Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Two sisters accused Bell, a family friend, of sexually assaulting them. There was no physical evidence. Bell did not testify. Bell’s attorney sought to undermine the sisters’ credibility, suggesting that the girls had motives to lie, highlighting the younger sister’s admission that she had been drunk and had lied to police about her inebriation, and noting that the older sister’s account had changed. In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that jurors who voted to acquit would “have to believe” that the sisters were lying and that if someone lies, “they’re going to have a reason.” The judge instructed the jury that the state had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence; and the jury should disregard any arguments suggesting facts not in evidence.The jury convicted Bell. Because of his prior sexual-assault convictions, the court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Wisconsin courts rejected Bell’s argument that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments shifted the burden of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Bell’s federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), stating that under de novo review, "the prosecutor’s comments might give us significant pause,” but under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s deferential standard, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "Bell v. Hepp" on Justia Law

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Salazar, at a Peoria bar, posted a video of himself online, which Peoria police officers saw. Salazar had an active arrest warrant for traffic violations. Officers went to the bar. Security cameras and body-worn cameras captured the subsequent events. Salazar was sitting at the bar with a black jacket on his chair. Draped over an empty chair to his left was another jacket with a Purple Heart insignia. As Salazar stood between the chairs, an officer cuffed his hands behind his back. Salazar claimed that the black jacket was not his but that the Purple Heart jacket was his. Police found a gun and a wallet containing Salazar’s identification in the black jacket on Salazar’s chair.Salazar was charged with possessing a firearm illegally. Salazar unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The district court ruled that the police had conducted a valid search incident to arrest because Salazar could reach the jacket (and gun) and, in any event, had abandoned the jacket. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The search was a lawful search incident to Salazar’s arrest. The court declined to address whether it matters that an arrestee is secured. View "United States v. Salazar" on Justia Law

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In 2014, Stacy was convicted of bank fraud. The district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and ordered Stacy to pay $1,495,689.60 in restitution jointly and severally with a codefendant. Though payable to the United States, the government forwards collected money to Stacy’s victims. When Stacy entered federal custody he suffered from pain and limited range of motion in his hip. Those problems worsened and he sought treatment through the prison medical system. A consulting orthopedic surgeon recommended a prompt hip replacement. Stacy did not receive the procedure while incarcerated. Stacy filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the federal prison was negligent in failing to procure his hip replacement surgery. The government settled with Stacy in 2021, not admitting liability but agreeing to pay him $75,000. The government expected the Treasury Department to offset the $75,000 settlement for application to Stacy’s restitution debt.The district court rejected Stacy’s arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Federal law authorizes the government to offset Stacy’s settlement award against his restitution debt. Stacy’s restitution is owed to the United States, and it has been past due since the time of sentencing. View "Stacy v. United States" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Baldwin and her then-husband Taylor, sexually exploited four girls, including her daughters and her niece. They conspired to produce and distributed explicit videos—some secretly recorded—of the girls. She sexually assaulted three of them. Convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor, conspiring to produce child pornography, and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(4)(B), the district court sentenced Baldwin to 400 months’ imprisonment, below the Guidelines’ range of 1,320 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting Baldwin’s argument that the government’s decision to prosecute her was vindictive and constituted retaliation for Taylor's success in vacating his first conviction. Baldwin's indictment was five years after Taylor was first indicted. Waiting to build a stronger case before pursuing an indictment is evidence of responsible, rather than vindictive, government behavior. Taylor’s success in vacating his original conviction stemmed from his counsel’s incompetence, not missteps by the government. The court rejected Baldwin’s argument that, on a per-count basis, her sentence is roughly an order of magnitude higher than Taylor’s. A below-Guidelines sentence like Baldwin’s cannot stem from an unwarranted disparity. The difference can be explained by Taylor’s cooperation and contrition. The court declined to reweigh section 3553(a)'s factors. View "United States v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Police found Miller lying on the sidewalk, bleeding from an apparent gunshot wound. An officer rendering aid removed a vehicle key fob from Miller’s hand, dropping it on the ground. A car, parked 15-20 feet from Miller, had bullet holes in the rear driver’s side door. Officers checked whether there was anyone in the car. One officer shined his flashlight through the windshield and saw what he thought was blood on the front passenger seat. An officer picked up the key fob and clicked a button. The car’s horn honked. Minutes later, an officer stated that he could see the barrel of a gun sticking out from under a hat on the front passenger seat. The car was towed to the police station. At the hospital, Miller said that he was using his girlfriend’s car. A database check showed that the impounded car was registered to Miller. The police obtained a warrant to search the car without mentioning the key fob. Police recovered the gun. DNA on the gun matched Miller’s. He was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon.The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of Miller’s motion to suppress. Miller argued that clicking the key fob qualified as a search. The district judge reasoned that the fob was used only to identify the car, not to gain entry, and that Miller had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his car. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the evidence was also admissible under the independent source doctrine. The car would have been searched regardless of the identity of its owner. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

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In 2007, Njos pleaded guilty to six federal crimes arising from robberies, and for attempted escape and assault of an FBI agent after his arrest. During his term of supervised release, he tested positive for illegal substances and failed to report. Njos then pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to eight new robberies. The state courts sentenced him to 25 years.The federal government petitioned to revoke Njos’s federal supervised release. Njos, proceeding pro se, repeatedly asked to be returned to the Illinois Department of Corrections and requested a 24-month sentence, concurrent with his state sentences. He argued that his underlying federal convictions were class C and D felonies and cited his history of mental illness. Noting Njos's wish to expedite the proceedings, the court said: “You don’t need to be in court for this,” proposing to enter a written order imposing his sentence. Njos thanked the judge, Neither Njos nor the government objected. The court later imposed a total of 82 months in prison for the six revocations.The only issue that appointed counsel deemed strong enough to raise on appeal was the imposition of a sentence in a written order rather than with the defendant present in person. When counsel decline to raise other issues that Njos wished to argue, Njos moved to dismiss counsel, submitting a brief of his preferred arguments. The Seventh Circuit denied Njos’s motion to dismiss counsel but allowed him to file the supplemental brief. On reconsideration, the court dismissed counsel and rejected Njos’s arguments about the calculation and reasonable of his sentence. View "United States v. Njos" on Justia Law

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Beechler and Turner, both serving home confinement through Marion County Community Corrections (MCCC), reported separate residences. An FBI Task Force was conducting a wiretap investigation involving individuals distributing controlled substances in Indianapolis. They discovered that a target of the investigation expected a shipment of marijuana to arrive at Turner’s residence. Watching the house, agents noticed a man with an ankle monitor and reported to MCCC that it suspected that one of the occupants was on home confinement and might be engaged in drug trafficking. An MCCC employee, with Indianapolis officers, went to Turner’s address to check compliance with the home detention contract. They encountered Turner and Beechler and discovered methamphetamine in the bedroom. Officers then obtained a search warrant and seized five firearms, ammunition, methamphetamine, heroin, and $1,508 in cash. After receiving his Miranda rights, Beechler acknowledged the drugs and guns, admitting that they were there to protect the drugs.Beechler unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that although police labeled the search as a community corrections compliance check, they actually conducted the search for law enforcement purposes so that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Convicted of multiple counts, Beechler was sentenced to 360 months in prison—below the bottom of the 420-month Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Beechler’s expectation of privacy was minimal; the government’s legitimate needs were significant. The search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Beechler" on Justia Law

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Howard was charged as a felon in possession of a weapon. Before his trial, the government struck the only three Black jurors on the 39-person venire panel. The judge had admonished the jurors that they could not use the internet for any purpose related to or surrounding the case and asked the jurors to “[r]aise your number if you don’t use the internet.” Jurors 9, 13, and 24 each raised their numbers. Jurors 9 and 24 were two of the three Blacks. The prosecutor struck each of them, explaining: “I do not believe people when they say they don’t use the Internet.” In response to the defendant’s subsequent Batson challenge, the court applied the three steps of the Batson inquiry. At the third step—that the defendant established purposeful discrimination by the government—the court summarized Howard’s counsel’s argument, stating: “Your sole justification and your persuasiveness is that the government attorney, who does happen to be African-American, has struck every single African-American on the panel.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed Howard’s conviction, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by injecting the prosecutor’s race into the Batson inquiry, improperly evaluating the peremptory strike, and failing to make required demeanor findings. The prosecutor’s theory was not so “implausible or fantastic” as to require a conclusion that the justification was “pretext[] for purposeful discrimination.” View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

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Ingram contends that, while confined in the Terre Haute Penitentiary, he was attacked and beaten by guards, after which the medical staff denied him necessary care. A magistrate concluded that Ingram failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C.1997e(a), and granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Ingram filed three substantive grievances. Two he did not pursue to a conclusion; one. asserting that members of the staff failed to protect him from harm, was rejected because it lacked required attachments and Ingram did not resubmit a grievance or appeal. A second grievance asserted that staff retaliated against him by withholding necessary medical care. The prison rejected this grievance because Ingram had not attempted an informal resolution. An inmate cannot short-circuit the grievance process by filing in court while that process is ongoing.The court remanded in part. Ingram alleged that he never got a written decision on his remaining substantive grievance, complaining about the attack itself. If an appeal was blocked by the need to attach a document that the prisoner did not have, then that appeal is not “available” to the prisoner, and the statute allows the prisoner to turn to court. The district court should have held a hearing and taken testimony on subjects such as whether the Warden refused to provide the statement to Ingram or whether there was just a bureaucratic delay in handing it over. View "Ingram v. Watson" on Justia Law

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After a high school student died from a fentanyl overdose, Kenosha police investigated the source of the fatal drugs. That investigation led them to Uzorma Ihediwa, who had sold Percocet pills to the student’s neighbor. Police soon discovered that Ihediwa’s pills were not authentic Percocet but were counterfeits that contained a mixture of drugs, including fentanyl. Ihediwa pleaded guilty to one count of distributing fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The only contested issue at sentencing was whether Ihediwa knew that the pills contained fentanyl. If so, then his Sentencing Guidelines offense level would be raised by four levels. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(13) applies “[i]f the defendant knowingly misrepresented or knowingly marketed as another substance a mixture or substance containing fentanyl.” Ihediwa urged that he did not manufacture the pills, did not know that they were counterfeit, and did not know that they contained fentanyl. The district court applied the enhancement.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ihediwa’s 40-month sentence. Because the district court emphasized that its ultimate sentencing decision was not affected by the Guidelines dispute, any error in its interpretation of the Guidelines was harmless. This sentence was below the Guidelines range, whether with the enhancement (78–97 months) or without it (51–63 months). View "United States v. Ihediwa" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law