Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a New Year’s Eve hit-and-run left one person dead and another injured, Jones became a suspect and turned himself in. During a recorded interrogation at 1:18 a.m., an officer read Jones his Miranda rights and fully explained those rights. Jones asked what penalty he was potentially facing. The officer refused to answer, asking multiple times if Jones wanted to proceed with questioning. The officer stated that others had placed him at the scene of the accident, police knew Jones fled because he was scared, Jones did the right thing coming in, and it was important for Jones to get his side of the story on record. After saying he felt horrible, Jones asked, “So y’all can get a public pretender right now?” After some laughter, a detective responded, “You said it right, pretender … they’re called public defenders.” After more chuckling, the detective said: “Obviously due to the time right now, we can’t.” At one point the detective stated that he believed the maximum punishment was 15 years. Jones then told the detectives what happened, implicating himself.The Wisconsin trial court denied his motion to suppress, concluding that Jones's joking reference to a “public pretender” cannot constitute a genuine request. A state appellate court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Jones’s question about a lawyer, whether earnest or in jest, was too ambiguous to invoke his right to counsel under Supreme Court law. View "Jones v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

Doe is a transgender male who was born female. He had breast-removal surgery but no other gender-altering procedure. Doe’s partner is A.B., the mother of R.M. and four other children. Starke County Detective Gray, and Purtee, a family case manager with the Indiana Department of Child Services, met with 17-year-old R.M. to investigate allegations that Doe and A.B. had abandoned him. Ultimately, Doe and A.B. were arrested for neglect of a dependent and nonsupport of a dependent child. During subsequent interviews and proceedings, it was divulged that Doe was born female.After the charges were resolved with deferred prosecution agreements, Doe and A.B. sued the detective, the Sheriff’s Department, and Purtee under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of Doe’s right to privacy in sexual preference under the Fourteenth Amendment and that they were arrested without probable cause contrary to the Fourth Amendment. They later sought to amend their complaint to clarify that Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment claim pertained to the disclosure of gender identity not sexual preference. The district court denied the motion to amend and entered summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as there is no clearly established right to privacy in one’s sexual preference or gender identity during a criminal or child welfare investigation. The totality of the circumstances provided probable cause for the arrests. View "Doe v. Gray" on Justia Law

Arroyo served in the Illinois House of Representatives from 2006-2019, while also managing a lobbying firm. In 2018-2019, Arroyo’s firm received $32,500 in checks from Weiss’s sweepstakes-gaming company in exchange for his official support for the sweepstakes industry in the General Assembly. Despite never previously expressing a view on sweepstakes gaming, Arroyo began pushing for sweepstakes-friendly legislation and encouraging other legislators and executive-branch officials to support the same. Arroyo concealed his financial arrangement with Weiss.When the government uncovered the bribery scheme, Arroyo pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2). The court sentenced him to 57 months’ imprisonment and ordered that he forfeit $32,500 in bribe money. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Arroyo’s contention that the judge erred by finding his 57-month sentence necessary to deter public corruption. District judges need not marshal empirical data on deterrent effects before considering whether a sentence adequately deters criminal conduct. The judge presumed that public officials are rational actors who pay attention when one of their own is sentenced. That presumption that sentences influence behavior at the margins was reasonable. The court also rejected arguments that the judge erred by deeming several of his allocution statements aggravating and ordering him to forfeit too much money. View "United States v. Arroyo" on Justia Law

Inmate Arce got a sharp knee in the thigh while he was playing soccer at Illinois’s Pinckneyville Correctional Center in June 2017. Since then, he has suffered from severe leg pain, which the prison’s medical providers (Wexford) ultimately concluded was attributable to a blood clot. Arce’s blood clot was successfully treated but his pain persisted. Arce sued Wexford and two of its employees, claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Arce claimed that he suffered from compartment syndrome and that failure to diagnose and treat this condition caused his long-term leg injury. But after five years and numerous visits to Wexford and non-Wexford health professionals, Arce has no evidence aside from his lay speculation that he experienced tissue necrosis in his thigh, the primary consequence of untreated compartment syndrome. Nor did Arce proffer any expert testimony or the results of any medical exam opining that his symptoms are consistent with untreated compartment syndrome. An orthopedist thought that he would benefit from further testing for that condition but Arce has not shown deliberate indifference in denying the recommended two-day follow-up appointment or that the denial was “a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.” View "Arce v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Booker was convicted of first-degree murder and received a 55-year sentence of 55. After unsuccessfully appealing his conviction, he tried a petition for postconviction relief. At the latter stage, he was represented by Illinois Assistant Appellate Defender Reyna. Booker wanted Reyna to argue that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Reyna declined. Booker filed a pro se supplemental brief raising the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected Booker’s pro se brief because of the state’s rule against hybrid representation.Booker then filed a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted, reasoning that Illinois courts did not violate any federal rule when they denied his attempt to raise the issue in a pro se supplemental brief. The court also held that Booker’s default could not be excused on actual innocence grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Booker must bear the consequences of his decision. Even if Reyna’s advice was not entirely accurate regarding his chances of success, Booker had proceeded pro se in the past and knew that he could do so again to ensure that his preferred arguments were raised, or he could hope that the court would make an exception to the rule against hybrid representation. View "Booker v. Baker" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Hendrix was sentenced to 78 months in prison, significantly more than the U.S.S.G. range of 46-57 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s sentence was well within its discretion. The court discussed and applied multiple 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in detail: it carefully considered Hendrix’s personal “history and characteristics” but found that this factor was mitigating in some respects and aggravating in others because Hendrix had a lengthy criminal history at age 23. The court also discussed the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” finding Hendrix’s conduct to be serious because Hendrix had possessed a firearm in connection with drug trafficking and had a prior firearms conviction. The court recommended that Hendrix be placed in a drug-abuse treatment program and provided a thorough explanation for its sentence. The court found no procedural error in the district court’s discussion of the prevalence of gun violence in Chicago at sentencing. View "United States v. Hendrix" on Justia Law

Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act authorizes the commitment and indefinite detention of individuals who are charged with a crime and found to suffer from a mental disorder "coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses.” The Act requires care and treatment for the committed person, "designed to effect recovery.” Once detainees are deemed “no longer dangerous,” the state must discharge them. The Supreme Court held, in 1986, that the Act, on its face, complies with the Due Process Clause, noting the lack of punitive intent, the availability of treatment, and the realistic possibility of release.Every Big Muddy River Program detainee participates in a weekly core therapy group. Only detainees who have acknowledged their prior sexual misconduct participate in offense-specific and didactic groups. Big Muddy does not provide individual therapy. Therapists evaluate detainees semiannually and provide them with copies of their evaluations and treatment plans. Detainees may discuss their evaluations with the therapists only in group therapy, not one-on-one. The state contracts with Wexford to evaluate detainees for release. The plaintiffs alleged that Big Muddy’s treatment program was run in a constitutionally deficient manner.The district court concluded that the disparity between Big Muddy’s treatment program and professional standards amounted to a constitutional violation and issued an injunction, requiring that Big Muddy provide the plaintiffs a minimum of 7.5 hours of core group therapy per week; reinstate inactive groups; and use independent evaluators for discharge evaluations.The Seventh Circuit reversed, acknowledging concern about whether Illinois is complying with its Fourteenth Amendment obligations. Detainees receive minimal treatment, raising serious questions about whether rehabilitation and release are realistically available. The district court, however, issued too broad an injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), which requires the least intrusive means available to correct the constitutional violation. View "Howe v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Evans twice sold heroin to a confidential source (50 grams, 125 grams). Officers stopped Evans 30 minutes later and found cash from the controlled purchase, methamphetamine, two handguns, and ammunition. He was charged with two drug distribution counts, 21 U.S.C. 841, and two firearm counts, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 922(g)(1). Following conflicts with Evans’s first two lawyers, Sarm was appointed to represent Evans. After Evans withdrew a plea, prosecutors added another 924(c) count.At trial, Sarm only subjected four of 11 witnesses to meaningful cross-examination and rested without presenting any evidence or calling any defense witnesses. Convicted, Evans was sentenced to 788 months; 50 years came from the 924(c) convictions, each of which carried mandatory minimum, consecutive sentences of 25 years because Evans had a prior qualifying 924(c) conviction. Nineteen days after the trial, Sarm overdosed on heroin. The district court appointed new counsel but, without a hearing, denied a motion for a new trial.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Evans made a single choice to possess a firearm over a continuous 30-minute span that included a sale of heroin and the police finding methamphetamine and a gun in his car. The facts support one 924(c) conviction, not two. Evans faced serious charges with serious sentencing consequences; his appointed counsel had never tried a federal criminal case and was using heroin before, during, and after trial. Evans was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Brown was convicted of bank robbery. The court determined that he was a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, 4B1.2, with an advisory range of 210-240 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Brown's 180-month sentence. Defendants are deemed career offenders if they have at least two prior felony convictions of a crime of violence. The 4B1.2(a)(1) “elements clause” defines a crime of violence as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Brown had a 2010 Illinois conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking; He “t[ook] a motor vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force,” carrying a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense.The Seventh Circuit previously held that Illinois vehicular hijacking constituted a 4B1.2(a)(1) crime of violence. That precedent was not overruled by the Supreme Court’s 2021 “Borden” decision, construing the term “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act's elements clause, which is identical to 4B1.2(a)(1). The Court held that, under the categorical approach, an offense does not involve the use of physical force against the person of another if the offense can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. The Illinois statute implied an element of knowing or purposeful use or threat of force. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

When police responded to a shooting outside a casino, the victim was dead. They found Grady’s cell phone, which they used, along with surveillance video, to track him down and arrest him. They searched Grady’s apartment and discovered a gun. An expert witness later testified that it was the weapon that was used in the shooting. Grady and his roommate, Bronson, gave different accounts of what happened that night.A state-court jury convicted Grady of first-degree murder. In response to a special verdict form, the jury found that the prosecution had not proved that Grady was the triggerman. Bronson was sentenced to 24 years, Grady to 60 years. Grady’s direct appeal focused on his sentence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of his ineffective assistance post-conviction petition, concluding that the evidence presented against Grady was “overwhelming” and Grady could not demonstrate the necessary prejudice under Strickland.Contending that the special-verdict finding negated the prosecution’s sole theory of guilt, Grady sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, because his direct-appeal lawyer raised only two issues on appeal, both of which Grady regards as significantly weaker than the inconsistent-verdict argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court’s rejection of this contention was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. View "Grady v. Truitt" on Justia Law