Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Skaggs was convicted in 2020 of producing and possessing child pornography. The indictment had included notice that the government intended to seek forfeiture of Skaggs’s property that was seized during the investigation. Skaggs proceeded pro se with the assistance of standby counsel and was convicted. When Skaggs objected to forfeiture on the ground that some of the property sought did not relate to his crimes. The court replied that, after sentencing, it would ask the government to itemize the property and give Skaggs a chance to object. The court sentenced Skaggs to life imprisonment. The judgment included a forfeiture provision that duplicated language from the notice in the indictment: “The defendant shall forfeit all images of child pornography … and all property seized during the searches of the defendant[], his residence, and [his] laundry room.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.About 30 months later, well outside the 14-day period (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a)) for correcting a sentence, at the government’s request, the court entered a preliminary forfeiture order, Itemizing each piece of property that Skaggs had forfeited, without giving Skaggs the promised chance to object. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Any forfeiture ordered at sentencing is part of the final judgment. The district court lacked the authority to amend that judgment years after its entry. View "United States v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

FBI agents executing a search warrant at Kamkarian’s home seized computers, containing 12 videos and more than 46,000 images of child pornography. Kamkarian was released on bond and was required to participate in mental health treatment. Kamkarian attended counseling but refused to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Kamkarian mentioned the possibility of suicide and was admitted to a hospital. During that hospital stay, Kamkarian was transported to court, Kamkarian, under oath, proceeded with a plea colloquy. The court confirmed that Kamkarian could read, write, and understand English; was able to think clearly and understand the proceedings; was fully satisfied with his counsel’s advice; had not been forced to plead guilty; and was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily. The court accepted his plea.With new counsel, Kamkarian moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that at the time he pled guilty, he was receiving in-patient treatment for depression. He was granted a psychological evaluation but denied an interpreter. A forensic psychologist interviewed Kamkarian, reviewed his treatment records, and opined that Kamkarian had Major Depressive Disorder that did not render him incompetent to plead guilty and that he had no difficulty communicating in English. The district judge denied his motion, explaining that she recalled Kamkarian’s hearing and that he had not appeared distressed, confused, or under duress. She discredited his testimony and sentenced Kamkarian to 87 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous; the court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Kamkarian" on Justia Law

Long was arrested for domestic battery. Police discovered a stolen firearm in his waistband and cocaine in plain view. Long pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. His guideline range was 33-41 months. The court explained it intended to impose a 51-month sentence, followed by three years of supervised release with conditions of drug testing and treatment. The court noted that Long had four felony convictions and several other convictions and that the guideline calculation understated his criminal history. Long’s history of domestic violence, was “very concerning” and Long had been “afforded the opportunity for rehabilitation by probation, parole, supervision, community corrections, jail sentences, and even a prison sentence.” The court noted that Long admitted he was addicted to drugs and requested treatment, that Long owed approximately $80,000 in child support and had limited employment history, then referred to “a long enough time that the defendant can participate in prison industries, as well as learn some job skills.” Neither party objected.Long argued that the court plainly erred by imposing a sentence in part to rehabilitate him, contrary to 18 U.S.C. 3582(a) as construed in by the Supreme Court in “Tapia” (2011). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rehabilitation is an important consideration in most sentences. Tapia permits a judge to discuss rehabilitation so long as she does not make rehabilitation a primary consideration. This record does not show a plain error under Tapia. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

Cichocki called the police to report that her 15-year-old daughter, G.C., had been sexually assaulted by Garcia days earlier at a resort where the families were vacationing. Cichocki told Detective Posewitz that G.C. had reported that, while G.C. and the other children were in the pool, Garcia purposely touched her breasts and “down there.” Both families stayed at the resort until the next afternoon. Cichocki suggested that G.C. could not remember all the details of the incident and had expressed fear that the video would contradict her report. Posewitz interviewed G.C., who described the incidents. Surveillance footage of the pool area was poor quality and inconclusive. Although the area was crowded, there were apparently no witnesses. ADA Spoentgen drafted a criminal complaint, which ADA Hoffman reviewed. It did not refer to the surveillance footage or Cichoki's statements. The Court Commissioner found probable cause for Garcia’s arrest. The court found probable cause to proceed to trial. After Hoffman’s opening statement, the judge declared a mistrial because Hoffman mentioned that G.C. had a learning disability, which had not been disclosed to the defense.Garcia sued Posewitz, Hoffman, and Spoentgen under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. No reasonable jury could find that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the information omitted from the complaint would have negated probable cause. G.C.’s and Cichocki’s accounts were largely consistent; the defendants lacked any indication that either had a motive to lie. View "Garcia v. Posewitz" on Justia Law

The FBI surveilled Jones and Schimenti, members of the same mosque, based on their pro-ISIS, violent social media posts. After several months, the FBI found no evidence of criminal activity but initiated contact between Jones and an undercover agent, “Omar.” Jones, not the agents, pursued subsequent conversations about radical Islam. Omar introduced Jones to “Bilal,” another undercover agent. Omar, Bilal, Jones, and Schimenti met. After Schimenti left, Jones explained that Schimenti worried that Bilal and Omar were federal agents. Jones continued to initiate pro-ISIS messages and built other ISIS connections, including Omar 2, another undercover FBI agent. Jones organized a meeting between himself, Bilal, and Omar 2, after which Omar 2 purportedly traveled to Syria with Bilal’s help. The FBI reestablished contact with Schimenti through a new confidential informant, “Muhamed,” who expressed his desire to join his brother in the ISIS army in Syria. Schimenti offered help. In 2017 Jones and Shimenti gave Muhamed nine phones and drove Muhamed to O’Hare airport. They believed he would be traveling to Syria to use the cell phones as makeshift bombs as an ISIS fighter. The FBI arrested Jones and Schimenti. Based on the provision of cell phones for use as IEDs by ISIS, they were convicted of providing material support to a terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court properly instructed the jury on the elements of entrapment; its ultimate determination is entitled to meaningful deference. The court upheld the denial of a motion for a new trial based on a revelation regarding a substantial payment the government made to a confidential source shortly after the convictions. It is impossible to conclude that earlier disclosure of a contemplated post-trial payment would have resulted in acquittals. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2008, Paris, a small, rural Kenosha County, Wisconsin community, enacted its “Sex Offender Residency Restrictions” ordinance, limiting where certain designated sex offenders could live within the town. The ordinance prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of certain protected locations where children are known to congregate and prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of any other designated offender Nelson, a former Paris resident and designated offender, was cited for violating the ordinance’s designated offenders restriction. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, argued that the ordinance—both facially and as applied—violated his constitutional right to substantive due process and Article I’s prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in part, summary judgment in favor of Paris, noting that Nelson conceded that the “protected locations” ordinance is rationally related to Paris’s legitimate interest in protecting children. Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of protected locations does not violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate Paris’s nonpunitive intent for the restriction. The court remanded the question of Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of each other. View "Nelson v. Town of Paris" on Justia Law

In 2013, Coleman was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Coleman was sentenced to the then-mandatory term of life imprisonment based on having at least two prior convictions for a “felony drug offense,” section 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Coleman’s pro se motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserted that his appointed counsel, Vaupel, was ineffective for failing to inform him of the government’s pretrial 21 U.S.C. 851 Notice of Enhancement, indicating its intention to seek life imprisonment based on his prior Illinois cocaine-related convictions. According to Coleman, had Vaupel shown him this notice, he never would have agreed to go to trial. Vaupel responded that he had repeatedly informed Coleman that he faced a mandatory life sentence and that the government was unwilling to waive the enhancement. Coleman moved to amend his petition to argue that Vaupel was ineffective by failing to argue that Coleman’s convictions did not qualify as “felony drug offenses” because Illinois defined “cocaine” more broadly than federal law. The district court denied Coleman’s section 2255 motion, and his motion to amend as not relating back to his initial pleading and untimely.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court must determine whether Vaupel considered a possible categorical challenge to Coleman’s predicate offenses and, if he did consider it, his reasons for not raising it. Coleman has established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s purportedly deficient performance. View "Coleman v. United States" on Justia Law

ShotSpotter devices alerted to possible gunshots on Chicago’s west side. Police officers began monitoring the area, using remote-controlled cameras, which had been positioned in high-crime locations. They saw a large group congregating on that block and a man handing a gun to Alexander. Alexander held the gun openly for several seconds before concealing it in his waistband. The officers who saw the hand-off went to the scene. When they arrived, Alexander turned away and stepped behind another man, then pushed against a fence that was blocking his way. Soon his arms were grabbed by the officers, who handcuffed and frisked him. One officer felt an L-shaped object in Alexander’s waistband and retrieved a loaded gun. Alexander was charged with possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Because it was not obvious at which point Alexander was arrested, the court employed the probable cause standard. Probable cause exists when an objectively reasonable officer—with the same information known by the arresting officer—would believe there is a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity. Even if the officers did not know that Alexander had a felony conviction or lacked a concealed-carry license, they had probable cause to believe that he violated the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act. Objectively reasonable officers could infer criminal activity from their knowledge that he possessed a gun and his furtive movements. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Gunter and Grommet participated in a conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, including a controlled purchase of actual methamphetamine from Gunter by law enforcement agents. A September 17, 2019 indictment charged Gunter and Grommet of conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Gunter was arrested on July 2, 2020. The court set an initial trial date of August 31, 2020. Over the next 23 months, the trial was repeatedly rescheduled. Gunter first requested continuances; later continuances were at the request of Grommet, who was evaluated for competency and whose lawyer subsequently died. When Gunter eventually (unsuccessfully) sought severance, he did not cite Speedy Trial Grounds.Days before trial, Gunter unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Gunter’s conviction after considering the length of and reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice the defendant suffered. Although Gunter first moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis of his right to a speedy trial immediately before trial, he opposed motions for continuances and asserted his desire for a speedy trial numerous times. The delays could not be attributed to the government. Gunter made no argument that he experienced any prejudice from the delay, and no strong showing of prejudice is obvious in the record. View "United States v. Gunter" on Justia Law

Maranto pled guilty to distribution of child pornography. In 2014, after his release from prison, Maranto began serving his lifetime term of supervised release in Wisconsin. Maranto subsequently committed a new crime, possession of child pornography, for which he was convicted in state court. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. The Wisconsin conviction violated a condition of his federal supervised release, as did possession of an unapproved cell phone and of child pornography. The district court revoked his probation, then sentenced Maranto to 14 months in prison, concurrent with his state court sentence, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.Maranto objected to two discretionary conditions of supervised release. Condition 13 requires that Maranto provide “all requested financial information, including copies of state and federal tax returns.” Condition 19 requires that Maranto, “[a]s approved by the supervising U.S. Probation Officer, undergo psychosexual evaluations which may involve use of polygraph examinations.” The judge cited the requirement to report place of employment under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. 20901, and Maranto’s history.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although there are other ways to monitor Maranto’s employment and SORNA compliance, tax returns are helpful information, and are not difficult to produce. The district court gave thoughtful consideration to the benefits and detriments of polygraph testing and noted its usefulness with sex offenders in general and with Maranto in particular. View "United States v. Maranto" on Justia Law