Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing.A law enforcement officer stopped Defendant while he was riding a motorized bicycle and arrested him under the theory that his bicycle was a motor vehicle requiring a license. During the arrest, police searched Defendant and found various drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the government needed to establish probable cause that he was driving a motor vehicle on a revoked license. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence established that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that Defendant rolled past a stop sign, which independently supported Defendant's arrest. View "United States v. Norville" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court imposing an above-Guidelines sentence of eighty-four months after Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable.The court ultimately calculated Defendant's new offense level to be seventeen, yielding an advisory Guidelines range of fifty-one to sixty-three months' imprisonment. The district court concluded that an upward variance from the advisory guidelines range was required to protect the public and sentenced Defendant to eighty-four months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant's sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions for arson stemming from their participation in riots in Madison, Wisconsin following the shooting of a Black man by a police officer in Kenosha, Wisconsin, holding that the district court properly held that 18 U.S.C. 844(i) is constitutional.Defendants Willie Johnson and Anessa Fierro moved to dismiss the indictment against them, arguing that the federal arson statute is facially unconstitutional because its enactment exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendants entered into conditional plea agreements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that section 844(i) was validly enacted pursuant to Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. View "United States v. Fierro" on Justia Law

Officers found nine firearms in Prado’s home: five were stolen and one had an obliterated serial number. Prado pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The district court calculated the initial base offense level as 20, which was lower than the base offense level of 22 recommended in the PSR because Prado’s prior conviction for mob action by force was not a crime of violence. The court applied a four-level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(B)) because the offense involved 8-24 firearms; a two-level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(A)) because Prado possessed a stolen firearm; and a four-level enhancement under subsection (B) because Prado possessed a firearm with an obliterated serial number. The PSR indicated that section 2K2.1(b)(4) allowed the application of only one of the enhancements in its subsections, not both. A “hanging paragraph” in 2K2.1(b) provided that the cumulative offense level from the application of 2K2.1(b)(1)–(4) may not exceed 29. Following the imposition of those enhancements, the court applied a four-level enhancement (2K2.1(b)(6)(B)) because Prado used or possessed the firearms in connection with another felony, and deducted three levels for Prado’s acceptance of responsibility. Despite a guideline range of 135-168 months, the statutory maximum was 120 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Prado's 108-month sentence, rejecting an argument concerning Prado’s guideline range. Under any calculation, the applicable guideline range is the 120-month statutory maximum. View "United States v. Prado" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendants' requests for reduced sentences following their convictions stemming from their participation in a drug conspiracy involving the distribution of crack cocaine and heroin, holding that the district court properly denied Defendants' requests for reduced sentences.In 2009 and 2010, Defendants pleaded guilty to one count each of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute controlled substances. In 2020, Defendants each filed motions under 404(b) of the First Step Act seeking reductions in their sentences based on changes congress made to penalties resulting from certain drug crimes. The district court judge denied the motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendants were not entitled to relief under the First Step Act. View "United States v. Clay" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court reducing Defendant's life sentence to a term of 420 months for his conviction of conspiring to distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Because Defendant had four prior drug convictions under Illinois law the district court imposed a mandatory term of life in prison. More than a decade later, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018. The district court reduced Defendant's life sentence but decided not to apply Mathis v. United States, 479 U.S. 500 (2016), under which Defendant's guideline and statutory ranges would have been reduced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there is no reason that any further consideration of Defendant's Mathis argument would have changed the court's determination; (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his disparity argument; and (3) the district court's comments about the weapons found at Defendant's home were not improper. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Thayer pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law for groping his 14-year-old daughter while she slept. Thayer later moved to Wisconsin without registering as a sex offender. The government indicted him for failing to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court dismissed the indictment, finding the relevant section of SORNA categorically misaligned with Thayer’s Minnesota statute of conviction. SORNA’s “Romeo and Juliet” exception excludes from the definition of “sex offense” consensual sex where “the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.” The Minnesota statute under which Thayer was convicted criminalizes sexual conduct both where “the complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant” and where “the actor is … in a current or recent position of authority over the complainant.” The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal. Section 20911(5)(A)(ii), as applied through section 20911(7)(I), must be analyzed under the circumstance-specific method, not by a categorical approach. Section 20911(7)(I) directs courts to evaluate the nature of an individual’s conduct, not the nature of an offense or of a conviction. View "United States v. Thayer" on Justia Law

Granite City Police officers conducted a traffic stop in a known drug-trafficking area and found Ingram, a passenger in the vehicle, in possession of a loaded handgun and small quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine. Ingram pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. At sentencing, the district judge added four offense levels to the Guidelines calculation after finding that Ingram possessed the firearm “in connection with” another felony—namely, felony drug possession, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The judge then sentenced Ingram to 72 months in prison, an upward variance from the 46-57 months advisory range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ingram possessed both the handgun and drugs as he left a known drug-trafficking area and fled on foot when the police initiated the traffic stop. From these facts, the judge found that Ingram’s handgun facilitated his drug possession. That finding was not clearly erroneous, making the application of the enhancement proper. Nor did the judge abuse his discretion with the upward variance, which was justified by Ingram’s criminal history and dangerous conduct during his arrest. View "United States v. Ingram" on Justia Law

Peoples led a gang that robbed four Indiana banks in 1997-1998, brandishing an assault rifle. At least once, he pointed the gun at tellers and threatened to kill them. Peoples stole getaway cars; twice he burned them. A jury convicted Peoples on multiple counts of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(d)), using a firearm during a felony (section 924(c)) and to commit a felony (844(h)), and maliciously destroying a vehicle by fire (844(i)). The four 924(c) convictions required the imposition of consecutive minimum sentences totaling 65 mandatory years. The two 844(h) convictions required a sentence of at least 30 consecutive years. Peoples was sentenced to almost 111 years.In prison, Peoples has successfully completed many classes and received no disciplinary infractions. Peoples, at substantial risk to his own safety, took steps to save another person’s life in prison. Nine correctional officers supported his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which cited his rehabilitation and the reality that, under the First Step Act’s amendments to 924(c), he would face a much shorter sentence today for the same armed bank robberies.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. In a compassionate release motion, the prisoner must identify an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction, but that reason cannot include, alone or in combination with other factors, consideration of the First Step Act. Peoples otherwise failed to identify an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting early release. View "United States v. Peoples" on Justia Law

Ten-year-old Amani, walking home, was grabbed by a man and pushed into a vehicle. The man hit her eye and lip, threatened to kill her, parked in an alley, pulled down her leggings, and touched her inside of her underwear. Amani escaped, ran away, and flagged down a passing car. The driver called 911. A week later, police arrested Protho, who was charged with kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and (g)(1)). During a nine-day jury trial, 29 witnesses, including Amani and Protho, testified. The trial focused on the kidnapper’s identity.The jury found Protho guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 38 years’ imprisonment plus restitution, including $87,770 for Amani’s psychotherapy needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of testimony by three expert witnesses: an FBI photographic technologist who analyzed surveillance videos that were admitted at trial, an expert on fiber evidence, and a manager of Ford's Design Analysis Engineering Department, who identified the vehicle on the videos. The district court did not clearly err in handling either of Protho’s Batson challenges or in allowing Amani to testify via closed-circuit television, 18 U.S.C. 3509. The court rejected challenges based on the “interstate commerce” element of the statute and to the district court’s handling of an evidentiary question at trial. The court noted the “overwhelming evidence” of guilt. View "United States v. Protho" on Justia Law