to distribute various drugs, engaging in a CCE, using a telephone in commission of his conspiracy, and distributing cocaine. The sentencing judge vacated Colon’s conspiracy conviction, determining that it violated the double jeopardy clause because conspiracy was a lesser-included offense of the CCE offense of which Colon was also convicted. The judge imposed a life sentence for the CCE conviction. In 2003, this court affirmed Colon’s conviction and sentence.In 2021, Colon moved for a sentence reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act, which allows a court to reduce the sentence of a “covered offense”—that is, an offense that had its statutory penalties modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The district judge denied the motion, concluding that Colon’s CCE conviction was not a “covered offense” because the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify 21 U.S.C. § 848(a).The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that a CCE conviction under § 848(a) is not a “covered offense” under the First Step Act because its penalties—twenty years to life imprisonment—were not altered by the Fair Sentencing Act. Therefore, Colon was not eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. View "USA v. Colon" on Justia Law

In 1996, Robert Pope was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He sought post-conviction relief, but his lawyer, Michael J. Backes, abandoned him and failed to take necessary steps to protect Pope's rights. After 14 months of inaction, Pope sought help from Wisconsin's public defender, who informed him that he first needed an extension from the court of appeals. However, the court of appeals denied his request, stating that he had waited too long. Pope then sought relief from the trial court, which also denied his request due to the appellate decision. Despite multiple attempts to reinstate his appeal rights, all were unsuccessful until 2016 when the state acknowledged his right to an appeal.The state court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed a 2017 decision granting Pope a new trial due to the absence of a trial transcript, which was not ordered by his lawyer and was later destroyed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a new trial based on the absence of a transcript is only appropriate if the defendant first makes a "facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error" that requires a transcript to substantiate. Pope, not being a lawyer and barely remembering the events of 1996, was unable to do so.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Pope filed a petition for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. §2254. The district court issued a conditional writ and directed the state to release Pope unless it set a retrial in motion within six months. The state appealed, leading to a deferral of the deadline. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, modifying it to include deadlines for Pope's release on bail and unconditional release if a trial does not start within the specified timeframes. The court noted that Pope had suffered at least two violations of his constitutional rights: the right to assistance of counsel and the right to an appeal equivalent to that available to well-heeled litigants. View "Pope v. Taylor" on Justia Law

John Feeney, a convicted felon, was charged with unlawfully possessing two pistols and carrying explosives, specifically modified fireworks shells, during the commission of that felony. Feeney pleaded guilty to both offenses. During sentencing, the court and the parties disagreed on the applicable base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines for Feeney’s conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court sided with the government and applied a higher base offense level to Feeney’s sentence.The district court calculated the total offense level for the firearm possession conviction to be 15, which combined with a criminal history category of IV, yielded a guideline range of 30 to 37 months of imprisonment. The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 30 months for the firearm possession offense and a mandatory consecutive sentence of 120 months for the offense of carrying explosives while committing a felony.Feeney appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred when it applied a base offense level of 18 under the Sentencing Guidelines instead of a base offense level of 14. He contended that the court's decision resulted in him being punished twice for the same conduct, which is prohibited by the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Feeney's interpretation of the relevant guideline and application note. The court found that the district court had erred in applying a higher base offense level based on Feeney's possession of an explosive. The court concluded that such an application constituted an "enhancement" prohibited by the Sentencing Guidelines, which aim to prevent duplicative punishment. The court vacated Feeney's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Feeney" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Denny Anderson, who was sentenced in 2012 for possessing a firearm as a felon, after shooting at a man and using racial slurs. The maximum penalty for the illegal-possession offense is typically 10 years, but the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for anyone with three prior convictions for a "violent felony." Anderson was sentenced to an agreed-upon term of 180 months (15 years) in prison. He was resentenced in 2021, following a successful habeas petition he filed in 2013. The government maintained that he was subject to a 15-year minimum sentence due to his prior convictions.The district court agreed that Anderson's convictions for burglary, robbery, and Florida aggravated assault qualified as violent felonies, triggering a 15-year minimum sentence. Anderson did not object to his designation as an armed career criminal. The court then resentenced him to 188 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Anderson’s Florida conviction in 2001 is not a predicate violent felony and that the government may not substitute one of Anderson’s other prior convictions as an alternative predicate offense. Because Anderson does not have three predicate convictions, the ACCA enhancement was improper. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law