Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brown was convicted of bank robbery. The court determined that he was a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, 4B1.2, with an advisory range of 210-240 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Brown's 180-month sentence. Defendants are deemed career offenders if they have at least two prior felony convictions of a crime of violence. The 4B1.2(a)(1) “elements clause” defines a crime of violence as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Brown had a 2010 Illinois conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking; He “t[ook] a motor vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force,” carrying a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense.The Seventh Circuit previously held that Illinois vehicular hijacking constituted a 4B1.2(a)(1) crime of violence. That precedent was not overruled by the Supreme Court’s 2021 “Borden” decision, construing the term “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act's elements clause, which is identical to 4B1.2(a)(1). The Court held that, under the categorical approach, an offense does not involve the use of physical force against the person of another if the offense can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. The Illinois statute implied an element of knowing or purposeful use or threat of force. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

When police responded to a shooting outside a casino, the victim was dead. They found Grady’s cell phone, which they used, along with surveillance video, to track him down and arrest him. They searched Grady’s apartment and discovered a gun. An expert witness later testified that it was the weapon that was used in the shooting. Grady and his roommate, Bronson, gave different accounts of what happened that night.A state-court jury convicted Grady of first-degree murder. In response to a special verdict form, the jury found that the prosecution had not proved that Grady was the triggerman. Bronson was sentenced to 24 years, Grady to 60 years. Grady’s direct appeal focused on his sentence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of his ineffective assistance post-conviction petition, concluding that the evidence presented against Grady was “overwhelming” and Grady could not demonstrate the necessary prejudice under Strickland.Contending that the special-verdict finding negated the prosecution’s sole theory of guilt, Grady sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, because his direct-appeal lawyer raised only two issues on appeal, both of which Grady regards as significantly weaker than the inconsistent-verdict argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court’s rejection of this contention was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. View "Grady v. Truitt" on Justia Law

At around 4:36 AM, Washington’s cellmate, Simmons, awoke to the sound of Washington, a pretrial detainee, gasping for breath. Simmons tried to shake Washington; he did not respond. At 4:37, Simmons pressed the intercom button, which triggers an audible ping and a flashing light at the control desk. Valentine, the control deck officer, did not answer for over one minute. Valentine claims he had trouble understanding Simmons and thought Simmons was referring to a plumbing issue. Valentine ended the call. For 30 seconds. Simmons tried to wake Washington. He used the intercom again around 4:47. Valentine did not answer for about 90 seconds. Other officers had joined him at the desk. This time, Valentine understood Simmons was reporting an emergency. The other officers ran to Washington’s cell, arriving at 4:50, issued an alert for medical assistance, and began CPR. A nurse with a defibrillator arrived around 4:52 and administered an electrical shock. At 5:00, EMTs arrived and continued CPR. Washington was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy concluded that sleep apnea caused Washington to go into cardiac arrhythmia, which caused Washington’s death.In a suit under 18 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Valentine’s delay in obtaining treatment harmed Washington, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Valentine for lack of sufficient evidence to show causation. View "Jackson v. Sheriff of Winnebago County, Illinois" on Justia Law

Cruz-Rivera was convicted of first-degree rape and first-degree assault (stabbing) in 2001, having violently attacked two women who suffered from a mild mental disability. After his 2015 release from prison, he was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA, 34 U.S.C. 20901; he never did so. Cruz-Rivera lived and worked (for a staffing agency, including at a school) in Indiana and was convicted of two felonies—resisting law enforcement and auto theft.Cruz-Rivera was convicted of failing to register, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The PSR recommended a condition of supervised release that required him to submit to the search of his person and property based on “reasonable suspicion” of a violation of a condition of supervision or other unlawful conduct. Cruz-Rivera unsuccessfully objected, arguing that his crimes did not provide a justification for the search of electronics and electronic communications. The Probation Office noted that the condition is imposed on all monitored offenders. “Searches are not conducted without probable cause and only after approval from the Deputy Chief and/or Chief Probation Officer.”The court imposed a sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release after describing Cruz-Rivera’s criminal history and stating that it had considered his mitigation arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After a conscientious reading of Cruz-Rivera’s PSR, the district court reasonably concluded that the circumstances surrounding his criminal history made the imposition of the contested condition an important ingredient in stopping his antisocial behavior. View "United States v. Cruz-Rivera" on Justia Law

Mata fired shots, killing two men and injuring another. Chicago police arrested Mata that evening. The following day, after receiving his Miranda rights and saying that he understood them, Mata gave a videotaped statement: Mata explained that he heard Mares calling his name. He turned around and saw two men holding Mares while other men surrounded him. Mata took out his gun and fired. The men backed away, but one man reached for his pocket. Mata fired five more shots toward the group, then ran toward his car. The men were walking with their backs to him when he fired; he never saw any of them with a weapon. An officer read Mata his Miranda rights again on tape. Mata said he understood his rights and wanted to make the statement; the police had treated him “well and fairly,” and he gave the statement “freely and voluntarily” without threats or promises by the police.Defense counsel moved to suppress Mata’s statements, claiming that Mata was subjected to abuse by the police for two days before being given any Miranda warnings. No hearing was held on the motion. Convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm, Mata sought habeas relief, arguing counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a hearing on the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Mata procedurally defaulted his claim and did not show cause to excuse the default. View "Mata v. Baker" on Justia Law

Gilbert and his son Michael were charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gilbert pleaded guilty and sought “safety-valve relief” from the mandatory minimum 10-year sentence. While Gilbert was awaiting sentencing, Michael pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate including by providing information about Gilbert’s criminal conduct. The plea agreement itself was not entered into the court’s docket. The government never disclosed the agreement to Gilbert or his lawyer. At Gilbert’s sentencing hearing, Michael testified against his father. The prosecutor elicited false testimony that Michael had pleaded “open”—without the benefit of a written plea agreement. The court subsequently located the written plea agreement and informed the parties. Gilbert’s lawyer did not move to recall Michael for further cross-examination nor did he probe Michael’s motivations for testifying. The court denied Gilbert’s request for safety-valve relief and sentenced Gilbert to 156 months.The Seventh Circuit “reluctantly” affirmed. To obtain relief for a “Brady” violation, a defendant must show that undisclosed information was “material either to guilt or to punishment.” While Gilbert was completely in the dark about evidence that would have been useful to impeach a witness who testified against him, that evidence would not have affected the outcome of his sentencing. The court described the prosecution’s conduct as “unsettling.” View "United States v. Bicknell" on Justia Law

Eight drug couriers, under indictment, identified Caraway as the supplier of the cocaine and leader of the operation. The government communicated to Caraway’s attorney that Caraway would soon be indicted. Caraway voluntarily traveled to Illinois for a proffer interview, then returned to Houston. In September 2017, the government learned that Caraway committed a violent robbery in Houston and notified Caraway’s attorney that he would be indicted and was required to surrender by December 15, 2017. Caraway never responded. In January 2018, the government charged Caraway with conspiracy to distribute cocaine.U.S. Marshals began searching for Caraway 11 months later. In July 2021, a Texas state trooper stopped Caraway for speeding. After initially supplying a fake name, Caraway provided his real name and was arrested. Caraway pleaded guilty. The PSR recommended sentencing enhancements for being the leader and organizer of the conspiracy and for obstruction of justice, based on evading arrest for approximately 42 months. Caraway argued that the fact that the government could not find him was not evidence that he was evading arrest. After overruling the enhancement objections, the court calculated Caraway’s sentence range as 292-365 months; without the obstruction enhancement, the range would have been 235-293 months. After discussing the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, the judge noted that she would have imposed the same 360-month sentence without the enhancements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly calculated the Guidelines range without the enhancement and tied the imposed sentence to the severity of the crime, Caraway’s role, relevant conduct, possible recidivism, and protecting the public. View "United States v. Caraway" on Justia Law

Hunter was housed in a general-population wing of “Unit H” at Redgranite Wisconsin state prison. Patterson, Hunter’s cellmate March-December 2017, was regarded as a “lifer” and a “violent individual.” On multiple occasions, Patterson told Hunter that he would beat him while he slept. Hunter communicated Patterson’s threats to Mueske, the Unit H supervisor with authority over housing assignments. Hunter told Officer Walker about Patterson’s threats. At Walker’s suggestion, Hunter filled out an Inmate Complaint form, dated August 9. Walker typically notifies his superiors and drafts an incident report when he learns of threats between inmates, but he did not do so. Wilcox decided to move Patterson out of Unit H on December 6, 2017, but not due to Hunter’s complaints.On the day of Patterson’s move, Hunter approached Patterson, purportedly to say goodbye. Hunter claims that Patterson flew into a rage, accusing Hunter of causing Patterson’s reassignment. Patterson testified that Hunter called him various derogatory terms, including the N-word. Patterson violently battered Hunter and stomped on his head, causing Hunter permanent injuries and triggering his PTSD from his time in the military. The altercation was captured on video. In Hunter’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted Mueske and Walker summary judgment. Hunter offered no facts from which a reasonable jury could find that Walker acted with deliberate indifference or that Mueske’s conduct caused his injury. View "Hunter v. Mueske" on Justia Law

A kitchen supervisor directed Balle, an Illinois state prisoner, to carry near-boiling water across a wet, damaged floor in a plastic five-gallon bucket. His foot caught in a hole, and he fell down. The water splashed on him and caused severe burns. Balle sued several prison officials, claiming they violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the dangerous kitchen conditions. The district court dismissed some of Balle’s claims at the pleading stage and granted summary judgment on the others.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. The record lacks sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to the subjective knowledge of two defendants. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Balle, a reasonable jury could conclude that the kitchen conditions represented an objectively serious danger to inmates, but gaps in the record prevent a jury from inferring that the two actually knew about the conditions that made the kitchen seriously dangerous–that inmates had to carry scalding water across the damaged floor. The court reversed in part, reinstating the claim against the kitchen supervisor, who required the inmates to carry the scalding water. The court affirmed the denial of a motion to recruit counsel. View "Balle v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Hartleroad responded to an online post soliciting persons interested in participating in sexual conduct with minors. The author (McCarty, an FBI agent) claimed to be engaged in sexual relations with his 14-year-old stepdaughter. Hartleroad agreed to a Skype meeting, during which Hartleroad would view McCarty engaging in sexual conduct with the minor. McCarty suggested that Hartleroad direct the sexual conduct. Hartleroad sent McCarty a photograph of a child on which he had ejaculated, drafted a script of sexual conduct he expected, and sent it to McCarty. McCarty reminded Hartleroad that the fictitious minor was under age. Hartleroad responded, “It’s cool” and joined the Skype call. McCarty then claimed his wife had returned. McCarty later posted similar messages. Hartleroad reinitiated contact, admitting he knew she was a minor but “would still love to do Skype” and “direct.”Hartleroad was charged with attempting to sexually exploit a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251, for “attempting to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction, or a live visual depiction.” The jury received a similar instruction but was told Hartleroad must have acted for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct. The court of appeal affirmed Hartleroad’s conviction, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment, and that the indictment charged conduct not prohibited under section 2251(a). View "United States v. Hartleroad" on Justia Law