Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

As early as 2009, Dickey recruited followers for her church, “DTM,” grooming vulnerable victims and forcing them to disavow their families, live in the church, and work multiple full-time jobs. The victims gave Dickey all their wages, which she kept for herself. She required multiple victims to find employment at Hyatt hotels, where Dickey forced them to falsify reservation bookings, thereby fraudulently misdirecting kickbacks to Dickey’s own travel company. If someone disobeyed, Dickey threatened them with violence and required them to be homeless until she considered them redeemed. Her scheme netted $1.5 million, most of which came from DTM members. She spent over $1 million on personal expenses, such as travel, rental and vacation properties, and luxury hotels.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Dickey’s convictions for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and forced labor, 18 U.S.C. 1589, upholding the district court’s denial of her fourth motion to continue her trial, rejection of a proposed jury instruction regarding religious liberty, and the imposition of restitution ordering her to pay for future mental health treatment for her victims. Dickey’s proposed instruction would have excused her criminal conduct based on her religious assertions and was not an accurate statement of the law. View "United States v. Dickey" on Justia Law

Roldan was convicted of criminal sexual assault. Roldan, then 21, allegedly had sex with an intoxicated 16-year-old noncitizen. The Illinois Appellate Court later reversed the conviction, concluding that the state did not prove that Roldan knew the victim was too intoxicated to consent.Drawing upon information he learned after trial, Roldan sued Cicero, Illinois police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers failed to disclose an agreement to help the victim apply for an immigration benefit—a U visa—in exchange for her testimony. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion on grounds that the Supreme Court’s 1972 “Giglio” decision and related cases clearly established the officers’ duty to disclose the agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that immunity is inappropriate at this early stage but for a different reason. Qualified immunity hinges on a fact that Roldan did not flesh out in his complaint: whether the police officers informed the prosecution about the U-visa agreement with the victim. If the police did, they cannot be liable, for the ultimate disclosure obligation would have rested with the prosecutors. View "Roldan v. Stroud" on Justia Law

Shaw’s pro se complaint alleged that three times in 2018 he needed to use the handicapped bathroom but was unable to because nondisabled prisoners occupied it. Shaw is confined to a wheelchair and incontinent. Each instance ended with Shaw defecating on himself. Shaw alerted prison staff, who asserted that they could not control what toilets other inmates used or reserve the handicapped stall solely for his use. Shaw’s complaint alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and constitutional rights.Before allowing the defendants to be served and fulfilling the screening obligation imposed by 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), the district court addressed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and concluded that Shaw, while unquestionably a qualified person with a disability, failed to allege a denial of access to any prison service and instead complained only about an “inconvenience” of prison life. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Shaw’s allegations suffice to state claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act; he will still need to prove his claim and show deliberate indifference. View "Shaw v. Kemper" on Justia Law

After Gates split up with his girlfriend, B.F., he began violently threatening her, apparently vandalizing the house where she was staying. Gates was arrested nearby for disorderly conduct but released after a few hours. Gates called B.F. to say, “I posted bond, bitch. I’m on my way.” She saw Gates across the street. He fired five shots in her direction, then fled. After a third threatening call, a woman drove Gates past the house. He leaned out the window and shot at B.F. again. Police stopped the car and arrested Gates.Gates pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The PSR recounted Gates’s extensive 25-year criminal history. In the weeks before he shot at B.F., he was arrested for domestic violence and was charged with drunk driving. Despite Gates’s long criminal record, the Guidelines assigned him just one criminal history point; with a four-level increase for using a firearm in connection with a felony offense, his Guidelines range was 18–24 months. The district court determined that an upward variance was appropriate, citing several 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and a “pattern of escalating violence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 48-month sentence. Gates’s sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law

Rodriguez was arrested for domestic violence. He gave the police his brother’s name and date of birth. He was convicted and sentenced to probation. Although the court had learned Rodriguez’s real name, the judgment of conviction listed “Ely M. Martinez” as an alias for Rodriguez and listed Martinez’s date of birth. Rodriguez failed to report for probation. An arrest warrant was issued with the same information as the judgment. Years later, police arrested Martinez for an unrelated offense and booked him in the Milwaukee County Jail on a Wednesday. The next day, the district attorney decided not to press charges but a warrant check revealed the outstanding warrant for Rodriguez. Although jail officials made efforts to positively identify the detainee, he was not released until Tuesday morning.Martinez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming due process violations. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Martinez’s detention was relatively brief and Martinez could not show that the defendants failed to investigate or ignored evidence of his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the defendants could have improved aspects of their investigation, Martinez has not provided evidence showing that they were deliberately indifferent to his claims of mistaken identity. View "Martinez v. Santiago" on Justia Law

Walton supplied crack cocaine to the people who ran three Gary, Indiana drug houses. Gould dealt drugs out of a different drug house. Eventually, more than 20 people were indicted for the drug conspiracy. Many pled guilty. Walton and Gould were convicted of conspiracy to distribute powder and crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841, 846). A jury found them guilty of conspiring to distribute more than 280 grams of crack cocaine but did not find them culpable for any quantity of powder cocaine. The court sentenced Walton to 360 months and Gould to 168 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the district court erred by holding a trial in March 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to Walton's sentence. There was no evidence that the jurors rushed to verdict in order to go home.Harris, who pled guilty, argued that his written judgment contradicted the district judge’s oral pronouncement of his sentence. The court rejected that argument, noting that it was not barred by Harris’s appeal waiver. An argument that a written judgment conflicts with a sentencing judge’s oral pronouncement is not a challenge to the sentence—it is a request for imposition of the actual sentence the judge intended. View "United States v. Gould" on Justia Law

S.B., age 13, lived with his mother in Michigan and visited relatives in Indiana. S.B.’s uncle, Hinkle, isolated and molested S.B. during two visits. By the time he was 17, S.B. used opiates and marijuana regularly and had experimented with heroin. During a family meeting to address his drug use, S.B. admitted his drug use and that Hinkle had molested him.Hinkle was charged with child molesting, sexual misconduct with a minor, and being a repeat sexual offender. Hinkle’s counsel opposed a motion to exclude evidence of S.B.’s drug use, arguing the evidence was relevant to show S.B.’s motive to fabricate allegations. The court ruled that it would not allow evidence of S.B.’s drug use except to show that it interfered with his ability to recall relevant events. At trial, Hinkle’s counsel unsuccessfully argued (outside the jury’s presence) that S.B. had falsely accused Hinkle to avoid facing consequences when his family confronted him for using narcotics. The jury heard evidence that S.B. “ha[d] a habit of playing family members against each other,” and was “really good at lying.” S.B. testified that he had convictions for credit card fraud, auto theft, and retail fraud.Hinkle was convicted and sentenced to 42 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition. The Court of Appeals of Indiana did not unreasonably apply federal constitutional law in upholding the exclusion of evidence of S.B.’s drug use. View "Hinkle v. Neal" on Justia Law

In 2005 Newbern pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. District judge Herndon found that Newbern had prior convictions for crimes of violence, including reckless discharge of a firearm, qualifying him as a career offender, and had distributed at least 50 grams of crack cocaine. With an advisory range of 262–327 months’ imprisonment, he sentenced Newbern to 300 months, explaining that he would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the career-offender determination.The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that reckless discharge of a firearm is not a crime of violence. Judge Herndon twice denied Newbern relief, reiterating that he would have sentenced Newbern to 25 years regardless of his career-offender status. Newbern later sought resentencing under the First Step Act; he met the criteria for relief: his sentence was based on the pre–Fair Sentencing Act crack-to-powder ratio, he committed his crime before August 2, 2010, his sentence had not been previously reduced under the First Step Act, and a previous motion for a sentence reduction had not been denied on the merits. Newbern reiterated that reckless discharge of a firearm no longer qualifies as a crime of violence and underscored his prison record. Judge Yandle denied Newbern’s motion, noting that Newbern’s guidelines range remained the same and adopting Herndon’s statements.The Seventh Circuit vacated, citing the 2022 Supreme Court holding (“Concepcion”) that “when deciding a First Step Act motion, district courts bear the standard obligation to explain their decisions and demonstrate that they considered the parties’ arguments.” The district court did not consider Newbern’s good-conduct argument. View "United States v. Newbern" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lomax was convicted of heroin distribution and firearm offenses. Lomax’s prior felony convictions for drug and violent offenses subjected him to increased penalties; the district court sentenced Lomax to 400 months of imprisonment. On remand in 2017, the district court again sentenced Lomax to 400 months of imprisonment. In 2019, Lomax moved, pro se, to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging his counsel performed deficiently during his 2017 resentencing by failing to investigate whether Lomax’s prior Indiana cocaine conviction constituted a “felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. 841. The district court construed Lomax’s motion as arguing that he was actually innocent of the section 841 sentencing enhancement and agreed that he was. Lomax was resentenced in 2021, without application of the section 841 sentencing enhancement, to a term of 300 months of imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a section 2255 evidentiary hearing regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. Lomax’s prior attempted murder conviction constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2. View "United States v. Lomax" on Justia Law

In March 2019, Lloyd robbed a Credit Union and led police on a high-speed chase, Lloyd was charged with credit union robbery and transporting stolen money interstate. On July 11, 2019, he pleaded not guilty. After a plea of not guilty is entered, the Speedy Trial Act requires that the trial begins within 70 days of the filing of the indictment or the arraignment, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), with exceptions including for delay resulting from mental competency examinations The court granted Lloyd two continuances. Trial was set for December 30, but on November 19, Lloyd’s attorney sought a competency evaluation. The court entered an order on November 22. Lloyd did not arrive at the site of his examination until February 27, 2020. The pandemic struck. Lloyd’s evaluation was completed on May 8, 2020; the psychologist’s report was finalized on May 26. Lloyd was returned to jail on July 1, 2020. On September 23, the court found Lloyd competent. The government conceded that over 70 non-excludable days elapsed. The court dismissed the case without prejudice.The government promptly brought the same charges again. Lloyd pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion. The facts and circumstances leading to dismissal weighed in favor of dismissal without prejudice. The discussions between counsel and the court at the hearing demonstrate the court’s sufficient consideration and application of all the factors within the Act. View "United States v. Lloyd" on Justia Law