Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the parties and the district court agreed that the appropriate guideline range based on Defendant's prior criminal history was 37 to 46 months.Citing the fact that he accepted responsibility for the crime and his traumatic upbringing, Defendant sought a 37-month sentence. Defendant also claimed he carried the weapon for protection, given his gang history. The government, citing Defendant's lengthy criminal history and multiple firearms convictions, sought a high-end 46-month sentence. The court sentenced Defendant to 78 months in prison. Defendant appealed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.In front of the Seventh Circuit, Defendant argued that the district court improperly relied on its own personal fears in fashioning an above-the-guidelines sentence. While "[t]he district court trod on dangerous ground" in personally expressing its own fears, its remarks did not rise to the level of “extraneous and inflammatory.” The Seventh Circuit also rejected Defendant's challenge that the district court disregarded the applicable guideline range.Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected Defendant's claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable as it "failed to address his offense conduct, juvenile history, and the general lack of evidence surrounding deterrence." The court noted that the district court adequately considered Defendant's upbringing within the context of the offense, and that Section 3553(a)(2)(B) specifically permits judges to consider general deterrence when sentencing. View "USA v. Elvin Saldana-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Granger, King, and Walker were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin and methamphetamine and firearms offenses. The judge sentenced Granger and King to 360 months’ imprisonment and Walker to 330 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting an argument that the court should have struck Juror 70 for cause after the defendants exhausted their peremptory challenges. Juror 70 had raised his hand when the judge asked whether any potential jurors thought that a law enforcement officer’s testimony should receive extra weight. Juror 70 was a retired police officer with 30 years of service, and said “I’m inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt” but that he would have an open mind and respect the presumption of innocence. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a district judge may take into account everything a potential juror says when deciding whether that person can be impartial. Juror 70 recited the correct standard and the judge was entitled to find that he possessed enough self-awareness and honesty to carry out his promises.The court vacated Walker’s sentence. In holding him accountable for all drugs that the conspiracy as a whole distributed during Walker’s time as a participant, the judge did not address what conduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to Walker. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

FBI Agent Wainscott posted an ad on Craigslist that hinted at an opportunity to engage in sexual activity with a minor. Baird responded to Wainscott, who posed as the father of a 10-year-old girl with whom Baird could have sex. Graphic emails and texts followed, indicating Baird's desire to have sex with the girl. In discussing where and when to meet, Wainscott suggested that Baird bring gummy bears as a gift for the child. Baird agreed to buy the candy, then drove to the address that Wainscott gave him. Agents arrested Baird and found three packages of gummy bears in his car.Baird was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court concluded Baird had attempted to “knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce” a minor, because he “inquired into what this child liked sexually, indicated what he liked and what he would do sexually to this child, requested photographs of the child, and continued to engage the father in conversations about the child.” The messages—although conveyed to Wainscott posing as the girl’s father—still fell within the scope of section 2422(b) and the intended gift was significant evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Considered as a whole, the evidence established that Baird took a substantial step toward the completion of the offense and intended to influence the minor to submit to sexual activity. View "United States v. Baird" on Justia Law

Two sisters accused Bell, a family friend, of sexually assaulting them. There was no physical evidence. Bell did not testify. Bell’s attorney sought to undermine the sisters’ credibility, suggesting that the girls had motives to lie, highlighting the younger sister’s admission that she had been drunk and had lied to police about her inebriation, and noting that the older sister’s account had changed. In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that jurors who voted to acquit would “have to believe” that the sisters were lying and that if someone lies, “they’re going to have a reason.” The judge instructed the jury that the state had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence; and the jury should disregard any arguments suggesting facts not in evidence.The jury convicted Bell. Because of his prior sexual-assault convictions, the court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Wisconsin courts rejected Bell’s argument that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments shifted the burden of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Bell’s federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), stating that under de novo review, "the prosecutor’s comments might give us significant pause,” but under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s deferential standard, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "Bell v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Salazar, at a Peoria bar, posted a video of himself online, which Peoria police officers saw. Salazar had an active arrest warrant for traffic violations. Officers went to the bar. Security cameras and body-worn cameras captured the subsequent events. Salazar was sitting at the bar with a black jacket on his chair. Draped over an empty chair to his left was another jacket with a Purple Heart insignia. As Salazar stood between the chairs, an officer cuffed his hands behind his back. Salazar claimed that the black jacket was not his but that the Purple Heart jacket was his. Police found a gun and a wallet containing Salazar’s identification in the black jacket on Salazar’s chair.Salazar was charged with possessing a firearm illegally. Salazar unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The district court ruled that the police had conducted a valid search incident to arrest because Salazar could reach the jacket (and gun) and, in any event, had abandoned the jacket. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The search was a lawful search incident to Salazar’s arrest. The court declined to address whether it matters that an arrestee is secured. View "United States v. Salazar" on Justia Law

In 2014, Stacy was convicted of bank fraud. The district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and ordered Stacy to pay $1,495,689.60 in restitution jointly and severally with a codefendant. Though payable to the United States, the government forwards collected money to Stacy’s victims. When Stacy entered federal custody he suffered from pain and limited range of motion in his hip. Those problems worsened and he sought treatment through the prison medical system. A consulting orthopedic surgeon recommended a prompt hip replacement. Stacy did not receive the procedure while incarcerated. Stacy filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the federal prison was negligent in failing to procure his hip replacement surgery. The government settled with Stacy in 2021, not admitting liability but agreeing to pay him $75,000. The government expected the Treasury Department to offset the $75,000 settlement for application to Stacy’s restitution debt.The district court rejected Stacy’s arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Federal law authorizes the government to offset Stacy’s settlement award against his restitution debt. Stacy’s restitution is owed to the United States, and it has been past due since the time of sentencing. View "Stacy v. United States" on Justia Law

Baldwin and her then-husband Taylor, sexually exploited four girls, including her daughters and her niece. They conspired to produce and distributed explicit videos—some secretly recorded—of the girls. She sexually assaulted three of them. Convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor, conspiring to produce child pornography, and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(4)(B), the district court sentenced Baldwin to 400 months’ imprisonment, below the Guidelines’ range of 1,320 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting Baldwin’s argument that the government’s decision to prosecute her was vindictive and constituted retaliation for Taylor's success in vacating his first conviction. Baldwin's indictment was five years after Taylor was first indicted. Waiting to build a stronger case before pursuing an indictment is evidence of responsible, rather than vindictive, government behavior. Taylor’s success in vacating his original conviction stemmed from his counsel’s incompetence, not missteps by the government. The court rejected Baldwin’s argument that, on a per-count basis, her sentence is roughly an order of magnitude higher than Taylor’s. A below-Guidelines sentence like Baldwin’s cannot stem from an unwarranted disparity. The difference can be explained by Taylor’s cooperation and contrition. The court declined to reweigh section 3553(a)'s factors. View "United States v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Police found Miller lying on the sidewalk, bleeding from an apparent gunshot wound. An officer rendering aid removed a vehicle key fob from Miller’s hand, dropping it on the ground. A car, parked 15-20 feet from Miller, had bullet holes in the rear driver’s side door. Officers checked whether there was anyone in the car. One officer shined his flashlight through the windshield and saw what he thought was blood on the front passenger seat. An officer picked up the key fob and clicked a button. The car’s horn honked. Minutes later, an officer stated that he could see the barrel of a gun sticking out from under a hat on the front passenger seat. The car was towed to the police station. At the hospital, Miller said that he was using his girlfriend’s car. A database check showed that the impounded car was registered to Miller. The police obtained a warrant to search the car without mentioning the key fob. Police recovered the gun. DNA on the gun matched Miller’s. He was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon.The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of Miller’s motion to suppress. Miller argued that clicking the key fob qualified as a search. The district judge reasoned that the fob was used only to identify the car, not to gain entry, and that Miller had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his car. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the evidence was also admissible under the independent source doctrine. The car would have been searched regardless of the identity of its owner. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2007, Njos pleaded guilty to six federal crimes arising from robberies, and for attempted escape and assault of an FBI agent after his arrest. During his term of supervised release, he tested positive for illegal substances and failed to report. Njos then pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to eight new robberies. The state courts sentenced him to 25 years.The federal government petitioned to revoke Njos’s federal supervised release. Njos, proceeding pro se, repeatedly asked to be returned to the Illinois Department of Corrections and requested a 24-month sentence, concurrent with his state sentences. He argued that his underlying federal convictions were class C and D felonies and cited his history of mental illness. Noting Njos's wish to expedite the proceedings, the court said: “You don’t need to be in court for this,” proposing to enter a written order imposing his sentence. Njos thanked the judge, Neither Njos nor the government objected. The court later imposed a total of 82 months in prison for the six revocations.The only issue that appointed counsel deemed strong enough to raise on appeal was the imposition of a sentence in a written order rather than with the defendant present in person. When counsel decline to raise other issues that Njos wished to argue, Njos moved to dismiss counsel, submitting a brief of his preferred arguments. The Seventh Circuit denied Njos’s motion to dismiss counsel but allowed him to file the supplemental brief. On reconsideration, the court dismissed counsel and rejected Njos’s arguments about the calculation and reasonable of his sentence. View "United States v. Njos" on Justia Law

Beechler and Turner, both serving home confinement through Marion County Community Corrections (MCCC), reported separate residences. An FBI Task Force was conducting a wiretap investigation involving individuals distributing controlled substances in Indianapolis. They discovered that a target of the investigation expected a shipment of marijuana to arrive at Turner’s residence. Watching the house, agents noticed a man with an ankle monitor and reported to MCCC that it suspected that one of the occupants was on home confinement and might be engaged in drug trafficking. An MCCC employee, with Indianapolis officers, went to Turner’s address to check compliance with the home detention contract. They encountered Turner and Beechler and discovered methamphetamine in the bedroom. Officers then obtained a search warrant and seized five firearms, ammunition, methamphetamine, heroin, and $1,508 in cash. After receiving his Miranda rights, Beechler acknowledged the drugs and guns, admitting that they were there to protect the drugs.Beechler unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that although police labeled the search as a community corrections compliance check, they actually conducted the search for law enforcement purposes so that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Convicted of multiple counts, Beechler was sentenced to 360 months in prison—below the bottom of the 420-month Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Beechler’s expectation of privacy was minimal; the government’s legitimate needs were significant. The search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Beechler" on Justia Law