Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Betts‐Gaston and Ross formed a company that defrauded homeowners and mortgage lenders. They found homeowners facing foreclosure and convinced them to sign documents that deeded their homes to a trust; arranged for straw buyers to obtain mortgages to buy the homes; and produced loan applications that inflated the buyers’ incomes and misrepresented the purpose of the purchases. Once a sale was completed, the buyer deeded the property back to the trust, so that the defendants had both the mortgage proceeds and title to the properties. The homeowners initially still lived in the homes but at least two were eventually evicted. At trial, the government offered evidence of three such transactions. Betts‐Gaston and Ross were indicted for wire fraud in 2011. Ross pled guilty and agreed to cooperate. Betts‐Gaston was convicted and sentenced to a 57-month prison term. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the government concealed the terms of Ross’s plea agreement, in violation of its Brady obligations; the court’s limited questioning of prospective jurors violated the right to an impartial jury; evidence on the materiality of her misrepresentations was excluded, impairing the right to present a defense; insufficient evidence supported the conviction on Count II; and the judge was hostile in front of the jury, impairing the right to a fair trial. View "United States v. Betts-Gaston" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Smith, a Putnam County police officer, of violating 18 U.S.C. 242, by subjecting two men to the intentional use of unreasonable and excessive force, and violating their civil rights. Smith’s fellow police officers had testified against him, describing two separate, unwarranted attacks on arrestees who were fully under control. Smith had bragged about his behavior and mocked those who objected. Smith had a prior conviction for misdemeanor battery of a three-year-old child and the child’s mother, who was then Smith’s wife. Smith had not taken responsibility for his actions, had “unaddressed anger control issues,” and had engaged in other misconduct that had not resulted in criminal charges. The district court sentenced Smith to 14 months’ imprisonment, less than half the low end of the guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Smith’s conviction but vacated the sentence. On remand, the court again sentenced Smith to 14 months’ imprisonment and again failed to adequately explain or justify the below-guidelines sentence. The Seventh Circuit again vacated and remanded, citing the “thin rationale” for the sentence. The court’s brief mention of the nature and circumstances of the offense affords no basis to review its exercise of discretion. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2011, Jackson was convicted and Kelly pleaded guilty to cocaine-related charges. The Seventh Circuit remanded Jackson's 360-month sentence for consideration under the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) based on the Supreme Court’s 2012 "Dorsey" holding. With a new Guidelines range of 262-327 months, the court sentenced Jackson to 200 months’ imprisonment. Jackson then filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson testified that his attorney, Ratcliffe, advised that the only way to preserve an FSA claim was to go to trial. Kelly testified that he told Jackson that he could take a plea agreement and preserve his right to argue that the FSA on appeal and that Jackson wanted to discuss this information with Ratcliffe. Ratcliffe testified that “Jackson never told [him] that he wanted to explore plea agreements.” A magistrate recommended granting Jackson’s petition, finding that Jackson established deficient performance and prejudice. The credibility assessment came out in Jackson’s favor. The district court nonetheless denied Jackson’s petition, stating that Jackson was unable to establish prejudice and rejecting the magistrate’s credibility determinations. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A district court may not reject a magistrate’s credibility findings, based on a witness’s live testimony, without first holding a de novo evidentiary hearing. View "Jackson v. United States" on Justia Law

An individual attempted to purchase prescription drugs from Jennings in Hudson, Wisconsin. Jennings put a gun to his head; Jennings’ girlfriend stole the purchaser’s money from his truck. After the victim reported the robbery, police stopped Jennings’ car. Nearby, police found a loaded semi-automatic handgun that Jennings’ girlfriend had thrown from his vehicle shortly before he was stopped. Jennings pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm following a felony conviction, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Jennings’ criminal history included a Minnesota conviction for simple robbery and two Minnesota convictions for felony domestic assault. The pre-sentence report treated those convictions as crimes of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and U.S.S.G. 4B1.4. Jennings argued that the offenses did not categorically involve the use or threatened use of violent physical force and did not qualify as violent felonies. The district court rejected the argument and stated that Jennings’ two convictions for making terroristic threats also constituted convictions for a violent crime. The district court elected to impose a below-Guidelines sentence of 180 months, the lowest sentence that the ACCA permitted him to impose. The Seventh Circuit, employing the categorical approach, affirmed the categorization of the prior convictions as crimes of violence. View "United States v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Mejia pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm without a plea agreement. He did not admit any factual allegations beyond the essential elements of the 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) charge. He declined to discuss the offense with the probation officer. Without Mejia's version of the offense, the probation officer used police reports to put together an account of the bar fight, during which Mejia pulled out a knife. Four men were involved when shots were fired, striking a building and a vehicle. Mejia hid the gun but claimed he had not fired the shots. The judge rejected the probation officer’s recommendation to add four offense levels on the theory that Mejia had “used or possessed” a gun “in connection with another felony offense” or else had “possessed or transferred” the weapon with “knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Without the adjustment, Mejia’s guidelines range was 51-63 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a sentence of 93 months. Given the facts about the incident that could be found with confidence, plus Mejia’s lengthy criminal history, the judge adequately explained that no matter who fired the shots, an above-guideline sentence was appropriate. View "United States v. Mejia" on Justia Law

Reed operated companies that he claimed would make loans of $50 million to $1 billion to entrepreneurs. Reed charged advance fees of $10,000 to $50,000 to apply for these loans. Reed’s companies actually had no funds to lend. Reed and his co‐defendants took in $200,000 from six clients, but never closed a loan. Reed was indicted for wire fraud. On the fourth day of trial, Reed’s lawyer told the court that Reed wanted to enter a “blind” guilty plea. The judge placed Reed under oath, explained his rights, and discussed his understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty, before accepting the plea. Four months later, before sentencing, Reed moved to substitute attorneys. His new attorney moved to withdraw the plea, arguing that Reed’s attorney’s ineffective representation had coerced Reed to plead guilty. The court denied the motion. Reed sought a below‐guidelines sentence of probation, emphasizing that his wife (who has a disabling illness) and three children (one of whom is also disabled) depend on him for financial and other support. The Guidelines range was 57-71 months incarceration. The district judge sentenced Reed to 64 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding Reed’s allegations of ineffective assistance vague. The district judge adequately considered Reed’s claims of family hardship. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

Between 2003 and 2011, Jackson operated three Cicero, Illinois daycares in succession, housed in a building next to the Ark of Safety Apostolic Faith Temple where he served as pastor. Subsidies from the State of Illinois’ Child Care Assistance Program largely funded the daycares. CCAP subsidies are paid directly to the childcare provider. Jackson and his wife, Faria, submitted or directed the submission of dozens of CCAP applications, employment verification letters, redetermination forms, and monthly childcare certificate reports that contained materially false information. The state paid over $2.28 million in subsidies to Jackson’s daycares. A jury convicted Jackson and Faria of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and making a false statement, 18 U.S.C. 1001 for his role in the scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Faria was not unduly prejudiced by the joint trial or by the jury seeing a redacted copy of the indictment. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Menominee Tribal Officer Nickodem was summoned to a school, concerning seven-year-old T. T. told a school counselor that her one-year-old brother had a head injury and that her mom’s boyfriend beat her mom and hurt her brother. Nickodem never met T. but asked a child protective worker to accompany him on a welfare check. Nickodem knocked and announced his presence. He heard movement and saw a curtain move. He knocked again. He heard a door lock. He could not see inside the home; there were no obvious signs of distress. Nickodem called his supervisor who was with the tribal prosecutor. Nickodem did not state that he was not certain who was in the house. The prosecutor stated that he should enter the home. Nickodem again knocked and announced, then kicked down the door. Officers entered, found T.’s mother, Tepiew, a four-month-old infant, and the one-year-old child, who had apparent head injuries. Tepiew had an injury around her eye. The officers heard noises and found her boyfriend, Johnson, in a closet. There were active warrants for Johnson’s arrest. Tepiew was treated as a victim and was not arrested. One-year-old D.T. had a fractured skull, multiple bruises, a healing tibial fracture, and indications of a liver injury. Eventually, Tepiew admitted that she had inflicted D.T.'s injuries while intoxicated. She was charged with assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6) and 1153. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of her motion to suppress, finding the warrantless search justified by an emergency. View "United States v. Tepiew" on Justia Law

After leaving rehab, Sweeney asked Wilson if he “wanted to get high one more time.” Wilson agreed and called Waldrip, who supplied the heroin, then left. Sweeney drove Wilson to purchase supplies for injecting heroin. Wilson injected himself and Sweeney. Sweeney passed out, woke up, and told Wilson to take her home. Wilson stayed at Sweeney’s house that night, woke up in withdrawal, stole Sweeney’s belongings, and left. Sweeney’s sister found Sweeney dead. Wilson claimed that Sweeney was alive when he left and agreed to testify that Waldrip sold the heroin. Officers arrested Waldrip after an undercover DEA agent bought heroin from Waldrip three separate times. The government charged Waldrip with distributing heroin to Sweeney and Wilson and three counts of distributing heroin to the agent. 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Waldrip agreed to stipulate that government experts (a pathologist and a forensic toxicologist) would testify that, but for her use of heroin right before her death, Sweeney would not have died. The jury convicted Waldrip of selling the heroin that caused Sweeney’s death. Section 841(b)(1)(C) imposes a 20‐year mandatory‐minimum sentence on one who distributes a controlled substance and “death … results from the use of such substance.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed Waldrip’s 280-month sentence, rejecting arguments that the government provided insufficient evidence to prove that the heroin was a but‐for cause of death, that section 841(b)(1)(C) is unconstitutionally vague, and that the 280‐month sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality requirement. View "United States v. Waldrip" on Justia Law

Klemis sold heroin. One of his young customers overdosed on heroin in Klemis’s driveway and nearly died. McKinney, age 19, another regular customer and occasional driver for Klemis, fatally overdosed on heroin supplied by Klemis. Klemis was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin, distribution of heroin to persons under 21, using a minor in a drug operation, and heroin distribution resulting in death. During jury selection, Juror 28 said that her brother had wrestled with drug addiction but assured the court that she could be fair to both sides and was seated without objection. In closing argument the prosecutor referred at length to Dante’s Inferno and its depiction of the inhabitants of the nine circles of hell, assigning Klemis to the innermost circle reserved for the worst of the damned. The prosecutor also stated that “heroin kills” and described a witness as a “straight citizen,” “not an addict.” The jury convicted him; the judge imposed a 240-month prison term. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The closing argument “crossed the line,” but was not prejudicial given the quantity and quality of the evidence against Klemis. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence relating to McKinney’s death, an argument about hearsay evidence, and a complaint about juror bias. View "United States v. Klemis" on Justia Law