Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Erlinger pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was given an enhanced 15-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his 1991 Illinois conviction for residential burglary, 1991 Indiana conviction for burglary, and two 2003 Indiana convictions for dealing in methamphetamine. The court vacated Erlinger’s sentence after the Seventh Circuit held that Illinois residential burglary is not a violent felony and Indiana methamphetamine convictions are not serious drug offenses under ACCA. The government argued that Erlinger still qualified for an ACCA enhancement, citing other 1991 Indiana burglary convictions. The government supplied the plea and charging documents; each charged a different burglary at a different business, three on different dates within a week. Erlinger argued that Indiana’s definition of burglary is broader than the federal definition and does not trigger ACCA and these burglaries were not committed on separate occasions as ACCA requires, and a jury, not the judge, must make that factual determination.The district court imposed an ACCA-enhanced 15-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Indiana statute does not include language the Supreme Court deems overly broad. Erlinger has not cited any Indiana cases that interpret the statute in this manner. The government was not required to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Erlinger committed the Indiana burglaries on separate occasions. View "United States v. Erlinger" on Justia Law

In 1997, Castaneda was arrested for his role in a large-scale heroin conspiracy. Once released on bond, Castaneda fled and lived as a fugitive in Mexico for more than 20 years. He returned to the United States in 2019 and was rearrested for his 1997 offense. Castaneda entered guilty pleas to attempt to possess with the intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin, and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin. Penalties for both charges included a statutory mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment. Castaneda qualified for the “safety valve”—under which a court is obligated to impose a sentence pursuant to the sentencing guidelines without regard to any statutory minimums, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). Safety valve relief is available if five requirements are met.The court sentenced Castaneda to 12 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court applied an incorrect guideline range and failed to provide any explanation for its rejection of Castaneda’s principal mitigation argument. The court appears not to have understood that if the safety valve applied, it was required to sentence Castaneda without regard to the mandatory minimum. View "United States v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

Police responded to a 911 call from a gas station, and discovered Gamez, on probation for a robbery conviction, in possession of a Winchester rifle. Eight days earlier Gamez had removed his GPS-tracking ankle bracelet; a LaPorte County Community Corrections officer had filed charges for escape. Gamez pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government sought the 15-year minimum sentence mandated by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e) for section 922(g)(1) offenders with three previous convictions “for a violent felony.” Gamez had three prior Indiana state convictions—two for robbery (2009, 2016) and one for aiding and abetting arson (2011)—and never disputed that his robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies. He argued that Indiana’s arson statute covered too broad a range of conduct to be considered a “violent felony.” The district court imposed the enhancement.The Seventh Circuit certified to the Indiana Supreme Court the question: whether Indiana arson requires a fire or burning. By its terms, the state’s criminal code does not require fire or burning as an element of arson but there are indications that Indiana state courts have interpreted and applied the arson statute to require proof of burning to sustain an arson conviction. The issue has not been addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court. The state’s choice to charge Gamez as an aider-and-abettor of arson and not a principal does not independently preclude the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Gamez" on Justia Law

Gonzales had an altercation at a bar, then got into a car with Pedro (driving) and fired several shots from the car’s window toward the men, hitting one in the leg. Charged under state law with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, with a 40-year maximum sentence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, Gonzales was offered an opportunity to plead guilty to recklessly endangering safety and unlawful possession of a firearm for a recommended ten-year sentence. After conferring with his attorney, Frost, Gonzales rejected the plea deal and requested a speedy trial. Frost predicted that the state would have trouble with its witnesses. One had absconded from probation; all had lengthy felony records, had been drunk, and gave inconsistent accounts.All the state’s witnesses were located for trial and testified that Gonzales was the shooter. Frost continued to pursue acquittal rather than focusing on the reckless-endangerment count. The jury convicted Gonzales of the more serious crime. Gonzales received a 25-year sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, Frost testified that it “never even crossed [her] mind” to argue for the lesser-included offense. The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed that Frost’s performance did not fall below the “constitutional line,” without reaching the issue of prejudice.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, stating that it was “deeply troubled by the performance of defense counsel” but could not “say that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland or relied on unreasonable determinations of fact.” View "Gonzales v. Eplett" on Justia Law

Lee carried out a scheme to defraud the Chicago White Sox. With the help of two Sox employees, Lee obtained thousands of discounted and free game tickets and resold them online for a profit. He was eventually convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The indictment expressly sought forfeiture of Lee’s ill-gotten gains and Lee did not object to that request. The parties disagreed on the amount. The court failed to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture specifying what would be due and what property was subject to forfeiture (Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)) but did everything else necessary for forfeiture, including giving Lee notice and an opportunity to contest the amount the government was seeking and orally imposing forfeiture in the sentence, along with an 18-month prison term, restitution, and the required special assessment. The written judgment, however, omitted forfeiture. After some additional proceedings, the court concluded that it was too late to enter a proper forfeiture order, and refused to amend the written judgment to reflect its oral sentenceThe Seventh Circuit rejected Lee’s challenges to the indictment, the court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, and his sentence but reversed and remanded for the district court to amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to include forfeiture in the amount the court found–$455,229.23. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

In 2015, Indiana charged Crowell with 13 felony counts: four counts of Class A felony child molesting, four counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, two counts of Level 5 felony incest, and one count each of Class C felony incest, Class C felony child molesting, and Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor. Unbeknownst to Crowell, the statute of limitations had run on the four counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and Class C felony child molesting. Crowell’s appointed attorney failed to inform him or the prosecution that Crowell had a statute-of-limitations defense. Crowell pled guilty to three charges (including one that was time-barred) under a binding plea agreement.Crowell sought federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Indiana Court of Appeals had rejected Crowell’s claim because he had not shown that if he had been properly advised, he would have rejected the plea bargain and insisted on going to trial on the timely charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Crowell, v. Sevier" on Justia Law

Nichols, charged with sex trafficking, faced a life sentence. Two attorneys with extensive experience were appointed as defense counsel. Months later, Nichols filed a pro se motion, challenging their representation. The judge warned Nichols about the perils of self-representation and stated: I am not giving you another lawyer. After an extended conversation, the attorneys were appointed standby counsel. Nichols objected, stating: “Courts are forcing me to go pro se.” At Nichols's request, the court ordered a competency evaluation. Dr. Goldstein spent 14 hours with Nichols and found Nichols competent to stand trial and to proceed pro se, indicating that his disorders are behavioral, not mental. Nichols twice refused to appear. The court repeatedly reviewed why Nichols should not represent himself but held that Nichols had constructively waived the right to counsel. A second expert, Dr. Fields, was unable to complete any test because of Nichols’s obstreperous behavior and relied on an interview with Nichols to conclude that Nichols’s competency was “not diminished by a severe emotional disorder.” It was Fields’s “clinical sense” that Nichols’s “lack of willingness to work” with counsel rendered him incompetent. At a competency hearing, the government introduced recorded jail calls in which Nichols indicated that he was delaying the proceedings. The court found Nichols competent. Nichols stated, “I’m not working with anybody.”Nichols was convicted and accepted the assistance of counsel before sentencing. A third competency evaluation concluded that Nichols was competent. The court imposed a within-Guidelines life sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating: “District courts are not permitted to foist counsel upon competent defendants.” View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Dr. Xiao taught mathematics for many years at Southern Illinois University. He also did academic work based in China, for which he received more than $100,000 in payments. An investigation of Xiao's grant applications led FBI agents to examine his finances. Xiao was charged with wire fraud, making a false statement, failing to disclose his foreign bank account on his income tax returns, and failing to file a required report with the Department of the Treasury. Xiao was acquitted of wire fraud and making a false statement, but convicted of filing false tax returns and failing to file a report of a foreign bank account, 31 U.S.C. 5314(a).The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient, primarily on the question of willfulness, that the tax return question was ambiguous, and that the foreign-account reporting regulation is invalid. The evidence permitted the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Xiao acted willfully in choosing not to disclose his foreign bank account. The tax return form was not ambiguous as applied to Xiao’s situation. The government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in reportable transactions. In 2019 he received deposits to the Chinese account and made withdrawals and investments using that account. View "United States v. Xiao" on Justia Law

Whitfield was scheduled for discharge from Menard Correctional Center in January 2010, to begin a term of mandatory supervised release. On that day, prison officials handed Whitfield only the signature page of a document called the “Electronic Detention Program Agreement.” That page stated that “the following conditions of the Program apply only to sex offender cases.” Whitfield was not a sex offender and objected to signing the Agreement without an explanation from a prison official clarifying why he, a non-sex offender, had to sign a form designed exclusively for sex offenders. Whitfield’s objections were rejected. Four times, clinical services supervisor Spiller directed Whitfield to sign the form. After his continued refusal, she issued a disciplinary ticket for failure to follow a direct order. Whitfield was transferred to disciplinary segregation; the Illinois Prisoner Review Board held a hearing and found he had violated the terms of his supervised release. His eligibility for supervised release was revoked. Whitfield remained in custody for another 18 months.Whitfield sued Spiller, other Menard officials, and Board members, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The case has narrowed to Whitfield’s claims against Spiller and then-warden Gaetz for First and Eighth Amendment violations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly granted the defendants summary judgment on some claims, but that Whitfield has sufficient evidence that Spiller’s conduct violated his First Amendment rights. View "Whitfield v. Cowan" on Justia Law

Simmons used another person’s Social Security number and falsified employment information to open a savings account and apply for multiple loans and credit cards at a credit union. Convicted of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and aggravated identity theft, section 1028A, Simmons argued that the government had not proved that he knew the Social Security number belonged to another person and, at sentencing, objected to the PSR’s calculation of the intended loss amount. The PSR calculated Simmons’s total intended loss amount at $176,326. That included a cashier’s check Simmons had cashed plus each loan and credit card amount for which he had applied—some of which had been denied. Simmons argued that he only intended to obtain one credit card and one auto loan and that if he had succeeded in obtaining a credit card and car loan on January 23, he would have stopped. Excluding two additional applications would have brought the loss amount under $150,000, resulting in an enhancement of only eight levels instead of ten.The district court adopted the PSR’s loss amount, and, with a Guidelines range of 30-37 months, sentenced Simmons to 46 months on the bank fraud counts, followed by a mandatory consecutive sentence of 24 months on the aggravated identity theft count. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sufficient evidence supported Simmons’s aggravated identity theft conviction, and the loss amount finding was not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law