Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Baker, sued (Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)) to obtain records connected to an FBI investigation into a protection racket run by Chicago police officers. The FBI gave him redacted records. He sought disclosure of the names of FBI agents involved in the investigation, Chicago police officers who assisted them, and officers who were investigated but not charged. He argued that the light sentences relative to the magnitude of the criminal activity reflected inadequate investigation. The FBI invoked FOIA exemptions for “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and for records and other information compiled for law enforcement purposes if their disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The FBI’s concern was that public identification could endanger individuals by identifying them to gangsters still involved in the racket and would unfairly stigmatize officers. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the FBI, noting that it is purely an investigatory agency and does not make charging decisions sentencing suggestions. Baker’s theory that release of the names would enable the public to determine whether the Bureau had adequately staffed the investigation was farfetched. View "Baker v. Federal Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Awaiting trial on state charges for armed robbery and unlawful restraint, Hudson's public defender advised that he faced a sentence of six-60 years. He rejected a plea deal that offered 16 years. Hudson was convicted. At sentencing, it was discovered that his criminal history including convictions for murder, armed robbery, burglary, felony theft, and felony drug possession. Hudson received a mandatory natural life sentence without the possibility of parole. After exhausting state appeals, Hudson filed a federal habeas action, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court issued the writ, ordering the state to reoffer Hudson the original plea deal. Hudson accepted a plea deal for attempted armed robbery, to avoid a mandatory life sentence. The judge declined to rule, stating that she had no jurisdiction because “orders from the Appellate Court … suggested all issues addressed by this Court were correct, and … nothing from the Federal Court that suggests otherwise.” The original sentence had not been vacated; the new agreement was contrary to Illinois law, in suggesting that Hudson plead guilty to an offense that he was not convicted of. The judge stated that she would have rejected the plea deal even if she were considering it for the first time, considering Hudson’s criminal history. Hudson’s state court appeal remains pending. Hudson filed a federal “motion to enforce” that sought his immediate release. The district judge denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. State prosecutors complied with the original writ, but a state judge refused to accept the deal. Hudson received all the relief he sought in his first habeas action. View "Hudson v. Lashbrook" on Justia Law

Bennett pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Ordinarily, the maximum punishment for that crime is 120 months in prison but the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), requires a minimum sentence of 180 months in prison for persons who violate section 922(g)(1) after having accumulated three or more convictions for committing a “violent felony.” Bennett’s plea agreement provided that he would be sentenced to 180 months. Before his sentencing hearing, Bennett argued that his conviction for violating an Indiana law that punishes resisting law enforcement was not a crime of violence. The district judge disagreed and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A “violent felony” is a crime that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” None of the offenses identified in the Indiana statute need involve a use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against anyone; none are felonies; violation of the statute is merely a misdemeanor. View "United States v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Bogdanov pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2314, and one count of substantive violation of the same law, stemming from his family’s multi‐million dollar shoplifting scheme. The district court sentenced him to 48 months’ imprisonment and entered a preliminary order of forfeiture in the amount of $2.8 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the forfeiture order and the total loss amount that supported his advisory sentencing guidelines range. The government demonstrated through direct evidence and Bogdanov’s own admissions that Bogdanov was in the business of stealing and reselling the same types of consumer retail goods that he sold to an informant. Bogdanov marshaled no evidence showing that any of the alleged goods in question were obtained legitimately: he produced neither receipts nor any other evidence of a legal source for the goods. The fact that the informant reported that Bogdanov had told him that the goods were not stolen was not evidence that Bogdanov had a legitimate source for the goods. The district court was within its discretion to disregard that statement when assessing the evidence. View "United States v. Bogdanov" on Justia Law

Tyson pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The plea agreement included a stipulation that, under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), the applicable base offense level was 24; Tyson had a prior federal conviction for possession of heroin, and a prior Wisconsin conviction for burglary. The parties agreed the burglary constituted a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2). The PSR recommended a two–level enhancement because the firearm was stolen, and a three–level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting a range of 92-115 months’ imprisonment. Tyson objected to the stolen firearm enhancement but did not object to the characterization of his burglary as a crime of violence. The court noted that Tyson was sincere in his regret for his actions and stated that the Guidelines were “a bit off the chart” as applied to Tyson’s situation, given that Tyson’s state and federal supervision that would be revoked as a result of the conviction. The court sentenced Tyson to 50 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While it was plain error for the court to use Tyson’s Wisconsin burglary conviction as a predicate under section 2K2.1(a), it “can hardly be said that such a sentence constitutes a miscarriage of justice.” View "United States v. Tyson" on Justia Law

A man entered a Rock Falls bank and handed the teller (Miller) a robbery note. Miller handed over $1,870. Miller immediately filled out a form, describing the robber's appearance and clothing. Police thought, based on the description, that Gonzalez was involved. Miller was shown poor quality printouts of Gonzalez’s driver’s license pictures, taken three years earlier. She stated that she did not recognize the person, although she thought one photograph depicted a man with features similar to those of the robber. Police released a still image taken from the bank’s video surveillance system. An employee at a restaurant close to the bank saw the photo and contacted the police because she had seen the sweatshirt in a dumpster. An officer retrieved the sweatshirt and found $20 bills in the pocket. Others told the police that they thought the robber in the still image resembled Gonzalez and connected him to the sweatshirt. Miller quickly identified Gonzalez from a six-man photo array that included his Facebook photo. Gonzalez was addicted to crack cocaine and stated that his addiction was “out of control.” Gonzalez was scheduled to visit his daughter at the time of the robbery, at a Rock Falls McDonald’s, next to the restaurant; he missed the visit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction for bank robbery. Although there were significant problems with the challenged identification procedures, any error was harmless. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Mabie was unhappy with police response to a burglary at his place of business and started sending vulgar and threatening messages to officers. He was convicted of sending threatening letters through the mail, 18 U.S.C. 876(c). In a second case, Mabie was convicted of assaulting a deputy U.S. marshal. Mabie received prison terms totaling 340 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Mabie’s claim that, in the threat case, the district court improperly admitted evidence (voicemails, statements, letters) under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Despite the absence of specific findings that the evidence fulfilled a non-propensity purpose and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value, given the court’s actions and statements combined with the limiting instruction and evidence tutorial given at trial, the court committed no error. The district court did not err by refusing to allow Mabie to proceed pro se in the assault case and by forcing him to attend trial after he had waived his right to be present in the courtroom. The court noted his disruptive behavior at trial. View "United States v. Mabie" on Justia Law

Perry bought shotgun shells at a Wal‐Mart. Hours later, police were dispatched to a restaurant, where Perry was arguing with his ex‐girlfriend, Tice. The officers asked Perry to leave. Perry complied, but returned, confronted Tice in the parking lot, and shot her to death in front of their son and Tice’s mother. The police quickly arrested Perry and found the murder weapon and ammunition in his truck. Petty was convicted of murder in state court. In federal court, Perry pleaded guilty to two counts under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), as a felon in possession of a firearm and of ammunition. The court found that Perry qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), because he had three prior “violent felony” convictions: two for burglary in Indiana, and one for battery resulting in serious bodily injury. Perry argued at sentencing that the two felon-in-possession counts were identical and should merge so that the sentences would run concurrently. Without explicitly addressing that argument, the court imposed a 360‐month sentence on each count, to run concurrently to each other and to the state sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Perry’s two burglary convictions were valid ACCA predicate offenses. The two section 922(g)(1) counts were not multiplicitous; the evidence showed that the gun and ammunition were acquired separately. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

From 2003-2006, while employed as Director of Application for the American Hospital Association (AHA), Sayyed directed overpriced contracts to companies in exchange for kickbacks. Sayyed eventually pled guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the AHA $940,450.00 restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. 18 U.S.C. 3663A. As of November 2015, Sayyed still owed $650,234.25. In post‐conviction proceedings, the government sought to enforce the restitution judgment under 18 U.S.C. 3613, which permits such enforcement “in accordance with the practices and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment.” The government served citations to Vanguard and Aetna to discover assets in Sayyed’s retirement accounts, then sought turnover orders alleging that the companies possessed retirement accounts with approximately $327,000 in non‐exempt funds. Sayyed argued that his retirement accounts were exempt “earnings” subject to the 25% garnishment cap of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The district court granted the government’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that because Sayyed, who was 48‐years‐old at the time, had the right to withdraw the entirety of his accounts at will, the funds were not “earnings.” The CCPA garnishment cap only protects periodic distributions pursuant to a retirement program. View "United States v. Sayyed" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Public Health furnishes funds to organizations that provide health services, including the Broadcast Ministers Alliance, Access Wellness and Racial Equity, and Medical Health Association, which, collectively, received more than $11 million from the Department between 2004 and 2010. About $4.5 million of those dollars flowed through the grantees to Advance Health, Social & Educational Associates which was owned and controlled by the Dingles, who spent the diverted funds on personal luxuries, such as yachts and vacation homes. In 2012, Leon was charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 371), 13 counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), and two counts of money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1957(a)). The charges against Karin were similar. A jury convicted them on all counts. The district court apparently considered their ages (Leon was 78 and Karin 76 at the time): Leon received a 72‐month sentence based on a range of 78-97 months; Karin received a 36‐month sentence based on a range of 41-51 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury instructions violated the Fifth Amendment because they allegedly made acquittal only optional upon a finding of reasonable doubt; the court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 when it permitted the admission of evidence of Leon’s marital infidelity; and the sentences were unreasonable. View "United States v. Dingle" on Justia Law