Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Snowden, staying at a hotel, received a call asking him to visit the lobby to pay for the room. When Snowden arrived, DEA Agent Henning pushed him into a door and onto the ground. Snowden did not resist. Henning punched him several times. Snowden suffered two black eyes and a fractured left eye socket.Snowden sued Henning, alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. The court construed the complaint to allege a “Bivens” claim (an implied damages remedy against federal officers for certain constitutional violations), then dismissed that claim, noting factual distinctions between Snowden’s case and Bivens–the location of the arrest, the presence of a warrant, and the number of officers involved. Bivens involved allegations concerning the rights of privacy implicated in an unlawful warrantless home entry, arrest, and search, the court reasoned, while Snowden alleged excessive force incident to a lawful arrest, and special factors weighed against recognizing a new Bivens context, including the availability of an alternative remedy.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the Supreme Court has declined to extend the Bivens remedy beyond specific Fifth and Eighth Amendment contexts, Snowden’s claim does not present a new context. Agent Henning operated under the same legal mandate as the Bivens officers and is the same kind of line-level federal narcotics officer. Like Bivens, Snowden seeks damages for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The legal landscape of excessive-force claims is well-settled. Nor does allowing a Bivens claim here risk a “disruptive intrusion” into the “functioning of other branches.” View "Snowden v. Henning" on Justia Law

Agents intercepted calls via a wiretap on Jose’s phone. Despite Jose’s use of coded language, they learned that he was arranging with a supplier to bring "new product" into town on a semi-truck; a distributor would help sell the product upon its arrival. Jose’s brother, Marcos, was to arrange a location and contacted “Juanito,” who had access to a private parking space big enough for a semi-truck. The brothers offered him $500 and informed Juanito of the meeting’s purpose. On the day of the deal, Jose and Marcos exchanged multiple calls about logistics. Authorities watched Marcos leave home and head to the parking space. Jose and Juanito joined him. A semi-truck arrived and parked. The group disbanded. Later, Marcos called Jose and relayed that Juanito was “scared.” The next day, authorities observed Jose meet with the courier under a bridge. Jose got into the courier’s car carrying a plastic bag. Within minutes, he exited the car empty-handed and left. Officers pulled the courier over and found the bag. It contained cocaine.At Marcos’ trial, an expert in drug-dealing practices and terminology interpreted some of the wiretap transcripts. Marcos called no witnesses, portraying himself as a pawn in Jose’s scheme. The jury found Marcos guilty of conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim that the government’s expert witness testified beyond the scope of his expertise. View "United States v. Bahena" on Justia Law

Fears was charged with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 1594(c), and four counts of sex trafficking, 1591(a), (b)(1). The 1591(b)(1) counts carry 15-year mandatory minimums. Fears pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy and one count of trafficking under 1591(a), (b)(2), which carries a 10-year mandatory minimum. Fears admitted to the factual bases of the charges. The plea agreement included a broad appellate waiver; Fears could only attack his conviction on the basis of “involuntariness or ineffective assistance of counsel” and seek to reduce his sentence if there were changes to the applicable law. Over two years after Fears pleaded guilty, but before he was sentenced, he filed pro se motions to withdraw his plea, claiming his guilty plea was not "knowing and voluntary" because of ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed that his attorney pressured him to plead guilty.The district court rejected his motions, noting the plea colloquy “where Fears affirmed, time and again,” that he understood the charges and potential sentence; that his attorneys explained the charges and answered all his questions; that he had no complaints about his representation; and that he had not accepted responsibility. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Fears’ appeal from his 30-year sentence, citing the plea waiver. Consideration for the agreement “abounds.” View "United States v. Fears" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s criminal history included a 1998 guilty plea to felony mail fraud. After maintaining an otherwise clean record for 24 years, he decided he wanted a gun. But 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) bars gun possession for anyone who, like Plaintiff, has a conviction for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” So he brought this suit under 18 U.S.C. Section 925A to challenge the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) as the law applied to him. Relying on pre-Bruen framework, The district court granted a motion from the government and dismissed the case.   The Seventh Circuit remanded to allow the district court to undertake the Bruen analysis. The court explained the parties may be unable altogether to find answers to certain questions, may find incomplete information in response to others, and perhaps in some instances, may identify substantial historical information pertinent to one or another dimension of the required inquiry. In the end, the district court will have to give the best answer available to whether the government has carried its burden of “affirmatively proving that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” View "Patrick Atkinson v Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), which makes it a crime to "knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement" in connection with certain firearm purchases. Initially, Defendnat entered a guilty plea, but then sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that 18 U.S.C. 922(n), which makes it a crime to purchase or receive a firearm while under indictment for a felony, violates the Second Amendment. The district court granted Defendant's motion and dismissed the indictment. The government appealed.On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant was not charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(n). The government is permitted to enact a law that penalizes providing an untruthful answer, which is the question the court was presented with. Whether Section 922(n) violates the Second Amendment remains unresolved. View "USA v. John Holden" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested on several counts of sex trafficking a minor, child pornography and cyberstalking. A jury convicted Defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to forty years in prison.Defendant appealed on two issues. First, the district court erred in admitting his confession to detectives. However, each of the challenged statements were made after Defendant was Mirandized. While Defendant indicated prior to this point that he would "rather have a lawyer," even if that statement invoked his right to counsel, subsequent re-initiation of the conversation by Defendant waived his right to counsel.Second, Defendant claimed the district court erred in refusing to provide a limiting instruction related to three threatening voicemails Defendant left for members of the victim's family. These statements were "other acts" admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). View "USA v. Khalil Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former mayor of Portage, Indiana, arranged a public bidding process to determine where the city was going to purchase new garbage trucks. Defendant put his long-time friend in charge of the bidding process. Ultimately, the company that won the bid ended up paying Defendant $13,000 less than three weeks after receiving the contract.In November 2016, a federal grand jury indicted Snyder for federal funds bribery and obstructing the IRS. He went to trial in January and February 2019. The jury convicted on one count of federal funds bribery and one count of obstructing the IRS. Defendant appealed, challenging decisions on motions to dismiss, jury instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence. The court rejected all of Defendant's claims on appeal and affirmed his conviction and sentence View "USA v. James Snyder" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the parties and the district court agreed that the appropriate guideline range based on Defendant's prior criminal history was 37 to 46 months.Citing the fact that he accepted responsibility for the crime and his traumatic upbringing, Defendant sought a 37-month sentence. Defendant also claimed he carried the weapon for protection, given his gang history. The government, citing Defendant's lengthy criminal history and multiple firearms convictions, sought a high-end 46-month sentence. The court sentenced Defendant to 78 months in prison. Defendant appealed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.In front of the Seventh Circuit, Defendant argued that the district court improperly relied on its own personal fears in fashioning an above-the-guidelines sentence. While "[t]he district court trod on dangerous ground" in personally expressing its own fears, its remarks did not rise to the level of “extraneous and inflammatory.” The Seventh Circuit also rejected Defendant's challenge that the district court disregarded the applicable guideline range.Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected Defendant's claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable as it "failed to address his offense conduct, juvenile history, and the general lack of evidence surrounding deterrence." The court noted that the district court adequately considered Defendant's upbringing within the context of the offense, and that Section 3553(a)(2)(B) specifically permits judges to consider general deterrence when sentencing. View "USA v. Elvin Saldana-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Granger, King, and Walker were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin and methamphetamine and firearms offenses. The judge sentenced Granger and King to 360 months’ imprisonment and Walker to 330 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting an argument that the court should have struck Juror 70 for cause after the defendants exhausted their peremptory challenges. Juror 70 had raised his hand when the judge asked whether any potential jurors thought that a law enforcement officer’s testimony should receive extra weight. Juror 70 was a retired police officer with 30 years of service, and said “I’m inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt” but that he would have an open mind and respect the presumption of innocence. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a district judge may take into account everything a potential juror says when deciding whether that person can be impartial. Juror 70 recited the correct standard and the judge was entitled to find that he possessed enough self-awareness and honesty to carry out his promises.The court vacated Walker’s sentence. In holding him accountable for all drugs that the conspiracy as a whole distributed during Walker’s time as a participant, the judge did not address what conduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to Walker. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

FBI Agent Wainscott posted an ad on Craigslist that hinted at an opportunity to engage in sexual activity with a minor. Baird responded to Wainscott, who posed as the father of a 10-year-old girl with whom Baird could have sex. Graphic emails and texts followed, indicating Baird's desire to have sex with the girl. In discussing where and when to meet, Wainscott suggested that Baird bring gummy bears as a gift for the child. Baird agreed to buy the candy, then drove to the address that Wainscott gave him. Agents arrested Baird and found three packages of gummy bears in his car.Baird was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court concluded Baird had attempted to “knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce” a minor, because he “inquired into what this child liked sexually, indicated what he liked and what he would do sexually to this child, requested photographs of the child, and continued to engage the father in conversations about the child.” The messages—although conveyed to Wainscott posing as the girl’s father—still fell within the scope of section 2422(b) and the intended gift was significant evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Considered as a whole, the evidence established that Baird took a substantial step toward the completion of the offense and intended to influence the minor to submit to sexual activity. View "United States v. Baird" on Justia Law