Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joseph Van Sach, a federal prison inmate, was sentenced to 87 months for assaulting a correctional officer. The incident occurred when Van Sach refused to comply with orders to submit to hand restraints, leading to the use of pepper spray and physical restraint by officers. Later, Van Sach punched a correctional officer in the eye, causing severe swelling, sharp pain, and bruising. He was subsequently convicted by a jury of one count of forcible assault on a federal officer.The probation officer prepared a presentence report recommending the base offense level for aggravated assault, along with several enhancements, resulting in a total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of III. This calculation yielded a guidelines range of 70 to 87 months in prison. The government objected to the report, seeking a higher sentence due to the officer's persistent headaches and extreme physical pain. However, the district court overruled the government's objection and adopted the guidelines calculation as set forth in the report, sentencing Van Sach to 87 months in prison.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, both Van Sach and the government agreed that the district court erred in applying the guideline provision for aggravated assault, as the correctional officer did not suffer serious bodily injury. They argued that the court should have used a different guideline provision, which would have resulted in a lower guidelines range of 24 to 30 months. The government conceded the error but argued it was harmless because the district court considered other factors in sentencing. However, the appellate court found the error was not harmless and vacated Van Sach's sentence, remanding the case for resentencing using the correct guideline provision. View "USA v. Sach" on Justia Law

The case involves Roland Black, who was convicted of attempting to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, specifically furanyl fentanyl. Law enforcement intercepted a package addressed to Black, believing it contained narcotics. After obtaining a warrant, they found the substance, replaced it with sham narcotics, and delivered the package to Black's residence. Black was arrested after the package was opened and he was found with luminescent powder from the sham narcotics on his hands.Prior to his trial, Black had unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress all evidence derived from the seizure of the package. He argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the package and requested an evidentiary hearing to resolve related factual disputes. The district court denied these motions, ruling that the totality of the circumstances supported the officers' reasonable suspicion determination.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Black appealed his conviction, raising four arguments. He contended that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the package, the jury instruction about his requisite mens rea was erroneous, the jury’s verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence, and the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the court’s treatment of furanyl fentanyl as an analogue of fentanyl.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize the package, the jury instruction accurately stated the law, the jury’s verdict was supported by more than sufficient evidence, and Black's motion to dismiss argument was foreclosed by precedent. View "USA v. Black" on Justia Law

Mario Giannini and Robert Czernek were involved in a series of fraudulent schemes in Bloomingdale Township, Illinois. Giannini worked for Bulldog Earth Movers, a contractor owned by his girlfriend, Debra Fazio. Czernek, the Township's Highway Commissioner, approved inflated invoices from Bulldog, and the excess funds were split between Czernek and Bulldog. Giannini, Czernek, and Fazio were indicted on counts of wire and honest services fraud. Czernek cooperated with the government and pleaded guilty, while Giannini and Fazio proceeded to trial. However, Fazio was acquitted on all counts after the government's case-in-chief.The district court had previously denied Giannini's motion for a mistrial based on the government's late disclosure of investigating agents' notes regarding an inculpatory statement he made to Czernek. Giannini also argued that the court erred in allowing the prosecutors to discuss Fazio's conduct in closing arguments, despite her acquittal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial, as the late disclosure of the agents' notes did not sufficiently prejudice Giannini. The court also found no error in allowing the prosecutors to discuss Fazio's conduct, as it was highly relevant to the charges against Giannini. The court concluded that even if it was error to allow the comments, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against Giannini. View "United States v. Giannini" on Justia Law

The defendant, Christopher Johnson, was indicted and pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft after purchasing stolen credit card data and using it to produce counterfeit cards. The district court, when calculating the loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, deferred to the guidelines commentary and assessed a $500 minimum loss for each card. Johnson argued that the guidelines commentary was not entitled to deference as an interpretation of § 2B1.1, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Kisor v. Wilkie.The district court denied Johnson's objection, holding that the term "loss" in the context of § 2B1.1 was genuinely ambiguous and that the minimum loss amount was a reasonable interpretation of that term. The court also stated that even without deferring to the guidelines commentary, it would still have assessed a loss of $500 per card. Johnson was sentenced to 58 months' imprisonment: 34 months for wire fraud and the mandatory 24 months for aggravated identity theft.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Johnson challenged the district court's deference to the guidelines commentary. The court, however, affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Kisor v. Wilkie did not disturb the Supreme Court’s holding in Stinson v. United States that guidelines commentary is “authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of” the guideline it interprets. The court concluded that the guidelines commentary assessing $500 minimum loss per credit card therefore remains binding under Stinson. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Seldrick Carpenter, who was serving a six-year term of supervised release after completing a federal sentence for distributing fentanyl. After the death of his mother, Carpenter began using drugs and acting out against his probation officer. When behavioral therapy failed to address these issues, his probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervised release. Carpenter was then suspected of setting a car on fire. The Probation Office alleged that Carpenter committed several supervised release violations, including arson, criminal damage to property, intimidation, and aggravated battery. Before the revocation hearing, Carpenter requested a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment and Article III, § 2, cl. 3. The district court denied the motion and presided over Carpenter’s revocation hearing without a jury. The court found Carpenter guilty of several violations and revoked his supervised release, imposing a revocation sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was tasked with determining whether a supervised release revocation proceeding held under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) constitutes the “trial of [a] crime” or a “criminal prosecution” within the meaning of either clause. The court agreed with the district court's decision that it does not. The court concluded that neither the Sixth Amendment nor Section 2 of Article III of the U.S. Constitution guarantee a jury trial in a revocation hearing like Carpenter’s. A defendant in Carpenter's situation is entitled only to those procedures dictated by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court also rejected Carpenter's argument that Article III, § 2 can apply to proceedings outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Marcos Mendez was stopped for inspection at O'Hare International Airport after returning from a trip abroad. Customs agents, who had been alerted to Mendez due to his arrest record and travel history, searched his cell phone and found child pornography. Mendez was subsequently indicted on multiple counts related to child pornography. He moved to suppress the evidence found on his phone, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights as it was conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.The district court denied Mendez's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment as customs agents had reasonable suspicion to look through Mendez's phone. Mendez pleaded guilty to one count of producing child pornography but preserved his right to appeal the district court's ruling on the suppression motion.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Mendez argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Riley v. California and Carpenter v. United States required a warrant, probable cause, or at least reasonable suspicion for the searches of his phone. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that searches at borders do not require a warrant or probable cause. The court held that the routine, manual search of Mendez's phone required no individualized suspicion. The court affirmed the district court's decision, joining the uniform view of other circuits that searches of electronics at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause. View "United States v. Mendez" on Justia Law

Kevin Shibilski was charged with environmental and wire-fraud crimes and conspiracy to defraud the United States, related to his operation of three Wisconsin-based companies involved in recycling electronic equipment. Shibilski pleaded guilty to a single felony count of willful failure to pay employment taxes, and in exchange, the government dropped the other charges. During the sentencing hearing, Shibilski objected to the presentence report’s recommendations regarding relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines, particularly the recommendation to hold him responsible for the total amount of unpaid employment taxes for all three companies. The district judge held a seven-hour sentencing hearing, most of which was consumed by the presentation of documents and testimony, including testimony from Shibilski himself.The district judge found Shibilski responsible for the full amount of unpaid taxes. The judge also declined to award credit for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), finding that Shibilski had falsely denied responsibility for relevant conduct. After weighing the statutory sentencing factors, the judge imposed a sentence of 33 months in prison, the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range.Shibilski appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the judge violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by unduly curtailing his attorney’s presentation of evidence, that the judge improperly denied credit for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a), and that the judge committed procedural error by failing to meaningfully address the statutory sentencing factors. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Shibilski" on Justia Law

The case involves Taiwo Onamuti, who was charged with 23 crimes related to his involvement in a tax-fraud scheme. He pleaded guilty to one count each of identity theft, aggravated identity theft, and presenting false claims for tax refunds. After several changes in defense counsel and an unsuccessful motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Onamuti was sentenced to 204 months in prison. Later, Onamuti moved to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his attorney had been ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the charge and for advising him to plead guilty. The judge vacated the aggravated identity theft conviction, reduced Onamuti’s prison sentence by 24 months, and denied all other relief.Onamuti filed a motion in his criminal case seeking attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment for the legal expenses he had incurred to fight the charges of aggravated identity theft. He argued that the government had pursued those charges vexatiously and in bad faith. The government objected on procedural grounds, arguing that the Hyde Amendment does not apply in a § 2255 proceeding. The judge denied the motion for fees, concluding that the motion was procedurally deficient.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Onamuti did not show that the government’s position was frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith. The court also held that the civil deadline applies to a motion for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment because it is a civil matter ancillary to the criminal case. Therefore, Onamuti was not entitled to an award of attorney fees under the Hyde Amendment. View "United States v. Onamuti" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Gerald Sewell, who responded to a post on Craigslist, seeking a sexual encounter. The post was made by an undercover FBI agent posing as a 15-year-old girl. The conversation between Sewell and the agent quickly turned sexual, with plans to meet later the same day. Sewell drove from Missouri to Illinois to meet the supposed minor, only to be arrested upon arrival.Sewell was indicted for attempted enticement of a minor and for traveling across state lines with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. He pleaded not guilty and requested a jury instruction on entrapment. The district court denied this request, finding no evidence of persistent persuasion by the undercover agent or reluctance by Sewell. The court concluded that the government had used the sting operation to solicit the crime without inducing Sewell. Sewell was convicted on both counts and sentenced to concurrent ten-year sentences.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Sewell appealed the district court's denial of an entrapment instruction. The court, after reviewing the case, found no evidence of inducement, only solicitation of the crime, which is insufficient to put the entrapment defense before the jury. The court noted that it was Sewell who encouraged the supposed minor to meet for a sexual rendezvous, and he set aside any misgivings he may have had to drive across state lines to meet her. The court concluded that the government had furnished Sewell the ordinary opportunity to commit the charged crime, and he eagerly took it. The court affirmed the district court's decision, denying Sewell's requested entrapment instruction. View "USA v. Sewell" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Echo Scheidt, who was convicted for knowingly providing false information on a Firearms Transaction Record (ATF Form 4473) during five separate gun purchases. Scheidt resold the firearms, two of which were later used in shootings, including a murder. The false statements pertained to her residential address, which she misrepresented in the forms. The authorities traced the firearms back to her after the shootings.The district court indicted Scheidt on five counts of knowingly making a false written statement likely to deceive a firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), and one count of knowingly making a false statement to a government agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Scheidt moved to dismiss the five § 922(a)(6) counts, arguing that the statute criminalized conduct protected by the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, stating that the conduct prohibited by § 922(a)(6) does not enjoy Second Amendment protection. Scheidt pleaded guilty to all counts and was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Scheidt appealed her conviction, arguing that § 922(a)(6) violates the Second Amendment. She contended that her right to purchase a firearm was conditioned on completing ATF Form 4473 and that § 922(a)(6) further conditioned her right to possess a firearm by demanding honesty. However, the court disagreed, stating that ordinary information-providing requirements, like those imposed by ATF Form 4473 and enforced through criminal statutes like § 922(a)(6), do not infringe the right to keep and bear arms. The court affirmed her conviction, concluding that the Second Amendment does not immunize purchasers from knowingly providing misstatements in ATF Form 4473. View "USA v. Scheidt" on Justia Law