Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police executed a warrant at Harper’s home and recovered a stolen firearm, 109.9 grams of methamphetamine (about 400 individual uses), a digital scale, plastic baggies, and 0.61 grams of heroin in small foil packages. Harper was charged as a habitual offender based on his prior felony convictions for burglary, battery on a minor, theft, and marijuana distribution. Harper also had three misdemeanor convictions; his probation had been revoked three times. On the methamphetamine conviction, Harper faced 20-50 years in prison. The habitual-offender finding allowed the judge to add one-to-three times the advisory sentence for the underlying offense. The judge imposed a sentence of 40 years on the methamphetamine conviction, 15 concurrent years on the heroin conviction, plus two years for receiving stolen property, and a consecutive 30-year habitual-offender enhancement (72 years). Appellate counsel urged the court to reduce the sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). That court affirmed Harper’s sentence, stating that Harper’s “brief [was] devoid of an argument supported by cogent reasoning” and deemed the issue waived. Harper sought state post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The appellate court affirmed denial of relief, holding that the waiver was not prejudicial because Harper’s sentence was not inappropriate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas review relief. The Indiana court reasonably applied Strickland. The argument was really an attack on that court’s resolution of a question of state law embedded within its analysis of a Strickland claim. View "Harper v. Brown" on Justia Law

Campbell, age 69 years, has been diagnosed with schizoaffective and post‐traumatic stress disorders. In 2012, Campbell was residing in a Chicago Reentry Center, completing his sentence for a 2005 conviction for entering a bank with intent to commit robbery. He was given a pass to a hospital but entered a grocery store. He walked through the store, gathering sunglasses, a turquoise and purple squirt gun, and a bottle of tequila. He entered the restroom, turned his shirt inside out, put on the sunglasses, and drank the liquor. He then approached the tellers at a branch bank inside the store. Pointing the squirt gun, he said, “Let’s make this easy.” The tellers filled his bag with $1495. Campbell was arrested in the parking lot. . He was indicted for bank robbery by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). In 2015, his competency restored, Campbell agreed to plead guilty and that he would be a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a) because bank robbery by intimidation is a crime of violence. His lawyer nonetheless argued that the crime of violence definition requires specific intent and bank robbery by intimidation is a general intent offense. The district court and Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that bank robbery by intimidation is a crime of violence under the elements clause of the pre-2016 version of section 4B1.2(a). View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Imperial Insane Vice Lords (Double-Is) street gang controlled the “Keystone Drug Market” in Chicago. Pagan and Hawthorne were members and began selling narcotics in 2000 and 2005, respectively. Brown a member of the Mafia Insane Vice Lords, purchased narcotics from the Double-Is and sold them on Keystone Avenue beginning in 2007; he was eventually required to pay a “tax,” in money or drugs, to sell drugs on Keystone Avenue. A police investigation, involving wiretaps and controlled purchases of narcotics, led to the indictment of 24 individuals in 2013. The indictment charged Brown, Hawthorne, and Pagan with various counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, heroin, cocaine base, and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 846; distributing narcotics, section 841(a)(1); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Brown pleaded guilty to the distribution charges. A jury convicted Hawthorne and Pagan of their possession and distribution charges and convicted all three of the conspiracy charge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to a jury instruction concerning the term “street tax,” and alleging a Brady violation. The court vacated Pagan’s sentence. View "United States v. Pagan" on Justia Law

Thompson found a 15-year-old runaway and promised her modeling work. She got into his truck. He and his wife stole a camper. The three embarked on a six-week trip, during which he sold the girl’s sexual services to at least 15 men across three states and had sex with the girl several times. The Thompsons took sexually suggestive pictures of the girl and posted them on Backpage.com, hiding her face to prevent rescue attempts. He told the girl to have customers touch her vagina before she agreed to have sex with them, to ensure that they were not police. He repeatedly threatened her. Thompson eventually sold the girl to a truck driver for $2000. Another truck driver eventually returned her to Illinois; she contacted her family. Thompson pled guilty to sex trafficking of a child by force, fraud, or coercion and conspiracy to do the same, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)–(2); 1594(c), without a plea deal. Thompson admitted that he read the presentence report with his attorney and that everything was accurate. The court calculated Thompson’s guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment; analyzed the section 3553 factors; and imposed a life sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Thompson made a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. The court conducted a thorough and proper plea colloquy. Thompson had pled guilty to crimes nine times before. “Thompson has earned his life sentence.” View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Enoch pleaded guilty to robbing a person having custody of property belonging to the United States, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a) and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). He reserved his right to appeal the district court’s ruling that the former offense qualified as a crime of violence, rendering his brandishing a gun in connection with that offense a separate crime that required a consecutive sentence. Enoch’s sentence (total 108 months) increased significantly because the court considered the conviction under section 2114(a) to be a crime of violence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Applying the “categorical approach,” the court stated that the underlying crime of robbing another of government property “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” View "United States v. Enoch" on Justia Law

Simpson, convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1), moved for a new trial, alleging that his counsel was ineffective by: failure to interview and call witnesses with potentially exculpatory evidence (Simpson’s mother, Donna, and Lintzenich and Hoffstot, who previously had accompanied Burdell and Simpson on drug buying trips); failure to effectively cross-examine government witnesses; inaccurate assessment of the government’s case, including advising Simpson to reject a plea bargain; and failure to prepare Simpson to testify. Simpson attached an affidavit asserting that he had told counsel that he wanted the women to testify and notarized letters: Donna stated that Burdell told her at the time of Simpson’s arrest that Simpson was “tak[ing] the rap for [Burdell].” Lintzenich heard Burdell and another say that Simpson took the rap, never saw Simpson sell heroin or buy drugs, and stated he “purchased [h]eroin for personal use only.” Hoffstot stated that he had witnessed “Burdell buying the [h]eroin” on other trips and that Simpson did not “deal[]” heroin. The district court declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, finding “no reasonable possibility” that the proposed testimony would have changed the outcome. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Simpson alleged sufficient facts to support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. View "United States v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Williams and Carpenter entered a Homewood, Illinois, bank, each carrying a nine‐millimeter handgun. Williams pointed his gun and forced several employees to the ground while Carpenter ordered others to open the vault. The robbers left with more than $80,000 in cash. The next day, the men were located with the getaway car, the missing cash, the bank’s anti‐theft devices, and two nine‐millimeter handguns. They were charged with bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and using a firearm in the course of the robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Williams argued that federal bank robbery is not a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) because section 2113(a) provides that bank robbery can be committed “by intimidation,” or “by force and violence.” The district court found that bank robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause because under Seventh Circuit precedent, “intimidation means threatened force capable of causing bodily harm and therefore constitutes threatened ‘violent force’ under section 924(c)(3)(A).” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that even bank robbery fits easily into the “elements clause” of the definition of a crime of violence because even when committed “by intimidation,” it has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hoping to earn money as a pimp, Wearing recruited a 15‐year‐old acquaintance, KV, to work as a prostitute. He posted a Craigslist ad with her photo, took her to a hotel where he had her “audition” on him, and twice tried to arrange meetings with clients. Both assignations fell through. KV then had second thoughts and alerted her mother, who called the authorities. Wearing was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1591, which makes sex trafficking of children a federal crime if done “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” The court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment, well below the guidelines range of 324 to 405 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Wearing’s arguments that the government failed to prove that KV had engaged in a “commercial sex act,” and that his recruitment of the victim (as opposed to the scheme as a whole) affected commerce. The statute requires that the defendant recruit the victim knowing her current age and knowing his plan to prostitute her after the recruitment. Nothing in the statute indicates that the plan must be fully carried out before conviction is possible. Wearing stipulated that the Craigslist advertisement—an integral part of his scheme—affected interstate commerce. View "United States v. Wearing" on Justia Law

Parkhurst posted advertisements on Craigslist’s “casual encounters” section, looking for “a very young white boy … little to no body hair … 18 or slightly older (younger the better) … prefer … a virgin.” Decatur Detective Koester responded as 15-year-old “Kacy,” who stated: I am 15. Parkhurst responded, “You are only too young if you can’t keep a secret.” A sexually explicit exchange followed. Parkhurst planned to pick Kacy up after Kacy’s mother left for work, take Kacy to Parkhurst’s Springfield home for the night, and return to Decatur before his mother. Parkhurst arrived at the address Koester had provided and was arrested. Koester asked how old Parkhurst had believed Kacy was. Parkhurst answered, “I assumed I was talking to a fifteen or sixteen year old” and acknowledged that he had implicitly referenced oral sex in his conversation with Kacy. Parkhurst was convicted of attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) and sentenced to 132 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of Koester’s testimony about the meaning of an online conversation about eating candy and about the meaning of phrases in the Craigslist ad. Koester’s dual role as a fact-expert witness did not confuse the jury. Parkhurst opened the door to questions about his emails with other individuals and did not show prejudice as a result of allegedly improper prosecutorial remarks about communications with another minor. View "United States v. Parkhurst" on Justia Law

Mars, age 19, drove the getaway car for Snyder and Vogt when they robbed a convenience store. The men became nervous that Mars would disclose their crime. Vogt lured Mars to the Decatur sanitation district and murdered her. Snyder was not present. Snyder pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, section 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, section 922(g), and was convicted of conspiring to murder a federal witness, 18 U.S.C. 1512. The court sentenced Snyder to life plus 10‐ and 20‐year concurrent terms. The Third Circuit vacated the section 1512 conviction, which required the government to prove that if Mars had not been murdered, she was reasonably likely to have communicated with a federal law enforcement officer about the robbery. Section 1512 is not satisfied simply because Snyder’s underlying crimes constituted federal offenses, nor by the fact that local police sought FBI assistance with technical aspects of the case. Without the murder, it is unlikely the robbery would have been prosecuted in federal court; although federal officers may have assisted with state prosecution, there is insufficient evidence to find a reasonable likelihood that any federal officer would have communicated with eyewitnesses. View "United States v. Snyder" on Justia Law