Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Galvan, a citizen of Honduras, borrowed a van from his employer, Gomez. He drove to Gomez’s home to return the vehicle and shared a meal with Gomez's family. For unknown reasons, Galvan eventually pulled out a handgun, fired several shots, took the keys from Gomez, and drove away in the van. Gomez called the police. Less than two hours later, police received a report of a man with a gun at an apartment complex. Galvan had threatened men in the complex while brandishing a handgun. Police found Galvan leaning on Gomez’s van, arrested Galvan, and found a handgun in the driver’s seat. Galvan pled guilty to possessing that handgun as an alien unlawfully in the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). A state court charge for armed robbery of Gomez’s van was dismissed.The district court found that the sentencing guideline for robbery governed Galvan’s firearm-possession offense because he had used the same handgun when he robbed Gomez, U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(a) & 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) and that Galvan fired the handgun in connection with the robbery, increasing his offense level by seven. Galvan’s sentencing range was 63-78 months in prison. The district court sentenced Galvan to 70 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ample evidence supported the court’s finding that the same gun was involved in both episodes. A preponderance of the evidence established that Galvan discharged a firearm “during” the robbery under Indiana law. View "United States v. Galvan" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted Muhammad of being a felon in possession of a firearm and stealing firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer. Muhammad was sentenced as an armed career criminal and ordered to pay $10,421.66 in restitution to the firearms dealer and its insurer under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.On collateral review, the district court vacated Muhammad’s sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2241, finding that he was improperly sentenced as an armed career criminal. Muhammad was resentenced to time served plus supervised release. Relying on the restitution amount in the revised PSR and the parties’ statements that Muhammad had not made any restitution payments, the court also ordered Muhammad to pay $10,421.66 in restitution. While an appeal was pending, the parties learned that Muhammad paid $433.32 toward his restitution judgment while incarcerated. The district court updated the record on appeal to reflect that Muhammad now owes $7,993.63 in restitution. The $2,228.03 reduction included $433.32 Muhammad paid, $200 his codefendant paid, and $1,794.71 from a Treasury Department offset. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court declined to correct any error, given that Muhammad concedes that he originally owed $10,421.66 in restitution and that there is no disagreement that he should receive credit for his payments. View "United States v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

Rogers, with a friend, A.W., went to a Rural King store where the video surveillance system recorded Rogers as he handled firearms, including a Mossberg shotgun. Minutes later, A.W. provided her ID, filled out Form 4473, and paid for the shotgun. A week later, Rogers and A.W. went to another Rural King: Rogers approached the counter alone and inspected several firearms, including a Sig Sauer rifle. A.W. later purchased the rifle. Law enforcement received a tip that Rogers and A.W. were purchasing firearms with fraudulently-obtained gift cards. Officers reviewed the Rural King security footage and concluded that A.W. was purchasing the firearms for Rogers. During an interview, A.W. denied knowing the location of the Sig Sauer. Rogers, interviewed by the same officer, stated that the rifle was under the couch in A.W.’s home. Rogers was charged with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm.At trial, it became evident that two Mossberg shotguns were involved, one that Rogers handled, and another retrieved by the manager from storage and sold to A.W. The defense argued impossible to ascertain whether the grand jury intended to accuse Rogers of possessing the gun that he had handled at the counter or the gun purchased by A.W. The prosecution proceeded on a theory of joint possession of the purchased Mossberg. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 70-month sentence. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Dunn was convicted in Indiana state court for the Torres murder. The case against Dunn was based largely on the testimony of two pathologists. In a state court post-conviction proceeding, Dunn argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with any forensic pathologist. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a conditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a state court post-conviction hearing, a board-certified forensic pathologist, Dr. Sozio, testified that the autopsy was substandard, missed a great deal, and that Torres’s injuries were more consistent with a fall than with being bludgeoned by a blunt object. If the defense had presented Sozio's testimony, the jury would have been presented with conflicting expert testimony regarding whether the fall alone caused the injuries. The state conceded that blood evidence effectively ruled out the use of a bat; no other weapon was found. Two eyewitnesses testified consistently that Torres was not beaten after his fall. Sozio's testimony was critical in this case to create reasonable doubt because it countered the state's scientific evidence and gave the jury reason to doubt that Torres was beaten. Dunn demonstrated prejudice under Strickland. View "Dunn v. Neal" on Justia Law

Police arrested Davis, a convicted felon, on a state warrant for three counts of aggravated battery by discharge of a firearm, just outside of his residence. While being arrested, Davis stated that there were children in the house. Officers entered the house to conduct a limited sweep of areas where a person could be hiding, finding an eight-year-old child and a 19-year-old. An officer observed a rifle, upright in plain view, in an open bedroom closet. About 45 minutes later, after the sweep had concluded, Antionette, a woman with whom Davis was living and the owner of the house, arrived and gave the officers oral and written consent to search the home, acknowledging that she had been advised of her rights.Davis, charged with illegally possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the rifle on the basis that no valid exception to the warrant requirement justified the initial entry or the later search. The district court found that three separate exceptions applied: a protective sweep following Davis’s arrest, exigent circumstances because a child was in the home, and Antoinette's voluntary consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Davis did not dispute that Antoinette’s consent was voluntary and not tainted by the initial entry into the house. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence Defendant received for being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that any error in the district court's methodology in arriving at the sentence was harmless.Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed a sentence of eighty-seven months in prison, which was less than the statute maximum of 120 months requested by the government. On appeal, Defendant challenged the procedures used by the district court in arriving at his sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) any error in the district court's methodology was harmless; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining claims of error. View "United States v. Settles" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of federal drug offenses in a two-count indictment and sentencing him to 180 months' imprisonment, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.While on federal supervised police, Defendant agreed to cooperate with local police, and his cooperation was allowed by a federal judge. The district court later issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest for violating the conditions of his supervised release. A federal grand jury subsequently indicted him on two counts of distributing a controlled substance. Defendant twice moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that he had received federal immunity from prosecution for the drug offenses through his cooperation agreement. The district court denied the motions to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant's first motion to dismiss based on federal immunity; and (2) did not err in denying Defendant's second motion to dismiss the indictment as a discovery sanction. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision affirming Defendant's conviction did not reflect an unreasonable application of clearly established law.Defendant moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to a detective, arguing that his statement "I don't want to talk about this" expressed an unambiguous intention to cut off all further questioning and that the detective's continued questioning violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The trial court denied the motion, after which Defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery and first-degree reckless injury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of Miranda. Thereafter, Appellant brought his habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the petition, holding that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision amounted to a reasonable application of the Supreme Court's Miranda line of cases. View "Smith v. Boughton" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241 challenging his money-laundering convictions, holding that Petitioner did not face the kind of "fundamental miscarriage of justice" that must exist to justify relief under section 2241.After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of violations of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. 2421-24, the money-laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. 1956, and associated conspiracies and sentenced to a 432-month term of imprisonment. Petitioner later filed his habeas petition arguing that he was convicted on the money-laundering counts for conduct that was not a crime. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that he faced a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" necessary to justify relief under section 2241. View "Roberts v. LeJeune" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit vacated Defendant's above-Guidelines sentence of eighty-four months in prison imposed in connection with his plea of guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, holding that the sentencing decision rested on conflicting findings that could not be reconciled.Based largely on his finding that Defendant was an active participant in the shoot-out at issue rather than an innocent bystander, the sentencing judge imposed an above-guidelines sentence of eighty-four months in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the judge selected the sentence based on the clearly erroneous finding that he was an active participant in the shooting. The Seventh Circuit agreed and remanded the cause for resentencing, holding that the record reflected an "inscrutable inconsistency" in the factual findings on which the judge based his choice of sentence. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law