Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anthony Day and Omarr Williams were charged with robbing a bank in Hammond, Indiana. Day was identified as the man who brandished a silver revolver during the robbery. After the robbery, the police tracked Day down using a GPS tracker embedded in the stolen cash. They found him in a wooded area, along with cash, an OGIO bag, parts of the robbers' disguises, and two firearms: a silver Smith & Wesson revolver and an American Tactical assault rifle. The police arrested Day and Williams, and a grand jury charged Day with bank robbery, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.In the district court, Day moved to exclude reference to the American Tactical assault rifle, arguing that there was no evidence he used it during the robbery. He also requested a unanimity instruction, meaning the jurors would have to agree on which gun he possessed for the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court denied both requests, citing a previous decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The jury found Day guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 292 months in prison. Day appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, challenging the district court's failure to give his requested jury instruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Day's argument de novo. The court noted that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury, which requires jury unanimity for convictions for serious crimes. However, this requirement only applies to the elements of the offense, not the means used to commit an element of the crime. The court explained that the particular firearm possessed is not an element of the crime, but rather the means used to satisfy the element of "any firearm." Therefore, jurors do not need to agree on which weapon the defendant possessed. The court also noted that where a defendant possessed multiple firearms, the government may only bring one charge if the defendant's possession of the firearms was "simultaneous and undifferentiated." The court found that the evidence supported a single course of possession of the firearms, not two distinct instances of possession. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that no unanimity instruction was required. View "USA v. Day" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Zebulon Marzette, who was convicted for possessing a firearm as a felon. The incident occurred on September 20, 2019, when a 911 call reported people pounding on a door and waving guns at an apartment complex in South Bend, Indiana. Responding officers encountered a chaotic scene and eventually pulled over a car leaving the area. Marzette, who had walked to the location of the car stop, was handcuffed and placed in a squad car. A gun was found in a purse in the back seat of the stopped car, and subsequent DNA testing revealed Marzette's DNA on the trigger. Marzette was charged with felony possession of a firearm.The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Marzette objected to the introduction of the DNA evidence, arguing that each custodian in the gun’s chain of custody needed to testify to prove that the gun and the DNA evidence were authentic and reliable. The district court disagreed and overruled Marzette’s objection, admitting the DNA-related testimony and testing results into evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict and Marzette was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Marzette challenged the district court’s admission of the DNA evidence and the hearsay testimony about the 911 call. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the DNA evidence, as the government had provided a substantially complete chain of custody. Regarding the 911 call, the court concluded that even if it was an error to admit the dispatch call, the government could have presented effectively the same case with its exclusion. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Marzette" on Justia Law

The case involves Bernell Brasher, who was convicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The case began when a confidential source informed the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that Bacaree Oaks had a pound of meth for sale. The source suggested he would sell the meth on credit and pay Oaks and Brasher $5,000 afterward. Instead, the source turned the meth over to law enforcement. The meth was tested and found to be 99% pure methamphetamine. Brasher and Oaks were later arrested. During his arrest, Brasher admitted to owing money to his supplier in Mexico for about 100 pounds of meth he had on the street.Brasher was indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and pleaded guilty. The presentence investigation report (PSR) concluded that Brasher's relevant conduct included four instances of past drug distribution activity. Brasher objected to the PSR's findings, but his objections are not part of this appeal. The district court sentenced Brasher to 200 months’ imprisonment, which fell within his Guidelines range.On appeal, Brasher argued that his past conduct was too dissimilar from his offense of conviction—and too long before it—to factor into his Guidelines calculation. The court disagreed, finding sufficient similarity between the offense of conviction and the uncharged conduct to satisfy the plain error standard. The court also rejected Brasher's argument that the district court failed to explain why the past conduct was relevant. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Brasher" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Huazhi Han, who was convicted on charges of money laundering and related offenses. Han used his electronic goods business to launder drug proceeds for Mexican drug traffickers. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Chicago Police Department (CPD) began investigating a money laundering organization in Chicago, in which Han played a key role. Han received cash proceeds from a drug trafficker, Rafiq Roman, on multiple occasions. After Roman's arrest, he cooperated with the authorities, leading to Han's arrest. The officers found a loaded firearm, approximately $200,000 in cash, and lookalike currency in Han's car. They also searched Han's home, where they found nearly $1.3 million in cash, a money counter, rubber bands, and firearms.Han was indicted on four charges, including conspiracy to commit money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Before trial, Han moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing that the officers searched his home without a warrant or consent. The district court denied the motion, finding that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Han was convicted on all counts.On appeal, Han argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, admitting threat evidence, and denying his motion for a mistrial based on the government’s closing argument. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found no error and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search of their home, the threat evidence was admissible as it was directly related to Han's crimes, and the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not result in an unfair trial. View "United States v. Huazhi Han" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a traffic stop in Wisconsin where police officers used a K-9 unit to sniff a car they suspected was involved in drug trafficking. The dog signaled the presence of drugs, leading to a search of the car and the discovery of almost eleven pounds of methamphetamine. The defendant, Juventino Plancarte, who was in the car during the stop, challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence.The lower courts had indicted Plancarte on two counts related to methamphetamine distribution. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the dog's sniff, arguing that the dog could identify both illegal marijuana products and legal products that come from cannabis plants. Therefore, he contended that the sniff violated the Fourth Amendment as it was a warrantless search unsupported by probable cause. However, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations denying Plancarte's suppression motion, leading to his guilty plea to both drug charges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the dog sniff did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search as it did not disrupt any reasonable expectation of privacy. The court noted that the dog sniff occurred outside the home, in a public area, and during a lawful traffic stop, which generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. The court also pointed out that the dog's sniff was not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court appropriately denied Plancarte's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Plancarte" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jack Clayborne, who was convicted for crimes related to an attempted carjacking. Clayborne, along with two other men, attempted to carjack Michael Guster. During the incident, Clayborne fired five shots, one of which hit Guster. Clayborne was charged with attempted motor vehicle robbery, discharge of a firearm during an attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. He was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 234 months' imprisonment.Clayborne appealed his sentence, and the case was remanded for resentencing after the government agreed to dismiss his conviction for discharging a firearm during an attempted robbery. Before resentencing, Clayborne submitted a letter expressing regret for his actions. However, the district court found the letter insufficient to warrant a reduction in sentence for acceptance of responsibility. Clayborne was resentenced to 223 months in prison and appealed again.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Clayborne challenged two aspects of his sentence: the district court's decision not to award him an acceptance of responsibility reduction and the district court's comment that his criminal history included "a lot of" robberies when he had no prior robbery convictions. The court found no procedural error in the district court's decision not to award an acceptance of responsibility reduction. It also found no evidence that the district court relied on incorrect information about Clayborne's criminal history when determining his sentence. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Clayborne" on Justia Law

The defendant, Delon Echols, was convicted of attempting to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute it. The case revolved around two packages containing illegal drugs that were sent to the home of Renita Burns, where Echols was temporarily residing. Burns testified that she suspected Echols was responsible for the packages. During the trial, the prosecution introduced testimony from a DEA agent about a prior consistent statement made by Burns. The defense objected, arguing that the testimony was merely bolstering Burns' credibility.The district court in Illinois admitted the testimony, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which allows for the admission of prior consistent statements to rebut charges of fabrication. Echols was found guilty and sentenced to 70 months in prison and three years of supervised release. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in admitting the prior consistent statement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the district court erred in admitting the prior consistent statement. The court noted that under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and Tome v. United States, a prior consistent statement offered to rebut charges of fabrication must have been made before the motive to fabricate arose. In this case, Burns' statement was made after her alleged motive to fabricate had arisen. However, the court found that Echols had not raised this specific objection at trial, thus forfeiting it on appeal.The court concluded that while the admission of the prior statement was an error, it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Therefore, the court affirmed Echols' conviction. View "United States v. Echols" on Justia Law

Rodney Lass was initially charged with misdemeanor domestic abuse. However, the case ended in a mistrial due to the alleged victim's disregard of a court order. Subsequently, the prosecutors recharged the case, adding multiple felony counts. Lass was found guilty on all but one charge and was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment. Lass contended that the second set of charges were the product of an unconstitutional vindictive prosecution. He argued that the prosecutors leveled the expanded charges against him in retaliation for his seeking and receiving a mistrial in the misdemeanor case.Lass sought post-conviction relief in Wisconsin state court and later in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, determining that Lass failed to allege facts that would establish a presumption of vindictiveness or actual vindictiveness. The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined review.Lass's application for relief in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 also fell short. The district court found that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not apply a presumption of vindictiveness and that its declining to do so was neither contrary to nor reflected an unreasonable application of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The district court also declined to consider Lass's two remaining claims, finding both procedurally defaulted.In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, Lass's contentions were seen as procedurally defaulted. The court affirmed the district court's disposition of these two claims. The court also found no basis for federal habeas relief under § 2254(d) on Lass's vindictive prosecution claim. The court concluded that no aspect of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' rationale was contrary to or reflected an unreasonable application of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. View "Lass v. Wells" on Justia Law

A nurse practitioner, Lisa Hofschulz, and her ex-husband, Robert Hofschulz, were convicted of conspiracy and multiple counts of distributing drugs in an unauthorized manner, including one count resulting in a patient's death. The charges stemmed from their operation of a "pain clinic" that functioned as a front for an opioid mill, dispensing opioid prescriptions for cash-only payments. Robert Hofschulz was also convicted for his role in assisting Lisa Hofschulz in running the opioid mill.The Hofschulzes were initially tried in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. They were found guilty on all counts, with Lisa Hofschulz receiving a minimum 20-year prison term for the count of unlawful distribution resulting in death, and Robert Hofschulz receiving concurrent terms of 36 months in prison on each of his five convictions. The Hofschulzes appealed their convictions on three grounds: they claimed the jury instructions were inconsistent with a Supreme Court decision, that the judge wrongly permitted the government’s medical expert to testify about the standard of care, and that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court found no instructional error, stating that the district judge had correctly instructed the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Hofschulzes intended to distribute controlled substances and intended to do so in an unauthorized manner. The court also found that the judge had correctly permitted the government’s medical expert to testify about the standard of care in the usual course of professional pain management. Lastly, the court dismissed the Hofschulzes' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, deeming it frivolous. The court affirmed the convictions of the Hofschulzes. View "United States v. Hofschulz" on Justia Law

The defendant, Travis Montgomery, pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine. The government presented evidence that Montgomery stored the drugs, cash, and drug trafficking paraphernalia in a storage unit leased by his sister. The district court applied a two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which requires an increase where a defendant “maintained a premises for the purpose of … distributing a controlled substance.” Montgomery objected to this enhancement, arguing that his use of the storage unit did not meet the requirements of the enhancement.The district court, however, found that the storage unit qualified as a “premises” under § 2D1.1(b)(12), and that Montgomery had used it primarily for storing and distributing drugs. This enhancement increased Montgomery’s total offense level, leading to a sentence of 235 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Montgomery challenged the application of the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The court agreed with the district court that the storage unit constituted a “premises” under the enhancement. However, the court was uncertain whether Montgomery sufficiently “maintained” the storage unit for the purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(12), given that he did not lease the unit himself and his use of it was for only a short time. The court also found that the record fell short of indicating that Montgomery was using the storage unit primarily for distributing drugs during the month in question. As a result, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further fact-finding. View "United States v. Montgomery" on Justia Law