Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When a Chicago jewelry store opened, Diggs and two others exited a Lexus SUV bearing Michigan license plates and entered the store with guns raised. They subdued and handcuffed the security guard and dragged a sales associate to a back room where they handcuffed and pistolwhipped her. One man encountered another sales associate, put a gun to her head, and locked her in the bathroom. A fourth man, McClellan, sat in the Lexus and listened to the robbery on his cell phone before driving the men and more than $400,000 in watches and jewelry away. Diggs and McClellan were tried together and convicted; two men remain at large. Before trial, the court denied the spousal testimonial privilege to Diggs's wife, Adams (his girlfriend at the time of the robbery), finding that Adams fell within the joint-participant exception, The evidence showed that Adams became a co-conspirator on the day of the robbery and only withdrew days later when she told police that Diggs had used her car for the robbery.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After considering Adams’s testimony in relation to “all else that happened” at trial, an average juror would not find the government’s case significantly less persuasive without it. The admission of purportedly hearsay testimony by a DHS agent was also harmless error. View "United States v. Diggs" on Justia Law

Patrick was working near the home of an on-and-off girlfriend when gang affiliates of the girlfriend’s current boyfriend–Freeman—shot at him. Patrick escaped and drove to his mother’s house. Patrick left the house to secure his equipment. Freeman and another Gangster Disciple opened fire on Patrick. Patrick ran inside, grabbed a gun loaded with pellet bullets, and fired from the doorway. The bullets struck Freeman in the buttocks and behind the ear. The gang members ran away. Chicago police officers arrived and handcuffed Patrick, demanding that Patrick tell them where the gun was or they were going to tear Patrick’s mother’s home apart. They did not have a warrant. Feeling that he had no choice, Patrick stated that there was a gun in a safe. The officers seized ammunition and several guns. Arrested, Patrick was eventually charged with additional crimes, including attempted murder. He was detained for over five years before pleading guilty to aggravated discharge of a weapon. He received a sentence of time served.Patrick’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. alleged that the city and 23 officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conspiring to conduct an unlawful arrest, execute a warrantless search, and detain him unlawfully. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Patrick is not collaterally estopped from pursuing his search and seizure claim based his previous false arrest litigation concerning the attempted murder charge. Because his detention was allotted to a lawful sentence, Patrick has no injury that a favorable decision may redress. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Russell was convicted of distributing heroin and fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and received a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Russell challenged one special condition of his supervised release: that he undergo a sex-offender evaluation to determine whether sex-offender treatment is necessary. In imposing the condition, the district court relied on facts from a police report, summarized in the PSR–that Russell had been convicted in 2010 of an offense that involved the sexual assault of a girl who became his stepdaughter. Russell furnished no evidence to call the PSR into question, stressing only that his “sexual assault case” was only a misdemeanor, not a felony. He expressed concern that imposing the condition could cause problems for him in prison. The court found the facts in the PSR quite detailed for the type of offense and age of the victim and credible. The court explained that if treatment were recommended following the assessment and Russell objected, the court would then decide if treatment was necessary.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The condition does not delegate judicial authority to anyone and vests final decision-making with the judge alone. It was narrowly tailored and promoted the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

Brown injured his knee when he fell at his former prison. He received medical care and was placed on “special needs,” which included being assigned a lower bunk, a wheelchair, and crutches. Weeks later, Brown was transferred. Over the first few months, he spent time in segregation. Brown repeatedly asked several times for medical care but received none. He was later moved to a shared cell where his cellmate, who was disabled, slept in the lower bunk. While climbing to his top bunk, Brown fell. Afterward, Brown saw a doctor who said that Brown needed surgery but that the prison would not provide it. Brown then asked the prison’s “special needs committee” to provide him “accommodations,” and he “filed an ADA reasonable accommodation request.” He also alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part. Brown alleged a viable failure-to-accommodate claim, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Brown’s complaint did not need to identify any particular legal theory, nor did it need to allege all legal elements of a particular claim. Brown’s alleged knee injury renders him disabled under the ADA and he alleged failure to accommodate his disability. No rule of law required Brown to identify a particular accommodation in his complaint. The ADA “does not create a remedy for medical malpractice” but Brown’s claim is not about allegedly substandard medical care. View "Brown v. Fofana" on Justia Law

Garcia provided logistical assistance while another man unloaded items from a secret compartment on an empty bus. The items were controlled substances. Based on his involvement in the affair, Garcia was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to do the same. The court rejected his argument that, although he may have known the bus contained unspecified contraband, the government failed to prove that he knew about drugs specifically, and that notes that jurors submitted to the court during trial suggested that jurors were deliberating prematurely and otherwise not following the court’s instructions.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was evidence that Garcia knew the bus contained controlled substances. Garcia knew the object of the conspiracy was drugs, as opposed to some general illicit end. The court noted a conversation about needing “more time because he had not been able to remove the drugs” and a second conversation in which Garcia explicitly mentioned drugs. Although the juror notes show something strange was happening with the jury, the district court did not abuse its discretion concluding that it did not rise to the level of misconduct. Courts presume the jury followed the instructions not to deliberate prematurely; there is no “overwhelming” evidence to overcome the presumption. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Skaggs was convicted in 2020 of producing and possessing child pornography. The indictment had included notice that the government intended to seek forfeiture of Skaggs’s property that was seized during the investigation. Skaggs proceeded pro se with the assistance of standby counsel and was convicted. When Skaggs objected to forfeiture on the ground that some of the property sought did not relate to his crimes. The court replied that, after sentencing, it would ask the government to itemize the property and give Skaggs a chance to object. The court sentenced Skaggs to life imprisonment. The judgment included a forfeiture provision that duplicated language from the notice in the indictment: “The defendant shall forfeit all images of child pornography … and all property seized during the searches of the defendant[], his residence, and [his] laundry room.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.About 30 months later, well outside the 14-day period (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a)) for correcting a sentence, at the government’s request, the court entered a preliminary forfeiture order, Itemizing each piece of property that Skaggs had forfeited, without giving Skaggs the promised chance to object. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Any forfeiture ordered at sentencing is part of the final judgment. The district court lacked the authority to amend that judgment years after its entry. View "United States v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

FBI agents executing a search warrant at Kamkarian’s home seized computers, containing 12 videos and more than 46,000 images of child pornography. Kamkarian was released on bond and was required to participate in mental health treatment. Kamkarian attended counseling but refused to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Kamkarian mentioned the possibility of suicide and was admitted to a hospital. During that hospital stay, Kamkarian was transported to court, Kamkarian, under oath, proceeded with a plea colloquy. The court confirmed that Kamkarian could read, write, and understand English; was able to think clearly and understand the proceedings; was fully satisfied with his counsel’s advice; had not been forced to plead guilty; and was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily. The court accepted his plea.With new counsel, Kamkarian moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that at the time he pled guilty, he was receiving in-patient treatment for depression. He was granted a psychological evaluation but denied an interpreter. A forensic psychologist interviewed Kamkarian, reviewed his treatment records, and opined that Kamkarian had Major Depressive Disorder that did not render him incompetent to plead guilty and that he had no difficulty communicating in English. The district judge denied his motion, explaining that she recalled Kamkarian’s hearing and that he had not appeared distressed, confused, or under duress. She discredited his testimony and sentenced Kamkarian to 87 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous; the court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Kamkarian" on Justia Law

Long was arrested for domestic battery. Police discovered a stolen firearm in his waistband and cocaine in plain view. Long pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. His guideline range was 33-41 months. The court explained it intended to impose a 51-month sentence, followed by three years of supervised release with conditions of drug testing and treatment. The court noted that Long had four felony convictions and several other convictions and that the guideline calculation understated his criminal history. Long’s history of domestic violence, was “very concerning” and Long had been “afforded the opportunity for rehabilitation by probation, parole, supervision, community corrections, jail sentences, and even a prison sentence.” The court noted that Long admitted he was addicted to drugs and requested treatment, that Long owed approximately $80,000 in child support and had limited employment history, then referred to “a long enough time that the defendant can participate in prison industries, as well as learn some job skills.” Neither party objected.Long argued that the court plainly erred by imposing a sentence in part to rehabilitate him, contrary to 18 U.S.C. 3582(a) as construed in by the Supreme Court in “Tapia” (2011). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rehabilitation is an important consideration in most sentences. Tapia permits a judge to discuss rehabilitation so long as she does not make rehabilitation a primary consideration. This record does not show a plain error under Tapia. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

Cichocki called the police to report that her 15-year-old daughter, G.C., had been sexually assaulted by Garcia days earlier at a resort where the families were vacationing. Cichocki told Detective Posewitz that G.C. had reported that, while G.C. and the other children were in the pool, Garcia purposely touched her breasts and “down there.” Both families stayed at the resort until the next afternoon. Cichocki suggested that G.C. could not remember all the details of the incident and had expressed fear that the video would contradict her report. Posewitz interviewed G.C., who described the incidents. Surveillance footage of the pool area was poor quality and inconclusive. Although the area was crowded, there were apparently no witnesses. ADA Spoentgen drafted a criminal complaint, which ADA Hoffman reviewed. It did not refer to the surveillance footage or Cichoki's statements. The Court Commissioner found probable cause for Garcia’s arrest. The court found probable cause to proceed to trial. After Hoffman’s opening statement, the judge declared a mistrial because Hoffman mentioned that G.C. had a learning disability, which had not been disclosed to the defense.Garcia sued Posewitz, Hoffman, and Spoentgen under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. No reasonable jury could find that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the information omitted from the complaint would have negated probable cause. G.C.’s and Cichocki’s accounts were largely consistent; the defendants lacked any indication that either had a motive to lie. View "Garcia v. Posewitz" on Justia Law

The FBI surveilled Jones and Schimenti, members of the same mosque, based on their pro-ISIS, violent social media posts. After several months, the FBI found no evidence of criminal activity but initiated contact between Jones and an undercover agent, “Omar.” Jones, not the agents, pursued subsequent conversations about radical Islam. Omar introduced Jones to “Bilal,” another undercover agent. Omar, Bilal, Jones, and Schimenti met. After Schimenti left, Jones explained that Schimenti worried that Bilal and Omar were federal agents. Jones continued to initiate pro-ISIS messages and built other ISIS connections, including Omar 2, another undercover FBI agent. Jones organized a meeting between himself, Bilal, and Omar 2, after which Omar 2 purportedly traveled to Syria with Bilal’s help. The FBI reestablished contact with Schimenti through a new confidential informant, “Muhamed,” who expressed his desire to join his brother in the ISIS army in Syria. Schimenti offered help. In 2017 Jones and Shimenti gave Muhamed nine phones and drove Muhamed to O’Hare airport. They believed he would be traveling to Syria to use the cell phones as makeshift bombs as an ISIS fighter. The FBI arrested Jones and Schimenti. Based on the provision of cell phones for use as IEDs by ISIS, they were convicted of providing material support to a terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court properly instructed the jury on the elements of entrapment; its ultimate determination is entitled to meaningful deference. The court upheld the denial of a motion for a new trial based on a revelation regarding a substantial payment the government made to a confidential source shortly after the convictions. It is impossible to conclude that earlier disclosure of a contemplated post-trial payment would have resulted in acquittals. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law