Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Armbruster, a CPA with experience working at a Big Four accounting firm, began serving as the controller for Roadrunner's predecessor in 1990 and became Roadrunner’s CFO. Roadrunner grew rapidly, acquiring transportation companies and going public in 2010. In 2014, Roadrunner’s then‐controller recognized shortcomings in a subsidiary's (Morgan) accounting and began investigating. In 2016, many deficiencies in Morgan’s accounting remained unresolved. The departing controller found that Morgan had inflated its balance sheet by at least $2 million and perhaps as much as $4–5 million. Armbruster filed Roadrunner's 2016 third quarter SEC Form 10‐Q with no adjustments of the carrying values of Morgan balance sheet items and including other misstatements. Roadrunner’s CEO learned of the misstatements and informed Roadrunner’s Board of Directors. Roadrunner informed its independent auditor. Roadrunner’s share price dropped significantly. Roadrunner filed restated financial statements, reporting a decrease of approximately $66.5 million in net income over the misstated periods.Criminal charges were brought against Armbruster and two former departmental controllers. A mixed verdict acquitted the departmental controllers on all counts but convicted Armbruster on four of 11 charges for knowingly falsifying Roadrunner‘s accounting records by materially misstating the carrying values of Morgan's receivable and prepaid taxes account, 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2), (5), i78ff(a), 18 U.S.C. 2, fraudulently influencing Roadrunner’s external auditor, and filing fraudulent SEC financial statements, 18 U.S.C.1348. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the case against Armbruster may not have been open‐and‐shut, a rational jury could have concluded that the government presented enough evidence to support the guilty verdicts. View "United States v. Armbruster" on Justia Law

In 2011 Sanders drove a truck into his sister and her boyfriend. He was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Sanders suffered from schizophrenia and was not taking his medication. Sanders was initially found to lack the capacity to proceed or to assist in his defense. Sanders received treatment, was reevaluated, and a second report suggested he was “malingering.” Sanders entered into a plea agreement, stating he had read and understood the criminal complaint and understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Sanders’s cognitive abilities and educational level were considered, as was whether Sanders could have pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.The day after receiving a seven-year sentence, Sanders gave notice of his intent to pursue postconviction relief and was appointed new counsel. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected that attorney’s no-merit report but dismissed the appeal, reasoning that Sanders relied on facts outside the record. On remand, Sanders moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that he did not understand the offenses to which he pleaded and that his attorney was ineffective. The court denied both motions, making extensive findings that Sanders’s trial counsel was credible and Sanders was generally not credible but was intelligent and understood the proceedings and issues. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sanders’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is procedurally defaulted. It plainly appears from Sanders’s petition and attached exhibits that he is not entitled to relief on his claim that his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. View "Sanders v. Radtke" on Justia Law

FBI Agent Wainscott posted an advertisement on Craigslist: “Bored No School looking to make $ for favors,” intending to identify adults interested in having sexual contact with a minor. York, a 51-year-old correctional officer, responded. Agent Wainscott became “Brionica,” a 15-year-old girl. York responded: “I can’t do anything but look at you [sic] sexy picks with clothes on.” The two continued to converse. York eventually discussed the sexual acts he wanted to perform with “Brionica.” York told “Brionica” that he would travel to meet her but would not do anything sexual during their first meeting because she was “very young,” and he did not want to go to jail. On the day of the meeting, York drove around for 18–20 minutes looking for “Brionica.” Agents arrested him near the planned meeting location. During a post-arrest interview, York stated that he was looking for “Brionica” because he is “a curious person.”York was charged with attempted enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and attempted use of interstate facilities to transmit information about a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2425. The court submitted the case to the jury, with an entrapment defense instruction. The jury convicted York on both counts. The court sentenced York to the mandatory 120 months’ imprisonment for Attempted Enticement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. York" on Justia Law

Turnipseed pled guilty to conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for actions he took while participating in the Four Corner Hustlers street gang. The district court sentenced Turnipseed to 120 months’ imprisonment—above the advisory sentencing guideline range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by applying the attempted murder guideline, U.S.S.G. 2A2.1, instead of the aggravated assault guideline, in calculating the guidelines for his RICO offense; that Turnipseed was a minor participant in the conspiracy and therefore entitled to a two-level reduction in his guidelines calculation; and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Based on both Turnipseed’s admitted conduct and the record, the district court permissibly concluded that Turnipseed acted with the requisite intent to justify the application of the attempted murder guideline. Turnipseed did not satisfy his burden of showing that he was “substantially less culpable than the average participant” in his conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 comment. 3(A). When fashioning a sentence, a judge may consider relevant uncharged conduct. The district court gave adequate justification for imposing an above-guideline sentence. View "United States v. Turnipseed" on Justia Law

Police were called to a motel to break up a fight between Graham and his coconspirator, Moore. Their body cameras captured Moore in an agitated state shouting that Graham was holding and prostituting a 19-year-old. Graham was later charged with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking and related crimes stemming from his operation of an interstate commercial sex enterprise. The government played the body-camera recordings at Graham’s trial during an officer’s testimony. Moore had pleaded guilty and was on the government’s witness list. Graham’s attorney moved for a mistrial, arguing that if Moore did not testify, Graham would be denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront her about the recorded statements. The government did not call Moore as a witness. The judge agreed that a Confrontation Clause violation had occurred but declined to grant a mistrial, reasoning that a curative instruction was adequate to remedy any prejudice. The jury found Graham guilty.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no Confrontation Clause violation. Moore uttered her statements spontaneously as the officers were responding to a fight in progress and to rapidly evolving circumstances suggesting that sex trafficking might be occurring at the motel. When statements are made to law-enforcement officers under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the police encounter is to respond to an ongoing emergency, the statements are not testimonial and do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. View "United States v. Graham, Jr." on Justia Law

FBI agents and Chicago police executed a search warrant at Johnson’s apartment, which authorized them to search for: Firearms, short-barreled, ammunition, paraphernalia for maintaining firearms, any photographs of individuals with firearms, any records of firearms transactions, which have been used in the commission of, or which constitute evidence of the offense of [unlawful use of a weapon by a felon]. The officers did not find firearms or ammunition but, on the back porch attached to Johnson’s apartment, they found over 100 grams of a substance containing heroin and furanylfentanyl, concealed in a cavity at the top of a ceiling beam. Johnson was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), which carries a mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment.Johnson’s motion to suppress was denied The district court found the porch to be curtilage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 132-month sentence. The officers’ seizure of the drugs was lawful under the plain view doctrine. The court rejected an argument that furanylfentanyl is not an “analog of [fentanyl]” under the statute; the district court did not plainly err in applying the 10-year enhanced penalty. Johnson qualified as a career offender based on two Illinois convictions for the manufacture and/or delivery of a controlled substance. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Turner made four sales of cocaine and one sale of heroin to an undercover officer. He had a loaded handgun in his waistband. Turner was convicted on six counts of distributing and possessing controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Turner’s 924(c) conviction would ordinarily carry a maximum sentence of 10 years but the court found that Turner qualified as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), so he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison. A defendant meets that classification if his “prior criminal record includes at least three convictions for ‘serious drug offense[s]’ or ‘violent felon[ies].’” A “serious drug offense” includes an offense under state law “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” Turner had two prior convictions under a Wisconsin drug trafficking statute.Turner argued that the Wisconsin statute sweeps more broadly than the ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense” because the state law makes it a crime to deal in substances that the federal law does not reach. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 20-year sentence. The supposed overbreadth concerns only substances that, as a matter of chemistry, do not exist and cannot possibly exist; “we opt for scientific reality over abstract legal doctrine.” View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Walsh’s had convictions for the murder of a police officer, unlawful use of loaded weapons, burglaries, and armed robbery. He has been in and out of prison since 1965. In 2018, Walsh (age 71) committed an armed bank robbery. Days later, Walsh recruited a getaway driver (an FBI informant), canvassed a different bank, and prepared the same outfit and mask used in the first robbery. Agents arrested Walsh and recovered a loaded revolver. Walsh pled guilty to bank robbery by force or violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d); use of a firearm during a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A); and unlawful possession of a firearm, section 922(g)(1). Because of the pandemic, the court granted Walsh’s motion to proceed with sentencing by videoconference. At the hearing, the judge announced an intended sentence of 156 months’ imprisonment, the top of the Guidelines range. Walsh interrupted, saying, "you mother-fucker," "I’d blow your fucking brains out" "kill your entire fucking family.” Walsh’s profanity-laced rant spans several pages of the transcript. Walsh demanded that his threats appear in the transcript, stating that he wanted to “start the appeal.”The judge terminated the hearing. Walsh then moved for recusal and to withdraw his plea. The court denied both motions, stating there was a “significant possibility” that Walsh’s purpose was a change of judges. The court held additional hearings and sentenced Walsh to life imprisonment; considering section 3553(a)'s factors, the court emphasized the seriousness of Walsh’s conduct, his criminal history and contempt for the law, the serious threat of recidivism, and the public danger he posed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the life sentence was substantively unreasonable and that Walsh’s tirade required recusal. View "United States v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Nine Illinois energy consumers sued their electricity provider, ComEd, and its parent, Exelon, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated for damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging injury from increased electricity rates. These rates increased, they allege, because ComEd bribed former Illinois Speaker of the House Michael Madigan to shepherd three bills through the state’s legislature: the Energy Infrastructure and Modernization Act of 2011 (EIMA); 2013 amendments to that legislation; and the Future Energy Jobs Act of 2016. Although Illinois law still required public utilities to file rates with the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC), EIMA implemented statutorily prescribed, performance-based rate increases that limited ICC discretion in reviewing rates and authorized at least $2.6 billion in ComEd spending on smart meters and smart grid infrastructure, costs that were required to be passed on to customers. In 2016, FEJA provided $2.35 billion in funding for nuclear power plants operated, paid for through a new fee for utility customers, and allowed ComEd to charge ratepayers for all energy efficiency programs and for some expenses relating to employee incentive compensation, pensions, and other post-employment benefits.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Paying a state’s required filed utility rate is not a cognizable injury for a RICO damages claim. View "Brooks v. Commonwealth Edison Co." on Justia Law

A man grabbed Flowers’s girlfriend in a bar. After a verbal altercation, the bar’s owner asked both men to leave. Flowers protested but left the bar accompanied by a bouncer and Davis, an off-duty police officer employed as a security guard. While Flowers waited in the parking lot for his girlfriend, he and Davis talked. Officer Renfro, another off-duty Springfield police officer employed by the bar, without warning or provocation, grabbed Flowers and slammed him to the pavement face first, knocking out Flowers’ tooth. Renfro then placed Flowers under arrest. Flowers had not verbally or physically threatened the officers and was not showing any indication that he would resist arrest. The only conduct that Renfro claims justified slamming Flowers to the ground was that Flowers questioned the command to leave the bar and turned around to face Davis within one to two feet of him. Flowers disputes that he ever turned to face Davis.Flowers sued the city, Renfro, and Davis under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, which asserted that the officers did not violate Flowers’ civil rights and were entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court held that there are genuine issues of disputed fact, material to Flowers’ claim against Renfro; the reasonableness of that use of force would inform a decision on qualified immunity. View "Flowers v. Renfro" on Justia Law