Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Butler downloaded, distributed, and shared child pornography via internet chat rooms. After tracking him online, investigators obtained a search warrant and seized ten electronic devices from his home, which contained more than 10,000 images and videos of child pornography. Much of this material involved very young children—including babies—and some depicted sadistic and masochistic content. After several years of competency proceedings, Butler pleaded guilty to one count of transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1).The district judge imposed a prison sentence of 188 months, the bottom of the properly calculated 188-235 month Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Butler’s argument that a lower sentence was warranted “in light of his background and mitigating circumstances” as “frivolous on the merits.” The judge considered all of the relevant factors and explained how she weighed those factors. She was aware that Butler suffers from bipolar disorder, personality disorder, and several mood disorders, and was himself the victim of sexual, physical, and emotional abuse as a child. Weighing the need to protect the public, she noted the seriousness of the offense and that Butler has an adult conviction for boarding a school bus while impersonating a police officer and another for child abduction in which he again posed as a police officer and attempted to lure children into his car. View "United States v. Butler" on Justia Law

In 2000, Von Vader pled guilty to distributing methamphetamine in Wisconsin and was sentenced to 270 months’ imprisonment; the court concluded he was a “career offender.” He did not appeal. Von Vader later pled guilty to possessing heroin in prison (in Kansas) and received an additional ten-year sentence. In a 2017 petition (28 U.S.C. 2255) Von Vader argued that intervening Supreme Court precedent indicated that one or more of his previous convictions should not have been counted toward career offender classification. Von Vader’s petition was dismissed as untimely.He then unsuccessfully applied for compassionate release (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)), contending that the 2000 sentencing error was an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. The Seventh Circuit first held that the fact that Von Vader’s 2000 sentence has expired did not render the application moot because relief would be possible, The court then rejected his claims on the merits. A challenge to a sentence must be resolved by direct appeal or motion under 2255, not by seeking compassionate release. Judicial decisions, even those announcing new law, cannot alone amount to an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, which, under 3582(c)(1), is some new fact about an inmate’s health or family status, or an equivalent post-conviction development, not a purely legal contention for which statutes specify other avenues of relief. Even if the Sentencing Commission’s staff erred in distributing information concerning Van Vader’s right to file a 2255 motion, prisoners do not have a right to legal assistance in initiating collateral relief requests. View "United States v. Von Vader" on Justia Law

Cruz‐Velasco entered the U.S. without inspection in 1999. He has remained continuously present, raising his American‐born sons as a single father after the death of his partner. In 2014, Cruz‐Velasco was convicted of reckless driving, endangering safety, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, with his nine‐ and 11‐year‐old sons in the car. In subsequent removal proceedings, Cruz‐Velasco sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). While in removal proceedings, Cruz‐Velasco was convicted again with DUI and sentenced to serve another 10 days in jail. Cruz‐Velasco stopped drinking after his 2016 arrest and completed a court‐ordered substance abuse program.The IJ held that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, having failed to establish that his sons would suffer hardship beyond what is predictable as a result of a parent’s removal and because his DUI convictions demonstrated a lack of good moral character. While his BIA appeal was pending, the Attorney General ruled that two or more DUI convictions in the relevant period raise a presumption that a noncitizen lacks good moral character, which cannot be overcome solely by showing rehabilitation. The BIA affirmed the removal order Amid the 2020 COVID‐19 pandemic, Cruz‐Velasco sought to reopen his application, submitting new evidence that he had been diagnosed with diabetes and that this condition increased his risk of dying from COVID‐19 in Mexico. The BIA denied Cruz‐Velasco’s motion, without specifically addressing arguments concerning his diabetes. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Cruz-Velasco v. Garland" on Justia Law

Williams was shot and killed in 2009, and two other men were injured. A Wisconsin jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson was the gunman. After exhausting state remedies, he appealed the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial and postconviction counsel.The Seventh Circuit declined to reach the merits of Wilson’s claims, finding both procedurally defaulted. Wisconsin state courts disposed of Wilson’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on adequate and independent state procedural grounds. Wilson failed to present his ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim for one complete round of state court review. If a petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas review is precluded unless the prisoner demonstrates either “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,” or that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” The miscarriage of justice exception ‘applies only in the rare case where the petitioner can prove that he is actually innocent. Wilson does not allege cause and prejudice and did not make a sufficient showing of actual innocence. View "Wilson v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

Oregon and his wife divorced; his ex-wife retained custody over their two children. After his divorce, Oregon failed to file and pay taxes for three years. When he ultimately filed his late tax returns, he mistakenly claimed his two children as dependents. Because of this mistake, Oregon owed the IRS approximately $60,000 in back taxes and penalties. Looking for additional work, Oregon met a man who offered to introduce Oregon to a man who needed help laundering his proceeds from illegal drug sales. He told Oregon that he could keep 10 percent of everything he laundered. Oregon agreed, not knowing that the man was an undercover FBI agent. The agent gave him $100,000. After laundering over $85,000, Oregon had a change of heart and refused to launder any more money.Oregon pled guilty to one count of laundering money, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B), and was sentenced to 18 months in prison—six months below the Sentencing Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Oregon’s arguments that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to consider relevant mitigating factors, such as his need to support his family and his payment of restitution, and improperly relied on the need for general deterrence and to avoid sentence disparities. View "United States v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Behning, an Illinois prisoner, claims that prison guards violated his constitutional rights while responding to his altercation with a prison guard. After the incident Behning was taken to the emergency room, was charged with assaulting an officer, and was put in solitary confinement at another institution. While he was in solitary confinement, Behning allegedly timely mailed a grievance over the altercation, inadequate medical care, and procedural defects in his disciplinary hearing to the Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Review Board. He sent a copy to his attorney, who also forwarded it to the Board. The Board returned it, asserting that only offenders themselves could submit grievances. Behning mailed another grievance, which the prison rejected as untimely.Behning filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted summary judgment based on Behning’s failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. Behning, through his attorney, submitted most of his grievances to the appropriate administrative office, on time. Nothing in the regulation prohibits an offender from submitting a grievance through an attorney. Regardless of how Behning’s grievance arrived, it apprised the Board of the nature of his complaints. View "Behning v.Johnson" on Justia Law

Baker ran from police officers, took a loaded firearm out of his waistband, and threw it over a fence into a residential backyard. He pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court added two offense levels under Sentencing Guideline 3C1.2 for Baker’s having “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.”The Seventh Circuit upheld Baker’s 72-month sentence. Without the contested enhancement, his guideline range would have been 57-71 Months but the record indicates that the district judge would have imposed the same sentence even if the contested guideline levels had not been added. The judge focused on Baker’s 11 prior convictions, including three for being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition, and said, “I noted that you got 72 months before when you [committed this offense] a third time. You need to get at least 72 months this time given your history. I need to deter you from committing this crime again. I need to deter others not to do it again.” Any guideline error would have been harmless. The actual sentence was reasonable under the circumstances. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

In 2013. Yankey pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 846. The court sentenced Yankey to 115 months in prison followed by 48 months of supervised release. His prison term was 36 months below the bottom of the advisory guideline range. In 2020, Yankey began his term of supervised release. The probation office’s summary indicates that Yankey associated with people engaged in criminal activity and had a certain person at his home who his probation officer had specifically and repeatedly warned could not be there. During a 2022 probation visit, drugs and paraphernalia were found in Yankey’s home. Yankey admitted that in March 2022, he had used methamphetamine and cocaine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the revocation of Yankey’s supervised release and his sentence of 24 months in prison followed by 24 more months of supervision. The judge’s questions and comments indicate that he considered mitigation arguments about Yankey’s family support, employment history, and efforts toward sobriety. The judge considered the sentencing factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant, and the need for treatment. The court’s decision that the prior below-guideline sentence justified a revocation sentence at the top of—but still within—the guideline range was not plainly unreasonable. View "United States v. Yankey" on Justia Law

Stapleton lured women into prostitution and exploited them using threats, force, and other forms of coercion. An anonymous tip led to his arrest. Indicted for sex-trafficking crimes, Stapleton claimed that the police had fabricated the anonymous tip and tampered with his cellphone. The court appointed a succession of defense attorneys, but Stapleton constantly disagreed with them regarding his police-misconduct claims. The judge denied his motion to suppress the evidence derived from the anonymous tip. Stapleton then insisted on representing himself. After making the inquiries required by Supreme Court precedent, the judge granted Stapleton’s motion and appointed a standby attorney. Before trial, Stapleton unsuccessfully moved for a court-funded expert to investigate his phone-tampering claim. Before opening statements, Stapleton announced that he would conditionally plead guilty, reserving the right to challenge the suppression ruling. The judge conducted a colloquy and accepted Stapleton’s pleas. Before sentencing, Stapleton unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his pleas. The judge sentenced him to life in prison.Stapleton did not appeal the suppression ruling but argued that his guilty pleas were invalid because he did not have counsel and was confused about his appellate rights and challenged the denial of his motion for a court-funded expert. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Stapleton validly waived his right to counsel after two thorough colloquies; his guilty pleas were also knowing and voluntary. The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Stapleton’s request for a court-funded cellphone expert. View "United States v. Stapleton" on Justia Law

Balentine, who lived in Kokomo, pooled money from co-conspirators to buy illegal drugs from Riley in Georgia. The two arranged for couriers. Balentine stored the drugs in the homes of his associates, then distributed the drugs to O’Bannon, Jones, Myers, Reed, Owens, Jones, and Abbott. After two years of investigation, officers intercepted a courier and seized methamphetamine and cocaine she was transporting. Myers’s girlfriend drove to Georgia to pick up another shipment; she was also intercepted. To protect the operation, Riley and Balentine plotted to kill a suspected confidential informant. Officers stopped O’Bannon as he drove with the hitmen to the target’s home. Officers found several firearms in the hitmen’s hotel room. With a warrant, a DEA agent searched the conspirators’ residences, finding guns and drugs.Fourteen people were charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and individual counts related to drugs, firearms, murder for hire, and money. laundering. Nine defendants pleaded guilty. The others were convicted on most charges. Ten defendants appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, only vacating Jones’s sentence–the court erred in applying a firearm enhancement. The wiretap and search warrant affidavits were sufficient. The district court properly rejected a Batson challenge, focusing on the credibility of the government’s explanations for its strikes. The court upheld the admission of a DEA special agent’s “dual-role” testimony; a related jury instruction was “confusing” but did not merit reversal. Sufficient evidence supported all of the convictions. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law