Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Courtney was sentenced to three years in state prison followed by one year of supervised release for violating an earlier term of parole by failing to register as a sex offender. Courtney’s supervised release was revoked before he left prison. The stated reason was not that he had acted wrongly but that he had no arrangements for a place to live that state officials deemed suitable. Courtney spent his year of supervised release in prison.Courtney brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants failed to investigate his proposed living arrangements and ignored his grievances and that his release was revoked without evidence that he violated any terms of release and without adequate procedural protections. The district court dismissed Courtney’s claims as barred by the Supreme Court’s 1994 “Heck” decision, which forecloses civil litigation that would call into question the validity of a state criminal conviction or sentence that has not been set aside or that would call into question the validity of parole revocation, at least when the revocation is based on the parolee’s wrongdoing.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part but remanded the claims based on the defendants’ failure to do their jobs. Courtney’s claims that the defendants, after his parole revocation, ignored his grievances and communications regarding possible host sites, if substantiated, would not necessarily imply that the Prison Review Board’s decision to revoke his parole was invalid. Courtney’s claims concerning the defendants’ inaction before that date are similar to seeking a writ of mandamus, not like seeking habeas corpus relief, and would not “necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” View "Courtney v. Butler" on Justia Law

Curtis was convicted in 2000 for his part in a crack-cocaine distribution enterprise, including related shootings. The indictment included drug conspiracy counts, firearm counts, and an 18 U.S.C. 924(c) count for carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Curtis’s PSR grouped the drug counts and grouped the firearms counts (for causing the death of another with a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy) separately, with terms of imprisonment to run consecutively. Section 924(c) convictions feature a five-year mandatory consecutive minimum sentence and are always grouped separately. Curtis did not object to the groupings. Curtis was sentenced to life imprisonment plus a concurrent term of 480 months on the drug counts; two consecutive life sentences on the firearms counts; and another consecutive 60 months on the 924(c) count.Under the 2018 First Step Act, the district court reduced Curtis's term of imprisonment for the drug conspiracy counts to 293 months but concluded that resentencing was not authorized for the other counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court was incorrect to rely rigidly on the grouping rules and that Curtis’s whole sentence should be treated as “a single sentencing package.” While a court does have discretion under the Act to reduce an aggregate sentence, even if part of that sentence rests on offenses that are neither covered by the Act nor grouped with a covered offense, Curtis’s consecutive sentences for the firearms convictions were not part of a package. They were not “covered offenses” and “could not be grouped” with a covered offense. View "United States v. Curtis" on Justia Law

In 1998, Evans was charged with murder. While awaiting trial, Evans asked his cellmate to kill two witnesses. The cellmate secretly recorded those conversations for the authorities. State charges followed for soliciting murder. In 1999 two separate juries convicted Evans of both murder and solicitation. After Illinois courts affirmed both convictions on direct appeal, Evans filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court in 2003. His petition is still pending. In 2019, frustrated with the delay, Evans invoked 28 U.S.C. 2254 and turned to federal court for relief. He claimed that Illinois’s postconviction relief process had proven “ineffective,” allowing him to seek federal habeas relief without waiting further for relief in the Illinois courts.The Seventh Circuit agreed with Evans and vacated the denial of relief. “The delay Evans has experienced of twenty years and counting is beyond the pale and indefensible.” The exhaustion requirement is neither ironclad nor unyielding. A state-law remedy can become ineffective or unavailable by virtue of delay if the delay is both inordinate and attributable to the state. In this case, the “extraordinary delay has stemmed in no small part from the state’s own conduct, both in its capacity as a respondent to the litigation and as the state trial court itself.” View "Evans v. Wills" on Justia Law

Caldera-Torres, a citizen of Mexico in the U.S. without permission, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4), 1229b(b)(1). To be eligible for that relief an alien must show that he has not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence. Caldera-Torres has a Wisconsin conviction for battery, arising from an attack on the mother of his daughter. An IJ and the BIA concluded that this conviction makes Caldera-Torres ineligible.The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting Caldera-Torres’s argument that, although Wis. Stat. 940.19(1) qualifies as a federal “crime of violence,” it is not a crime of domestic violence, because the victim’s identity is not an element of the offense. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) does not say or imply that the “protected person” aspect of the definition must be an element of the crime. It is enough that the victim’s status as a “protected person” be established. A “crime of domestic violence” is a generic “crime of violence” plus the victim’s status as a “protected person.” All other circuits that have addressed section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) recently have held that the victim’s status as a “protected person” need not be an element of the crime of conviction. It is irrelevant how Wisconsin classified Caldera-Torres’s conviction for its own purposes. View "Caldera-Torres v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires sex offenders who study, work, or reside in Indiana to register with the state. Indiana residents who committed sex offenses either before the Indiana General Assembly enacted SORA or before the Assembly amended SORA to cover their specific offense challenged, under the Equal Protection Clause, SORA’s “other-jurisdiction” provision. That provision requires them to register under SORA because they have a duty to register in another jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit previously rejected arguments that SORA violated the constitutional right to travel and the Ex Post Facto Clause and concluded that the district court incorrectly applied strict scrutiny to the equal protection claim, remanding for a determination of whether the other-jurisdiction provision survives rational basis review. On remand, the district court concluded that requiring the registration of pre-SORA sex offenders who have a registration obligation in another jurisdiction is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and granted the plaintiffs summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Indiana has a legitimate interest in seeking to register as many sex offenders as the state constitution permits; SORA’s other-jurisdiction provision is rationally related to advancing that interest. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that when an offender is already obligated to register elsewhere, requiring registration in Indiana merely extends that existing duty, which is not punitive and does not offend Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause. View "Hope v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Correction" on Justia Law

Police released the footage of a bank robbery to the media. Several tipsters identified Garcia as the robber. Garcia was arrested without a warrant. Two days later Detective Spano submitted a “Probable Cause Statement and Judicial Determination” (CR-215) form to a court commissioner (essentially a magistrate) to establish a basis for Garcia’s continued detention. The form references the Fourth Amendment and Wisconsin Statute 970.01, “Initial Appearance Before a Judge.” Spano indicated that he had “probable cause to believe that [Garcia] committed” bank robbery and violated his parole," citing a description of the surveillance footage and the tips. The commissioner checked a box stating: “I find probable cause to believe that the arrested person committed the offense(s),” and set bail at $50,000. Garcia, in jail, was not present for the CR-215 determination.Hours after the probable cause finding—without counsel for Garcia—the police conducted an in-person lineup with two tellers. Three days later, Wisconsin prosecutors charged Garcia with bank robbery. Garcia appeared in court that day represented by a public defender; 10 days later Garcia appeared at a preliminary hearing; the court ordered him detained pending trial.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed Garcia’s conviction, determining that the right to counsel had not attached at the time of the lineup. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief (28 U.S.C. 2254). The state court's resolution of Garcia’s Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel claim was objectively unreasonable, even applying "vast deference" under 2254(d)(1). The court cited the “Supreme Court’s long line of cases on the attachment of the right to counsel.” The judicial machinery of the state’s adversarial process necessarily began to turn against Garcia after the commissioner executed the CR-215 form. View "Garcia v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Officers executing a warrant at Johnson’s address found a rifle and drugs. He spoke with police in a recorded proffer session on the condition that it be inadmissible except for purposes of impeachment. In April 2020, Johnson was charged in state court. His speedy trial requests were complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the state’s adjournment of jury trials. Before his December 9, 2020 trial date, the prosecutor notified the state court that he expected Johnson to be charged in federal court. The state court rescheduled the case; on January 19, 2021, the state charges were dismissed without prejudice. Johnson was indicted on federal drug and firearms charges on January 20. The district court denied his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds because time spent in state custody is not considered under the federal Speedy Trial Act. Johnson had received a written summary of his proffer months earlier but had received a digital recording just days before trial and was unable to watch it at the jail. Johnson was able to view the recording before the second day of trial. He did not testify.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting Johnson’s arguments that his speedy trial rights were violated by the delay between his arrest on state charges and his federal trial and concerning the proffer. While an officer testified improperly to an admission from the proffer, the error was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Police discovered a loaded firearm, cocaine, and more than 800 methamphetamine pills on Jones’s person and in his car during a traffic stop. Federal charges followed. Counsel declined to make frivolous challenges to the court’s jurisdiction at Jones’s request. Jones sought to represent himself. Magistrate Long conducted an extensive Faretta colloquy, covering Jones’s education, mental health, and prior legal experiences. Jones confirmed his understanding of the charges and agreed to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure. He claimed that he understood the perils of self-representation, which Long explained in detail. The court allowed Jones to represent himself and appointed his public defender as standby counsel. Jones spent months before trial challenging the court’s jurisdiction in frivolous filings, advancing “sovereign-citizen” arguments.Concerned with the incoherence of the filings, the government requested a second Faretta colloquy. District Judge Mihm conducted the colloquy. Jones insisted he did not “consent” to jurisdiction and would not participate in his trial. While he acknowledged understanding the “letter” of the charges against him, he also expressed confusion about whether the proceedings were criminal, civil, administrative, or even “statutory maritime.” Mihm concluded that Jones’s waiver of counsel remained valid. Jones did not deliver opening or closing statements, cross-examine witnesses, or lodge any objections. His testimony had no bearing on the charges against him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 138-month sentence. Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Thomas was wanted by Indiana officials and warrants had been issued for his arrest. Thomas obtained fake identification documents, including one issued by North Carolina under the name “Alredius”. Using that fictitious identity, Thomas leased an Atlanta condominium. Federal officials arrested him outside the building. Thomas’s landlord stated that she had rented the unit to “Alredius Frieson.” With the landlord’s consent, officers searched the condo, finding drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cell phones. After obtaining warrants to search the phones, the officers discovered evidence that Thomas was trafficking methamphetamine. Charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846, Thomas unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Seventh Circuit reversed. A tenant lawfully may exclude others, even when the landlord consents to a search. Using an alias to sign a lease does not deprive a tenant of a legitimate expectation of privacy. A Georgia tenant who deceives or even defrauds a landlord is entitled to retain possession of the residence until the landlord has provided notice and obtained a judicial order. Thomas’s landlord could not summarily terminate his protections without violating Georgia law, nor could she consent to a warrantless search of his condo. A breach of a rental agreement does not automatically deprive the breaching party of a legitimate expectation of privacy. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Hise was charged with two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. Hise was employed by the victim's construction company as an office manager and bookkeeper for more than 12 years. An FBI investigation revealed that Hise had embezzled over $1.5 million from that company. Hise entered an open guilty plea to those charges. The district court sentenced her to 63 months’ imprisonment and ordered $200 in special assessments and $1,550,379.14 in restitution, subject to a set-off ($21,953.55), which reflected the proceeds of a Sheriff’s Sale.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A) and(C) in that it failed to ensure that Hise and her attorney had read and discussed the amended PSR and any addendum to it before imposing the sentence. Hise fails to identify any objection that could have been made to the revised PSR. She has not pointed to any aspect of the PSR that was incorrect or which could be subject to an objection. The court also rejected Hise’s argument that she was denied her right to be represented by counsel because her attorney failed to make any objection to the PSR and failed to appear at the final determination hearing regarding the imposition of the final restitution amount. View "United States v. Hise" on Justia Law