Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Balentine, who lived in Kokomo, pooled money from co-conspirators to buy illegal drugs from Riley in Georgia. The two arranged for couriers. Balentine stored the drugs in the homes of his associates, then distributed the drugs to O’Bannon, Jones, Myers, Reed, Owens, Jones, and Abbott. After two years of investigation, officers intercepted a courier and seized methamphetamine and cocaine she was transporting. Myers’s girlfriend drove to Georgia to pick up another shipment; she was also intercepted. To protect the operation, Riley and Balentine plotted to kill a suspected confidential informant. Officers stopped O’Bannon as he drove with the hitmen to the target’s home. Officers found several firearms in the hitmen’s hotel room. With a warrant, a DEA agent searched the conspirators’ residences, finding guns and drugs.Fourteen people were charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and individual counts related to drugs, firearms, murder for hire, and money. laundering. Nine defendants pleaded guilty. The others were convicted on most charges. Ten defendants appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, only vacating Jones’s sentence–the court erred in applying a firearm enhancement. The wiretap and search warrant affidavits were sufficient. The district court properly rejected a Batson challenge, focusing on the credibility of the government’s explanations for its strikes. The court upheld the admission of a DEA special agent’s “dual-role” testimony; a related jury instruction was “confusing” but did not merit reversal. Sufficient evidence supported all of the convictions. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Aguas received a tenant complaint about a marijuana odor and suspicious drug activity at Apartment 103. He called the police and stated that, on three occasions, he had smelled marijuana when passing by Apartment 103 and in the empty unit directly above it. When Aguas knocked on the door, Turner, opened the door. Investigator Quinley and Aguas swore to these facts in an affidavit. Warrants were issued. The first authorized a canine sniff outside Apartment 103. The second authorized a search of the apartment conditioned on a positive canine alert. A police dog alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers entered the apartment and found firearms, marijuana, heroin, and a scale with heroin residue.Turner was charged with possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense Turner unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause for the search. Turner stated he did not want to accept the government’s plea agreement. Turner’s counsel confirmed Turner wanted “an open plea.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. Turner entered an unconditional plea in open court and waived any objection to the suppression ruling. The court remanded for resentencing, the district court improperly relied on prior state convictions to enhance his statutory maximum sentence. Illinois defines cocaine in a matter “categorically broader than the federal definition.” View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Jerry robbed a cellphone store at gunpoint, The store determined that Jerry had taken 45 phones and watches, valued at $31,599.86. Jerry pleaded guilty to obstruction of commerce by robbery (Hobbs Act robbery), 18 U.S.C. 1951, brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a robbery, section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and possession of a firearm by a felon. Sections 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced Jerry to 264 months as a career offender.The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing based on its 2021 “Bridge” holding that Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a “crime of violence.” On remand, the district court resentenced Jerry to 171 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court committed procedural error and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. A court does not commit procedural error simply by listening to purportedly incorrect arguments, nor did the court err in its calculation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines range. The district court’s remarks about the sentencing range were a “personal belief” that cannot reasonably be understood to indicate a personal grudge against Jerry. The court adequately explained that because the Guidelines range did not account for Jerry’s violent conduct and the impact on his victims, a sentence 16-27 percent above that range was appropriate. View "United States v. Jerry" on Justia Law

Barsanti was delinquent on $1.1 million of senior secured debt it owed to BMO Harris Bank. Barsanti’s owner, Kelly, hired attorney Filer and Gereg, a financing consultant. After negotiations with BMO failed, Filer introduced Gereg to BMO as a person interested in purchasing Barsanti’s debt. Filer created a new company, BWC, to purchase the loans. BWC purchased the loans from BMO for $575,000, paid primarily with Barsanti’s accounts receivable. Barsanti also owed $370,000 in delinquent benefit payments to the Union Trust Fund. Filer, Kelly, and Gereg used BWC’s senior lien to obtain a state court judgment against Barsanti that allowed them to transfer Barsanti’s assets beyond the reach of the Union Fund, using backdated documents to put confession-of-judgment clauses into the loan documents and incorrectly claiming that Barsanti owed BWC $1.58 million. Filer then obtained a court order transferring Barsanti’s assets to BWC, which then transferred the assets to Millwork, another new entity, which continued Barsanti’s business after the Illinois Secretary of State dissolved Barsanti for unpaid taxes. Gereg was Millwork's nominal owner in filings with the Indiana Secretary of State. Barsanti filed for bankruptcy. Filer instructed others not to produce certain documents to the bankruptcy trustee.After a jury convicted Filer of wire fraud 18 U.S.C. 1343., the district court granted his motions for a judgment of acquittal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. View "United States v. Filer" on Justia Law

Five days after Carter was booked into the Macon County Jail, he died of diabetic ketoacidosis. In the hours preceding his death, Carter exhibited symptoms commonly associated with diabetic ketoacidosis: confusion, lethargy, and labored breathing. He was denied timely medical care because the jail nurse thought he was faking his condition. She assured the corrections officers tasked with transferring Carter out of the medical unit that his vitals were within a normal range. Relying on the nurse’s medical judgment, the officers declined to intervene and proceeded to relocate Carter, believing that his failure to follow orders stemmed from deliberate refusal, not medically induced incapacity.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including claims against five corrections officers, the district court denied the officers’ summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding there to be a material factual dispute over whether they had reason to know that Carter was receiving inadequate medical care, creating a duty to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Established circuit precedent entitles a corrections officer to defer to the judgment of medical professionals. That is what the officers did here; they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "McGee v. Parsano" on Justia Law

Dorsey, an Illinois state prisoner, was emptying a bucket in the prison laundry when he felt a pop in his lower back and felt pain shoot down his leg. He asked to see a nurse and was told to “go lay down.” Dorsey took ibuprofen and lay down for two hours, but his pain worsened. He again, unsuccessfully, requested permission to seek medical care. The next morning, Dorsey could barely move. Six days later, a nurse concluded that he was exaggerating his symptoms. Dorsey alleges that instead of being treated for back pain, he was prescribed psychiatric medications without his knowledge or consent and was disciplined for refusing to take those medications.Dorsey sued. The district court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and determined that Dorsey had improperly joined unrelated claims. His complaint asserted three claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against 12 defendants. Two claims alleged Eighth Amendment violations based on the poorly maintained washing machines and deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, his back injury. The third alleged a due process violation, that Dorsey was prescribed medications without his consent. After deeming three amended complaints unsatisfactory, the district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Dorsey’s claims met both requirements of Rule 20(a)(2), so joinder was legally permissible and the dismissal was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected his other claims. View "Dorsey v. Varga" on Justia Law

After exchanging hundreds of messages with an FBI agent—who posed first as an 18-year-old woman and then as a 15-year-old girl—and driving to a planned rendezvous at a gas station, Anderson was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Anderson appealed whether he offered sufficient evidence of entrapment to have the jury instructed on that defense. Seventh Circuit precedent holds that a defendant who offers “some evidence” of both government inducement and his own lack of predisposition is entitled to have the entrapment defense submitted to the jury.The Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial in which Anderson should be permitted to present his entrapment defense. On this record, a jury could find government inducement in the form of “subtle, persistent, or persuasive conduct.” As for predisposition, Anderson had no record of any sexual misconduct or any other offenses against children. It was the government agent, not Anderson, who first suggested a criminal liaison. Anderson repeatedly expressed reluctance, and the agent responded with persistent coaxing and persuasion. Anderson agreed to meet for sex with someone he thought was an underage girl but whether his entrapment defense should succeed was an issue for the jury. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Wallace and Santos, inmates at Menard Correctional Center in Illinois filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Menard’s “double-ceiling” policy of housing two inmates in single-person cells violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Where a plaintiff is able to point to some evidence that administrative remedies were not “available” to him under the PLRA, as described by the Supreme Court in its 2016 Ross v. Blake decision, the district court must decide whether remedies were “available” before granting summary judgment on exhaustion. The plaintiffs claimed to have submitted grievances, offered some evidence that other inmates complained of the same issue with no response, and cited a mechanism by which prison officials can allegedly use state law to reject their grievances without any consideration of their merits. The court remanded for consideration of the exhaustion question as it applies to double-celling at Menard. If the district court finds that double-celling remedies were “available,” then the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies. The court affirmed a factual determination that Santos did not file a grievance regarding Menard’s double-celling policy. View "Wallace v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

An informant purchased 3.1 grams of methamphetamine from Smith. Later, an undercover agent purchased 0.7 grams of fentanyl and heroin from Smith. Smith was subsequently arrested on an outstanding warrant, carrying a loaded semiautomatic handgun; 23 packages collectively containing 3.1 grams of fentanyl and heroin; several hundred dollars in cash; and a digital scale bearing fentanyl residue.Smith was convicted (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C)) for both purchases and the drugs recovered during his arrest; of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and as a felon in possession of a firearm, 922(g)(1). The PSR grouped Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 together for an offense level of 23 because Smith’s semiautomatic firearm was “capable of accepting a large capacity magazine,” and a one-level multiple-count enhancement applied. The court awarded one point for acceptance of responsibility. Smith was in the highest criminal history category. The Guidelines range on the grouped counts was 84–105 months; the 924(c) conviction carried a 60-month mandatory consecutive minimum sentence. Smith argued that he had possessed small quantities of drugs, that his criminal history was nonviolent, and that he only carried a gun for protection. The district court noted that fentanyl was especially dangerous and that Smith's presence with a gun created “a very dangerous event” but determined that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors made a downward variance appropriate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Smith's 120-month sentence. Smith failed to establish any procedural error. His below-Guidelines-range sentence is substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, a detective and a police officer worked in tandem to search Colbert’s vehicle and frisk him, uncovering on his person a brick-shaped package later confirmed to contain a controlled substance. Colbert moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that the frisk violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the motion. Colbert entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk him based on two officers observing the smell of marijuana coming from the vehicle, Colbert’s erratic driving, evasive and nervous behavior, a bulge in his pocket, and unwillingness to follow directions. Colbert had read and signed a form, giving the officer permission to search his vehicle. View "United States v. Colbert" on Justia Law