Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

ATF confidential informant Potts recruited Mayfield for an armed robbery of a fictional cocaine stash house and introduced Mayfield to undercover Agent Gomez, posing as a disgruntled drug courier. Gomez instructed Mayfield to recruit others. They met again. Mayfield brought Kindle; Kindle brought Ward. Gomez explained the plan and asked whether it was too much for them to handle. Ward responded that his concern was the number of guards at the stash house. He was not concerned with whether the guards were armed because, he asserted, they would enter with guns drawn. The next day, Ward drove the men from Mayfield's apartment to meet Gomez. They followed Gomez to a storage facility. Gomez again asked for any hesitations. Ward announced that he did not “come all the way from Milwaukee for nothin’.” ATF agents then arrested the men, searched Ward's van, and recovered masks, guns and ammunition, bulletproof vests, gloves, and a duffle bag. The court granted a motion in limine, precluding the defendants from presenting entrapment defenses. Ward did not testify. The court sentenced him to 270 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and later affirmed the denial of Ward’s pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The courts rejected Ward’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an entrapment defense. Ward did not indicate any evidence to support the requisite inducement or lack of predisposition necessary to support that defense. View "Ward v. United States" on Justia Law

Douglas pleaded guilty as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The judge found that at least three of Douglas’s 16 other felony convictions were “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After the Supreme Court found, in “Johnson,” the residual clause of section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally vague, Douglas unsuccessfully sought a sentence reduction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson concerns only a part of 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The elements clause, 924(e)(2)(B)(i), applied by the district court to Douglas's convictions, remains in effect. Class C felony battery in Indiana at the time of those convictions required that a person “knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner,” which “results in serious bodily injury to any other person.” The Supreme Court has stated that the sort of force that comes within the elements clause is “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” The Indiana statute had “serious bodily injury” as an element. Douglas did not cite any decision in which Indiana’s courts have convicted someone of Class C felony battery after a light touch resulted in serious injury. All the cited cases involved violent force. Intent to use force was an element of the offense, satisfying the elements clause. View "Douglas v. United States" on Justia Law

Sanchez-Lopez pleaded guilty to unauthorized presence in the U.S. after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), and was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment—90 days above the guidelines range. The district court stated that, in an effort to deter future illegal reentry, it was sentencing him to a lengthier term than the sentence he had served the last time he was convicted of the same offense. Sanchez-Lopez had a long history of criminal activity in and removal from the U.S., dating back to his first entry in 1994 and including convictions for DUI, hit-and-run, driving with a suspended license, battery, sexually assaulting an 11-year-old child, and criminal escape. He claimed that his wife’s illness and need for care prompted his latest return. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. The district court thoughtfully considered Sanchez-Lopez’s personal characteristics, including that he had not committed “serious offenses” since reentering, his reason for returning, and the danger posed to society by his many drunk driving arrests. The court focused on one particular concern in fashioning an appropriate sentence—the need to deter Sanchez-Lopez from continuing to enter the country illegally. That decision was proper; 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(B) specifically instructs courts to consider the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” View "United States v. Sanchez-Lopez" on Justia Law

An officer stopped a car for expired license plates. Barry, the driver, did not have registration papers, and professed not to know who owned the car or where he was going. Fadiga, the passenger, replied that “a friend” owned the car and produced a rental agreement. The car’s return was past due; the agreement did not authorize either man to drive the car. When Fadiga opened his wallet to extract his driver’s license, the officer saw multiple plastic cards and sought permission to search the car; both consented. The officer found a bag full of gift cards and requested a card reader. About 30 minutes later the reader arrived and detected that the cards had been tampered with. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Fadiga’s conviction for possession of unauthorized “access devices,” 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3), upholding denial of a motion to suppress. The delay between the call and the reader’s arrival was justified by reasonable suspicion that the men possessed doctored gift cards. The court noted that neither man was authorized to drive the car; even without waiting for a reader, the police were entitled to detain them. The court also rejected a discrimination claim. The venire from which the jury was selected comprised 48 persons, none of them black. Defense counsel did not show discrimination in the venire's selection under 28 U.S.C. 1861. View "United States v. Fadiga" on Justia Law

Paulette helped found an East St. Louis, Illinois street gang during the late 1980s. By 2012 he and the gang were trafficking large amounts of drugs. Paulette led the gang and managed its drug trade, even controlling the sale of illegal drugs in nearby Washington Park, with many people working for him. Paulette sold 105 grams of cocaine to an informant during two controlled buys in 2014. Two months later, authorities were waiting when Paulette and eight travel companions got off a train in St. Louis, returning from a supply run to Texas. Seven of them were carrying a total of 2.4 kilograms of cocaine in packages concealed under their clothing. Paulette eventually pled guilty to eight counts related to drug trafficking and was sentenced to a total of 300 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting Paulette’s arguments about the scope of the conspiracy and that the district court, in calculating his imprisonment range under the Sentencing Guidelines, wrongly counted certain years of drug dealing as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3. Paulette admitted, through his plea agreement, that the conspiracy had “involved” at least five kilograms of cocaine and at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine. View "United States v. Paulette" on Justia Law

In 1984, Ben-Yisrayl was convicted in Indiana state court of capital murder, rape, criminal confinement, and burglary. The case bounced back and forth for many years in the state courts as the death sentence and other issues were litigated on direct review and in postconviction proceedings, eventually resulting in a 60-year sentence on the murder conviction. In the meantime, Ben-Yisrayl pursued habeas relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Because he had not completed state post-conviction review, the district judge stayed the proceedings. When the state courts finally finished with the case, the judge lifted the stay and ordered the state to respond to the petition. Indiana did so. Ben-Yisrayl failed to file his reply within the allotted time, so the case proceeded to decision without a reply brief from him. The judge denied relief on all grounds without an evidentiary hearing and denied Ben-Yisrayl’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Ben-Yisrael had waived his only argument on appeal: that his resentencing counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to introduce “a veritable mountain of mitigation evidence.” View "Ben-Yisrayl v. Neal" on Justia Law

Radford boarded a train in Flagstaff, to deliver heroin to Toledo. The train stopped in Galesburg. Officer Mings, who goes to the station daily to study passengers, noted indicators of drug trafficking. Radford had purchased a one-way ticket two days earlier, paying a premium for a roomette, and was traveling between locations associated with illegal drugs. Radford had been arrested seven years earlier for assisting undocumented aliens and for possessing marijuana. Mings, in uniform, knocked on Radford’s door and stated that he was doing “security checks” for ”illegal narcotics.” Radford answered Ming’s questions. He asked to search her luggage. Radford responded, “I guess so. You’re just doing your job.” He never advised Radford that she could refuse his requests. The search revealed heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of her motion to suppress, finding that the encounter was consensual, not a seizure, and that Radford voluntarily consented to the search. Even with no basis for suspecting a particular individual, officers may pose questions, request identification, and request consent to search—"provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.” No seizure occurs if “a reasonable person would feel free to … terminate the encounter.” Rejecting claims of intimidation, the court noted Mings did not enter Radford’s roomette before her consent, told her why he wanted to search, and did not threaten Radford; there cannot be a rule that an "officer is forbidden to speak to a person of another race.” View "United States v. Radford" on Justia Law

Wheeler pleaded guilty to an attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)), and to discharging a gun during that crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The plea did not reserve any issue for appeal. The court sentenced him to 108 months for the Hobbs Act offense and the required consecutive 120 months for the firearms offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Wheeler’s argument that attempted robbery is not a “crime of violence” because an attempt to rob a retail establishment does not have the use of physical force as an element and the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the elements clause in section 924(c) is a statutory issue; an unconditional guilty plea waives any contention that an indictment fails to state an offense. The court also rejected Wheeler’s argument that he should be resentenced in light of a 2017 Supreme Court holding that 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which requires a sentence under section 924(c) to run consecutively to the sentence for the offense in which the firearm was used, does not forbid the court to choose a term of imprisonment for the predicate offense so that the aggregate imprisonment comports with 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing criteria. View "United States v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

On remand, court was entitled to rely upon the record established at the original sentencing concerning the Guidelines range.Armand pleaded guilty to distributing crack and powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Applying Amendment 782 decreased the total offense level, for a Guidelines range of 84-105 months. At his hearing, Armand repeatedly acknowledged that Guidelines range, but contended that the court should depart downward to impose a sentence that would apply if the crack and powder cocaine Guidelines reflected a one-to-one ratio; the court declined and imposed a sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. On remand for resentencing, Armand did not dispute that range, but reiterated his argument regarding the sentencing disparity and his mitigation arguments. The court discussed the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and sentenced Armand to 104 months’ imprisonment, recognizing efforts Armand undertook to improve his life while imprisoned. The court expressed skepticism that mental health treatment and his age would lower his risk of recidivism. The court also stated that its position on the crack cocaine Guidelines had not changed since the original sentencing hearing, and declined to decrease the ratio. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court was entitled to rely upon the record established at the original sentencing. View "United States v. Armand" on Justia Law

Seventh Circuit finds that 10 years of prison segregation raised serious constitutional concerns. In 1989, Isby was incarcerated for robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. Months later, Isby hit a prison counselor. Officers gassed Isby and entered his cell. During the altercation, a dog was killed, and Isby stabbed two officers. Isby was convicted of attempted murder and battery, and sentenced to an additional 40 years. Isby was moved among Indiana prisons and received several major‐conduct reports. Since October 2006, Isby has been in long‐term segregation. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. Unaware that Isby had accumulated three “strikes” for filing frivolous suits or appeals and was restricted under the Prison Litigation Reform Act from seeking pauper status, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the court granted Isby’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, but rejected his claims, and allowed him to appeal as a pauper. The Seventh Circuit declined to dismiss the appeal, affirmed with respect to the Eighth Amendment claim, and remanded for further proceedings on Isby’s due process claim. The court noted serious constitutional concerns: the “repeated issuance of the same uninformative language (without any updates or explanation of why continued placement is necessary) and the length of Isby’s confinement, could cause a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Isby has been deprived” of liberty without due process. View "Isby v. Brown" on Justia Law