Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a man who, in 2005, forcibly entered his estranged wife’s home, threatened her with a knife, and sexually assaulted her. He was convicted by a jury in Allen County, Indiana, of rape, burglary, and related offenses, and sentenced to 70 years in prison. The evidence at trial included testimony from the victim, their daughter, and other witnesses, as well as the defendant’s own statements to police. The defendant had a history of domestic abuse and was subject to a protective order at the time of the offenses.After his conviction, the defendant appealed, but the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied review. He then filed a state postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that his trial attorney failed to pursue plea negotiations and made poor decisions regarding witness strategy. For over a decade, his postconviction attorneys took no substantive action to develop the record. When he proceeded pro se, the state court required him to submit affidavits, but he was unable to obtain one from his trial counsel. The state trial court denied relief, finding insufficient evidence that plea negotiations would have changed the outcome, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the lack of corroborating evidence for his claims. The Indiana Supreme Court again denied review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case after the district court denied federal habeas relief and an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit held that, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the failure of postconviction counsel to develop the record is attributed to the petitioner, and the statutory exceptions for evidentiary hearings did not apply. The court also found that the state appellate court’s decision was not unreasonable under federal law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Ford v Reagle" on Justia Law

John Seiwert, who had a long history of daily heroin and crack cocaine use, was found in possession of firearms at his home in Illinois shortly after his father’s death. Law enforcement, investigating Seiwert’s drug dealer, observed frequent contact between the two and recovered firearms and drug paraphernalia from Seiwert’s residence. Seiwert admitted to using crack cocaine just hours before police arrived and to being a daily user for twenty years. He was charged with two counts of possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of, or addict to, a controlled substance under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Seiwert’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which argued that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Second Amendment, both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. At trial, the government presented evidence of Seiwert’s drug use and firearm possession, and the jury convicted him on both counts. The district court denied Seiwert’s post-trial motions and sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Seiwert’s arguments that § 922(g)(3) violated the Second Amendment, was unconstitutionally vague, and that the evidence was insufficient. The court held that, under the Bruen framework, § 922(g)(3) does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Seiwert, finding it analogous to historical laws disarming the intoxicated and mentally ill. The court also found that its prior decision in United States v. Cook foreclosed Seiwert’s vagueness challenge, and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Seiwert" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company participated in a federal program that required it to report the average price it received for drugs sold to wholesalers, which in turn affected the rebates it owed the government under Medicaid. From 2005 to 2017, the company sold drugs to wholesalers at an initial price, but if it raised the price before the wholesaler resold the drugs to pharmacies, it required the wholesaler to pay the difference. The company reported only the initial price as the average manufacturer price (AMP), excluding the subsequent price increases, which resulted in lower reported AMPs and thus lower rebate payments to the government. The company justified this exclusion by categorizing the price increases as part of a bona fide service fee to wholesalers, even though the increased value was ultimately paid by pharmacies.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case after a qui tam action was filed by a relator, who alleged that the company’s AMP calculations were false and violated the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court granted summary judgment to the relator on the issue of falsity, finding the AMP calculations and related certifications were factually and legally false. The issues of scienter (knowledge) and materiality were tried before a jury, which found in favor of the relator and awarded substantial damages. The company appealed, challenging the findings on falsity, scienter, and materiality, while the relator cross-appealed on the calculation of the number of FCA violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the company’s exclusion of price increase values from AMP was unreasonable and contradicted the plain language and purpose of the relevant statutes, regulations, and agreements. The court also held that the jury reasonably found the company acted knowingly and that the false AMPs were material to the government’s payment decisions. The court rejected the cross-appeal on damages, finding the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. View "Streck v Eli Lilly and Company" on Justia Law

Tyree M. Neal, Jr. was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine under federal law. After evading arrest in a high-speed chase and carjacking, he was eventually apprehended. The government sought a sentencing enhancement based on Neal’s prior Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of cocaine, which, if applied, increased his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years. Neal pleaded guilty, represented by several attorneys during plea negotiations and sentencing. At sentencing, the district court found the enhancement applicable and imposed the 30-year maximum. Neal appealed, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and lacked a factual basis, but did not challenge the enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction.Subsequently, Neal filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his appellate, sentencing, and plea counsel were deficient for failing to raise the argument that his Illinois cocaine conviction could not support the federal enhancement, an argument that later succeeded in United States v. Ruth. The district court denied relief, finding that counsel were not deficient for failing to anticipate a change in law, and held an evidentiary hearing regarding appellate counsel’s performance. The court concluded appellate counsel was not ineffective, as the unraised argument was not “obvious nor clearly stronger” than those presented.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, although later precedent established the categorical approach to such enhancements, counsel’s failure to raise the argument did not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that none of Neal’s attorneys performed below an objective standard of reasonableness given the law at the time, and thus denied collateral relief. View "Neal v USA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested at a gas station mini-mart after officers, investigating an earlier robbery, observed him enter a single-occupancy restroom marked “Out of Order.” The defendant did not lock the door. Officers entered the restroom shortly after and found him standing on the handicap bars, reaching into the ceiling. A firearm was recovered from the ceiling area, and a subsequent search of the defendant revealed cash and various controlled substances. The government conceded that the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant had committed a crime at the time they entered the restroom.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the out-of-order restroom. The court also found sufficient evidence to convict him of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance following a bench trial. The defendant appealed, challenging the denial of the suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm conviction, and sought to preserve a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the defendant did not have a subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the unlocked, out-of-order restroom, so the officers’ entry did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court also found that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, based on constructive possession. Finally, the court held that the defendant waived his constitutional challenge to § 922(g) by failing to present any legal argument on appeal. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Miguel Salinas-Salcedo pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, admitting that over a two-and-a-half-year period he helped Mexican drug cartels launder nearly $3 million through 24 transactions. His role was to connect cartel members with individuals in the United States who could deposit and transfer large sums of cash into bank accounts without attracting government attention. Salinas-Salcedo acted as the intermediary, relaying instructions, authenticating transactions, and confirming deposits, ultimately earning over $44,000 in commissions. Unbeknownst to him, some of his contacts were undercover law enforcement agents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, sentenced Salinas-Salcedo after applying a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2S1.1(b)(2)(C) for being “in the business of laundering funds.” Salinas-Salcedo argued that he was merely a “middleman” and not in the business of laundering funds as contemplated by the guidelines. The district court rejected this argument, finding his participation integral to the conspiracy and imposing a below-guidelines sentence of 96 months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, as the facts were undisputed. The appellate court held that Salinas-Salcedo’s conduct fell squarely within the scope of the “business of laundering funds” enhancement, as defined by the guidelines and relevant statutes. The court found that his regular, multi-year involvement, substantial earnings, and discussions with undercover agents satisfied the enhancement’s factors. The Seventh Circuit also rejected Salinas-Salcedo’s claim of procedural error, concluding that the district court adequately addressed his objections. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Salinas-Salcedo" on Justia Law

Christopher Hill was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine after law enforcement, acting on information from a confidential informant, arranged a controlled purchase and arrested him en route to the meeting location. During the arrest, officers recovered approximately 100 grams of methamphetamine, a handgun, other drugs, and cash. Hill claimed the drugs were for personal use. He was indicted four days later and the case proceeded to a jury trial.During jury selection in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, two prospective jurors with family ties to law enforcement were questioned. Juror 53, who had been married to a sheriff’s officer and knew an officer involved in the case, expressed concerns about impartiality and was excused for cause. Juror 55, whose sons were in law enforcement, initially expressed concern about her ability to be impartial but ultimately stated she could judge the case based on the evidence and give equal weight to all testimony. The district court denied the motion to strike Juror 55 for cause, and she served on the jury. The jury found Hill guilty, and he was sentenced to 188 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether Hill’s right to an impartial jury was violated by the district court’s decision to seat Juror 55. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court held that the district court did not err in crediting Juror 55’s assurances of impartiality, distinguishing her responses from those of Juror 53. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the trial judge acted within her discretion and affirmed Hill’s conviction. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

James Weiss owned a company that manufactured sweepstakes machines, which in 2018 operated in a legal gray area under Illinois law. Seeking to secure favorable legislation, Weiss arranged for his company to make monthly payments to a lobbying firm owned by State Representative Luis Arroyo, who then became a vocal advocate for legalizing sweepstakes machines. After initial legislative efforts failed, Weiss and Arroyo sought to amend existing gaming legislation by enlisting the support of State Senator Terrance Link. Unbeknownst to them, Link was cooperating with federal authorities. During meetings, Arroyo assured Link he would be compensated for his support, and Weiss’s company provided checks intended for Link under a fictitious name created by the FBI. Weiss was later stopped by FBI agents, interviewed without Miranda warnings, and made false statements during the encounter.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Weiss’s pretrial motions to suppress his statements to the FBI and to exclude Arroyo’s recorded statements. At trial, the jury heard evidence of the bribery scheme, including testimony from Link and federal agents, and found Weiss guilty on all charges after deliberation. The district court sentenced Weiss to 66 months’ imprisonment, exceeding the calculated guidelines range, and declined to delay sentencing for anticipated changes to the Sentencing Guidelines.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Weiss’s challenges to the admission of his statements, the admission of Arroyo’s statements as coconspirator statements, the jury instructions regarding “official acts,” and the sentence imposed. The Seventh Circuit held that Weiss was not in custody for Miranda purposes during the FBI interview, the district court did not err in admitting Arroyo’s statements, the jury instructions did not constitute plain error, and the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Earl Miller, who owned and operated several real estate investment companies under the 5 Star name, was responsible for soliciting funds from investors, primarily in the Amish community, with promises that their money would be used exclusively for real estate ventures. After becoming sole owner in 2014, Miller diverted substantial investor funds for personal use, unauthorized business ventures, and payments to friends’ companies, all in violation of the investment agreements. He also misled investors about the nature and use of their funds, including issuing false statements about new business activities. The scheme continued even as the business faltered, and Miller ultimately filed for bankruptcy.A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Indiana indicted Miller on multiple counts, including wire fraud and securities fraud. At trial, the government presented evidence, including testimony from an FBI forensic accountant, showing that Miller misappropriated approximately $4.5 million. The jury convicted Miller on one count of securities fraud and five counts of wire fraud, acquitting him on one wire fraud count and a bankruptcy-related charge. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana sentenced Miller to 97 months’ imprisonment, applying an 18-level sentencing enhancement based on a $4.5 million intended loss, and ordered $2.3 million in restitution to victims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Miller’s appeal, in which he challenged the district court’s loss and restitution calculations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court reasonably estimated the intended loss at $4.5 million, as this amount reflected the funds Miller placed at risk through his fraudulent scheme, regardless of when the investments were made. The court also upheld the restitution award, finding it properly included all victims harmed by the overall scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Miller" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with making threats against an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) in Fort Wayne, Indiana, on two separate occasions: May 20, 2022, and February 15, 2023. The first incident involved in-person threats at the federal courthouse and the Allen County prosecutor’s office, where the defendant made statements suggesting violent intent toward the AUSA. The second incident involved a threatening message sent to the AUSA’s personal Facebook account after she refused to return his calls. The defendant had a history of erratic behavior, including repeated attempts to contact the AUSA, hostile statements to law enforcement, and social media messages referencing the AUSA.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana allowed the government to introduce evidence of the defendant’s other interactions with or about the AUSA under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), to show motive, intent, and context. However, the court excluded testimony from mental health professionals who had evaluated the defendant and from police officers who had experienced threats from him, finding that this evidence was not sufficiently probative of his intent or state of mind regarding the charged threats. The court also denied the defendant’s motion for acquittal, rejecting the argument that the Facebook message could not be a threat related to official duties because it was sent to a personal account and received after work hours. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts, though it acquitted him of threatening to murder the AUSA on the first occasion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the government’s evidence or excluding the defendant’s proffered testimony. It also found that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, including the finding that the Facebook message could be intended to interfere with the AUSA’s official duties. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law