Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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The defendant, Joseph Wilcher, was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor and travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual activity after he drove across state lines to meet someone he believed was a fifteen-year-old girl, who was actually a federal agent. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois sentenced Wilcher to a custodial prison term and a term of supervised release. In explaining the sentence, the district court only discussed the seriousness of the offense and did not address any of Wilcher's arguments for mitigation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the district court erred in its sentencing. The appellate court held that the district court had relied on the seriousness of the offense as the sole justification for the sentence, including the term of supervised release. However, the seriousness of the offense is not a factor that courts can consider when imposing a term of supervised release. The appellate court also found that the district court had failed to consider Wilcher's principal mitigation arguments. The appellate court concluded that the district court's failure to adequately explain the sentence precluded meaningful appellate review.The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated Wilcher's sentence and remanded the case for a full resentencing hearing. The court clarified that on remand, the district court could not consider the seriousness of the offense when imposing a term of supervised release and must consider Wilcher's principal mitigation arguments. View "USA v. Wilcher" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2015, DeShawn Harold Jewell was convicted of robbery by use of force and bail jumping, following a robbery outside a Milwaukee tavern. A DNA match from a hat left at the scene and a photo identification by the victim led to his arrest, but Jewell argued that the photo array procedure did not adhere to best practices. During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court if the numbering system of the photo array matched that of a photo "six-pack" shown at trial. The trial court, without consulting the parties, answered "No." The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict. Jewell challenged this ex parte communication, arguing that it violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the trial court's error was harmless. Jewell sought habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court reasoned that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals had not unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in its harmlessness analysis, and that the ex parte communication did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. View "Jewell v. Boughton" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed an appeal related to a Fourth Amendment issue involving a warrantless search of a vehicle. The defendant, Charles Hays, was stopped by the police while driving, and his passenger was found in possession of methamphetamine. The police officers then searched the vehicle's interior but found no drugs. However, under the hood of the car, inside the air filter, they discovered more methamphetamine.Hays was indicted and later moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the officers did not have probable cause to search under the hood and in the air filter. The district court denied his motion, and Hays subsequently pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, including all parts of the vehicle where there is a fair probability contraband could be concealed, as long as there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of illegal activity. The court found that given the totality of the circumstances, including the passenger's possession of methamphetamine, Hays's previous drug-related arrest, and the presence of a screwdriver in the car - a tool known to be used for hiding drugs in vehicles - officers had a fair probability to believe that methamphetamine could be concealed in the car, including under its hood. View "United States v. Hays" on Justia Law

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The case arose from a tipster's information that led to an investigation and subsequent search of David Hueston's apartment in Marion, Indiana. The search, which was conducted under a warrant, produced drugs, cash, a gun, and ammunition. Hueston was charged with various drug-related offenses. He sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that the detectives deliberately or recklessly made misleading omissions and misrepresentations to obtain the search warrant. The district court denied Hueston's motion after conducting a Franks hearing, and Hueston appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that though the affidavit supporting the search warrant contained omissions and inaccuracies, it was not clear that the detectives acted with deliberate intent or recklessness to mislead the judge who issued the warrant. The court noted that the detectives' consultation with a prosecutor both before and after drafting the affidavit argued against a finding of intent to mislead. The court also found that the good-faith exception applied, meaning that the police officers acted in good faith reliance upon a facially valid warrant. As such, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Hueston's motion to suppress the evidence. View "United States v. Hueston" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case, the defendant, Patrick Thompson, was convicted of making false statements about his loans to financial institutions. Thompson took out three loans from a bank totaling $219,000. After the bank failed, its receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and a loan servicer, Planet Home, attempted to recoup the money owed by Thompson. However, Thompson disputed the loan balance, insisting that he had only borrowed $110,000. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of making false statements to influence the FDIC and a mortgage lending business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.On appeal, Thompson argued that his statements were not “false” under § 1014 because they were literally true, and that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him. He also claimed that the government constructively amended the indictment and that the district court lacked the authority to order him to pay restitution to the FDIC.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Thompson's arguments and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that under its precedent, § 1014 criminalizes misleading representations, and Thompson's statements were misleading. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Thompson's conviction and that the indictment was not constructively amended. Finally, the court held that the district court properly awarded restitution to the FDIC, as the FDIC had suffered a financial loss as a direct and proximate result of Thompson's false statements. View "USA v. Thompson" on Justia Law

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This case concerns Johnnie Wesley, who was brought in for questioning by Wisconsin police in connection with a murder investigation. Wesley invoked his right to remain silent during the initial interrogation, and the interrogation ceased. However, he was interrogated two more times, during which he made incriminating statements implicating himself in the murder. Wesley was subsequently charged with felony murder. He moved to suppress the incriminating statements on two grounds: (1) the officers did not honor his initial invocation of his right to remain silent, and (2) he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The motion was denied and Wesley was convicted. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was dismissed.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent to Wesley’s case. The court determined that Wesley's right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored" after he invoked it during the first interrogation, and that he did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The court reasoned that Wesley's statements during the third interrogation could reasonably be interpreted as exculpatory, rather than as an invocation of silence. View "Wesley v. Hepp" on Justia Law

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In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court looked at the appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The defendant, Johneak Johnson, was indicted for possessing a firearm as a person previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government appealed a pretrial ruling by the District Court, which excluded evidence of a laser sight attached to the firearm. The District Court had ruled that the evidence would cause unfair prejudice to the defendant, outweighing its probative value. The government's proposal to limit the laser sight evidence to reduce any risk of unfair prejudice was also denied by the District Court.The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, ruling that the District Court had incorrectly assessed the balance between the probative value of the laser sight evidence and the risk of unfair prejudice. The Court of Appeals held that the laser sight evidence was central to proving a key disputed element of the offense – possession of the firearm. It also found that the laser sight evidence tended to corroborate the testimony of the government's eyewitnesses, which was critical given the defense's intended strategy of attacking their credibility.The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the District Court's assessment of the risk of unfair prejudice, holding that the government's proposed limits on the laser sight evidence should minimize any risk that it will cause the jury to view the defendant as unduly dangerous. Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding the laser sight evidence under Rule 403 and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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This case involves the appeal of a judgment convicting Byron Pierson of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Pierson contested the decision, arguing that the district court erred by not holding a hearing to determine if he had knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights when he entered into a proffer agreement with the government. Furthermore, he argued that the court erred by allowing a witness to testify about the investigation that led to his arrest. The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions.The case began when an Indianapolis Police Officer responded to a 911 call from a woman who reported that Pierson threatened to "come back and shoot the house up." After learning about Pierson's criminal record and obtaining a description of his car, the officer decided to return to the woman's home later that evening. Upon returning, the officer saw the car described by the woman and initiated a traffic stop. Pierson was in the back seat of the car. When asked to step out of the car, Pierson hesitated and then fled on foot when an attempt was made to handcuff him. During the ensuing chase, officers saw a firearm under Pierson's body, which was later retrieved and used as evidence against him.Prior to his trial, Pierson had entered into plea negotiations with the government, signing a Proffer Letter that waived certain rights. After admitting possession of the firearm in two proffer sessions, Pierson withdrew his plea and decided to go to trial. Pierson moved to exclude statements he made during these plea negotiations, arguing that he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.The Court of Appeals found that Pierson failed to provide an evidentiary basis for his assertion that he had not knowingly and voluntarily entered into the proffer agreement. Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, the court did not find it necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing, and the proffer waiver was deemed valid. The court also noted that the government never sought to introduce any of Pierson's proffer statements at trial, meaning any potential error in refusing to hold a hearing was harmless.Additionally, Pierson contended that the district court erred in allowing the government to present evidence about the investigation that led to his arrest. The court found that Pierson had opened the door to this testimony in his opening statement by referencing a complaint made by his ex-girlfriend. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony, and immediately gave a limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of this evidence.Given the strong evidence of Pierson's guilt, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decisions. View "USA v. Pierson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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This case involves Daryl McGhee, who was charged with several federal offenses related to possession of a firearm and cocaine. The charges arose after the police received a 911 call from McGhee's wife reporting domestic violence and alleging that McGhee had left their house carrying a gun and a leather bag. The police followed footprints in the snow to find McGhee and later found the bag, which contained the gun and cocaine, under a nearby dumpster. During the trial, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois issued an order prohibiting McGhee from testifying about the domestic violence incident, even to deny the allegation, threatening to jail him and his defense counsel if they violated the order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that while the district court's decision to limit McGhee's testimony was valid as it avoided turning the trial into a domestic dispute, the order was overly broad as it completely silenced McGhee, leaving the jury to potentially conclude that he did hit his wife. Despite this, the appellate court concluded that the exclusionary order did not have a substantial influence over the jury and did not result in a verdict inconsistent with substantial justice. The court expressed concerns about the district court's treatment of McGhee's defense counsel but ultimately affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. McGhee" on Justia Law

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The defendant-appellant, Rickey Claybron, was convicted on counts of Hobbs Act robbery and firearm-related offenses. He appealed his sentence, arguing that Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and that a retroactive amendment in the Sentencing Guidelines should have been applied to lower his criminal history category and consequently, his sentencing range. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Claybron's firearm-related convictions, ruling that Hobbs Act robbery does qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c). However, the court agreed with Claybron's argument about the retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. It ruled that because the amendment would reduce his Guidelines range and it was retroactive, Claybron's sentence for the robbery counts should be reconsidered. The court found that remand for resentencing was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, given the lower Guidelines range Claybron would have had if the amendment had been in effect at sentencing. Consequently, while Claybron's convictions and sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were affirmed, the sentence imposed on his convictions for the Hobbs Act robbery counts was vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of the Sentencing Guidelines amendments. View "USA v. Claybron" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law