Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On July 21, 2018, Sara Rodriguez and her daughters were carjacked at gunpoint in Chicago as they returned to their parked Chevrolet Equinox. Two armed men forced them out of the vehicle, which was then driven away by the assailants. Later that evening, a shooting occurred at a nearby park, and witnesses saw a man matching the carjacker’s description fleeing in a vehicle resembling the stolen Equinox. Early the next morning, police located the Equinox, but the occupants escaped after a crash. Inside the vehicle, officers found items linking Kashif Dukes to the car, including his cell phone, DNA, and a pistol later connected to the park shooting. Angelica Rodriguez initially gave a tentative identification of Dukes in a photo lineup, but seven months later, she identified him with high confidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Dukes’s trial. The government introduced evidence tying Dukes to the carjacking and shooting, including forensic and social media evidence. Dukes challenged the reliability of the eyewitness identification and objected to the admission of evidence about the uncharged shooting, arguing it was prejudicial. The jury found Dukes guilty of carjacking, brandishing a firearm during the carjacking, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court denied Dukes’s motion for acquittal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that evidence of the shooting was admissible as direct evidence of the charged firearm possession and, under Rule 404(b), as relevant to motive for the carjacking. The court also found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, noting that the jury could reasonably infer Dukes’s guilt from both direct and circumstantial evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Dukes" on Justia Law

In early 2015, Daniel Stewart was stopped by Indianapolis police for a traffic violation, leading to the discovery of a handgun, over $9,000 in cash, and more than 800 grams of illegal narcotics in his car. A subsequent search of his home revealed additional drugs, nearly $500,000 in cash, and five more firearms. Stewart was found to be laundering drug proceeds through sham businesses. He was convicted in November 2016 on multiple counts, including drug distribution, firearm possession, and money laundering.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially sentenced Stewart to life imprisonment plus five years. Stewart appealed, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. He then sought postconviction relief, arguing that recent case law invalidated his sentence enhancements. The government conceded, and the district court ordered resentencing. At resentencing, the court imposed a 360-month term of imprisonment, considering Stewart's efforts at rehabilitation but also the severity of his crimes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Stewart's appeal of his resentencing. Stewart argued that the district court miscalculated his sentencing range under the career-offender guideline and misunderstood its discretion regarding his rehabilitation efforts. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court correctly applied the career-offender guideline and did not err in its consideration of Stewart's rehabilitation. The court also held that the district court provided a sufficient explanation for the increased sentences on the money laundering counts, which did not affect the overall sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Stewart's 360-month sentence. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Eric Skeens was convicted in Indiana of five counts of child molesting, based almost entirely on the detailed testimony of the child victim, K.W. There was no physical evidence presented at trial, but the prosecution relied on K.W.’s account, as well as supporting testimony from her mother, a school counselor, a therapist, and a sexual assault nurse who explained the absence of physical evidence. During closing arguments, Skeens’s attorney made a statement to the jury, “I believe her,” referring to K.W., which Skeens later argued constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After his conviction, Skeens appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and found that the attorney’s statement did not prejudice the outcome, given the strength and detail of K.W.’s testimony. The Indiana Supreme Court declined to review the case, and Skeens’s subsequent state post-conviction and federal habeas petitions were also denied. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied relief, concluding that Skeens had not shown the state court’s decision was unreasonable under federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, applying the deferential standards required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Strickland v. Washington. The court held that the Indiana Court of Appeals did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply the Strickland standard when it concluded that there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different absent the attorney’s statement. The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Skeens’s habeas petition. View "Skeens v Neal" on Justia Law

Mitchell Green was charged with trafficking a child and related offenses in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. During his trial, Green called his cousin, Jonathan Cousin, as a witness, who testified that he, not Green, had driven the minor to a hotel. The state did not initially object to Cousin's testimony but later argued that Green failed to provide pretrial notice as required for a "Denny witness," leading the judge to declare a mistrial. Green, out on bond, argued that a retrial would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.The trial court denied Green's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held that the mistrial was erroneous. However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin sided with the trial judge, finding that he exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial. Green then filed a collateral attack, and the district court denied relief, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial was based on a mistaken belief that pretrial notice for Denny evidence was required. The court noted that no such requirement existed in Wisconsin law. The trial judge failed to exercise sound discretion by not considering alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance. The Seventh Circuit held that there was no manifest necessity for the mistrial, and thus, a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue an unconditional writ. View "Green v. Milwaukee County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Sheldon Morales and Eduardo Santana were surveilled by the DEA after Morales, recently released from prison for drug trafficking, resumed similar activities. Morales coordinated with two incarcerated brokers to arrange drug shipments, which were intercepted by law enforcement. Santana acted as a translator and partner in the operation, discussing plans to expand their drug distribution and defraud suppliers. Morales and Santana were indicted for conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine. Morales faced additional charges for attempting to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl.In the Northern District of Illinois, Morales requested new counsel multiple times, causing trial delays. His final request for new counsel was partially granted, but the court denied a subsequent motion to replace Joseph Lopez, citing potential further delays. Morales and Santana were convicted by a jury, with Morales found guilty of all charges and Santana convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Post-trial motions for a new trial and acquittal were denied. Santana's request for a minor role reduction at sentencing was also denied, and he was sentenced to 200 months, while Morales received 235 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Santana's appeal argued insufficient evidence for his conspiracy conviction and error in denying a minor role reduction. The court found ample evidence of Santana's active role in the conspiracy and upheld the district court's sentencing decision. Morales contended the district court erred by not giving a buyer-seller jury instruction and violated his right to counsel of choice. The court found sufficient evidence of a conspiracy with Santana, making the buyer-seller instruction irrelevant, and determined Morales had not properly requested new counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgments. View "United States v. Santana" on Justia Law

Kenin Edwards was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment for tax fraud after a series of procedural complications. Edwards, who was represented by four different attorneys throughout the process, delayed his trial multiple times before pleading guilty. After his guilty plea, he fired his final attorney, decided to represent himself, recanted his admission of guilt, sought to vacate his plea, and filed numerous frivolous motions. The government, which had initially agreed to recommend a five-month split sentence, sought a 21-month sentence due to Edwards's conduct.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois handled the case. Edwards's initial attorneys withdrew due to a breakdown in strategy, and his subsequent attorney was disqualified due to a conflict of interest. Edwards then retained a fourth attorney, with whom he eventually reached a plea agreement. However, Edwards later discharged this attorney as well and chose to represent himself. The district court conducted a Faretta hearing to ensure Edwards's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. Despite Edwards's numerous pro se filings and attempts to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court denied his motions and sentenced him to 21 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Edwards argued that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the district court disqualified his attorney and allegedly forced him to proceed pro se at sentencing. He also claimed the government breached the plea agreement by recommending a higher sentence. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Edwards's appeal, finding that he had waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement. The court held that Edwards's claims did not fall within the exceptions to the appeal waiver and that the government did not breach the plea agreement. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Auston McLain exchanged sexually explicit messages with an undercover FBI agent posing as a fifteen-year-old boy named Codey. McLain drove from Iowa to Illinois to meet Codey, where he was arrested with condoms and a cell phone containing the messages. A jury convicted McLain of attempted enticement of a minor and traveling with intent to engage in illicit sexual activity.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois excluded McLain's expert witnesses and certain testimony he wished to give. The court also addressed objections to the prosecutor's closing argument remarks and a jury instruction. McLain appealed, arguing these decisions denied him a fair trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony, as it was not relevant to McLain's specific intent and could confuse the jury. The court also held that any error in excluding McLain's testimony about his past experiences was harmless, given the strong evidence against him. The prosecutor's remarks, while close to improper, did not deny McLain a fair trial. The jury instruction on intent was a correct statement of law and did not mislead the jury.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The evidence overwhelmingly supported McLain's guilt, and none of the errors, individually or cumulatively, affected the verdict. View "United States v. McLain" on Justia Law

Dante Small faced charges of battery and two counts of attempted murder for hitting one police officer with a car and narrowly missing another. He claimed that his trial attorney misadvised him about his sentencing exposure, leading him to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial. An Illinois jury convicted him on all counts, and the trial judge sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of 40 years in prison. Small then sought federal habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.In the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Small's attorney indicated that Small wanted to negotiate a plea agreement. During a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor mentioned a 20-year plea offer, which was rejected. Small was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 40 years. He filed a pro se post-conviction petition, arguing that his counsel misinformed him about the sentencing range and that he would have accepted a plea if properly advised. The state trial court denied his petition, and the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, finding that the pretrial transcript contradicted Small's claims. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied his petition for leave to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the state court made an unreasonable determination of fact by concluding that the pretrial transcript contradicted Small's claims about being misadvised on sentencing exposure. The Seventh Circuit held that Small was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to develop the factual record regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. View "Small v. Woods" on Justia Law

David Swartz was charged with wire fraud and aiding and assisting the filing of a false tax return. He pleaded guilty to both counts. The probation department prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) that incorrectly calculated Swartz's net worth. Despite Swartz's correction of his assets, the PSR did not update his net worth. At sentencing, the district court imposed a $10,000 fine, relying on the PSR's recommendations.Swartz objected to the PSR's net worth calculation and filed a memorandum noting the correct figure. The district court adopted the PSR's recommendations, including the fine, and ordered restitution and a special assessment. Swartz argued that the district court violated his due process rights by relying on inaccurate financial information and failed to comply with statutory requirements in imposing the fine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not rely on the incorrect net worth figure when imposing the fine. The district court considered Swartz's significant assets, limited liabilities, and positive monthly cash flow, which were accurately stated in the PSR. The court also found that the district court properly considered the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) and did not err in determining Swartz's ability to pay the fine.The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not commit procedural error or violate Swartz's due process rights. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, including the imposition of the $10,000 fine. View "United States v. Swartz" on Justia Law

Frederick Brewer was convicted by a jury of distributing fentanyl, possessing with intent to distribute fentanyl, and participating in a conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. The jury, however, found that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brewer's conspiracy and possession convictions involved at least 40 grams of fentanyl. Brewer moved for acquittal twice, arguing insufficient evidence, but the district court denied both motions. Brewer appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the district court erred in calculating the drug quantity for sentencing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin initially denied Brewer's motions for acquittal. The court found sufficient evidence to establish that Brewer and his co-defendant, Don James, Jr., were engaged in a conspiracy to distribute fentanyl, rather than a simple buyer-seller relationship. The court also rejected Brewer's argument that the jury's finding regarding the drug quantity undermined the guilty verdicts. At sentencing, the district court attributed 1.2 to 4 kilograms of fentanyl to Brewer, resulting in a higher base offense level and a sentence of 144 months in prison followed by 120 months of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Brewer's convictions for conspiracy, possession, and distribution of fentanyl. The court also upheld the district court's drug quantity determination for sentencing purposes, noting that the sentencing court could consider conduct underlying acquitted charges if proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Brewer's conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Brewer" on Justia Law