Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kibambe Mwendapeke, a permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of the Congo, was convicted of complicity to robbery in the first degree under Kentucky law. Later, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Mwendapeke based on his conviction. He appealed, arguing that his conviction should not categorize him as an "aggravated felon," which would render him removable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction is indeed a categorical match for an "aggravated felony."The court applied the categorical approach to determine whether Mwendapeke's crime was a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), a requirement for classification as an "aggravated felony." The court found that Kentucky’s first-degree robbery statute, under which Mwendapeke was convicted, meets the level of force and has the required mens rea, or state of mind, for a "crime of violence" under § 16(a). The court also concluded that Kentucky’s complicity statute is not overbroad with respect to generic aiding-and-abetting liability. Therefore, the court ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction constituted an aggravated felony, making him removable. The court denied his petition for review. View "Mwendapeke v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Federal prisoner Sargeant filed a grievance against a prison official, Cruze, after she commented on his sexual preferences and refused to give him books that he had ordered. When Sargeant's case manager, Barfield, showed Sargeant the prison’s response, Sargeant noticed that it was signed by Cruze and pointed out that, under the prison’s rules, Cruze should not have seen a grievance lodged against her. Barfield then told others about the grievance. Sargeant filed a separate grievance against Barfield. In retaliation, Barfield “repeatedly” put Sargeant, who had cooperated with the government, in cells with prisoners known to be violent. This led to fights until Sargeant was transferred to another prison.Sargeant sued seeking monetary damages, alleging that Barfield retaliated against him for filing grievances. He did not identify which of his constitutional rights she had allegedly violated. In screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the judge decided that Sargeant could proceed only on a First Amendment retaliation claim and did not discuss any possible Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Under the Bivens doctrine, a federal prisoner cannot recover damages for a violation of First Amendment rights. Recognizing a failure-to-protect claim in this context would risk intrusion with the federal prison system; the claim presents separation-of-powers concerns and special factors not accounted for by any of the Supreme Court’s Bivens precedents. View "Sargeant v. Barfield" on Justia Law

Escorted by an officer who had followed him from the scene of a shooting, Hudson entered the Medical Center seeking emergency treatment for a gunshot wound. The officer stood outside Hudson’s hospital room. Medical staff discovered Hudson was concealing “something plastic” in his mouth and spent nearly 20 minutes admonishing Hudson to spit it out before he finally complied, revealing a device used to convert a firearm into a fully automatic weapon. Hudson moved to suppress the device, arguing that the medical staff acted as government agents in conducting a warrantless search.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Knowledge and inaction alone are insufficient to establish an agency relationship. There must be some evidence of government participation in or affirmative encouragement of the private search before a court will hold it unconstitutional. Viewed in context, the officer answered questions but did not direct the medical staff to act in any particular way. The facts supported a finding that medical staff acted with the purpose of providing medical treatment, not assisting law enforcement. The court noted that both the officer and the medical staff apparently assumed that Hudson was concealing drugs, voicing concerns that the suspected drugs could cause him to overdose. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Two men buzzed a neighboring unit and explained they were trying to contact Apartment 7’s resident. Neighbors admitted them but moments later heard gunshots. Neighbors called 9-1-1. Police saw bullet holes in Apartment 7’s door, shell casings on the stairs, and an empty gun holster. Considering whether someone inside needed assistance, officers called an ambulance, unsuccessfully tried to contact anyone inside, and attempted to open the door manually. They then used a sledgehammer, which fractured the door, splintered the doorjamb, and overcame the deadbolt 10 minutes after the police arrived. Police immediately smelled raw cannabis and saw loose cannabis. Sergeant Barksdale entered a bedroom, saw a large closet, opened the closet door, and found cannabis. In the living room, he opened another large closet, pushed aside clothing, and found a rifle. The search lasted about 90 seconds. Maxwell arrived. Police determined that it was his apartment and obtained a search warrant. During the subsequent search, they found two guns, more than 10 pounds of marijuana, and $75,000 in cash.After the denial of his motion to suppress, Maxwell conditionally pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of firearms as a felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. When the police entered Maxwell’s apartment, they had an objectively reasonable basis for believing someone was injured inside, their entrance did not cause excessive or unnecessary damage, and they searched only in places where an injured person could be. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Officers used a confidential source (CS) for two controlled methamphetamine buys from Deeren. The CS met Deeren at a gas station and went to 3243 Brouse Avenue in Dereen's car. The CS handed Deeren cash; Deeren entered the house. Minutes later, Deeren returned and handed the CS meth. The two returned to the gas station, where the CS gave the meth to an undercover officer. Deeren used a different car each time. Officers obtained a warrant to search the residence and any vehicles on its premises. Days later, they arranged another controlled buy and observed Miles using a key to enter the residence. When Deeren and the CS arrived, Deeren approached Miles on the front porch. Officers arrested both men and executed the warrant. After waiving his Miranda rights, Miles admitted to living at the house and owning two vehicles on the premises (not those used during the controlled buys). The officers found 107.3 grams of meth inside a vehicle, 160.5 grams of meth in the house, 124 grams of a mixture containing cocaine, two rifles, and drug distribution paraphernalia.Miles, charged with possession with intent to distribute meth and a mixture containing cocaine and knowing possession of two firearms, argued that the warrant did not establish probable cause and was not sufficiently particular. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress but vacated Miles’s 240-month sentence, remanding for the purpose of vacating one of his firearm sentences and merging his two firearm convictions. View "United States v. Miles" on Justia Law

In 2010, Sweatt pleaded guilty to five counts of armed bank robbery. The district court ordered him to pay $20,038.52 under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A–3664. In the “Payment Schedule,” the court selected “immediately.” Sweatt declined to participate in the Bureau’s Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, through which the Bureau allocates portions of prisoners’ incomes to their restitution debts. In 2023, the district court authorized the Bureau of Prisons to turn over $600 of $1,100 in Sweatt’s prison trust account to be applied toward his restitution debt. Sweatt then had hip replacement surgery, preventing him from working for about 18 months.Sweatt moved to modify his judgment to halt his restitution payments until he resumes working; 18 U.S.C. 3664(k) provides that once a court receives notification of “any material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances that might affect the defendant’s ability to pay restitution,” the court may “adjust the payment schedule.” The Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of his motion. Sweatt did not ask to alter the fact or amount of restitution or to usurp the Bureau’s exclusive authority to impose a pre-release payment plan. The government assumed that Sweatt was trying to alter his obligations under a Program agreement with the Bureau but no such agreement existed. Generally, district courts lack jurisdiction to modify a sentence, but they can do so when authorized by statute; section 3664(k) permits the court to modify the restitution schedule. View "United States v. Sweatt" on Justia Law

Pemberton sold methamphetamine to an undercover informant and pleaded guilty to distributing drugs, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Ordinarily, distributing the quantity of drugs Pemberton admitted to distributing carries a 10-year minimum sentence. The district court ruled that his 2003 conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery under Indiana law was a “serious violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(2)(F), subjecting him to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. Although Pemberton had not agreed that his co-participant would carry a weapon, and his co-participant was never convicted, the court reasoned that the facts of his crime included a dangerous weapon that caused serious harm (his coconspirator fired a gun during the robbery, hitting a bystander), and his plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery precluded him from denying his involvement in a conspiracy.On appeal. Pemberton argued that Indiana’s crime of conspiracy is not a categorical match to the federal conspiracy counterpart of section 3559(c)(2)(F) and not a “serious violent felony” meriting the enhanced minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pemberton raised his argument for the first time on appeal and therefore forfeited it. He has not demonstrated that the district court plainly erred when it determined his prior conviction was a serious violent felony, View "United States v. Pemberton" on Justia Law

Pfister and Evans dealt methamphetamine in Illinois. In 2016, they traveled to Colorado approximately 20 times to buy meth from Wright. After Evans sold several ounces to Heavener, officers searched Heavener’s home and recovered over 50 grams of meth. Heavener knew that Evans got the meth from “Monica” in Colorado.Wright was charged with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of meth and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing meth. She retained Garfinkel. In its opening statement, the government previewed testimony from Evans, Pfister, Heavener, and Deherrera, a Colorado-based middleman. Garfinkle also foreshadowed testimony from Deherrera, referring to him as the government’s witness. During trial, the government alerted the court that Deherrera had stated that Garfinkel had encouraged him to change his testimony. The government referenced Deherrera’s potentially exculpatory testimony but stated that it no longer planned to call him as a witness, noting that if Wright called Deherrera and he testified to being pressured to change his testimony, Garfinkel would have to take the stand to impeach him. Garfinkel denied Deherrera’s allegations. The court questioned Wright, who confirmed she agreed with Garfinkel’s strategy to not call Deherrera, understanding the possibility that Garfinkel was personally motivated. Deherrera did not testify. In closing arguments, Garfinkel described Deherrera’s absence as the missing link—a burden the government had to overcome to convict Wright. Wright was convicted and sentenced to 264 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no conflict of interest and sufficient evidence of conspiracy. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Williams pled guilty to four counts under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); (b)(1)(B), based on his role in a large-scale methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy. The government portrayed Williams as a major supplier to other dealers and individual users, asserting that he was responsible for the distribution of more than 48 kilograms (105 pounds) of methamphetamine over the course of the conspiracy. The government’s investigation linked three deaths to methamphetamine supplied by Williams. Laboratory testing of different batches of drugs supplied by Williams and confiscated by law enforcement indicated that the tested drugs were between 96 to 100% pure methamphetamine. Ten people who purchased significant quantities of methamphetamine from Williams testified at his sentencing hearing about the quantities of drugs they bought from him. Several also testified about threats he made to them to induce payment and about his possession and use of firearms. Officers had also orchestrated a controlled buy with audio and visual recording in which Williams’ associate provided the source with approximately 20 grams of methamphetamine.After calculating a U.S.S.G. range of 360 months to life range, the court imposed a 360-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning sentence disparities and the application of the enhancement for credible threats of violence. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Pacilio and Bases were senior traders on the precious metals trading desk at Bank of America. While working together in 2010-2011, and at times separately before and after that period, they engaged in “spoofing” to manipulate the prices of precious metals using an electronic trading platform, that allows traders to place buy or sell orders on certain numbers of futures contracts at a set price. It is assumed that every order is bona fide and placed with “intent to transact.” Spoofing consists of placing a (typically) large order, on one side of the market with intent to trade, and placing a spoof order, fully visible but not intended to be traded, on the other side. The spoof order pushes the market price to benefit the other order, allowing the trader to get the desired price. The spoof order is canceled before it can be filled.Pacilio and Bases challenged the constitutionality of their convictions for wire fraud affecting a financial institution and related charges, the sufficiency of the evidence, and evidentiary rulings relating to testimony about the Exchange’s and bank prohibitions on spoofing to support the government’s implied misrepresentation theory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants had sufficient notice that their spoofing scheme was prohibited by law. View "United States v. Bases" on Justia Law