Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cameron Johnson, a convicted felon, was found in possession of a firearm on September 15, 2019. He pleaded guilty to this charge. The Government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on Johnson's three prior robbery convictions under Indiana law. Johnson argued that two of these robberies, committed on January 22, 2009, occurred on the same occasion and thus should not count as separate offenses under ACCA. He also contended that a jury should determine whether the robberies were committed on different occasions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana rejected Johnson's argument, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent that did not require a jury to decide the different-occasions question. The court concluded that the robberies were committed on different occasions and sentenced Johnson to fifteen years in prison, the minimum under ACCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Erlinger v. United States established that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitle defendants to have a jury decide whether prior offenses were committed on the same or different occasions. Given this precedent, the Seventh Circuit determined that the district court erred in not submitting the different-occasions question to a jury. The court also found that this error was not harmless, as it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found the robberies to be committed on different occasions.The Seventh Circuit vacated Johnson's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Xengxai Yang robbed a credit union in Appleton, Wisconsin, wearing a black mask and armed with a sawed-off rifle. After his arrest, Yang admitted to the robbery, claiming he wanted to "try something new." He was indicted on multiple counts, including armed bank robbery. Yang initially raised an insanity defense but later withdrew it and entered a plea agreement. However, he subsequently sought to withdraw his guilty plea, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. A second psychological evaluation suggested Yang's mental conditions impaired his judgment during the crime. The court allowed Yang to withdraw his plea and reassert the insanity defense, but ultimately found him guilty and sentenced him to 168 months in prison.Yang did not appeal his conviction directly but filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, Yang withdrew this claim and instead argued that the court's failure to hold a competency hearing violated his due process rights. The district court denied his motion, finding that Yang had procedurally defaulted his competency claim by not raising it earlier and that he was competent during the proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that procedural default bars Yang's competency claim because he failed to raise it on direct appeal and did not demonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence to overcome the default. The court concluded that Yang's competency claim was procedurally defaulted and dismissed his petition for collateral relief under § 2255. View "Xengxai Yang v. United States" on Justia Law

In late 1996, Jerry Walker was convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) and other drug-related offenses. He was sentenced to life in prison. Following the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, Walker sought a sentence reduction in 2020, arguing that his CCE conviction qualified as a "covered offense" under the Act. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin initially handled Walker's case. After his conviction, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated his statutory penalties, suggesting a mandatory 20 years to life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). The government argued for a mandatory life sentence under § 848(b), the "Super CCE" provision. The court agreed with the PSR's guideline range of life imprisonment but did not explicitly state whether the sentence was under § 848(a) or § 848(b). In 1998, the Seventh Circuit vacated Walker's conspiracy charge but upheld the CCE conviction and life sentence. In 2020, Walker moved for resentencing under the First Step Act, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that his CCE conviction under § 848(a) was not a "covered offense."The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no clear error in determining that Walker was sentenced under § 848(a). The court held that a conviction under § 848(a) is not a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, as its statutory penalties were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Therefore, Walker was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Walker's motion for First Step Act relief. View "USA v. Walker" on Justia Law

Jasmine Bradley was assessed as incompetent to assist in her defense against criminal charges and was referred to the Bureau of Prisons for evaluation under 18 U.S.C. §4241. She reported to the U.S. Marshal on January 28, 2022, and was released on August 24, 2022, with a report stating she was competent. Bradley then pleaded guilty to ten counts of fraud and aggravated identity theft, receiving a 198-month sentence. Her conditional guilty plea reserved the issue of whether the seven-month period between reporting and release required dismissal of her indictment with prejudice.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois held that dismissal was not mandatory, even though the Bureau exceeded the statutory time limits set by §4241(d). The court found that the statute did not specify a remedy for exceeding the time limits, and thus dismissal was not required.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that while §4241(d) sets a four-month limit for evaluating a defendant's competence, it does not specify a consequence for exceeding this limit. The court emphasized that statutory time limits are "time-related directives" and that dismissal with prejudice is not a fitting remedy for delays in restoring a detainee to competence. The court also noted that the Speedy Trial Act excludes delays caused by mental-health examinations and that dismissal of the indictment would not serve the interests of justice. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy for such delays is not dismissal but potentially ordering the release of the detainee while evaluations continue. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Don Bevly, a repeat bank robber, pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery and one count of attempted bank robbery. He also admitted to six additional bank robberies as relevant conduct. During sentencing, the government established that Bevly made death threats during two of the robberies, leading the district judge to increase his offense level by two levels under the Sentencing Guidelines. The judge also sentenced Bevly as a career offender due to his six prior bank robbery convictions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, handled Bevly's case. Bevly argued that the government had promised not to pursue the threat enhancement, but the judge rejected this claim based on the plea agreement and Bevly's statements during the guilty-plea colloquy. The judge also found that Bevly's prior convictions qualified him as a career offender, resulting in an advisory imprisonment range of 151 to 188 months. Ultimately, the judge imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 144 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the threat enhancement or the career-offender designation. The court noted that the plea agreement clearly stated the government's right to seek the threat enhancement and that Bevly had confirmed under oath that no other promises were made. Additionally, the court held that bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) qualifies as a crime of violence under the career-offender guideline, consistent with circuit precedent. The court also rejected Bevly's Sixth Amendment claim regarding judicial fact-finding at sentencing, citing established Supreme Court precedent. View "United States v. Bevly" on Justia Law

Donald Reynolds began a 60-month term of supervised release in 2020 after serving a lengthy prison sentence. During his supervision, he tested positive for methamphetamine twice. Despite efforts by the United States Probation Office to help him access drug treatment services, Reynolds failed to participate in the recommended programs. Consequently, the Probation Office petitioned to revoke his supervised release. At the revocation hearing, Reynolds admitted to violating his release conditions, and the district court revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to 21 months of custody.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana initially handled the case. After Reynolds tested positive for methamphetamine, the Probation Office referred him to a recovery center. When he tested positive again, an intensive outpatient program was recommended, but Reynolds did not comply. The Probation Office then petitioned for revocation. A magistrate judge ordered Reynolds to participate in an inpatient drug treatment program, but he struggled with obtaining his mental health medications and attempted suicide. After leaving the treatment facility without permission, he was arrested.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Reynolds argued that the district court erred by not recognizing its discretion to consider substance abuse treatment as an alternative to revocation and incarceration. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, noting that even if the district court had realized its discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), it would not have opted for further treatment given Reynolds's history of noncompliance. The court concluded that any error in the district court's understanding of its discretion was harmless, as the outcome would have been the same. View "United States v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The FBI conducted an investigation into a dark-web child pornography website called "Playpen." In 2015, the FBI took control of the website's servers and obtained a warrant to deploy a Network Investigative Technique (NIT) to identify users. Donald Dorosheff, a resident of Springfield, Illinois, was identified as a user and subsequently charged with receiving and possessing child pornography. Dorosheff sought to suppress the evidence obtained from his digital devices, arguing that the magistrate judge who issued the NIT warrant lacked authority under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to authorize an extraterritorial electronic search.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois agreed that the magistrate judge exceeded her authority under Rule 41 but applied the good-faith exception and declined to suppress the evidence. The court found that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in relying on the magistrate judge's assessment of the law. Dorosheff's motion for reconsideration and a second suppression motion, which argued that high-ranking Department of Justice officials knew the warrant was invalid, were both denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the agents involved acted reasonably in relying on the magistrate judge's determination of her authority. The court rejected Dorosheff's argument that the DOJ's advocacy for an amendment to Rule 41 indicated knowledge of the warrant's invalidity, noting that the amendment was an attempt to clarify the rule's application to new circumstances. The court concluded that the benefits of suppression did not outweigh its costs, as the case did not involve deliberately culpable police conduct. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Dorosheff" on Justia Law

Joshua Campbell sought to suppress evidence of child pornography found during an unannounced parole check by his parole officers. He argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because his parole agreement and the officers' failure to issue Miranda warnings led to the incriminating statements. Campbell contended that the parole agreement compelled his responses under threat of penalty and that he was in custody during the interrogation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied Campbell's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the parole agreement did not threaten to penalize Campbell for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights and that he was not in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements. Campbell entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the parole agreement did not impose a penalty for invoking the Fifth Amendment, as it only required Campbell to respond to communications from parole officers, which could include invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. Additionally, the court determined that Campbell was not in custody during the parole check, as he was in a familiar environment, not physically restrained, and the officers did not display weapons or use force. Therefore, the court concluded that Campbell's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated, and the evidence obtained during the parole check was admissible. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Robert Mason Elliott was charged with multiple federal offenses, including possession of firearms, sexual exploitation of a minor, and plotting to murder the minor and her mother. Elliott retained Attorney Brandon Sample for his defense. Over a year into the representation, Sample discovered a controlled substance hidden in documents meant for Elliott and sought to withdraw from the case. The court, however, denied Sample's motion, emphasizing Elliott's right to counsel of his choice. Elliott later reached a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to five counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially handled the case. After Sample's motion to withdraw was denied, Elliott continued with Sample as his attorney. Elliott later filed a second motion to determine his mental competency, which the court granted, and he was found competent to stand trial. Elliott eventually entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of murder for hire, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court sentenced him to 520 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Elliott argued that Sample had a conflict of interest and that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by not informing him of this conflict, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. The appellate court held that Elliott's Sixth Amendment claim was not foreclosed by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. However, the court concluded that even if Sample had a conflict of interest, Elliott could not demonstrate that he was adversely affected by it. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Olalekan Jacob Ponle orchestrated a scheme to defraud businesses by using phishing emails and information from the dark web to access corporate email accounts. He and his co-conspirators sent fraudulent emails to employees, instructing them to wire funds to bank accounts controlled by Ponle. This resulted in the theft of over $8 million from seven companies, with an additional $51 million in attempted but unsuccessful thefts.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois charged Ponle with eight counts of wire fraud. He pleaded guilty to one count and acknowledged owing over $8 million in restitution. The court, relying on the United States Sentencing Guidelines, used the intended loss amount to calculate his offense level, resulting in a custodial range of 168 to 210 months. Ponle objected, arguing that "loss" should only include actual loss, not intended loss. The district court disagreed and applied a twenty-two point increase to his offense level.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the term "loss" in the Sentencing Guidelines includes both actual and intended loss, as clarified by the Sentencing Commission's commentary. The court found that the commentary, which underwent public notice and comment and Congressional review, was authoritative and consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Stinson v. United States. Therefore, the district court correctly used the intended loss amount to calculate Ponle's sentence. View "USA v. Ponle" on Justia Law