Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Paris, a small, rural Kenosha County, Wisconsin community, enacted its “Sex Offender Residency Restrictions” ordinance, limiting where certain designated sex offenders could live within the town. The ordinance prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of certain protected locations where children are known to congregate and prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of any other designated offender Nelson, a former Paris resident and designated offender, was cited for violating the ordinance’s designated offenders restriction. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, argued that the ordinance—both facially and as applied—violated his constitutional right to substantive due process and Article I’s prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in part, summary judgment in favor of Paris, noting that Nelson conceded that the “protected locations” ordinance is rationally related to Paris’s legitimate interest in protecting children. Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of protected locations does not violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate Paris’s nonpunitive intent for the restriction. The court remanded the question of Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of each other. View "Nelson v. Town of Paris" on Justia Law

In 2013, Coleman was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Coleman was sentenced to the then-mandatory term of life imprisonment based on having at least two prior convictions for a “felony drug offense,” section 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Coleman’s pro se motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserted that his appointed counsel, Vaupel, was ineffective for failing to inform him of the government’s pretrial 21 U.S.C. 851 Notice of Enhancement, indicating its intention to seek life imprisonment based on his prior Illinois cocaine-related convictions. According to Coleman, had Vaupel shown him this notice, he never would have agreed to go to trial. Vaupel responded that he had repeatedly informed Coleman that he faced a mandatory life sentence and that the government was unwilling to waive the enhancement. Coleman moved to amend his petition to argue that Vaupel was ineffective by failing to argue that Coleman’s convictions did not qualify as “felony drug offenses” because Illinois defined “cocaine” more broadly than federal law. The district court denied Coleman’s section 2255 motion, and his motion to amend as not relating back to his initial pleading and untimely.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court must determine whether Vaupel considered a possible categorical challenge to Coleman’s predicate offenses and, if he did consider it, his reasons for not raising it. Coleman has established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s purportedly deficient performance. View "Coleman v. United States" on Justia Law

ShotSpotter devices alerted to possible gunshots on Chicago’s west side. Police officers began monitoring the area, using remote-controlled cameras, which had been positioned in high-crime locations. They saw a large group congregating on that block and a man handing a gun to Alexander. Alexander held the gun openly for several seconds before concealing it in his waistband. The officers who saw the hand-off went to the scene. When they arrived, Alexander turned away and stepped behind another man, then pushed against a fence that was blocking his way. Soon his arms were grabbed by the officers, who handcuffed and frisked him. One officer felt an L-shaped object in Alexander’s waistband and retrieved a loaded gun. Alexander was charged with possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Because it was not obvious at which point Alexander was arrested, the court employed the probable cause standard. Probable cause exists when an objectively reasonable officer—with the same information known by the arresting officer—would believe there is a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity. Even if the officers did not know that Alexander had a felony conviction or lacked a concealed-carry license, they had probable cause to believe that he violated the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act. Objectively reasonable officers could infer criminal activity from their knowledge that he possessed a gun and his furtive movements. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Gunter and Grommet participated in a conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, including a controlled purchase of actual methamphetamine from Gunter by law enforcement agents. A September 17, 2019 indictment charged Gunter and Grommet of conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Gunter was arrested on July 2, 2020. The court set an initial trial date of August 31, 2020. Over the next 23 months, the trial was repeatedly rescheduled. Gunter first requested continuances; later continuances were at the request of Grommet, who was evaluated for competency and whose lawyer subsequently died. When Gunter eventually (unsuccessfully) sought severance, he did not cite Speedy Trial Grounds.Days before trial, Gunter unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Gunter’s conviction after considering the length of and reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice the defendant suffered. Although Gunter first moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis of his right to a speedy trial immediately before trial, he opposed motions for continuances and asserted his desire for a speedy trial numerous times. The delays could not be attributed to the government. Gunter made no argument that he experienced any prejudice from the delay, and no strong showing of prejudice is obvious in the record. View "United States v. Gunter" on Justia Law

Maranto pled guilty to distribution of child pornography. In 2014, after his release from prison, Maranto began serving his lifetime term of supervised release in Wisconsin. Maranto subsequently committed a new crime, possession of child pornography, for which he was convicted in state court. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. The Wisconsin conviction violated a condition of his federal supervised release, as did possession of an unapproved cell phone and of child pornography. The district court revoked his probation, then sentenced Maranto to 14 months in prison, concurrent with his state court sentence, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.Maranto objected to two discretionary conditions of supervised release. Condition 13 requires that Maranto provide “all requested financial information, including copies of state and federal tax returns.” Condition 19 requires that Maranto, “[a]s approved by the supervising U.S. Probation Officer, undergo psychosexual evaluations which may involve use of polygraph examinations.” The judge cited the requirement to report place of employment under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. 20901, and Maranto’s history.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although there are other ways to monitor Maranto’s employment and SORNA compliance, tax returns are helpful information, and are not difficult to produce. The district court gave thoughtful consideration to the benefits and detriments of polygraph testing and noted its usefulness with sex offenders in general and with Maranto in particular. View "United States v. Maranto" on Justia Law

Erlinger pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was given an enhanced 15-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his 1991 Illinois conviction for residential burglary, 1991 Indiana conviction for burglary, and two 2003 Indiana convictions for dealing in methamphetamine. The court vacated Erlinger’s sentence after the Seventh Circuit held that Illinois residential burglary is not a violent felony and Indiana methamphetamine convictions are not serious drug offenses under ACCA. The government argued that Erlinger still qualified for an ACCA enhancement, citing other 1991 Indiana burglary convictions. The government supplied the plea and charging documents; each charged a different burglary at a different business, three on different dates within a week. Erlinger argued that Indiana’s definition of burglary is broader than the federal definition and does not trigger ACCA and these burglaries were not committed on separate occasions as ACCA requires, and a jury, not the judge, must make that factual determination.The district court imposed an ACCA-enhanced 15-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Indiana statute does not include language the Supreme Court deems overly broad. Erlinger has not cited any Indiana cases that interpret the statute in this manner. The government was not required to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Erlinger committed the Indiana burglaries on separate occasions. View "United States v. Erlinger" on Justia Law

In 1997, Castaneda was arrested for his role in a large-scale heroin conspiracy. Once released on bond, Castaneda fled and lived as a fugitive in Mexico for more than 20 years. He returned to the United States in 2019 and was rearrested for his 1997 offense. Castaneda entered guilty pleas to attempt to possess with the intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin, and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin. Penalties for both charges included a statutory mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment. Castaneda qualified for the “safety valve”—under which a court is obligated to impose a sentence pursuant to the sentencing guidelines without regard to any statutory minimums, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). Safety valve relief is available if five requirements are met.The court sentenced Castaneda to 12 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court applied an incorrect guideline range and failed to provide any explanation for its rejection of Castaneda’s principal mitigation argument. The court appears not to have understood that if the safety valve applied, it was required to sentence Castaneda without regard to the mandatory minimum. View "United States v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

Police responded to a 911 call from a gas station, and discovered Gamez, on probation for a robbery conviction, in possession of a Winchester rifle. Eight days earlier Gamez had removed his GPS-tracking ankle bracelet; a LaPorte County Community Corrections officer had filed charges for escape. Gamez pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government sought the 15-year minimum sentence mandated by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e) for section 922(g)(1) offenders with three previous convictions “for a violent felony.” Gamez had three prior Indiana state convictions—two for robbery (2009, 2016) and one for aiding and abetting arson (2011)—and never disputed that his robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies. He argued that Indiana’s arson statute covered too broad a range of conduct to be considered a “violent felony.” The district court imposed the enhancement.The Seventh Circuit certified to the Indiana Supreme Court the question: whether Indiana arson requires a fire or burning. By its terms, the state’s criminal code does not require fire or burning as an element of arson but there are indications that Indiana state courts have interpreted and applied the arson statute to require proof of burning to sustain an arson conviction. The issue has not been addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court. The state’s choice to charge Gamez as an aider-and-abettor of arson and not a principal does not independently preclude the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Gamez" on Justia Law

Gonzales had an altercation at a bar, then got into a car with Pedro (driving) and fired several shots from the car’s window toward the men, hitting one in the leg. Charged under state law with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, with a 40-year maximum sentence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, Gonzales was offered an opportunity to plead guilty to recklessly endangering safety and unlawful possession of a firearm for a recommended ten-year sentence. After conferring with his attorney, Frost, Gonzales rejected the plea deal and requested a speedy trial. Frost predicted that the state would have trouble with its witnesses. One had absconded from probation; all had lengthy felony records, had been drunk, and gave inconsistent accounts.All the state’s witnesses were located for trial and testified that Gonzales was the shooter. Frost continued to pursue acquittal rather than focusing on the reckless-endangerment count. The jury convicted Gonzales of the more serious crime. Gonzales received a 25-year sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, Frost testified that it “never even crossed [her] mind” to argue for the lesser-included offense. The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed that Frost’s performance did not fall below the “constitutional line,” without reaching the issue of prejudice.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, stating that it was “deeply troubled by the performance of defense counsel” but could not “say that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland or relied on unreasonable determinations of fact.” View "Gonzales v. Eplett" on Justia Law

Lee carried out a scheme to defraud the Chicago White Sox. With the help of two Sox employees, Lee obtained thousands of discounted and free game tickets and resold them online for a profit. He was eventually convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The indictment expressly sought forfeiture of Lee’s ill-gotten gains and Lee did not object to that request. The parties disagreed on the amount. The court failed to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture specifying what would be due and what property was subject to forfeiture (Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)) but did everything else necessary for forfeiture, including giving Lee notice and an opportunity to contest the amount the government was seeking and orally imposing forfeiture in the sentence, along with an 18-month prison term, restitution, and the required special assessment. The written judgment, however, omitted forfeiture. After some additional proceedings, the court concluded that it was too late to enter a proper forfeiture order, and refused to amend the written judgment to reflect its oral sentenceThe Seventh Circuit rejected Lee’s challenges to the indictment, the court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, and his sentence but reversed and remanded for the district court to amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to include forfeiture in the amount the court found–$455,229.23. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law