Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Freeman was charged in Counts 1 and 2 with distribution of 28 grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); in Count 3, with possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); in Count 4, with distribution of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and (Count 5) with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Freeman pled guilty to Counts 1 and 5 and stipulated to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, the basis of a different indictment. Freeman admitted that he had been selling crack cocaine since 1999 and bought and sold 80 firearms: 40 in 1999-2001 to a high-ranking member Gangster Disciples member and 40 in 2010 to a different member. The court calculated the guidelines range as 140-175 months on Count 1 with the stipulation and 60 months’ consecutive imprisonment on Count 5. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a sentence below that range, sentencing Freeman to 132 months’ imprisonment on Count 1 and to 60 months, consecutive, on Count 5. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that he should have been sentenced using a 1:1 crack-to-powder ratio instead of the 18:1 ratio encompassed within the Sentencing Guidelines and that the district court relied on its own speculations as to uncharged criminal conduct and erred in allowing its frustration with his litigation tactics to affect his sentence. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In 2013, Harris was part of a group of armed robbers. He robbed a Schererville, Indiana T‐Mobile store, an Addison, Illinois Sprint store; and a LaPorte, Indiana AT&T store. He was charged in Indiana state court for the LaPorte robbery. Harris received a target letter informing him that he might be charged in federal court for the Addison robbery. A federal public defender was appointed, but failed to advise him or his state defense attorney of the progress of the federal proceedings. Harris pled guilty in state court in December 2013 and was later charged in federal court. After serving three years, Harris pled guilty to federal charges of robbery and brandishing a firearm, stipulating that he committed the Schererville robbery and agreeing to its consideration as relevant conduct. The parties agreed to a lower sentencing guideline range, recommending grouping Harris’ state conviction as part of his federal case rather than as a separate conviction to ameliorate federal defense counsel’s failure to communicate. The district court concluded that the state conviction was part of Harris’s criminal history rather than a grouped offense in his federal case and sentenced Harris to an additional 160 months in federal custody to run concurrently with his state court sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s rejection of a “hypothetical guideline range” to compensate for the public defender’s error. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Ortiz was sentenced to prison for 135 months for three bank robberies. The Seventh Circuit twice reversed and remanded for resentencing. On the second remand the judge reimposed the 135-month prison sentence but altered the conditions of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding conditions: permitting a probation office to visit the defendant “at any reasonable time” at home or “any reasonable location” specified by the probation officer; requiring Ortiz to report “any significant change” in his economic circumstances; requiring him to report to the probation officer “in the manner and frequency” directed by the officer; and requiring him to participate in a substance abuse, an alcohol treatment, and a mental health treatment program approved by the probation officer and to “abide by the rules and regulations of [each] program.” The court noted the necessity of a certain level of vagueness and that Ortiz did not question the conditions at his sentencing hearing and, therefore, waived objections. View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Warren pled guilty to transporting and possessing child pornography and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and 15 years’ supervised release. During his prison term, Warren tutored inmates, started a Sex Addicts Anonymous group, and became involved in “Life Connections,” a Christian residential‐reentry preparation program. Warren successfully requested relocation of his supervision. His Madison, Wisconsin probation office petitioned the court to modify Warren’s conditions of supervised release to match the office’s standard language and to add conditions that the office generally requests in “sex offender” cases, including: a travel condition, a no‐contact‐with‐minors condition, and a polygraph condition. Warren’s appointed counsel filed a brief, unsuccessfully objecting to the proposed changes. Warren’s treatment provider had not requested polygraph testing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the travel condition was vague, that the no-contact condition was overbroad and not justified by the facts of the case, and that the polygraph condition would be appropriate only if requested by the treatment office and directed to treatment. View "United Stated v. Warren" on Justia Law

Briseno was tried for multiple crimes relating to his association with the East Chicago Imperial Gangsters. After the government’s case‐in‐chief, the judge granted Briseno’s motion for acquittal only as to the counts relating to the attempted murder of Arenivas. During closing argument, the prosecutor referenced alleged facts connecting Briseno to the attempted murder of Arenivas; contended that for Briseno to be not guilty, the government’s witnesses must have conspired to frame him and supply false testimony; and emphasized that eight of its witnesses deserved to be believed. The jury convicted Briseno of: conspiracy to participate in racketeering, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine and 100 kilograms of marijuana, five separate murders in aid of racketeering, attempted murder in aid of racketeering, and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. The judge sentenced Briseno to multiple consecutive terms of life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the Arenivas evidence was relevant to other charges. While the government did erroneously shift the burden of proof by suggesting that Briseno could be acquitted only if the jury concluded that government witnesses had testified falsely, that error was made harmless by curative instructions and by significant prosecution evidence. The “improper vouching” statements are better viewed as permissible appeals to the jurors’ common sense. View "United States v. Briseno" on Justia Law

After Kirk was convicted for wire and mail fraud, the judge cut her sentence from 188 to 110 months for providing substantial assistance to prosecutors, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b). Kirk contends that she subsequently provided additional assistance, but the prosecutor declined to file a second motion. The district court dismissed Kirk’s suit, in which she sought an order to require the prosecutor to file the motion. The court reasoned that her suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was inappropriate because the matter was committed to the prosecutor’s discretion and because she had the alternative of seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the decision of whether to file a Rule 35(b) motion is not entirely discretionary and section 2255 would not have provided relief, Kirk’s suit under the APA was foreclosed by Kirk’s option of filing an ordinary motion, seeking to compel the prosecutor to act. The court did not determine whether Kirk is entitled to relief. View "Kirk v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Yates was sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) in 2003. The district court concluded that he had six qualifying prior convictions; the statute provides that three or more require an enhanced sentence. After the Supreme Court held in 2015 that the “residual clause” in section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, and made the decision retroactive, Yates argued that he had only two qualifying convictions. The prosecutor conceded that the petition was timely under 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3) and that three of Yates’s convictions were disqualified, but argued that Yates’s conviction of battery by a prisoner (Wis. Stat. 940.20(1)), qualifies as a violent felony under the “elements clause” of 924(e)(2)(B)(i) because it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against a person. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The elements of the offense, not the facts of the crime, control. The Wisconsin statute provided: Any prisoner … who intentionally causes bodily harm to an officer, employee, visitor or another inmate … is guilty of a Class D felony.” Section 939.22(4) added that bodily harm means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” The described offense categorically is a crime of violence under the elements clause. View "Yates v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2001, Raney was convicted of transportation of a minor with intent to engage in a sexual act and attempt to manufacture child pornography. He was sentenced to 145 months’ imprisonment. In 2012, he began serving three years of supervised release. During that term, the district court found that he had violated the terms of release by possessing a memory stick and maintaining contact with a convicted felon and warned Raney that any future violations would result in revocation of his supervised release. A year later, the court found that he had violated his supervised release conditions by taking unauthorized day trips with a female acquaintance and her two minor children. The court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to nine months’ imprisonment followed by another two years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the revocation decision, but vacated the sentence because the district court did not explain its decision to impose two years of supervised release. On remand, the district court imposed the same sentence under the same conditions as before, with an explanation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Raney had waived a challenge to the imposition of a condition of supervised release that requires him to “notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal history or characteristics.” View "United States v. Raney" on Justia Law

Just days after his release from prison in 1995, Frazier entered the apartment of a 62-year-old woman and attempted to rob her at gunpoint. The woman distracted Frazier, struggled for the gun, and eventually fled. Frazier received a bullet wound. Frazier was convicted of home invasion and received an enhances sentence of 60 years because of the victim’s age. After failing to obtain relief from the conviction and sentence in the state courts, Frazier unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition, rejecting Frazier’s sole claim on appeal: that his trial lawyer was ineffective by failing to warn him he faced a potentially longer sentence based on the victim’s age. That claim was not presented in the district court. Arguments in a federal habeas petition which were not raised to the district court are not properly raised for the first time on appeal. View "Frazier v. Varga" on Justia Law

Haywood, an inmate at Illinois’s Shawnee Correctional Center, accused a teacher of attacking him. Guards charged him with making false statements. A disciplinary panel found him guilty, ordered him transferred to segregation for two months, and revoked one month of good‐time credit. He was subsequently transferred to a different prison and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment violations and that his conditions of confinement in segregation were cruel and unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected both claims, dismissing the First Amendment claim because the disciplinary panel’s decision, which affected the duration of Haywood’s confinement, had not been set aside on collateral review or by executive clemency. The court cited Supreme Court holdings that section 1983 cannot be used to seek damages when relief necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction or prison discipline that remains in force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the First Amendment theory and reversed with respect to the Eighth Amendment theory, remanding for consideration under the deliberate indifference standard.The warden had actual knowledge of the unusually harsh weather, had been apprised of the specific problem with Haywood’s cell (the windows would not shut), and had toured the segregation unit. View "Haywood v. Hathaway" on Justia Law