Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A supplier shipped substances containing detectable amounts of methamphetamine, cocaine, and MDMA from California to Indiana, where Medrano and others used the U.S. Post Office and a post office employee to distribute the drugs in Indiana. Officers tracked Medrano to an Indiana motel and attempted to arrest him. Medrano fled and led officers on a high-speed chase. Medrano evaded arrest, but officers found his truck and took a co-conspirator into custody. They obtained a warrant to search Medrano’s motel room and found his burner phone; drug paraphernalia including scales, baggies, and substances used to dilute methamphetamine; and the key to a post office box, which Medrano had received from a post office employee. Officers tracked Medrano to another motel. Medrano again led officers on a high-speed chase and avoided arrest. Officers executed a search warrant for Medrano’s motel room and found drug paraphernalia, and another phone belonging to Medrano. Officers finally arrested Medrano at an Indiana residence, where they discovered methamphetamine, paraphernalia, and a third phone, containing text messages between Medrano and “Rob Marshalltown.” The texts were later introduced at trial.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Medrano’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Any error in admitting the text messages was harmless, given the totality of the evidence. View "United States v. Medrano" on Justia Law

Lumar caused a disturbance at a Chicago clinic. Called to the scene, police discovered that Lumar was wanted on an arrest warrant and took him into custody. About 19 hours later he committed suicide. His estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 argued that Lumar should have been released without a bond hearing, and, had he been released swiftly, Lumar would not have killed himself.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit. While the warrant set bond at an amount Lumar could have posted, it had been issued in Lee County, so a local order required a local bond hearing. Even if the order is inconsistent with state law, in denying arrestees the right to waive local bond hearings, a violation of state law does not permit an award under section 1983. Federal law does not prohibit presenting the arrestee to a local judge, within a reasonable time not to exceed 48 hours. The time Lumar spent in custody, including six hours in a hospital to address breathing problems, and the discovery of 12 rocks of crack cocaine in his cell and ensuing return to the Police Department, was reasonable under the standard set by the Supreme Court. Lumar was screened for suicide risk shortly after his arrest and again at the hospital. Illinois law offers a remedy for suicide during custody only if the jailers do something that makes suicide foreseeable. View "Alcorn v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Whitaker, an Illinois prisoner, had $573 when he filed a notice of appeal in his Section 1983 lawsuit; he subsequently spent most of his money at the prison commissary and on postage. The district court denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court did not adequately consider the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) balance between the need to collect fees and a prisoner’s discretionary use of his funds. The PLRA mandates that a court apply a statutory formula and collect an initial partial filing fee, then collect the remainder of the fees in installments. Whitaker had enough money to pay the fees in full when they were due and when this court sent him a notice informing him as much but the statute does not mandate that prisoners prioritize their filing fees above all other expenses. Drawing the line for in forma pauperis eligibility at the mere ability to pay the full fee can lead to odd, unintended results. There is nothing suggesting that Whitaker deliberately depleted his account to avoid payment. Whitaker should be permitted to prepay the prescribed portion of the fee with the rest to be collected from his future income, as Congress envisioned. View "Whitaker v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

McMullen was convicted under Indiana law of possession of cocaine and marijuana. In preparation for sentencing, McMullen’s attorney, Lewis, said he “really didn’t do anything independently to develop any mitigation” and “just relied” on the PSR although he knew McMullen “came from a seriously troubled background.” Lewis did not consider having a mental health professional evaluate McMullen, who was given a 50-year sentence, largely based on his criminal history. State courts rejected his claim of ineffective assistance. The district court denied his petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Although in 2021, an Indiana trial court modified McMullen’s sentence and placed him on probation, the issue was not moot. The Indiana Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to “Strickland.” Given that the state was asking for the statutory maximum prison term, Lewis’s investigation should have gone beyond reliance on the PSR, and talking to a relative. The state appellate court failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence, which is significant and compelling. On remand, the district court must consider evidence and argument as to whether Lewis had any strategic reasons for the limits of his investigation into McMullen’s mental health and background and the presentation of mitigating circumstances. View "McMullen v. Dalton" on Justia Law

Conner was convicted in Indiana state court for three counts of felony drug dealing and maintaining a common nuisance. Conner qualified as a habitual offender and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 72 years in prison. He had remained in custody pre-trial, but there was a delay of 1,029 days from the charging date (1,034 days from his arrest). Conner’s attorney never made a Sixth Amendment objection to the pretrial delays and Conner’s own objections were rejected because he was represented by counsel. State courts rejected his post-trial Sixth Amendment and ineffective assistance claims. Conner was advised by his postconviction counsel to postpone filing his federal habeas petition until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the petition for a writ of certiorari filed after his state postconviction proceedings. Conner relied on that advice, to his detriment. The one-year period in which to file the habeas petition continued to run while the certiorari petition was pending.The district court dismissed his subsequent habeas petition as untimely, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the postconviction lawyer’s mistake was particularly grave but holding that Supreme Court and circuit precedent j foreclose equitably tolling the deadline. View "Conner v. Reagle" on Justia Law

At his Broadway home, Barker sold a confidential informant 109.8 grams of methamphetamine; a month later, Barker sold the CI another 106.4 grams. Barker’s primary residence was on Havens. Officers obtained search warrants for both residences to be executed on November 30. Barker flew to California that morning. His friend, Carr, and Carr’s children were staying at the Broadway residence. At 4:03 p.m., officers monitoring Havens stopped Barker’s SUV but found his wife inside; she called Barker, 4:11-4:14 p.m. Officers recorded Barker’s voice asking about a search warrant., Barker contacted Carr at 4:15. Officers watching the Broadway residence saw Carr exit the home with a trash bag, go next door, and return without the bag. Officers recovered a trash bag containing three firearms and 464 grams of methamphetamine. Carr stated that the bag belonged to Barker, who had instructed him to move it.Barker pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). His PSR indicated an initial guidelines range between 151-188 months. The government then informed the probation office about Carr’s statements. An amended PSR more than tripled Barker’s drug quantity and recommended sentencing enhancements for possessing firearms in connection with drug trafficking; maintaining premises for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance; and obstruction of justice. His new guidelines range was 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court acknowledged that Carr was “not necessarily” a person who would tell the truth but observed several corroborating facts and imposed an underguidelines sentence of 300 months The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Barker" on Justia Law

Tam participated in a scheme to launder funds from unlawful narcotics transactions by Mexican drug traffickers through bank accounts in China. In 2017, Tam participated in the transfer of around $1.4 million in narcotics proceeds. Tam was charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), money laundering, 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, 1960(a). He pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. Tam’s written plea agreement acknowledged that Tam was subject to a maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, projected a Guidelines range of 87-108 months’ imprisonment if the minor participant decrease was not applied, and 70-87 months if the court determined that the minor participant reduction was proper. The court imposed a sentence of 65 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court failed to ask the questions required in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), that the error was not harmless, and that the court erred in denying a downward adjustment due to Tam’s minor role in the offense. The court recognized the factors that had to be considered, identified them explicitly, endorsed the facts set forth by the government and the application of those factors, and determined that the downward adjustment was not warranted. View "United States v. Tam" on Justia Law

In 2017, White participated in several Indianapolis commercial armed robberies, primarily as a lookout. He also assisted his coconspirators by selecting and staking out the targeted premises and providing supplies, including (at least once) the gun. Eventually, undercover detectives spotted them attempting to rob a Verizon store. White pleaded guilty to three counts of conspiracy to commit robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery. Based on a sentencing range of 97-121 months, the judge imposed four concurrent 108-month terms of imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit vacated White’s sentence. The general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 371, caps any term of imprisonment at 60 months. The judge must impose a new sentence on one count. Though she may restructure the entire sentence, she is not required to do so. The physical restraint enhancement was properly applied to one robbery conspiracy count. During the bank robbery, one of White’s accomplices wielded a handgun, grabbed a bank manager, and led him to the lobby at gunpoint, which is physical restraint under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). The conduct underlying the second application of the enhancement is not physical restraint; during the robbery of a cellphone store, an accomplice wielded a gun and ordered an employee to move to another area. That error was harmless and did not alter the applicable Guidelines range. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

When a Chicago jewelry store opened, Diggs and two others exited a Lexus SUV bearing Michigan license plates and entered the store with guns raised. They subdued and handcuffed the security guard and dragged a sales associate to a back room where they handcuffed and pistolwhipped her. One man encountered another sales associate, put a gun to her head, and locked her in the bathroom. A fourth man, McClellan, sat in the Lexus and listened to the robbery on his cell phone before driving the men and more than $400,000 in watches and jewelry away. Diggs and McClellan were tried together and convicted; two men remain at large. Before trial, the court denied the spousal testimonial privilege to Diggs's wife, Adams (his girlfriend at the time of the robbery), finding that Adams fell within the joint-participant exception, The evidence showed that Adams became a co-conspirator on the day of the robbery and only withdrew days later when she told police that Diggs had used her car for the robbery.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After considering Adams’s testimony in relation to “all else that happened” at trial, an average juror would not find the government’s case significantly less persuasive without it. The admission of purportedly hearsay testimony by a DHS agent was also harmless error. View "United States v. Diggs" on Justia Law

Patrick was working near the home of an on-and-off girlfriend when gang affiliates of the girlfriend’s current boyfriend–Freeman—shot at him. Patrick escaped and drove to his mother’s house. Patrick left the house to secure his equipment. Freeman and another Gangster Disciple opened fire on Patrick. Patrick ran inside, grabbed a gun loaded with pellet bullets, and fired from the doorway. The bullets struck Freeman in the buttocks and behind the ear. The gang members ran away. Chicago police officers arrived and handcuffed Patrick, demanding that Patrick tell them where the gun was or they were going to tear Patrick’s mother’s home apart. They did not have a warrant. Feeling that he had no choice, Patrick stated that there was a gun in a safe. The officers seized ammunition and several guns. Arrested, Patrick was eventually charged with additional crimes, including attempted murder. He was detained for over five years before pleading guilty to aggravated discharge of a weapon. He received a sentence of time served.Patrick’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. alleged that the city and 23 officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conspiring to conduct an unlawful arrest, execute a warrantless search, and detain him unlawfully. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Patrick is not collaterally estopped from pursuing his search and seizure claim based his previous false arrest litigation concerning the attempted murder charge. Because his detention was allotted to a lawful sentence, Patrick has no injury that a favorable decision may redress. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law