Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Pemberton sold methamphetamine to an undercover informant and pleaded guilty to distributing drugs, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Ordinarily, distributing the quantity of drugs Pemberton admitted to distributing carries a 10-year minimum sentence. The district court ruled that his 2003 conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery under Indiana law was a “serious violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(2)(F), subjecting him to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. Although Pemberton had not agreed that his co-participant would carry a weapon, and his co-participant was never convicted, the court reasoned that the facts of his crime included a dangerous weapon that caused serious harm (his coconspirator fired a gun during the robbery, hitting a bystander), and his plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery precluded him from denying his involvement in a conspiracy.On appeal. Pemberton argued that Indiana’s crime of conspiracy is not a categorical match to the federal conspiracy counterpart of section 3559(c)(2)(F) and not a “serious violent felony” meriting the enhanced minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pemberton raised his argument for the first time on appeal and therefore forfeited it. He has not demonstrated that the district court plainly erred when it determined his prior conviction was a serious violent felony, View "United States v. Pemberton" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Pfister and Evans dealt methamphetamine in Illinois. In 2016, they traveled to Colorado approximately 20 times to buy meth from Wright. After Evans sold several ounces to Heavener, officers searched Heavener’s home and recovered over 50 grams of meth. Heavener knew that Evans got the meth from “Monica” in Colorado.Wright was charged with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of meth and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing meth. She retained Garfinkel. In its opening statement, the government previewed testimony from Evans, Pfister, Heavener, and Deherrera, a Colorado-based middleman. Garfinkle also foreshadowed testimony from Deherrera, referring to him as the government’s witness. During trial, the government alerted the court that Deherrera had stated that Garfinkel had encouraged him to change his testimony. The government referenced Deherrera’s potentially exculpatory testimony but stated that it no longer planned to call him as a witness, noting that if Wright called Deherrera and he testified to being pressured to change his testimony, Garfinkel would have to take the stand to impeach him. Garfinkel denied Deherrera’s allegations. The court questioned Wright, who confirmed she agreed with Garfinkel’s strategy to not call Deherrera, understanding the possibility that Garfinkel was personally motivated. Deherrera did not testify. In closing arguments, Garfinkel described Deherrera’s absence as the missing link—a burden the government had to overcome to convict Wright. Wright was convicted and sentenced to 264 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no conflict of interest and sufficient evidence of conspiracy. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

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Williams pled guilty to four counts under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); (b)(1)(B), based on his role in a large-scale methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy. The government portrayed Williams as a major supplier to other dealers and individual users, asserting that he was responsible for the distribution of more than 48 kilograms (105 pounds) of methamphetamine over the course of the conspiracy. The government’s investigation linked three deaths to methamphetamine supplied by Williams. Laboratory testing of different batches of drugs supplied by Williams and confiscated by law enforcement indicated that the tested drugs were between 96 to 100% pure methamphetamine. Ten people who purchased significant quantities of methamphetamine from Williams testified at his sentencing hearing about the quantities of drugs they bought from him. Several also testified about threats he made to them to induce payment and about his possession and use of firearms. Officers had also orchestrated a controlled buy with audio and visual recording in which Williams’ associate provided the source with approximately 20 grams of methamphetamine.After calculating a U.S.S.G. range of 360 months to life range, the court imposed a 360-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning sentence disparities and the application of the enhancement for credible threats of violence. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Pacilio and Bases were senior traders on the precious metals trading desk at Bank of America. While working together in 2010-2011, and at times separately before and after that period, they engaged in “spoofing” to manipulate the prices of precious metals using an electronic trading platform, that allows traders to place buy or sell orders on certain numbers of futures contracts at a set price. It is assumed that every order is bona fide and placed with “intent to transact.” Spoofing consists of placing a (typically) large order, on one side of the market with intent to trade, and placing a spoof order, fully visible but not intended to be traded, on the other side. The spoof order pushes the market price to benefit the other order, allowing the trader to get the desired price. The spoof order is canceled before it can be filled.Pacilio and Bases challenged the constitutionality of their convictions for wire fraud affecting a financial institution and related charges, the sufficiency of the evidence, and evidentiary rulings relating to testimony about the Exchange’s and bank prohibitions on spoofing to support the government’s implied misrepresentation theory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants had sufficient notice that their spoofing scheme was prohibited by law. View "United States v. Bases" on Justia Law

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In 2011, Price pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced under the ACCA to 15 years’ imprisonment, in high-level security facilities. Price, as a gay man (before transitioning) and later as a transgender woman, was hospitalized multiple times due to violence by other inmates. Price was transferred several times, to meet her security and programming needs and spent most of her time in the special housing unit—sometimes for protection, but often for discipline because of her belief that she had to fight and “be tough” to protect herself. Her sentence was reduced. After Price’s release, she worked full-time and obtained substance abuse therapy but lost her placement at a halfway house because of rule infractions, started using drugs, missed drug tests, and eventually fled after stabbing a man. In 2022, the U.S. Marshals arrested Price in Iowa.At her supervised release revocation hearing, the court acknowledged the risk of harm to Price, imposed a prison sentence slightly below the statutory maximum, and recommended that the Bureau of Prisons consider Price’s safety and gender transition when selecting her incarceration facility. The Seventh Circuit affirmed her 18-month sentence. The district court adequately considered Price’s unique vulnerability. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Prieto, a convicted felon, arranged several firearms transactions with a confidential source (CS). During the first transaction, which resulted in a completed sale, the CS informed Prieto that he was on parole and suggested that he had outstanding warrants. Prieto continued to contact the CS and eventually sold several more firearms to the CS.Prieto pleaded guilty to three counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, 19 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The PSR recommended and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the application of enhancements to Prieto’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5), for “trafficking” firearms, applied because Prieto transferred two or more firearms to the CS and knew or had reason to believe the CS was an individual whose possession of the firearms would be unlawful; under section 2K2.1(b)(1)(B), because Prieto’s conduct involved eight firearms; and for obstruction-of-justice. With these enhancements, Prieto’s guidelines range was 140-175 months’ imprisonment. Upholding the 120-month sentence, the court rejected arguments that the government did not prove that the CS actually was on parole, or that he, Prieto, had reason to believe the CS remained on parole when he transferred the guns and that he should not be held accountable for eight firearms because—for three of them—he merely offered (but failed) to sell them to the CS. View "United States v. Prieto" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Fieste was charged with threatening to assault and murder two federal judges, three former U.S. presidents, and the current President. She is currently incompetent to stand trial. Fieste's mental illness causes her to experience delusions. In custody, Fieste refused the antipsychotic medication that experts believe will restore her competence. The government obtained permission to involuntarily medicate her to render her competent to stand trial. The order was stayed pending appeal.The Seventh Circuit affirmed but remanded. Fieste’s pretrial detention is insufficient to overcome the government’s interest in prosecution although Fieste’s anticipated Guidelines range is 12-18 months and she will “likely face a sentence of time served” if convicted. The district court properly conducted a holistic assessment to conclude that the proposed treatment plan is substantially likely to render Fieste competent and that the side effects are substantially unlikely to significantly interfere with her ability to participate in the proceedings. The order permitted Fieste to be medicated with “long-acting injectable anti-psychotic medication, along with other medications” suggesting impermissible flexibility to administer unspecified medications. The district court must provide a dosage range based on the expert’s recommendation or some other appropriate evidence, whether directly in its order or by incorporating a sufficiently detailed treatment plan. View "United States v. Fieste" on Justia Law

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Agbi, born and raised in Nigeria but a resident of the U.S. since 2016, acted as a middleman in a scheme to use fake online dating accounts to solicit hundreds of thousands of dollars from unwitting elderly people. Agbi collected cash at his Indianapolis apartment, took his “cut,” and transferred the rest to accounts in Nigeria. More than 30 months after his arrest, Agbi’s counsel notified the government that Agbi intended to pursue a duress defense, claiming, for the first time, that members of the conspiracy located in Nigeria had threatened Agbi’s family. The district court granted a motion to preclude the defense. At trial, two of the scheme’s victims testified that they were deceived into believing that they were in relationships and sent “hundreds of thousands of dollars.” Secret Service agents described the details of a controlled delivery and Agbi’s subsequent interview.Agbi was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; use of a fictitious name in furtherance of mail fraud, section 1342; conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 1341, 1349; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 1956(a)(1), 1956(h) and was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence supporting each count was legally sufficient to support a conviction. The district court appropriately employed the obstruction of justice enhancement based on its finding that Agbi knowingly submitted a “fake” police report concerning threats against his family. View "United States v. Agbi" on Justia Law

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The DEA placed a tracking device on Tousis’s car. On June 2, agents believed that Tousis would go to Turner’s Aurora home to procure drugs. They watched Tousis enter Turner’s garage carrying a bag, and then leave carrying the bag, which had changed in appearance, suggesting a drug transaction. The Sheriff’s Department attempted a traffic stop. Tousis fled; the tracking device showed 115.2 miles per hour on I-88. Agent Billiot, driving an unmarked car, followed Tousis off the highway. Tousis was then driving at normal speeds, but taking evasive actions. At a red light, Billiot activated his emergency lights and siren, and pulled in front of Tousis’s car, 10-25 feet away. Billiot grabbed his firearm, exited his car wearing a DEA vest, and ran toward Tousis’s car, shouting commands.As Tousis moved the car forward, with nothing between Billiot and Tousis’s car, Billiot fired a single shot. The bullet struck the steering wheel; a fragment hit Tousis in the neck as he was maneuvering his vehicle away from Billiot. Tousis’s car then accelerated and struck a light pole. Tousis died. Officers recovered 300 grams of cocaine from Tousis’s car.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Billiot qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The material undisputed facts demonstrate that Billiot fired the fatal shot fearing for his own safety and for that of the public if Tousis resumed his reckless flight. There was no precedent warning Billiot that his actions amounted to excessive force. View "Tousis v. Billiot" on Justia Law

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Storme faced multiple charges of cyberstalking and unauthorized intrusion into a cell phone. He was ordered released on bond into the custody of his mother subject to conditions. He immediately attempted suicide. Months later, Pretrial Services reported that Storme had violated his curfew over 30 times and had been arrested for allegedly stalking a fourth woman. Storme was abusing alcohol and expressing suicidal ideation. The court did not his revoke release. Storme's mother moved to Virginia. The court did not appoint a new custodian. Months later, the court received a report from Storme’s therapist, expressing concern that Storme would kill himself if he thought the court might deny his motion to dismiss. Storme then began transferring assets to his mother and appeared multiple times in court to watch unrelated proceedings before his assigned judge.The district court heard arguments, then, without advance notice, revoked Storme’s pretrial release and ordered him detained, without making supporting findings. Storme began slamming his head to the floor and urging the marshals to kill him. In a holding cell, he tried to hang himself. After review by the Seventh Circuit, the government filed a motion to revoke. The district court granted its motion, finding probable cause to believe that, while on release, Storme committed crimes and otherwise violated his release conditions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the court reached the correct conclusion, based on the ongoing threat to the community, despite procedural irregularities under the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. 3142(d)). View "United States v. Storme" on Justia Law