Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael Porter was investigated and indicted on ten counts related to child pornography, including receipt, possession, and production. He pleaded guilty to three counts, with a conditional plea on the production charge, reserving the right to appeal whether his conduct fell under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Porter argued that he did not "use" minors or record them in "sexually explicit conduct" as defined by the statute and contested the district court's calculation of his offense level at sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Porter's motion to dismiss the production charges. Porter then entered a plea agreement, admitting to placing a hidden camera in a gym locker room and recording prepubescent boys in various states of undress and sexual activity. The district court calculated his total offense level at 43, including several enhancements, and sentenced him to 22 years in prison, followed by 15 years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Porter's conduct fell within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), as he "used" minors by recording them in sexually explicit conduct, including lascivious exhibition of the genitals. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancements, finding that Porter's actions constituted a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of minors. The court rejected Porter's arguments, noting that his conduct was clearly distinguishable from cases where mere nudity was involved, and reaffirmed the established legal standards for determining lasciviousness and "use" under the statute. View "USA v. Michael Porter" on Justia Law

Brian Jones, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued several correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The claims arose from an incident where Jones caused a disturbance in the prison dayroom, refused to return to his cell, and was subsequently placed in a restraint chair and transported to a restrictive-housing cell. Jones alleged that the officers used excessive force, conducted an unlawful strip search, and confined him in a dirty cell.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on all claims. Jones, who represented himself during the lower court proceedings, argued on appeal that the magistrate judge should have granted his request for pro bono counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The magistrate judge had denied this request, concluding that Jones was competent to litigate the straightforward case on his own.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the magistrate judge applied the correct legal standard and reasonably concluded that Jones was capable of handling the case himself. The court also determined that the video evidence conclusively showed that Jones's claims lacked merit. The video demonstrated that the officers used only minimal force, conducted the strip search in a professional manner, and that Jones's cell conditions did not amount to a constitutional violation. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the denial of pro bono counsel was appropriate and that the officers did not violate Jones's Eighth Amendment rights. View "Jones v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Christopher Roalson was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and burglary for the murder of a 93-year-old woman. At trial, a DNA analyst testified about evidence found on the murder weapons, although she did not perform the initial DNA testing. The original analyst was unavailable, and the testifying analyst based her conclusions on the initial analyst's notes. Roalson argued that this violated his right to confront the witness who performed the DNA testing.Roalson appealed his conviction, claiming a Confrontation Clause violation. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, citing State v. Luther Williams, which allows one analyst to testify about their own conclusions based on another analyst's work if they can provide an independent evaluation. The Wisconsin and United States Supreme Courts denied certiorari. Roalson then filed a habeas corpus petition in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was dismissed. The district court found no clear federal law barring the testifying analyst from giving her own independent opinions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the relevant federal law, as established by the Supreme Court, does not clearly prohibit an analyst from testifying to their own conclusions based on another analyst's data. The court found that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied existing law and that the testifying analyst did not merely act as a conduit for the original analyst's conclusions. Additionally, the court determined that any potential error was harmless given the substantial evidence supporting Roalson's conviction, including eyewitness testimony and his own confessions.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, denying Roalson's habeas corpus petition. View "Roalson v. Noble" on Justia Law

A high-school administrator, Justin Schimandle, forcibly restrained a student, C.G., at school. Following an investigation, Detective Josh Duehning of the Dekalb County Sheriff’s Office submitted affidavits to support an arrest warrant for Schimandle on battery charges. An Illinois state magistrate judge issued the warrant, and Schimandle turned himself in. The criminal case proceeded to a bench trial, where Schimandle was found not guilty after the prosecution rested.Schimandle then sued the Dekalb County Sheriff’s Office and Duehning, alleging false arrest. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the motion, dismissing Schimandle’s claims. The court found that there was probable cause to arrest Schimandle and that Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that arguable probable cause supported Schimandle’s arrest, meaning a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed based on the circumstances. The court also found that Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity, protecting him from liability for the false arrest claim. Additionally, the court noted that the magistrate judge’s issuance of the arrest warrant further supported the reasonableness of Duehning’s actions. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Schimandle’s complaint. View "Schimandle v. DeKalb County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

In 2004, Graham Stowe was charged with violent offenses against his former girlfriend and her family. He pleaded no contest, claiming insanity, which a state judge accepted, leading to his commitment for 39.5 years unless he recovered earlier. Released in 2007, Stowe was soon re-incarcerated for violating release conditions and later escaped in 2013, using drugs while free. After serving a sentence for escape, Stowe sought release in 2016 under Wisconsin law, which requires clear and convincing evidence of significant risk to deny release. Expert testimony indicated Stowe had a personality disorder and posed a risk of violence, leading the state circuit court to deny his release, a decision affirmed by the state court of appeals.Stowe then sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that the Wisconsin statute violated the Due Process Clause as interpreted in Foucha v. Louisiana, by allowing detention without a finding of mental illness. The district court found that Stowe had not preserved an as-applied challenge in state courts and limited the certificate of appealability to whether the statute was facially invalid. The district court upheld the statute, noting it allows consideration of mental history and condition, and thus often includes findings on mental illness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Stowe failed to show the Wisconsin statute was facially invalid under clearly established federal law, as the statute permits consideration of mental condition and does not inherently violate due process. The court also noted that Stowe's as-applied challenge was not preserved for federal review. Therefore, the court concluded that the Due Process Clause does not entitle Stowe to immediate release. View "Stowe v. Rybroek" on Justia Law

Cameron Johnson, a convicted felon, was found in possession of a firearm on September 15, 2019. He pleaded guilty to this charge. The Government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on Johnson's three prior robbery convictions under Indiana law. Johnson argued that two of these robberies, committed on January 22, 2009, occurred on the same occasion and thus should not count as separate offenses under ACCA. He also contended that a jury should determine whether the robberies were committed on different occasions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana rejected Johnson's argument, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent that did not require a jury to decide the different-occasions question. The court concluded that the robberies were committed on different occasions and sentenced Johnson to fifteen years in prison, the minimum under ACCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Erlinger v. United States established that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments entitle defendants to have a jury decide whether prior offenses were committed on the same or different occasions. Given this precedent, the Seventh Circuit determined that the district court erred in not submitting the different-occasions question to a jury. The court also found that this error was not harmless, as it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found the robberies to be committed on different occasions.The Seventh Circuit vacated Johnson's sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Xengxai Yang robbed a credit union in Appleton, Wisconsin, wearing a black mask and armed with a sawed-off rifle. After his arrest, Yang admitted to the robbery, claiming he wanted to "try something new." He was indicted on multiple counts, including armed bank robbery. Yang initially raised an insanity defense but later withdrew it and entered a plea agreement. However, he subsequently sought to withdraw his guilty plea, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. A second psychological evaluation suggested Yang's mental conditions impaired his judgment during the crime. The court allowed Yang to withdraw his plea and reassert the insanity defense, but ultimately found him guilty and sentenced him to 168 months in prison.Yang did not appeal his conviction directly but filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, Yang withdrew this claim and instead argued that the court's failure to hold a competency hearing violated his due process rights. The district court denied his motion, finding that Yang had procedurally defaulted his competency claim by not raising it earlier and that he was competent during the proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that procedural default bars Yang's competency claim because he failed to raise it on direct appeal and did not demonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence to overcome the default. The court concluded that Yang's competency claim was procedurally defaulted and dismissed his petition for collateral relief under § 2255. View "Xengxai Yang v. United States" on Justia Law

In late 1996, Jerry Walker was convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) and other drug-related offenses. He was sentenced to life in prison. Following the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, Walker sought a sentence reduction in 2020, arguing that his CCE conviction qualified as a "covered offense" under the Act. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin initially handled Walker's case. After his conviction, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated his statutory penalties, suggesting a mandatory 20 years to life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). The government argued for a mandatory life sentence under § 848(b), the "Super CCE" provision. The court agreed with the PSR's guideline range of life imprisonment but did not explicitly state whether the sentence was under § 848(a) or § 848(b). In 1998, the Seventh Circuit vacated Walker's conspiracy charge but upheld the CCE conviction and life sentence. In 2020, Walker moved for resentencing under the First Step Act, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that his CCE conviction under § 848(a) was not a "covered offense."The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no clear error in determining that Walker was sentenced under § 848(a). The court held that a conviction under § 848(a) is not a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, as its statutory penalties were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Therefore, Walker was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Walker's motion for First Step Act relief. View "USA v. Walker" on Justia Law

Jasmine Bradley was assessed as incompetent to assist in her defense against criminal charges and was referred to the Bureau of Prisons for evaluation under 18 U.S.C. §4241. She reported to the U.S. Marshal on January 28, 2022, and was released on August 24, 2022, with a report stating she was competent. Bradley then pleaded guilty to ten counts of fraud and aggravated identity theft, receiving a 198-month sentence. Her conditional guilty plea reserved the issue of whether the seven-month period between reporting and release required dismissal of her indictment with prejudice.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois held that dismissal was not mandatory, even though the Bureau exceeded the statutory time limits set by §4241(d). The court found that the statute did not specify a remedy for exceeding the time limits, and thus dismissal was not required.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that while §4241(d) sets a four-month limit for evaluating a defendant's competence, it does not specify a consequence for exceeding this limit. The court emphasized that statutory time limits are "time-related directives" and that dismissal with prejudice is not a fitting remedy for delays in restoring a detainee to competence. The court also noted that the Speedy Trial Act excludes delays caused by mental-health examinations and that dismissal of the indictment would not serve the interests of justice. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy for such delays is not dismissal but potentially ordering the release of the detainee while evaluations continue. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Don Bevly, a repeat bank robber, pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery and one count of attempted bank robbery. He also admitted to six additional bank robberies as relevant conduct. During sentencing, the government established that Bevly made death threats during two of the robberies, leading the district judge to increase his offense level by two levels under the Sentencing Guidelines. The judge also sentenced Bevly as a career offender due to his six prior bank robbery convictions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, handled Bevly's case. Bevly argued that the government had promised not to pursue the threat enhancement, but the judge rejected this claim based on the plea agreement and Bevly's statements during the guilty-plea colloquy. The judge also found that Bevly's prior convictions qualified him as a career offender, resulting in an advisory imprisonment range of 151 to 188 months. Ultimately, the judge imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 144 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the threat enhancement or the career-offender designation. The court noted that the plea agreement clearly stated the government's right to seek the threat enhancement and that Bevly had confirmed under oath that no other promises were made. Additionally, the court held that bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) qualifies as a crime of violence under the career-offender guideline, consistent with circuit precedent. The court also rejected Bevly's Sixth Amendment claim regarding judicial fact-finding at sentencing, citing established Supreme Court precedent. View "United States v. Bevly" on Justia Law