Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Conner was convicted in Indiana state court for three counts of felony drug dealing and maintaining a common nuisance. Conner qualified as a habitual offender and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 72 years in prison. He had remained in custody pre-trial, but there was a delay of 1,029 days from the charging date (1,034 days from his arrest). Conner’s attorney never made a Sixth Amendment objection to the pretrial delays and Conner’s own objections were rejected because he was represented by counsel. State courts rejected his post-trial Sixth Amendment and ineffective assistance claims. Conner was advised by his postconviction counsel to postpone filing his federal habeas petition until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the petition for a writ of certiorari filed after his state postconviction proceedings. Conner relied on that advice, to his detriment. The one-year period in which to file the habeas petition continued to run while the certiorari petition was pending.The district court dismissed his subsequent habeas petition as untimely, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the postconviction lawyer’s mistake was particularly grave but holding that Supreme Court and circuit precedent j foreclose equitably tolling the deadline. View "Conner v. Reagle" on Justia Law

At his Broadway home, Barker sold a confidential informant 109.8 grams of methamphetamine; a month later, Barker sold the CI another 106.4 grams. Barker’s primary residence was on Havens. Officers obtained search warrants for both residences to be executed on November 30. Barker flew to California that morning. His friend, Carr, and Carr’s children were staying at the Broadway residence. At 4:03 p.m., officers monitoring Havens stopped Barker’s SUV but found his wife inside; she called Barker, 4:11-4:14 p.m. Officers recorded Barker’s voice asking about a search warrant., Barker contacted Carr at 4:15. Officers watching the Broadway residence saw Carr exit the home with a trash bag, go next door, and return without the bag. Officers recovered a trash bag containing three firearms and 464 grams of methamphetamine. Carr stated that the bag belonged to Barker, who had instructed him to move it.Barker pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). His PSR indicated an initial guidelines range between 151-188 months. The government then informed the probation office about Carr’s statements. An amended PSR more than tripled Barker’s drug quantity and recommended sentencing enhancements for possessing firearms in connection with drug trafficking; maintaining premises for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance; and obstruction of justice. His new guidelines range was 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court acknowledged that Carr was “not necessarily” a person who would tell the truth but observed several corroborating facts and imposed an underguidelines sentence of 300 months The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Barker" on Justia Law

Tam participated in a scheme to launder funds from unlawful narcotics transactions by Mexican drug traffickers through bank accounts in China. In 2017, Tam participated in the transfer of around $1.4 million in narcotics proceeds. Tam was charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), money laundering, 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, 1960(a). He pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. Tam’s written plea agreement acknowledged that Tam was subject to a maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, projected a Guidelines range of 87-108 months’ imprisonment if the minor participant decrease was not applied, and 70-87 months if the court determined that the minor participant reduction was proper. The court imposed a sentence of 65 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court failed to ask the questions required in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), that the error was not harmless, and that the court erred in denying a downward adjustment due to Tam’s minor role in the offense. The court recognized the factors that had to be considered, identified them explicitly, endorsed the facts set forth by the government and the application of those factors, and determined that the downward adjustment was not warranted. View "United States v. Tam" on Justia Law

In 2017, White participated in several Indianapolis commercial armed robberies, primarily as a lookout. He also assisted his coconspirators by selecting and staking out the targeted premises and providing supplies, including (at least once) the gun. Eventually, undercover detectives spotted them attempting to rob a Verizon store. White pleaded guilty to three counts of conspiracy to commit robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery. Based on a sentencing range of 97-121 months, the judge imposed four concurrent 108-month terms of imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit vacated White’s sentence. The general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 371, caps any term of imprisonment at 60 months. The judge must impose a new sentence on one count. Though she may restructure the entire sentence, she is not required to do so. The physical restraint enhancement was properly applied to one robbery conspiracy count. During the bank robbery, one of White’s accomplices wielded a handgun, grabbed a bank manager, and led him to the lobby at gunpoint, which is physical restraint under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). The conduct underlying the second application of the enhancement is not physical restraint; during the robbery of a cellphone store, an accomplice wielded a gun and ordered an employee to move to another area. That error was harmless and did not alter the applicable Guidelines range. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

When a Chicago jewelry store opened, Diggs and two others exited a Lexus SUV bearing Michigan license plates and entered the store with guns raised. They subdued and handcuffed the security guard and dragged a sales associate to a back room where they handcuffed and pistolwhipped her. One man encountered another sales associate, put a gun to her head, and locked her in the bathroom. A fourth man, McClellan, sat in the Lexus and listened to the robbery on his cell phone before driving the men and more than $400,000 in watches and jewelry away. Diggs and McClellan were tried together and convicted; two men remain at large. Before trial, the court denied the spousal testimonial privilege to Diggs's wife, Adams (his girlfriend at the time of the robbery), finding that Adams fell within the joint-participant exception, The evidence showed that Adams became a co-conspirator on the day of the robbery and only withdrew days later when she told police that Diggs had used her car for the robbery.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After considering Adams’s testimony in relation to “all else that happened” at trial, an average juror would not find the government’s case significantly less persuasive without it. The admission of purportedly hearsay testimony by a DHS agent was also harmless error. View "United States v. Diggs" on Justia Law

Patrick was working near the home of an on-and-off girlfriend when gang affiliates of the girlfriend’s current boyfriend–Freeman—shot at him. Patrick escaped and drove to his mother’s house. Patrick left the house to secure his equipment. Freeman and another Gangster Disciple opened fire on Patrick. Patrick ran inside, grabbed a gun loaded with pellet bullets, and fired from the doorway. The bullets struck Freeman in the buttocks and behind the ear. The gang members ran away. Chicago police officers arrived and handcuffed Patrick, demanding that Patrick tell them where the gun was or they were going to tear Patrick’s mother’s home apart. They did not have a warrant. Feeling that he had no choice, Patrick stated that there was a gun in a safe. The officers seized ammunition and several guns. Arrested, Patrick was eventually charged with additional crimes, including attempted murder. He was detained for over five years before pleading guilty to aggravated discharge of a weapon. He received a sentence of time served.Patrick’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. alleged that the city and 23 officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conspiring to conduct an unlawful arrest, execute a warrantless search, and detain him unlawfully. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Patrick is not collaterally estopped from pursuing his search and seizure claim based his previous false arrest litigation concerning the attempted murder charge. Because his detention was allotted to a lawful sentence, Patrick has no injury that a favorable decision may redress. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Russell was convicted of distributing heroin and fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and received a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Russell challenged one special condition of his supervised release: that he undergo a sex-offender evaluation to determine whether sex-offender treatment is necessary. In imposing the condition, the district court relied on facts from a police report, summarized in the PSR–that Russell had been convicted in 2010 of an offense that involved the sexual assault of a girl who became his stepdaughter. Russell furnished no evidence to call the PSR into question, stressing only that his “sexual assault case” was only a misdemeanor, not a felony. He expressed concern that imposing the condition could cause problems for him in prison. The court found the facts in the PSR quite detailed for the type of offense and age of the victim and credible. The court explained that if treatment were recommended following the assessment and Russell objected, the court would then decide if treatment was necessary.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The condition does not delegate judicial authority to anyone and vests final decision-making with the judge alone. It was narrowly tailored and promoted the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

Brown injured his knee when he fell at his former prison. He received medical care and was placed on “special needs,” which included being assigned a lower bunk, a wheelchair, and crutches. Weeks later, Brown was transferred. Over the first few months, he spent time in segregation. Brown repeatedly asked several times for medical care but received none. He was later moved to a shared cell where his cellmate, who was disabled, slept in the lower bunk. While climbing to his top bunk, Brown fell. Afterward, Brown saw a doctor who said that Brown needed surgery but that the prison would not provide it. Brown then asked the prison’s “special needs committee” to provide him “accommodations,” and he “filed an ADA reasonable accommodation request.” He also alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part. Brown alleged a viable failure-to-accommodate claim, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Brown’s complaint did not need to identify any particular legal theory, nor did it need to allege all legal elements of a particular claim. Brown’s alleged knee injury renders him disabled under the ADA and he alleged failure to accommodate his disability. No rule of law required Brown to identify a particular accommodation in his complaint. The ADA “does not create a remedy for medical malpractice” but Brown’s claim is not about allegedly substandard medical care. View "Brown v. Fofana" on Justia Law

Garcia provided logistical assistance while another man unloaded items from a secret compartment on an empty bus. The items were controlled substances. Based on his involvement in the affair, Garcia was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to do the same. The court rejected his argument that, although he may have known the bus contained unspecified contraband, the government failed to prove that he knew about drugs specifically, and that notes that jurors submitted to the court during trial suggested that jurors were deliberating prematurely and otherwise not following the court’s instructions.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was evidence that Garcia knew the bus contained controlled substances. Garcia knew the object of the conspiracy was drugs, as opposed to some general illicit end. The court noted a conversation about needing “more time because he had not been able to remove the drugs” and a second conversation in which Garcia explicitly mentioned drugs. Although the juror notes show something strange was happening with the jury, the district court did not abuse its discretion concluding that it did not rise to the level of misconduct. Courts presume the jury followed the instructions not to deliberate prematurely; there is no “overwhelming” evidence to overcome the presumption. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Skaggs was convicted in 2020 of producing and possessing child pornography. The indictment had included notice that the government intended to seek forfeiture of Skaggs’s property that was seized during the investigation. Skaggs proceeded pro se with the assistance of standby counsel and was convicted. When Skaggs objected to forfeiture on the ground that some of the property sought did not relate to his crimes. The court replied that, after sentencing, it would ask the government to itemize the property and give Skaggs a chance to object. The court sentenced Skaggs to life imprisonment. The judgment included a forfeiture provision that duplicated language from the notice in the indictment: “The defendant shall forfeit all images of child pornography … and all property seized during the searches of the defendant[], his residence, and [his] laundry room.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.About 30 months later, well outside the 14-day period (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a)) for correcting a sentence, at the government’s request, the court entered a preliminary forfeiture order, Itemizing each piece of property that Skaggs had forfeited, without giving Skaggs the promised chance to object. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Any forfeiture ordered at sentencing is part of the final judgment. The district court lacked the authority to amend that judgment years after its entry. View "United States v. Skaggs" on Justia Law