Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Five days after Carter was booked into the Macon County Jail, he died of diabetic ketoacidosis. In the hours preceding his death, Carter exhibited symptoms commonly associated with diabetic ketoacidosis: confusion, lethargy, and labored breathing. He was denied timely medical care because the jail nurse thought he was faking his condition. She assured the corrections officers tasked with transferring Carter out of the medical unit that his vitals were within a normal range. Relying on the nurse’s medical judgment, the officers declined to intervene and proceeded to relocate Carter, believing that his failure to follow orders stemmed from deliberate refusal, not medically induced incapacity.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including claims against five corrections officers, the district court denied the officers’ summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding there to be a material factual dispute over whether they had reason to know that Carter was receiving inadequate medical care, creating a duty to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Established circuit precedent entitles a corrections officer to defer to the judgment of medical professionals. That is what the officers did here; they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "McGee v. Parsano" on Justia Law

Dorsey, an Illinois state prisoner, was emptying a bucket in the prison laundry when he felt a pop in his lower back and felt pain shoot down his leg. He asked to see a nurse and was told to “go lay down.” Dorsey took ibuprofen and lay down for two hours, but his pain worsened. He again, unsuccessfully, requested permission to seek medical care. The next morning, Dorsey could barely move. Six days later, a nurse concluded that he was exaggerating his symptoms. Dorsey alleges that instead of being treated for back pain, he was prescribed psychiatric medications without his knowledge or consent and was disciplined for refusing to take those medications.Dorsey sued. The district court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and determined that Dorsey had improperly joined unrelated claims. His complaint asserted three claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against 12 defendants. Two claims alleged Eighth Amendment violations based on the poorly maintained washing machines and deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, his back injury. The third alleged a due process violation, that Dorsey was prescribed medications without his consent. After deeming three amended complaints unsatisfactory, the district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Dorsey’s claims met both requirements of Rule 20(a)(2), so joinder was legally permissible and the dismissal was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected his other claims. View "Dorsey v. Varga" on Justia Law

After exchanging hundreds of messages with an FBI agent—who posed first as an 18-year-old woman and then as a 15-year-old girl—and driving to a planned rendezvous at a gas station, Anderson was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Anderson appealed whether he offered sufficient evidence of entrapment to have the jury instructed on that defense. Seventh Circuit precedent holds that a defendant who offers “some evidence” of both government inducement and his own lack of predisposition is entitled to have the entrapment defense submitted to the jury.The Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial in which Anderson should be permitted to present his entrapment defense. On this record, a jury could find government inducement in the form of “subtle, persistent, or persuasive conduct.” As for predisposition, Anderson had no record of any sexual misconduct or any other offenses against children. It was the government agent, not Anderson, who first suggested a criminal liaison. Anderson repeatedly expressed reluctance, and the agent responded with persistent coaxing and persuasion. Anderson agreed to meet for sex with someone he thought was an underage girl but whether his entrapment defense should succeed was an issue for the jury. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Wallace and Santos, inmates at Menard Correctional Center in Illinois filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Menard’s “double-ceiling” policy of housing two inmates in single-person cells violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Where a plaintiff is able to point to some evidence that administrative remedies were not “available” to him under the PLRA, as described by the Supreme Court in its 2016 Ross v. Blake decision, the district court must decide whether remedies were “available” before granting summary judgment on exhaustion. The plaintiffs claimed to have submitted grievances, offered some evidence that other inmates complained of the same issue with no response, and cited a mechanism by which prison officials can allegedly use state law to reject their grievances without any consideration of their merits. The court remanded for consideration of the exhaustion question as it applies to double-celling at Menard. If the district court finds that double-celling remedies were “available,” then the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies. The court affirmed a factual determination that Santos did not file a grievance regarding Menard’s double-celling policy. View "Wallace v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

An informant purchased 3.1 grams of methamphetamine from Smith. Later, an undercover agent purchased 0.7 grams of fentanyl and heroin from Smith. Smith was subsequently arrested on an outstanding warrant, carrying a loaded semiautomatic handgun; 23 packages collectively containing 3.1 grams of fentanyl and heroin; several hundred dollars in cash; and a digital scale bearing fentanyl residue.Smith was convicted (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C)) for both purchases and the drugs recovered during his arrest; of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and as a felon in possession of a firearm, 922(g)(1). The PSR grouped Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 together for an offense level of 23 because Smith’s semiautomatic firearm was “capable of accepting a large capacity magazine,” and a one-level multiple-count enhancement applied. The court awarded one point for acceptance of responsibility. Smith was in the highest criminal history category. The Guidelines range on the grouped counts was 84–105 months; the 924(c) conviction carried a 60-month mandatory consecutive minimum sentence. Smith argued that he had possessed small quantities of drugs, that his criminal history was nonviolent, and that he only carried a gun for protection. The district court noted that fentanyl was especially dangerous and that Smith's presence with a gun created “a very dangerous event” but determined that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors made a downward variance appropriate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Smith's 120-month sentence. Smith failed to establish any procedural error. His below-Guidelines-range sentence is substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, a detective and a police officer worked in tandem to search Colbert’s vehicle and frisk him, uncovering on his person a brick-shaped package later confirmed to contain a controlled substance. Colbert moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that the frisk violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the motion. Colbert entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk him based on two officers observing the smell of marijuana coming from the vehicle, Colbert’s erratic driving, evasive and nervous behavior, a bulge in his pocket, and unwillingness to follow directions. Colbert had read and signed a form, giving the officer permission to search his vehicle. View "United States v. Colbert" on Justia Law

The FBI was alerted to a predatory scheme involving various Facebook accounts and (apparently) many victims, including minors. The perpetrator used a Facebook account under a false name, telling the victims that he had nude photos of them, taken from a Facebook account he had “hacked.” He said he would leak the photos if the victims did not meet his demands—chiefly, sending more explicit material. The FBI tracked the internet address associated with some of the messages to Burns Construction, where Cox worked. Agents went to Burns Construction without a search warrant. An owner agreed to allow the agents to search and image the computer in Cox’s office. Cox was not present. The agents then went to Cox’s home. They assured Cox that he could end the conversation at any time and that he would not be arrested that night. When Cox proposed helping the FBI investigate the broader sextortion network in exchange for leniency, the agents responded that such an arrangement was beyond their control. Cox nonetheless made numerous incriminating statements and let the agents take his personal laptop.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Cox’s convictions, rejecting Cox’s claims of Fourth Amendment violations based on the warrantless search, Fifth Amendment violations based on the failure to give Miranda warning, and Sixth Amendment violations based on the court’s evidentiary and procedural decisions. There was sufficient evidence to support his convictions. View "United States v. Cox" on Justia Law

Moran was convicted of attempted murder and aggravated battery with a firearm for a 2006 Calumet City, Illinois shooting. After the trial, the prosecution learned that exculpatory evidence, including a ballistics report linking the gun used in the Calumet City shooting to a different shooting, had not been turned over to the defense as required by Brady v. Maryland. Moran sought postconviction relief. A state court vacated his conviction. Moran was retried and acquitted in 2017.Moran then filed a federal suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against the city, two detectives who investigated the shooting, and a crime scene technician who mishandled the ballistics report, seeking redress for the decade he spent incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, noting that Moran’s allegation that an Assistant States Attorney knew about the report was a judicial admission that negated an essential element of the claim; prosecutorial knowledge of exculpatory evidence blocks civil liability for police officers. The court stated that even without that judicial admission, the record could not allow a reasonable jury to find that the evidence had been suppressed. Moran moved for leave to amend his complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of that motion. Moran unduly delayed seeking to amend his complaint; he should have known that his complaint contained factual errors at the outset. View "Moran v. Calumet City, Illinois" on Justia Law

Gan lived in Mexico and worked with U.S. associates to launder money for drug trafficking organizations. One of Gan’s couriers began cooperating with the government and participated undercover in three cash pickups coordinated by Gan. Recordings from those undercover operations and testimony from the courier were central to the government’s case. Gan was convicted on three counts of money laundering and one count of operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business but was acquitted on one count of participating in a money laundering conspiracy. He was sentenced to 168 months in prison.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a law enforcement expert improperly provided testimony interpreting communications the jury could have understood itself. Gan waived an argument that jury instruction misstated the mens rea required for the money-laundering convictions. The prosecution’s closing remarks were not improper. Binding Supreme Court precedent allows consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing when, as in this case, the judge finds the conduct proved by a preponderance of the evidence. View "United States v. Gan" on Justia Law

Based on a child’s report that West molested him and paid him for a nude photograph, police searched West’s home and business and found a laptop computer and flash drives that contained roughly 1000 photographs and videos of child pornography. West was charged with possessing child pornography, sexual exploitation of a minor, receiving child pornography, and commission of an offense by a registered sex offender. West stipulated that certain images found on his devices were part of known child pornography series identified by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, produced outside Illinois, and distributed on the internet. The court admitted those exhibits. At trial, the government briefly showed several images from West’s devices to the jury. An FBI agent testified that six images found on West’s devices were from a child pornography series he had investigated; the government briefly published exhibits as the agent identified each child, without objection. As the prosecutor asked about Exhibit 5E, West unsuccessfully objected.The Seventh Circuit affirmed West’s conviction, rejecting his argument that the admission and publication of the exhibits violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403 on the theory that the content of the images was not in dispute, so their admission was needlessly cumulative and unfairly prejudicial. He also argued, unsuccessfully, that because he had stipulated that child pornography was found on the devices recovered from his home and business, their admission violated Supreme Court precedent. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law