Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man entered a Rock Falls bank and handed the teller (Miller) a robbery note. Miller handed over $1,870. Miller immediately filled out a form, describing the robber's appearance and clothing. Police thought, based on the description, that Gonzalez was involved. Miller was shown poor quality printouts of Gonzalez’s driver’s license pictures, taken three years earlier. She stated that she did not recognize the person, although she thought one photograph depicted a man with features similar to those of the robber. Police released a still image taken from the bank’s video surveillance system. An employee at a restaurant close to the bank saw the photo and contacted the police because she had seen the sweatshirt in a dumpster. An officer retrieved the sweatshirt and found $20 bills in the pocket. Others told the police that they thought the robber in the still image resembled Gonzalez and connected him to the sweatshirt. Miller quickly identified Gonzalez from a six-man photo array that included his Facebook photo. Gonzalez was addicted to crack cocaine and stated that his addiction was “out of control.” Gonzalez was scheduled to visit his daughter at the time of the robbery, at a Rock Falls McDonald’s, next to the restaurant; he missed the visit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction for bank robbery. Although there were significant problems with the challenged identification procedures, any error was harmless. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Mabie was unhappy with police response to a burglary at his place of business and started sending vulgar and threatening messages to officers. He was convicted of sending threatening letters through the mail, 18 U.S.C. 876(c). In a second case, Mabie was convicted of assaulting a deputy U.S. marshal. Mabie received prison terms totaling 340 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Mabie’s claim that, in the threat case, the district court improperly admitted evidence (voicemails, statements, letters) under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Despite the absence of specific findings that the evidence fulfilled a non-propensity purpose and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value, given the court’s actions and statements combined with the limiting instruction and evidence tutorial given at trial, the court committed no error. The district court did not err by refusing to allow Mabie to proceed pro se in the assault case and by forcing him to attend trial after he had waived his right to be present in the courtroom. The court noted his disruptive behavior at trial. View "United States v. Mabie" on Justia Law

Perry bought shotgun shells at a Wal‐Mart. Hours later, police were dispatched to a restaurant, where Perry was arguing with his ex‐girlfriend, Tice. The officers asked Perry to leave. Perry complied, but returned, confronted Tice in the parking lot, and shot her to death in front of their son and Tice’s mother. The police quickly arrested Perry and found the murder weapon and ammunition in his truck. Petty was convicted of murder in state court. In federal court, Perry pleaded guilty to two counts under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), as a felon in possession of a firearm and of ammunition. The court found that Perry qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), because he had three prior “violent felony” convictions: two for burglary in Indiana, and one for battery resulting in serious bodily injury. Perry argued at sentencing that the two felon-in-possession counts were identical and should merge so that the sentences would run concurrently. Without explicitly addressing that argument, the court imposed a 360‐month sentence on each count, to run concurrently to each other and to the state sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Perry’s two burglary convictions were valid ACCA predicate offenses. The two section 922(g)(1) counts were not multiplicitous; the evidence showed that the gun and ammunition were acquired separately. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

From 2003-2006, while employed as Director of Application for the American Hospital Association (AHA), Sayyed directed overpriced contracts to companies in exchange for kickbacks. Sayyed eventually pled guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the AHA $940,450.00 restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. 18 U.S.C. 3663A. As of November 2015, Sayyed still owed $650,234.25. In post‐conviction proceedings, the government sought to enforce the restitution judgment under 18 U.S.C. 3613, which permits such enforcement “in accordance with the practices and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment.” The government served citations to Vanguard and Aetna to discover assets in Sayyed’s retirement accounts, then sought turnover orders alleging that the companies possessed retirement accounts with approximately $327,000 in non‐exempt funds. Sayyed argued that his retirement accounts were exempt “earnings” subject to the 25% garnishment cap of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The district court granted the government’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that because Sayyed, who was 48‐years‐old at the time, had the right to withdraw the entirety of his accounts at will, the funds were not “earnings.” The CCPA garnishment cap only protects periodic distributions pursuant to a retirement program. View "United States v. Sayyed" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Public Health furnishes funds to organizations that provide health services, including the Broadcast Ministers Alliance, Access Wellness and Racial Equity, and Medical Health Association, which, collectively, received more than $11 million from the Department between 2004 and 2010. About $4.5 million of those dollars flowed through the grantees to Advance Health, Social & Educational Associates which was owned and controlled by the Dingles, who spent the diverted funds on personal luxuries, such as yachts and vacation homes. In 2012, Leon was charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 371), 13 counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), and two counts of money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1957(a)). The charges against Karin were similar. A jury convicted them on all counts. The district court apparently considered their ages (Leon was 78 and Karin 76 at the time): Leon received a 72‐month sentence based on a range of 78-97 months; Karin received a 36‐month sentence based on a range of 41-51 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury instructions violated the Fifth Amendment because they allegedly made acquittal only optional upon a finding of reasonable doubt; the court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 when it permitted the admission of evidence of Leon’s marital infidelity; and the sentences were unreasonable. View "United States v. Dingle" on Justia Law

In 2002, Jones was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).; he was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment and eight years’ supervised release. The district court imposed several conditions of supervised released, including drug testing, mental health treatment, and sex offender treatment.Jones appealed but did not challenge the conditions of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2006. In 2014, Jones began serving his supervised release, but over the following year, he did not comply with several conditions. In December 2015, Jones’ probation officer filed a petition to revoke his term of supervised release, alleging that Jones: failed to participate in sex offender treatment; failed to comply with mental health treatment; violated the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act; and possessed a controlled substance. Jones admitted that he violated all four conditions. With a Grade B violation and a criminal history category of VI, Jones’ recommended Guidelines range was 21-27 months’ imprisonment. “Without a discernable explanation,” the district court sentenced Jones to the statutory maximum of 60 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the sentencing transcript did not allow meaningful review. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

King obtained personal identifying information for more than 100 people, including the Director of the National Security Agency, then created and attempt to use 185 credit and debit cards. He also prepared and submitted 62 false tax refund claims. Reported actual losses from his crimes totaled only $10,980. King was arrested in June 2014. He was not detained before trial. In November King was arrested again, having resumed his fraudulent activities. King pled guilty to five counts, including aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), which requires a minimum sentence of 24 months consecutive to any other sentence. The court sentenced King to concurrent terms of 24 and 30 months on three access device fraud counts, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a) and 1029(b)(1) and the fraudulent tax refund count, 18 U.S.C. 287, which was below the applicable guideline range, then added the mandatory consecutive 24 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge did what he was supposed to do: calculate the offense level and criminal history category under the Guidelines, then use his independent judgment under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) to impose a sentence tailored to the individual offender and his crimes. The court rejected King’s argument that section 3553(a)'s “parsimony principle,” which instructs the court to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to serve the statutory purposes of sentencing, required an adjustment of the guideline calculations themselves. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Jones lived with Kelley. Kelley’s daughter (MK) went to a neighbor to call the police to report that Jones sexually assaulted her. Westville police officers went to the scene. Kelley stated that she was afraid of Jones; MK stated that she had been sexually assaulted by Jones for several years. Kelley stated that Jones was a convicted felon, was violent, and had guns in a bedroom safe. The officers verified that Jones was a felon, then went to the residence. Jones opened the door. Officers observed knives on a counter and told Jones that he needed to vacate the premises. Jones followed instructions. He was handcuffed at a picnic table, 10-20 feet from the door. Kelley signed a consent to search form. In the couple’s bedroom, officers found two gun safes, boxes of ammunition, and empty gun holsters. They saw several guns in one safe, which was partially open. The officers stopped the search, obtained a warrant, then seized 12 firearms, over a thousand rounds of ammunition, 17 clips, and several scopes. Jones was charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. Jones failed to object to the search when it occurred; the initial search was conducted with Kelley’s consent and the guns were in plain view, The officers did not unlawfully detain or remove Jones; they had probable cause to arrest him. The guns would have inevitably been discovered. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Aguilar, an inmate, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was confined for 90 days without a hearing based on a purported violation of extended supervision, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. For offenses committed before December 31, 1999, Wisconsin offenders are released from prison to “parole,” whereas for offenses committed after January 1, 2000, the offenders are released to “extended supervision.”Although the supervision for each status is essentially the same, there are legal differences between parole and extended supervision that dictate the punishments available for rule violations. Aguilar was convicted in 1996 and on February 23, 2010, he was released on parole. When Aguilar failed to report, his parole agent completed a Violation Investigation Report in which she properly checked the box indicating he was on “Parole,” but after Aguilar was arrested, she completed an Order to Detain form in which she erroneously checked the box indicating that Aguilar was on “Extended Supervision.” Aguilar admitted to violating rules. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the claims. Aguilar’s evidence supported only a claim of negligent conduct, which is insufficient to support a due process claim or an Eighth Amendment claim. View "Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police arrested Moseley at his house after M.K. accused him of domestic violence. While searching Moseley’s apartment, officers found handcuffs, rope, and other items associated with sexual bondage and seized Moseley’s computer, camera, external hard drive, and CDs and sent the electronic devices to the Department of Justice. When DOJ detectives searched the devices, they discovered nude photos of M.K. and of T.H., who worked with Moseley at a U.S. Marshal’s office. T.H. alleged that Moseley forced her into a sexual relationship by threatening her job. Her statement also chronicled his abusive behavior. The state charged Moseley with possessing nude photos of T.H. taken without her consent. Wis. Stat. 942.09(2). Moseley’s primary defense was that the two had been in a consensual relationship and that T.H. had consented to the photos. Before trial, Moseley unsuccessfully sought in camera review of T.H.’s mental-health records. Moseley was convicted. Wisconsin courts affirmed the denial of in camera review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court decisions that the records did not contain material impeachment evidence and that whether T.H. consented to the relationship was immaterial to whether she consented to the photographs, were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Moseley v. Kemper" on Justia Law