Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Scott was suspected of shooting and killing Bishop. Scott claims he asked for an attorney during his arrest, but no questioning occurred at that time. Approximately four hours later, Scott was taken for an interview. After the detectives read Scott his Miranda rights, he admitted in a recorded interview to murdering Bishop. Four attorneys worked on Scott’s case before trial; one moved to exclude Scott’s confession on the basis of intoxication. The judge denied the motion, doubting Scott’s testimony. The jury heard the confession and convicted Scott.In a postconviction motion, Scott unsuccessfully alleged that his attorney was ineffective for not moving to suppress his confession on the theory that, because he requested an attorney during his arrest, his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Scott's second unsuccessful postconviction motion claimed his first postconviction counsel deficiently pleaded his claim by failing to marshal facts showing he informed his trial counsel of his request for an attorney.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition, in which he claimed both his trial and first postconviction attorneys were ineffective. The Wisconsin appellate court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, which has never extended Miranda beyond the context of custodial interrogation to permit an accused to request an attorney at the time of his arrest so as to cut off questioning before any attempt at questioning. View "Scott v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Robinson let Solorzano, stay at his Chicago home. The two frequently exchanged coded text messages about cocaine deals. Robinson drove to Indiana to pick up Solorzano after a transaction ended with Solorzano getting robbed. Robinson later texted Solorzano, “You should have taken me to watch your back.” Later, Solorzano arranged a deal with an undercover officer. Robinson drove him; upon their arrival, authorities approached the vehicle to arrest them. One officer said that, during the arrest, he saw his colleague pull a handgun from Robinson’s waistband; it was loaded. The officer who interrogated Robinson said that Robinson told him he had brought the gun to avoid being robbed. A jury found Robinson guilty of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and of possessing a firearm as a felon but found him not guilty of possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The court imposed a sentencing enhancement to the felon-in-possession conviction, finding Robinson possessed a firearm “in connection with” the cocaine conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The use of acquitted conduct to enhance Robinson’s sentence did not violate his constitutional rights and the court made sufficient factual findings to apply the enhancement. The district court’s rationale for connecting the gun to the cocaine conspiracy was clear. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Perry died from gunshot wounds sustained during a fight with Shirley. In 2008, Shirley was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide. Shirley uses a prosthetic device below his knee. Although he can walk, during his trial Shirley was in a wheelchair with his legs shackled. To prevent the jury from observing the shackles, fabric was draped over both counsel tables. During voir dire, Juror 34 stated, if he’s in cuffs, "he did something.” Juror 34 separately confirmed he had seen the restraints, had not mentioned them to other jurors, and that his observations did not bias him. Shirley and his counsel said they were satisfied with those responses and did not request accommodations to muffle the noise of the shackles while Shirley was on the witness stand.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected claims that his presumption of innocence was violated because Juror 34 noticed his restraints, that being shackled inhibited his right to present a complete defense because it limited his ability to approach exhibits, make demonstrations and show the jury which leg his prosthesis was on. The court could not locate an explanation in for the restraint decision but found Shirley “had little difficulty communicating” in an “intelligent and articulate” manner from the witness stand. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Shirley’s petition for habeas relief. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that the decision to shackle a criminal defendant while testifying violates the defendant’s constitutional rights. View "Shirley v. Tegels" on Justia Law

Police discovered a gun in Hatley’s possession during a Gary, Indiana traffic stop. Hatley pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which ordinarily carries a statutory maximum of 10 years. The government contended that Hatley’s criminal history exposed him to an enhanced sentence of at least 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in particular under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which applies to offenders with “three previous convictions … for a violent felony … committed on occasions different from one another.” Hatley’s criminal history included convictions for robbery and criminal battery under Indiana law, both violent felonies under 924(e), and eight separate federal convictions for Hobbs Act robberies committed on eight different occasions.The district court rejected an argument that those robbery convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” and sentenced him to the 15-year minimum term mandated by 924(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court compared the elements of Hobbs Act robbery with the elements of a violent felony under ACCA. Hobbs Act robbery committed by using force against a person fits within ACCA’s force clause. The other way of committing Hobbs Act robbery—using force against property—does not fit within ACCA’s force clause but qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA’s enumerated definition of generic extortion. View "United States v. Hatley" on Justia Law

Worthen, Darryl, and Harris planned to rob a gun store and, if necessary, shoot the store owner, Maxie. During the robbery, Darryl shot and killed Maxie. Worthen was charged with Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and discharge of a firearm resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. 924(j). Because Darryl directed the robbery and killed Maxie, Worthen was charged as an aider and abettor, 18 U.S.C. 2(a). For the 924(j) charge, the government needed to show the discharge of a firearm in the course of a “crime of violence” involving “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Worthen unsuccessfully argued that Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence but did not mention accessory liability. Worthen then pled guilty to the 924(j) charge as an aider and abettor.On appeal, Worthen again argued that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence and argued, for the first time, that aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence and that the 924(c) force clause was unconstitutionally vague. The Seventh Circuit rejected those arguments. Because the principal offense of Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the force clause, aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. The “clear” meaning of physical force is “violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” View "United States v. Worthen" on Justia Law

In 1998 Williams, a leader of the Gangster Disciples, was indicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Convicted, Williams was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 240 months on two counts and a life sentence on a third count; there was evidence that Williams directed a murder to further the gang’s drug dealing activities. Williams invoked the 2018 First Step Act, seeking to reduce his sentence to time served. Williams cited the revised penalty scheme for crack cocaine offenses in place before the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, his advanced age, poor health, and record of good behavior in prison. The government argued that Williams remained affiliated with the Gangster Disciples and posed an ongoing risk to the public.The court held a hearing and reviewed photos of Williams posing in prison with other Disciples and investigative reports showing that Williams was helping distribute drugs for the gang within the prison. Williams disputed the extent of his involvement but admitted that he continued his association with the Disciples. The district court explained that Williams’s ongoing affiliation with the Disciples was “sufficient” to deny relief and found that Williams was still participating in drug dealing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The district court acted well within the bounds of its broad discretion. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

At St. Vincent Hospital, police spoke to Banks. He told them he had been shot three times in the hip. Roland explained that he drove Banks to the hospital in his Buick, which was in the parking lot.” Officers found Roland’s Buick in the hospital parking lot and saw blood and firearms through the window. Sergeant Lewis provided all this information in his search warrant application. Pursuant to the warrant, Detective Shue searched Roland’s Buick. In addition to the visible blood and handguns, Shue and an evidence technician found ammunition in a duffel bag and a loaded magazine in the armrest console. Banks told Shue that he did not know who shot him, that he called Roland after being shot, and that Roland drove him to the hospital. None of this information appeared in the warrant application but comes from an affidavit Shue prepared to support Roland’s arrest as a felon in possession of a firearm.Roland waived his Miranda rights and stated that the car, handguns, and ammunition belonged to him. He had prior convictions for robbery and for possessing cocaine. Roland unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his Buick and his statements. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected his arguments that there was not probable cause to issue the warrant and that the warrant application omitted material information that would have negated probable cause. View "United States v. Roland" on Justia Law

Chicago police officer Miedzianowski was convicted of conspiring to participate in racketeering activity from 1985-1998, conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, more than 50 grams of cocaine base, and unspecified quantities of heroin and marijuana, conspiring to commit extortion, using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a violent or drug-trafficking crime, distributing cocaine and cocaine base, wire fraud, possessing stolen ammunition, possessing a dangerous weapon, and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to life in prison.Miedzianowski moved to reduce his sentence after the 2018 First Step Act made retroactive the lower penalties enacted in the Fair Sentencing Act, to reduce the disparities between sentences for crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine offenses. If a defendant is eligible for relief because he could have received a lower sentence had the Act been in effect at the time of the crimes, the court must exercise its discretion and weigh the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Miedzianowski was eligible for relief. The Act modified the penalty for conspiring to distribute crack.Miedzianowski cited his post-sentencing conduct, advanced age, and family support and argued that his sentence was greater than those of co-defendants. The district court acknowledged those factors but concluded that they did not outweigh the need for general deterrence, the seriousness of his crimes, misusing his status as a police officer, perjuring himself, and threatening witnesses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The court sufficiently addressed Miedzianowski’s arguments and did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Miedzianowski" on Justia Law

Pierner-Lytge, a Second Amendment supporter, walked to a public park near Walker Elementary School that contains a playground and a baseball field. Many children and families were reportedly present that evening. Pierner-Lytge carried a rifle with a spike bayonet bolted to the end of the barrel, a holstered semi-automatic handgun, plus a duty belt containing pepper spray, a baton, and handcuffs. Milwaukee County officers responded to reports. Pierner-Lytge stated that she was exercising her Second Amendment rights and confirmed that she had a concealed carry weapon license but did not have it with her. Pierner-Lytge had previously resisted arrest and threatened officers and had been the subject of six mental health detention proceedings. Officers arrested Pierner-Lytge for disorderly conduct. She complied with instructions. Officers confiscated her rifle, bayonet, handgun, and duty belt. Pierner-Lytge was released from custody and was not charged. The seized property was returned.Pierner-Lytge sued. 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity. While a reasonable officer should have known in 2020 that simply carrying a firearm in public does not constitute disorderly conduct, more is required to show that the legality of Pierner-Lytge’s conduct was “beyond debate.” To the extent the officers misjudged whether probable cause existed to arrest Pierner-Lytge, it was a reasonable decision given the Wisconsin disorderly conduct statute at the time View "Pierner-Lytge v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Bailon accompanied Aguila on a trip to purchase cocaine. The seller was a DEA confidential source. DEA agents arrested both men and searched Aguila’s car, recovering a pistol. The agents questioned Bailon inside a DEA van; he had limited English. Bailon admitted he owned the handgun. In the DEA office, an agent spoke Spanish and translated. Bailon was given an “Advice of Rights” form written in Spanish, explaining his Miranda rights. Bailon initialed next to each of his rights and signed the form. Bailon admitted to being in the country without authorization, stated that he had seven children, and consented to searches of his home and his phone. Agents had asked him if he “want[ed] to go back to Mexico or … tell [them] the truth.” They stated that they were going to call ICE and that they would test the gun for fingerprints. Agents found a photo of a gun on Bailon’s cell phone.Bailon was charged as an alien unlawfully in the U.S. in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). The court excluded the statements made in the van but not those made in the DEA office, finding that the Miranda warning was not undermined by the references to his children or his lack of formal education. Convicted, he has been removed to Mexico. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Considering the totality of the circumstances, Bailon’s conduct and statements establish that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. View "United States v. Bailon" on Justia Law